The Heroic Age in Sinnār



Jay Spaulding

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Jay Spaulding

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The author honors the memory of Muhammad `Abd al-Hayy, master poet and Sudanese patriot.

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Introduction

Those who look back upon the history of the Arabs have often experienced strong but mixed emotions when encountering the *jahiliya*, the "Heroic Age" of Arab antiquity preceding the prophetic mission of Muhammad. Poetry and legends attributed to this period reveal an age of indomitable personalities, noble and unbending convictions and mighty acts, but also an air of pessimism and futility; absent is a firm point of reference, a sense of what is normal, against which these heroic accomplishments might be evaluated. Historians have added the insight that the Heroic Age was one of social and institutional transition in Arab society, of changes attendant upon the rise of states, the encroachments of empires, and the arrival of money, trade, and differentiation in wealth and rank. But the forces which dissolved the old society could be harnessed to construct a new. The first generation of Muhammad's followers, among other accomplishments, achieved an effective synthesis between the heritage of the Arab past and the intrusive ways of more recent times, and the new society they created proved viable on a scale beyond the wildest fantasies of the heroes of old.

The period in northern Sudanese history between the overthrow of the Funj kings of Sinnar and the career of the Mahdi (approximately 1750-1850) invites comparison to the Arab *jahiliya*. Sources from this period document a similar dissolution of traditional verities through the influence of commerce and commoditization accompanied by the intervention of neighboring powers, and rendered both appealing and tragic in human terms by a similar set of mighty men who struggled—often at cross-purposes—to reimpose order upon a society in flux. In the end, the Mahdi made tangible the vision of a new and wider Arab nation.

This is a book about the Sudanese *jahiliya* and specifically about the Heroic Age in Sinnar. It attempts to analyze and describe the process by which the old order of the Funj was crippled and destroyed, and to identify the forces and institutions that did so. It is a work of advocacy written from a perspective of sympathy for Sinnar and must therefore contain negative judgments in regard to some institutions and beliefs which may lie near the heart of a modern reader; it may also cast in a favorable light a few features of life in the olden Sudan which seem strange or even unpleasant today. The intended goal of this partisan approach is not a condemnation of the modern Sudan but clarity of vision concerning an important although neglected era in its past; it is healthy to regard one's forefathers with respect, even if one has chosen not to emulate them. This

study embodies two other deliberate limitations. First, the Turks are considered only in regard to their effect upon the society of Sinnar, and since this effect was baneful, the impression given will be negative.[1] Second, although the Mahdist state has already been introduced as a response to the problems and opportunities of the Heroic Age, that theme will not be developed here.

This study attempts to impose order upon a very heterogeneous body of source materials, concerning which Ahmad b. al-Hajj Abu `Ali, one of the founding fathers of Sudanese Arabic history-writing, has wisely said: "We shall mention [historical events], God willing, in detail or in overview according to what has reached the ear, and without organization, for I do not perceive them as being organized, but rather as stories circulating—and not without displacements forward or backward [in time], alterations and modifications . . . . Let us begin with mention of that!"[2] "In such cases," a modern historian willing to learn from the social sciences might reply, "the structure-directed approach is not so much the consummation of the event-directed approach—it is the only possible choice. In short, one is not seduced by structural history, but condemned to it."[3] So be it.

This is the story of the erosion and overthrow of one system of social organization by another. The older social formation may be characterized as "feudal" in the analytical sense proposed by Barry Hindness and Paul Hirst, an interpretation abundantly supported on the impressionistic level by the observations of foreign visitors to Sinnar who, through the frequent use of terms such as "lord," "vassal," "serf," "fief," "investiture," and "obeisance" in their writings, oblige a modern interpreter either to justify or explain away the medieval experience in Europe as one comparative point of reference.[4] In regard to some more limited themes, such as exchange relationships within Sinnar, comparison outside the European experience would also seem fruitful, and this study has profited from diverse insights of Paul Einzig, Karl Polanyi, and Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch.[5] The study to follow proposes to work out concepts derived from these theorists upon the records of a particular historical experience, the decline of Sinnar. The usurping social forces and intrusive institutions that destroyed Sinnar may be broadly characterized as "capitalist." It should surprise no one familiar with the writings of Maxime Rodinson and Peter Gran to find that these forces and institutions were couched under the rubric of Islam, nor could one acquainted with the work of Immanuel Wallerstein express astonishment at the incorporation of Sinnar into a worldwide system of unequal relationships structured according to capitalist premises at the close of its feudal period.[6] A full treatment of Sudanese capitalism and the incorporation and subordination of the Sudan at the international level, however, lies beyond the scope of this work, whose concern is the decline of Sinnar.

This study is organized in accordance with the logic of its theoretical and methodological vision. Since this vision is to some extent at odds with received wisdom of the "Orientalist" tradition of Sudanese studies, a few introductory comments seem warranted here which would probably count as belaboring the

obvious in other historical fields.[7] Part One offers an interpretation of some important features of society and government in Sinnar as they may have existed during the approximate period 1650-1750. While contemporary evidence has been employed wherever possible, this interpretive model derives also in part from anachronistic data recorded during later periods. For example, the term *hamil* appears in the immunity clauses of precolonial Sudanese land charters, yet the fact that this term refers to the right of a lord to appropriate stray livestock and slaves found wandering in his fief reaches scholarship only from information collected by officials of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium early in the twentieth century. The justification for this approach (which does not claim to possess precisely the same authority as statements resting exclusively upon sound contemporary evidence) lies in the hypothesis of institutional continuity, an assumption almost universally employed in historical studies, yet for obvious reasons rarely explicitly specified. (Did the Kiowa perhaps speak Italian up until the day before they first encountered a European, and a Uto-Aztecan language thereafter?) Since this study rejects orthodox Orientalist analytical concepts such as "Islamisation," "migration," "Arabisation," "syncretism," "miscegenation," and "tribalism" which have long dominated discussion of the precolonial Sudan, it would be appropriate to outline the analytical categories offered in their place.

Sinnar is understood to be a state, inhabited by hereditary classes of nobility and commoners and a category of slaves whose ranks and roles in society were diverse. In several instances the distinct position of women within each social group also requires special consideration. Some important productive activities in Sinnar included cultivation, animal husbandry, hunting and gathering, the extraction and working of gold and iron, and the manufacture of fabrics; the fruits of these activities were exchanged within Sinnar and also, to a lesser degree, with foreigners. The behavior of the inhabitants was not random but purposeful, and it followed discernable repetitive patterns which this study has called "institutions." In Part One emphasis is given to those institutions recognized as such by the inhabitants themselves. Some institutions (marriage) were common to all or most levels of society and some to only one group (the wearing of headgear by the nobility), while others (the performance of labor services) were structured to serve the interests of a particular group (the nobility) in its relation with another (the commoners). Of particular historical importance were those institutions which sustained the dominance of the nobility over the commoners. The state was staffed in part by noblemen and was committed to the continued dominance of that class; however, it also possessed certain interests of its own (the supremacy of the sultan over the other nobles) and a measure of independent coercive power with which to defend them. The state interposed itself into most of the important sets of unequal institutional relationships between nobility and commoners, often in such a way as to be able to uphold either as the circumstances of the individual case might seem to warrant. The intricate and sophisticated institutional system of Sinnar was the

accumulated historical legacy of one of the world's oldest cultural traditions. Each institution in Sinnar had its own rationale for existence, and in the case of some of the more important and stressful institutions the rationale was formalized as a constitutional folk-tale, a ritual to be acted out, or a formula of consent to be repeated on specified occasions. Some of these tales, acts, and formulas have been preserved in written sources, and it is not surprising that they bear the imprint of diverse languages, religions, and historical periods. It would be wrong to elevate any single element in this ideological system to the exclusion of the others, for each was repeated and preserved into the eighteenth century or later because it afforded an explanation and justification for some aspect of society in Sinnar at that time. At a more superficial level, however, it is bootless to contradict the overall assessment of Sinnar given by contemporaries in neighboring lands; the "black Moors of Nubia" (Ethiopia, c. 1510) were ruled by the "king of the Nubian Muslims" (Egypt, c. 1660).[9] Sinnar was a Nubian Renaissance.

A visitor to the court of Sinnar toward the close of the seventeenth century noted that the sultan "is called a Turk [Muslim], but he does not have the laws of the Turks."[10] During the following Heroic Age, however, the Muslim Nubians of Sinnar began to adjust many features of their society in accordance with the laws and customs of the Islamic heartlands. To a perceptive observer at the close of the period (1853), this seemed a fatal error: "They were converted to Islam, and applied the principles of the Arabs in their councils. They also conceded to them a portion of their authority, and this excess of confidence accorded to strangers was essentially the cause of the decadence and failure of the Funj princes."[11] Part Two examines these "principles of the Arabs," which are found to be a cluster of institutional innovations designed to accommodate a new middle class within Sinnar. If this middle class was "foreign" to the older structure of Sinnar, it consisted nevertheless of native-born Sudanese. It may be identified impressionistically as the masters of the new religious communities and towns of eighteenth-century Sinnar, in formal terms as holy men (*fuqara'*, singular, *faqih*) and merchants (*jallaba* and *khawajat*) who enjoyed a distinct legal status in late Sinnar, and in analytical terms as a class which appropriated the surplus of its subordinate producers through diverse means unknown or unacceptable to ancient custom, but characteristic of commercial capitalism. The concept of "accommodation" is understood to involve the acceptance in late Sinnar of institutions which defined the identity of the middle class itself, its relations with the subjects, and with the ruling establishment. To cite some respective examples, the new middle class claimed Arab identity, practiced patrilineal descent, employed coin currencies, and bound itself in its dealings by the standards of Islamic law; it elicited alms, purchased slaves, monopolized exchange relationships, and imposed perpetual indebtedness upon its free subjects; it imposed its own legal and ideological concepts upon the government, demanded exemption from all obligations to the state, and took up a variety of

duties hitherto exercised by the state or the nobility, such as the administration of justice and the collection of taxes.

The rise of bourgeois institutions in Sinnar after 1700 permitted the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of individuals outside the capital city and sometimes quite outside the traditional structure of government. While the sultans did not fail to seize every available opportunity for aggrandizement afforded by the new institutional tools, they were unable to assert a new form of nation-wide primacy; they became at best *primus inter pares* among a new generation of regional warlords, each of whom manipulated the economic and political resources of a part of the kingdom and invested the gains in military power. The warlords repeatedly directed their forces against the sole threat to their liberties and the supreme political prize—the seat of sultanic power. The old matrilineal Funj dynasty was overthrown as early as 1718, but the decisive coup was the seizure of power in 1762 in which the warlords—by that date often known as the Hamaj—definitively tamed the sultans and imposed one of their own as regent.[12] Several of the Hamaj regents responded constructively and with imagination to the social realities of their day by initiating policies intended to reform the administration of Sinnar along bourgeois lines, but their attempts to achieve a new form of centralized power were forcibly frustrated by successive coalitions of disaffected warlords. As coup followed coup in dreary sequence, the central government gradually ceased to constitute either a prize or a threat, and neither it nor the feuding warlords posed a serious obstacle to the ambitions of Sinnar's powerful neighbors. Such is the tale told in Part Three.

In 1820-1821 Turkish forces from Egypt overran Sinnar and extinguished its political independence. The forms of rule established by the Turks encouraged the transformation of society in Sinnar, crushing all but a few residual vestiges of the old order and giving an intensified stimulus to the spread of bourgeois institutions. The process of class differentiation initiated during the eighteenth century accelerated, and the older ascribed categories of "noblemen" and "commoners" yielded in significance to new social ranks based upon success or failure in mastering the opportunities of the bourgeois system. Conspicuously, the subjects of southern Sinnar were stripped of their status as Muslims to legitimize their enslavement. By the time the Mahdi proclaimed the Millennium, little of the old order of Sinnar survived—only an affectionate but ever-vaguer memory, a "Funj Mystique."[13]

Part One

THE KING OF THE NUBIAN MUSLIMS

1

The King of the Nubian Muslims

During the century between 1650 and 1750 the Nubian Renaissance in the Nile Valley reached its apogee. The King of the Nubian Muslims reigned over the heartland of all the medieval Nubian lands from Dongola to Ethiopia, from the Red Sea into Kordofan, and exacted tribute from the neighboring southern lands of Taqali, Fazughli and the Shilluk. The Nubian monarch was also called the Lord of Sinnar [1], for after the mid-seventeenth century the kings no longer moved their royal encampments from province to province, but established a fixed urban seat of government. [2] Thereafter, the kingdom was often known by the name of its capital city which, by the end of the century, had acquired its romantic (although probably spurious) folk etymology, "Tooth of Fire." It was also known as Funjistan after the name of its ruling group, the Funj [3] In 1700 the reigning sultan of Sinnar was Badi III, a capable ruler if perhaps not the equal of his predecessor and namesake of two decades before, who was reported to have been the cleverest man in the kingdom and both effective and humane in his dealings with high and low alike. [4] The boundaries of Badi's realm had reached their widest extent, and his prosperous and cosmopolitan capital ranked as "in all Africa . . . close to being the greatest trading city." [5]

The impressions of foreigners perhaps naturally tended to emphasize the importance of the king, in whose name the authority of the state was ordinarily exercised. But the king did not stand alone; the well-being of Sinnar rested upon the labors of many and entailed the systematic organization of these efforts. Such was the task of the court of high dignitaries who surrounded the king. The court of Sinnar was dominated by two groups of people whose social status set them apart from the rest of society and from each other; the hereditary nobility, or Funj, and the titled slaves of state. The power of both groups extended into the countryside and through a variety of institutional arrangements secured the appropriation of surplus from the subject producers. From the position of economic dominance thus achieved, the central government assumed responsibility for setting the terms by which exchange activities within Sinnar, and between Sinnar and the outside world, might take place. In dealings with the outside world and its ambassadors, Sinnar adopted the posture of an Islamic state. Within the sphere of internal affairs, however, the various subject peoples of Sinnar interpreted their relationship to the king in diverse ways according to their respective historical and cultural traditions. The monarchs responded by accepting and exploiting the rights and powers assigned to them by each ideo-

logical tradition. The royal policy of religious tolerance and cultural pluralism in regard to the subjects was objectively at variance with the formal dictates of orthodox Islam, but it remained viable as long as the latter possessed no powerful internal constituency.

2

The Court

Visitors to eighteenth-century Sinnar recognized the existence of a group of important people at the capital who assisted the sultan in the functions of government. Recorded perceptions, however, are fragmentary and diverse references to, for example, "twenty old men"[1] or "five or six shaykhs"[2] surrounding the king, isolated officials such as the *wazir*, the *sid al-qum*, the queen mother, or the royal slaves. With a few significant exceptions, the foreigners were so preoccupied with their own respective predicaments that they failed to observe and record the behavior of the court officials in their dealings with the king and with one another. But the few exceptional references, to be discussed in various contexts below, suffice to demonstrate that court ritual was an elaborate and well-orchestrated drama that not only enunciated the formal acts of state, but also ceremonially reconfirmed the right of the state to exist and of those present, including the king, to hold their assigned positions within it.

A pageant of such profound significance required a suitable physical setting, and when the kings of the mid-seventeenth century brought their roving capital to rest at the town of Sinnar, they constructed the palace complex in accordance with the requirements of state ceremony. During the Heroic Age the buildings of packed earth progressively deteriorated through neglect and the ravages of human violence, but a memory (perhaps imperfect) of its structure and functions survived:

> [Sultan Badi II] built the government castle, and made it with five stories one above the other. He built a number of other [buildings] for the deposit of the necessities of government such as arms and the like, and also the houses of the harem and a divan for his sitting-in-state. He had two other divans, one of which was outside the great castle and the other within the castle wall. He put a great wall around the whole, and in it he made nine gates. He assigned to each one of the great men of his kingdom a gate through which to enter and exit, and likewise to each of the great men of his kingdom a special divan in which to sit for the consideration of his business. If such a great man wished to enter the divan of the king, he entered alone, unaccompanied by any of his followers. As for the ninth gate, no one could enter or exit through it except the king himself or [the] Walad `Ajib [the governor of the important northern province]. All these gates opened from a single wall in a straight line. In front of

> these gates was a roofed gallery with twin pillars, under which was a high bench known as *dikkat man nadak*. [3]

The significance of state architecture in Sinnar largely escaped contemporary visitors, who conceded that the palace complex was so large that it would take three-quarters of an hour to walk around it,[4] but found it "a confused heap of buildings, without symmetry or beauty."[5] They did recognize the existence of a special royal audience hall paved with colored tiles and equipped with a raised dais for the king, "an elevated table or platform two spans above the ground, covered with a red carpet," and a stone which marked the limit beyond which one who approached the king must not advance.[6] In front of the palace complex lay a wide square, the *fashir*,[7] in which public ceremonies of state took place and which served as the market.[8]

Court ceremony embodied strict rules of protocol to be followed in the presence of the king, the institutionalized violation of which in certain specific cases may thus be invested with considerable significance. With the possible exception of the nine high officials for whom real or constitutional "gates" into the royal audience hall are said to have existed, one came into the presence of the king only when summoned, alone and unarmed. Upon entering, footwear and headgear were removed, and any garment worn around the shoulders was lowered to the waist. One approached the king with head bowed and eyes averted to perform obeisance by bowing down and striking the forehead against the ground.[9] Thus the first Funj sultan, ʿAmara, was commonly remembered by the epithet *dungas* or *dugas*, a term placed in context by the eighteenth-century writer who spoke of "Sultan ʿAmara . . . whom one approached with *dugas*,"[10] meaning "bent down, with an inclined head."[11] If the king consented, one might be seated upon the ground, while he sat on the carpeted dais or an *ʿanqarib* in lieu of a throne. Three sitting postures were assigned by protocol to persons of various ranks. Ordinary people were obliged to sit with one leg touching the ground while grasping the knee of the other upright leg with both hands. "People of distinction" were allowed to lower both legs to the ground and to recline on an elbow if they so desired. Only those who enjoyed the particular confidence of the king, however, were allowed to cross their legs. It was not permitted to spit on the ground in the king's presence.

When the king spoke formally from the throne his words had the force of law,[12] and direct public pronouncements by the monarch in court were therefore restricted—as far as is known—to the administration of justice and the ceremony of confirmation of status, both to be considered below. Under ordinary circumstances communications between the king and others present at court were made to pass through an intermediary or "linguist," whose special position was symbolized by his unique right to sit on a low stool below the throne. For example, when Charles-Jacques Poncet was presented before Badi III in 1699, he reported that the intermediary "complimented the king in our names, and delivered back his answer to us."[13] The "linguist" was known by the Funj title of *manamalecna*, said to mean "Master of Speech" (*sid al-kalam*)

in Arabic.[14] The right to address the court had to be obtained from the king: "In an assembly, the king gives his scepter to hold to whomever he wishes to authorize to speak, and he takes it back when he wants to impose silence."[15]

The king of Sinnar demanded the right to know the identity and quality of everyone within his kingdom. When a caravan entered Sinnar, for example, an official at the border "wrote down the names of all the merchants, their rank and nationality, and how many camels they had" and dispatched the information by rapid courier to the capital.[16] Nor was his interest confined to merchants or foreigners; when one group of early eighteenth-century subjects transferred their residence and loyalties from one local jurisdiction to another without properly informing their superiors, the king commanded the higher provincial authorities to ascertain the names and "condition" (*hal*) of these subjects. As the reluctant high official explained to his subordinates, "this remains an order of my sultan and I have no choice in the matter."[17] Furthermore, a ruler in Sinnar could command any person to come into his presence, "and those who refused to do so would be considered rebels against the king."[18] The motive of the sultan in wishing to identify and meet his (more prominent) subjects and guests was more than idle curiosity, for he exercised the right to confirm the identity and condition of any or, if he so desired, to withhold recognition. The most commonly described formal activity of the court was a ceremony in which the king recognized the identity and confirmed the status of those he had summoned, particularly but not exclusively the high officials who constituted his court.

Written descriptions of the sultan's confirmation of status ceremony are found in several contemporary European travel accounts, but these are defective in that the foreigners usually appeared formally before the sultan only once or twice, and then briefly. Much superior is the information about the provincial court of Qarri written by Theodoro Krump, who served involuntarily as court physician during 1701; some elements of his account are confirmed on the strength of early nineteenth-century oral tradition as being the practice of the sultan's court as well.[19] In Qarri the ceremony took place every evening, accompanied by the continual beating of the governor's drums and announced by a messenger (probably the figure entitled the *`ukkaz* or staffbearer by those who spoke Arabic[20]), who went out with a special rod to summon "all the subjects who live in the town."[21] In Sinnar no record of such a public gathering exists, but circumstantial evidence suggests that a more restricted constituency of important people may have been summoned for similar purposes; Poncet (1699) reported that the sultan's court met regularly in the evening,[22] while James Bruce (1773) mentioned the beating of the royal kettledrums in the evening and reported that at least one high court official must always attend the sultan "necessarily once very late in the evening."[23] This interpretation is consistent with what is otherwise known about Qarri and Sinnar. Qarri, although the most important provincial capital, was nevertheless a small town; one may infer that a large proportion of its inhabitants may have been associated with the court, so that it would have been appropriate to issue a rather

general summons. Sinnar was a vastly bigger city with a highly cosmopolitan population, and a general summons would have been neither feasible nor constitutionally correct.

After gathering before the Shaykh of Qarri, each individual stepped forward in sequence and addressed him as *manjil*, a Funj title appropriate to provincial governors and certain other high officials.[24] (If the sultan was addressed by a corresponding title, that term is not presently known.) The individual would then give his name. At Qarri, according to Krump, this fulfilled the requirements of protocol, but before the sultan one was expected to add one of several set expressions of goodwill chosen according to the speaker's social group.. Three formulas and the groups to which they were deemed appropriate are presently known, but it is not impossible that other formulas, and by implication other groups, may also have existed. An Arab should say, in Arabic, *tawwal 'umrak*, "May [God] lengthen your life."[25] A Hamaj should say, also in Arabic, *jad sidi*, "May my lord prosper!"[26] The formula to be pronounced by a Funj has been variously recorded as *giar murè, giar murèh, gar morg*, and *gar mol*,[27] possibly a vestigial use of the Meroitic *qore* ("king") and *m_l*, vocalized with o or e ("good").[28] According to the informants of Giovanni Battista Brocchi (1824) the meaning of this formula was unknown, but it was said to be in the Funj language.[29] A century later H.C. Jackson was told that the phrase meant "God preserve thee!" that it was used by both Funj and Hamaj, and that it could be addressed to *manjils* as well as to the sultan.[30]

When the subject had completed this routine the sultan would repeat his name, addressing him directly from the throne.[31] Krump's experience at Qarri strongly suggests there was an additional feature to the ruler's reply, for when Krump gave his adopted Arabic name, Yunus, "the shaykh replied '*hakim*,' that is, 'doctor.'"[32] In this case the address from the throne not only indicated Krump's acceptability, but also officially confirmed his title and position at court. While no comparable testimony from the sultan's court is at hand, it seems probable that an analogous exchange took place there. After the men presented themselves before the Shaykh of Qarri, "they placed themselves on either side . . . . Afterwards these two parties, with drawn swords or sticks in their hands, go into remarkable postures; first they make them small, then large. They jump and hop here and there without saying a word as if they wanted to strike at each other. This lasts for a quarter or half an hour. After that they are dismissed, and each one wends his way home."[33]

The formal protocol incumbent upon officials of the Funj court precluded the free flow of political give-and-take on public occasions, and the acerbic but vivid account of Bruce offers a brief glimpse behind the scenes into the complex network of informal meetings, visitations, and conversations among officials by which political alliances were forged, enmities nourished or assuaged, and policy decisions taken. The court had the duty, however, of periodically making public and enunciating policies of state, and if necessary isolating those officials who could not be won over informally to a consensus. When the officials came

together before the king to express their views formally, they were subject to a rule attributed to one of the early sultans: "to such as were wont to be seated in his presence he gave a definite order of precedence when they were so seated in his council chamber."[34] Opinions were voiced in sequence according to the hierarchy of precedence; a visitor to a provincial court observed that "greater harmony could not exist in any assembly: the highest in rank expresses his sentiment on the subject first, and the others almost invariably coincide with him."[35] Each in turn received from the king the small staff that bestowed the right to speak.

The surviving written documents issued by the government of Sinnar, all of which date from after 1700, constitute an important source regarding the composition of the court. Those documents which recorded a legal act would usually conclude with the phrase "there were present and witnessed to it," followed by a list of individuals and their appropriate titles. Given the principle of hierarchical sequence observed at court, one may infer that these officials are listed in at least approximate order of rank, and in subsequent discussion reference may be made to the ordinal position of any official within the hierarchy established by a given document. Within their ranking the court officials may be subdivided into several broad categories on the basis of their relationship to the seat of authority. These distinctions are not consciously recognized by the documents themselves; to the Funj, unlike a modern reader, they would have been self-evident. The chapters to follow discuss both the activities of individual officials and the changing composition of the court during the Heroic Age in some detail. An initial overview will be offered here, followed by a single detailed standard against which subsequent changes in the court structure may be measured.

The first three positions in the hierarchy were occupied by members of the royal family.[36] Positions 1 and 2, appertaining to the officials entitled *amin* and *jundi*, were the exclusive hereditary possession of a single line throughout the documented period,[37] while position 3 belonged to the maternal uncle of the king. The second group of officials, also hereditary noblemen, were the governors of provinces. They never exceeded eight in number, and not all were necessarily in the capital at the same time. A third category was composed of bureaucratic and military officers, some or many of whom seem to have been slaves. The functions of several titled officers in this category are not presently known. In a fourth group were the religious notables, including the *qadi*, the staff of the Sinnar mosque, the scribe who wrote the document, and sometimes others. In addition to these categories, which appear in all witnessed documents, a few other groups of courtiers achieved prominence within more restricted temporal limits. Following the coup of 1762 the Hamaj regent placed himself either in position 1 or immediately preceding the provincial governors. Visiting dignitaries, usually from lands west of Sinnar, were often inserted after the provincial governors, but occasionally among the bureaucrats. After mid-century the court was swollen by the admission of large numbers of holy men (*fuqara'*, singular *faqih*) and petty noblemen (*arbabs*), who were placed together fol-

lowing the mosque staff. Finally, under the last sultans, positions at court were given to a variety of their personal attendants—physicians, tailors, freedmen, religious advisors, and masseurs. A few officials of the Hamaj period do not lend themselves to easy classification and will be discussed individually.

The first seven surviving charters from Sinnar, originating from the reign of Badi IV and spanning the period 1729-1744, form a coherent group which may be distinguished from later charters, in regard to their rosters of court officials, on the basis of the comparatively small size of the court and the absence of specifically Hamaj officials such as the regent. Taken as a whole, they offer the most accurate available image of the structure of the sultan's government at the beginning of the Heroic Age. Figure 1 introduces all the court offices mentioned in the seven charters. The offices are classified by their broad functional or status groupings, and the rank of each official according to the respective column roster is indicated in the vertical column beneath the year in which the document was issued. A special category is provided for miscellaneous courtiers either totally without title or listed under a title of personal status which did not carry specific governmental significance, such as *arbab* or *faqih*; in these cases the total number of such individuals, rather than their rank, is given.

The ceremony of confirmation and the protocol of unanimous policy enunciation as reconstructed above provide an imaginary setting for two important functions of the court known to have taken place but never described in writing by an eyewitness—the deposition of a sultan and the election of his successor. Funj constitutional usage held that a king should be deposed and executed if the "great officers" decided that "it is not for the advantage of the state that he be suffered to reign any longer."[38] While it is possible to visualize a sudden and dramatic confrontation between a sultan and his court at the evening ritual, the Chronicler's account of the depositions of the sultans Unsa and Badi IV suggests that in practice the removal of a king could be a lengthy and gradual political process.[39] The panel of judges was said to exclude Islamic holy men and was therefore not coterminous with the roster of courtiers identified by the documents;[40] a greater degree of precision is not presently possible. An analogous difficulty prevents the specification of the electors who chose the successor to a dead king; they were vaguely said to be "all the shaykhs and other highest noblemen of the kingdom.[40] When the choice was made public, one need not doubt that the voices were unanimous.

In conclusion, the court of Sinnar may be seen from a formal perspective as a gathering of a limited number of powerful people who, in a manner to be discussed below, exercised supreme power within the state. Substantive political issues were resolved privately, while the highly ritualized public interactions of court members emphasized mutual recognition and corporate unanimity. Among the several groups who comprised the court membership, one requires particular comment, for its identity and behavior were defined and governed by an additional set of social institutions peculiar to itself. This group was the hereditary nobility, the Funj.

Figure 1. The Sultan's Court: 1729-1744

YEAR	1729	1732	1733	1734	1743	1744	1744
FUNJ OFFICIALS							
[*amin*]	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
jundi	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
maternal uncle or his *wakil*	3	3	3	3	3	3	13
grandfather	12	4	4	4	-	-	-
PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS							
Qarri	4	5	5	-	4	4	3
Atbara	6	6	6	-	7	7	6
Al-Taka	7	-	-	-	6	6	5
Bayla	8	-	-	-	8	8	7
Alays	5	-	-	-	5	5	-
Al-Qarbin	9	10	10	6	9	9	-
Al-Bahr	15	8	8	5	10	10	8
[Kordofan]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BUREAUCRATS AND OFFICERS							
muqaddam al-sawakira	10	7	7	-	12	12	-
muqaddam al-khayl	13	-	-	-	14	14	12
muqaddam al-'udda	14	-	-	-	-	15	-
muqaddam al-quwwariyya	16	-	-	-	11	11	9
shaykh al-sijada	17	9	9	7	-	20	-
malik bursaj	18	-	-	-	-	19	-
muqaddam al-qawawid	-	-	-	-	15	16	11
FOREIGNERS							
Sultan al-Musabba'at	11	-	-	-	13	13	10
Sultan Borqu	-	-	-	-	19	-	-
RELIGIOUS DIGNITARIES							
qadi	19	11	11	8	-	21	-
khatib	20	-	-	9	17	22	-
scribe	25	15	15	11	21	-	-
OTHERS (totals)							
arbabs	2	1	1	-	-	1	-
fuqara'	2	1	1	-	2	2	-
TOTAL RECORDED MEMBERS							
	25	15	15	11	21	25	13

3

The Funj

In eighteenth-century Sudanese society it was assumed that some men had an hereditary right to rule, while others did not. "Among the inhabitants of Sinnar," as one European observer expressed it, "are to be distinguished magnates or *primores* of a sort, equivalent to our nobility."[1] In the official government documents of the period, which drew heavily upon Islamic chancellery traditions, this social distinction was expressed as that between *al-khass* ("the special ones") and *al-'amm* ("the generality"); the latter were also called *al-ra'iya* ("the subjects"). But the constitutional principles by which membership in the nobility of Sinnar was determined did not resemble those of the Islamic heartlands.

The marriage and succession practices of the Funj monarchs may be interpreted within the broader cultural setting of an historically inherited preference among the Nubian-speaking community toward matrilateral parallel cousin marriage; the exercise of this preference over time may be viewed as having generated the largely endogamous lineages which constituted fundamentally important units of organization throughout Nubian society.[2] In 1700 the right to rule was vested in the Unsab, a group of Funj whose lineage antedated the rise of the kingdom of Sinnar, and to which all the previous sultans were said to have belonged. The Unsab identified themselves as the offspring of a marriage between a remote female ancestress and a culture-reforming "Wise Stranger;" "At the time when they appointed a new sultan, they would cause him to marry from among the descendants of that woman, whom they used to call Bint `Ayn al-Shams . . . . and this [custom] remained among them until the end of their kingdom."[3] Membership in the Unsab was thus transmitted through the female line, as exemplified by the name of the sultan in 1700, Badi III, who was known as the son of his mother al-`Udiya,[4] and of the mid-eighteenth century nobleman al-Hajj `Abd Allah, the son of Amina (female), the daughter of Balila (female), the Unsabi.[5] A newly elected sultan received an Unsab wife as part of his ceremony of investiture. Like all newlyweds in the northern Sudan, the royal couple was considered to be in a liminal state, "green like tender shoots, not yet dry and firmly set,"[6] and therefore, like the rest of their countrymen, they spent their first forty days together in a seclusion which might ideally result in the birth of a male heir early in the new king's reign. When a queen produced a son she was forbidden to have relations with her husband again, but was "dismissed from the palace and given an honorable maintenance either in the [capital] city or at another place in the kingdom. The prince, however, she must leave in the palace."[7]

The male offspring of a sultan were separated from their mothers and raised at the palace under strict confinement, "locked up tighter than the cloistered nuns of Christendom."[8] The institution of maintaining princely hostages had also existed in medieval Nubia, where they were known as *sawakira*; since a court official entitled "supervisor (*muqaddam*) of the *sawakira*" existed in Sinnar, it would seem reasonable to infer that Funj practices in this regard were a direct legacy from the medieval kingdom. When a sultan died one of his sons would be elected his successor, and all the others were supposed to be executed. "This is done," as Krump explained, "so that there will be no rebellion against the king among the many princes, nor any division of the realm; the peace of the kingdom is preserved."[9] In practice, however, it is clear that princes sometimes managed to escape, presumably with the connivance of high court officials and their respective mothers. If a prince did escape, "the newly-elected king, as his blood-brother, is then himself obligated to pursue him and put him to death."[10] Therefore, the escapees sought refuge in lands beyond the reach of the sultan, usually in Ethiopia or Dar Fur. There they might be promptly dispatched in the interests of good international relations, but they were more commonly maintained in exile as useful diplomatic pawns. The situation described by Poncet in 1699 was probably typical: "Prince Gorech, who lay hid until the death of the King his brother, had the good fortune to be preserved by his nurse from the cruelty of this terrible council [the electors who chose the new sultan]. They have also saved one of the brothers of the present king. That prince is at the court of Ethiopia, where he distinguishes himself as well by his merits as his birth."[11] The threat of princely refugees to the public order of Sinnar is amply demonstrated by the various revolts which featured the return of a royal pretender from Ethiopia or Dar Fur; in constitutional terms, however, the brothers of a newly elected sultan were legally, if not actually, dead. Since no woman was allowed to sleep with a sultan after bearing him a son, no prince had a full brother, but if a queen's first (or only) offspring were female, he might well have sisters or half-sisters. "In regard to these princesses," wrote Krump, "they have another custom, and in their case a much happier one than with the men. They suffer no misfortune, but are honorably married off."[12]

Funj constitutional principles embodied a division between the formal source of legitimacy in the female line and the actual exercise of power by men. As the kingdom of Sinnar had expanded and absorbed diverse pre-existing communities, this division had facilitated first the political and subsequently the dynastic incorporation of the newly subordinated leadership into the Funj nobility. In the words of Bruce, the rulers of Sinnar would make "the prince of the state they have conquered their lieutenant in the government of his own country afterwards."[13] Such a prince exercised power, within limits, but could not attain full legitimacy; steps were taken at his investiture, however, to bring him as close as possible to the royal family and to ensure the full legitimacy—the "Funj-ness"—of his heirs. The heart of any investiture ceremony among noblemen in Sinnar was the marriage of the male subordinate to a woman of the

family of his superior; it was to such individuals that Krump's "princesses" were "honorably married off." These women were expected to serve the political interests of their overlord and not those of their mates; "they are spies upon their husbands," noted Bruce, "and keep up the consequence of their birth in their husband's house, even after they are married."[14] The precise constituency of first-ranking noblemen who were both entitled and obliged to marry into the sultan's family is not known. The Shaykhs of Qarri, al-Bahr, and al-Taka did so,[15] and therefore it is probable that the other provincial governors (of Atbara, Bayla, Alays,[16] al-Qarbin, and Kordofan) did too. The Hamaj regents did so,[17] and since the dynasty of hereditary *amins* and *jundi*s—whose positions in the charters outranked the provincial governors and often even the regents—were said to be "close relatives" of the king,[18] it would seem likely that they did also. It is quite possible that on occasion other important people may have participated in the dynastic marriage system at the sultanic level, but there is no evidence that any other group of titled officials were systematically incorporated in that way. It would seem that sultanic marriage policy extended into the outlying districts said to have been part of Sinnar, but whose rulers do not appear in the lists of noblemen appended to sultanic charters. For example, an Ethiopian nobleman subject to Sinnar in 1699, whose lands lay in the east "near Sawakin," was given a sister of Badi III as a wife,[19] while the kingdom of Taqali was also incorporated at the sultanic level through marriage.[20] The dynastic relationship between Fazughli and the central government between its conquest in about 1685 and the Hamaj coup of 1762 which altered its status is not known, but the use of marriage diplomacy between superiors and inferiors within the Funj nobility of the Fazughlian zone is well attested.[21]

The next stage in the dynastic marriage policy rested upon the prevailing custom—still common in the northern Sudan—that a woman upon becoming pregnant should leave her husband and return to her parents' home until after the child had been born and weaned. In the case of Funj princesses married to vassal lords, this custom implied that the heirs of the high nobility would be born in the sultan's palace.[22] Male children of Funj noblewomen of the first subordinate rank, termed *qawawid*, grew up at court as hostages for the good behavior of their respective fathers. The workings of the institution of the *qawawid* are best documented in the orally preserved traditions surrounding the life of Sha` al-Din b. al-Tuwaym (flor. c. 1600-1650), founding father of the Shukriya governors of al-Taka. Sha` al-Din was reared as a hostage at the sultan's court, given a chance to prove his mettle in the field, and was then sent out as the leader of his people, having been married for the occasion to the sultan's daughter Bayaki (Meroitic *wayeke*, "star"?) with whom he had grown up at court. Although Sha` al-Din had other wives and many sons, it was Nayil, his son by Bayaki, who was chosen as his successor. Nayil, upon his succession to his father's office, was also married to a woman named Bayaki; she was the daughter of Nayil's maternal uncle, the next sultan (See Figure 2).[23]

Figure 2. Funj Dynastic Incorporation

X = Man O = Woman & = Marriage

Generation	I	II	III	IV
Sultan's wives	O	O		
	&	&		
Sultans	X	X(c)	X	
Sultans' daughters	O	O		
	&	&		
Provincial governors	X	X(a)	X	
Provincial governors' daughters	O(b)	O		
	&	&		
District governors	X	X		

This diagram illustrates the incorporation of provincial and district governors over several generations. Each marriage required the endorsement of the mother's brother; thus, both provincial governor X(a) and his sister, district queen O(b), could marry only with the consent of sultan X(c).

The pattern of dynastic relationships that prevailed between the sultan and the high nobility was reproduced at a lower level between the latter and their vassals. Thus the lord of Qarri married off women of his family to such subordinates as the *makk* of Shandi,[24] and he possessed his own supervisor of *qawawid*.[25] The lord of the province of Bayla married his daughter to the leader of one of his most important groups of subjects.[26] While there is little evidence concerning the practices of the courts of tertiary rank, one need not doubt that the lesser nobles also engaged in marriage diplomacy and hosted the sons of their clients (See Figure 3).[27]

Figure 3. The Downward Donation of Women

X = Man O = Woman & = Marriage (X) = Heir

Sultan	X		
	O	O	(X)
Provincial governors	X & O	O & X	
O O	(X) O	O (X) O O	
District governors	X & O	O & X	
O O O (X)		(X) O O O	

This diagram illustrates the downward donation of women by senior superiors to junior inferiors as it might take place toward the middle of the incumbency

of a generation of lords. These women were donated on the occasion of the subordinate lord's investiture, and each became a senior wife. The male children of these queens would be born and raised as hostages at the court of the superior and were potential heirs. (The gift of women by dynastically incorporated noblemen to *arbabs* is not depicted.)

Noblemen of lesser rank gave their sisters and daughters in marriage to their superiors; as the daughters of older women of the superior nobleman's own lineage, these brides ranked as parallel cousins of the superior nobleman of the next generation, and thus constituted preferred mates.[28] Marriage outside the nobility, or the begetting of children by concubinage, was considered "a degradation."[29] Since higher ranking noblemen could draw upon a broader constituency of vassals than could their subordinates, their wives were correspondingly more numerous; the sultan had about 600 wives,[30] a provincial governor about 200,[31] and a district ruler about 30 (see Figure 4).[32]

Figure 4. The Upward Donation of Women

X = Man O = Woman & = Marriage

Sultan	OO OO & (X) & OO OO
Provincial governors	O O (X) & O O & (X) O O
District governors	O O (X) & O O & (X) O O

This diagram, based upon the same political and family relationships introduced in Figure 2, illustrates the upward donation of women by senior inferiors to junior superiors as it might take place following the accession of a new sultan. These women could be donated on any occasion except the investiture of a lord, and they became junior wives. In real life both phases in the cycle of circulation of women took place contemporaneously. Each nobleman depicted in Figure 4 is the maternal nephew of his superior.

The Islamic limit of four simultaneous wives was ignored. These arrangements produced a serious shortage of noble wives for the superfluous male offspring of women of the nobility. The excess sons of a sultan, as previously noted, were executed upon the accession of each succeeding ruler; the redundant sons of the wives of lesser ranking noblemen, entitled *arbab*,[33] were permitted to live but unless—in true fairy tale fashion—they won the hand of a princess, their noble status would die with them, for they lacked the capacity to bequeath it. Fortunately, the attainment of a noble wife was nevertheless a plausible aspiration for at least some of the more enterprising arbabs, for if a wife did not bear a child to a nobleman expeditiously, it was customary for him, after a decent interval, to give her away to a deserving subordinate.[34]

The donation of unsuccessful wives to subordinates provided a regulatory mechanism for the Funj kingship system; it offered solutions to both of the self-destructive tendencies likely to arise in any lineage system generated through preferential parallel cousin marriage. These may be stated in the form of a dilemma. On the one hand, when an ample supply of suitable mates is available, the rules of parallel cousin marriage can and will be observed, but the lineage will tend to increase to such an extent that it bifurcates. The Funj sultan, who enjoyed the assistance of about 600 parallel cousins in producing the one male heir necessary to fill his office, provides an extreme example of this "condition of demographic increase;" his practice of wife-donation helped reduce the number of excess heirs to eradicable proportions. On the other hand, when an insufficient number of suitable mates is available, there prevails a "condition of demographic decrease;" in this case the danger lies in the possible selection of unsuitable mates, and thus the *de facto* rejection of the normative principle of parallel cousin preference itself. The danger to be avoided may be personified by the seventeenth-century holy man Idris, "the son of the *arbab*," whose immediate family opted out of the nobility, took up a religious vocation, and rejected matrilineal principles of succession. Because the high nobility of Sinnar hoarded so very many of the Unsab women, the lowly *arbabs* were a numerous and warlike but nevertheless endangered species. For political reasons, it behooved the high lords of Sinnar to appease the knightly appetites of the *arbabs* through the gift of wives.[35]

The dynastic marriage system of Sinnar made every vassal the son-in-law of his political superior in the first generation and often, as exemplified by Nayil b. Sha` al-Din, the sister's son of his lord in the second. All important political relationships within the high nobility were thus also family relationships, and the sultan and his noble relatives were bound, in their dealings with one another, by much the same set of rules of conduct that obtained among commoners. These customs of deference and avoidance have dissipated almost to the vanishing point over the past two centuries in many parts of Sinnar as intrusive Islamic ways have supplanted traditional usages; however, revealing vestiges have survived in remote districts, notably among the Rubatab,[36] and in the south.[37] For general historical purposes the most important feature of this set of customs was the dominance exercised by the maternal uncle over the sister's son, a fundamental feature of the constitutional relationship between vassal and lord in Sinnar.

Since a sultan succeeded to the throne on the death of his father, no sultan had a living father or paternal grandfather. Since no sultan was allowed to have a full brother, and half-brothers were systematically executed in fact or theory upon his accession, it was impossible for a sultan of the next generation to have living paternal uncles. In contrast, the father and particularly the senior brother of the sultan's mother seem to have played an important role in dynastic affairs. Their influence was conspicuous during the period from 1729 to 1743 when, during the minority of the sultan Badi IV, they occupied seats at court. The

king's maternal grandfather, Idu, appeared first in position 12 but thereafter in position 4 of the court roster,[38] while his maternal uncle and *wazir* Isma`il consistently occupied position 3;[39] these maternal relatives ranked above everybody at court except the family who provided the *amins* and *jundis* of positions 1 and 2. When Badi personally seized power in 1156/1743-1744, he executed Isma`il,[40] and other leading nobles of the blood;[41] no maternal relative of the sultan, however influential behind the scenes, ever appeared in a roster of the court officials of Sinnar again. Rather, it became the practice, perhaps reverting to a long-established custom violated during Badi's minority, to have the maternal uncle of the sultan represented at court by an agent, the "deputy from the court of the maternal uncle of the king" (*wakil hosh khal al-malik*).[42] The removal from court of the sultan's maternal uncle probably should be understood in the light of customs which would have either made it socially impossible for the two men to be in the same public place at the same time, or at least demanded a display of deference from the sultan (for example, the refusal to be seated in his uncle's presence) which would have rendered his exercise of kingly authority difficult. However, the continuing indirect influence of the absent maternal uncle is evident in the fact that his agent at court continued to occupy the third (after the rise of the Hamaj regents, the fourth) position in the court hierarchy.[43]

Circumstantial evidence seems to suggest a link between the maternal uncle of the king and an official entitled *sid al-qum* or *sid qum al-shams*, whose right and duty of executing a reigning monarch rejected by his court astounded European visitors, but who does not appear under that designation in any roster of officials at the sultan's court. Contemporary Europeans translated the title as "master of the king's household, or servants,"[44] or as "Oberster über das Hofgesinde,"[45] and this view of the *sid al-qum* as a royal seneschal may indeed accurately describe his day-to-day functions. Yet, it is doubtful that the constitutional authority of the *sid al-qum* over the life of the sultan derived from his routine activities. Rather, it would seem more credible that his authority must have rested upon his biological relationship to the ruler, for the *sid al-qum* was always a Funj and "had to be of the family of the king."[46] This perspective invites a more literal translation of the title itself as "master of the [royal] kinsmen" or "master of the kinsmen of [Bint `Ayn] al-Shams," that is, the Unsab. The exceptionally high position of the *sid al-qum* within the royal family is further evident in the fact that on two occasions the *sid al-qum* became sultan.[47] In the second of these cases it was said specifically that the *sid al-qum* was of the Unsab through his mother,[48] and it is plausible to argue that his relationship to the sultan he supplanted should also be construed in matrilineal terms. On that basis, who except the maternal uncle of the king could have claimed superiority over him within the royal family? Consistent with this interpretation is the fact that the reigns of both sultans who had been *sid al-qum* were short (seven and five years), as they might have been if they belonged to a generation older than the sultans they replaced. Similarly consis-

tent is the observation of Bruce that the *sid al-qum* had "no vote in deposing [the sultan]"[49] and that the monarch did not blame him for his role as executioner because "the king knew he had no hand in the wrong that might be done to him, nor any way advanced his death."[50] Since the maternal uncle of the king, on the evidence of the charter rosters, was generally excluded from the deliberations of the court, he could indeed be disassociated from any decision by that body. As an exception, the violence with which young Badi IV struck out at his maternal uncle Isma`il becomes perfectly comprehensible if one assumes that Isma`il was also his *sid al-qum*, who by taking a prominent position at court was thus acting as both judge and executioner. Such are the arguments, admittedly inconclusive, that support the identification of the *sid al-qum* with the maternal uncle of the king.

The family discipline of the Funj exemplified by that of the head of the Unsab over the sultan was not confined to the immediate royal family, but was re-imposed by the sultan upon his own in-laws and nephews, the high noblemen, and by them upon their respective lesser vassals. As Brocchi expressed it, "if the monarch of Sinnar was subject to being legally butchered, he did not fail to exercise this right—when he was able—upon the *maliks* [noblemen] subject to him."[51] The qualifying phrase "when he was able" serves as a reminder that the system of authority described here in its formal aspects was not, in practice, self-enforcing, but a discussion of its demise as a viable institution may conveniently be postponed.

When a new sultan was elected, the rusticated queen who bore him emerged from retirement as the queen mother. The fact that she was a very important person may be inferred from the recall of a major diplomatic mission when the mother of Badi III died.[5] In similar fashion Badi's sister Kamir, who apparently held estates at some distance from the capital, was influential enough that Badi could seek refuge with her at a difficult moment in his career.[53] No known source specifically describes the duties and powers of the queen mother in Sinnar. However, a measure of insight may be gained from comparison with the better-known role of the queen mother in the tributary kingdom of Taqali, whose institutions of government were said to be very similar to those of Sinnar proper.[54] In Taqali the queen mother was entitled *artiya*, a Nubian word understood to mean "goddess;" "She ruled over the traditional customs of the inhabitants of Taqali. The *artiya* deposed kings of Taqali and appointed successors just as she wished, for in her hands were deposited the keys to the royal insignia . . . and other necessities of the king. However, she could do nothing except after a council [of the court of Taqali]."[55] One may reasonably speculate that the queen mother in Sinnar was probably influential in watching and controlling the political activities of the next generation of queens; the respective ambitions of each to place her own son on the throne (and thus save his life) must have been played out with peculiar intensity and, if left unchecked, easily could have led to an assault upon the incumbent ruler. Or again, the system of arranged marriages between Unsab women and provincial noblemen, however

perfect in theory, must have demanded considerable finesse in execution; was not the unseen hand that of the imperial *haboba*?

The Funj of the early eighteenth century constituted a ruling hereditary elite which defined its corporate identity and the structure of its internal relationships through the idiom of kinship. By no means all of this constitutional idiom is presently comprehensible to the historian, but even the bare outline offered above serves two useful purposes. First, the incorporation of matrilineal principles, noble hostages, and the judicial execution of rulers evokes resonances of the more remote periods in the Sudanese past and sounds the theme of institutional continuity. Second, the intrusive beliefs, practices, and idiom of self-definition which gained currency during the Heroic Age are cast into sharp relief.

4

The Nobility

In Sinnar most forms of wealth derived from the land, and the hereditary Funj nobility arranged its basic institutions for the exercise of power in relation to that resource. The distribution of rights over the land among the nobility took place at several levels. The supreme landholder was the sultan, whose rights of overlordship extended to all lands whatsoever.[1] In a more restricted sense, he also possessed a personal demesne,[2] and bestowed other comparatively modest estates upon members of his immediate family.[3] One may infer that these sultanic estates were probably located in geographical proximity to the capital, whose environs find no place in any other known administrative subdivision of the kingdom.[4]

The sultan distributed the greatest part of the kingdom to a few prominent noblemen, his sons-in-law and maternal nephews. These fiefs at the first level of infeudation may be called provinces. Their number, size, and identity varied according to the fortunes of history; by 1750 some earlier possessions along the Red Sea and in Eritrea were lost, and during the eighteenth century Funj control over the western province of Kordofan was problematic. While recognizing the existence of other parts of Sinnar, this discussion is confined to those eighteenth-century provinces whose *manjils* appear in contemporary court records—Qarri, Alays, Kordofan, al-Bahr, al-Qarbin, Bayla, Atbara and al-Taka. These provinces are usually identified in the sources by the name of the seat of government, and even where a broader geographical designation is employed (al-Bahr, Kordofan), it is not presently possible to define the border with precision. This is unfortunate, for each province had an exact boundary well known in its day however obscure now. This principle may be demonstrated in the exceptional case of the province of al-Taka as delineated by a sultanic charter in 1791: "Its boundaries are: on the south, the spring of al-Luwayqa; on the east, the Atbara river as far as al-Sharif Hasab Allah; on the north, the lands of the pious Shaykh `Ali Abu Dulayq and the pious Shaykh Hasan walad Hasuna; on the west, the east bank of the Bahr al-`Adik [Blue Nile] and the Rahad river."[5]

The existence of provincial demesnes and grants to members of the *manjil's* family may be assumed, but no direct contemporary evidence is at hand.[6] Folk traditions concerning the system of land tenure below the sultanic level recall the demesne vividly, however; termed the *kursi*, "this piece of land was set aside so that the head of the [noble] family should be richer, more influential, and more able to help anyone that got into trouble than other members of the

[noble] family"—who nevertheless had their own lesser estates.[7] Being "originally a grant from the ruling power of the country,[8] the *kursi* appertained to the fief of which it was a part and could not be divided or alienated. In the lands cultivated by rainfall, the *kursi* embraced from about one-third to one-half the total land under cultivation.[9]

Each province was subinfeudated in a manner analogous to the primary division of the kingdom; with the exclusion of the provincial *kursi* and the personal estates of the *manjil's* kin, it was divided into fiefs appertaining to noblemen of the second rank, who derived their nobility from dynastic ties to the family of the *manjil*. Landholding units at this second level may be called districts, and their governors were often known by the title of *makk* (sometimes Arabicized as *malik*, "king"). Districts, like provinces, had precisely defined boundaries.[10] Landholding at the district level differed in style from the patterns typical of the higher levels of organization, because while the potential size of a lord's family at each level remained approximately constant, within the limited resources of the district fief the proportion of land assigned by the lord to his kinsmen as their estates assumed a more prominent relative position. Thus, in some cases it appeared to foreign observers, perhaps correctly, that the entire district was parceled out to members of the lord's family: "These small states [districts] of Argo, the Shaiqiya, of Dongola, etc., were divided into fiefs which the *maliks* gave to their children."[11] In other cases the lord would assign estates to agents who were not his kinsmen: "On the first of August [1701] the shaykh clothed beautifully one of his slaves who had been very faithful to him, and made him shaykh over a certain village."[12] In either instance, the limits of the system of subinfeudation had been reached. At the foot of the hierarchy of nobility and the pyramid of feudal landholdings were the subjects. Among sedentary cultivators the village constituted both the smallest administrative unit in the feudal system and the largest unit of communal society. Among herdsmen the corresponding landholding unit was the territory assigned by a tribal chief to a subtribe or *khashm al-bayt*. A more complete description of interactions between the nobility and their subjects may be found below.

The preceding analysis of the distribution of land and authority in Sinnar has not been confined strictly to terminology attested by contemporary documents; it has introduced some terms (province, district) which do not have any obvious counterpart in the written sources from Sinnar, and it has deliberately overemphasized other terms (sultan, *manjil*, *makk*) which differentiate different levels within the hierarchy of noblemen. Eighteenth-century Arabic usage employed a rather uniform terminology for the institutions of landholding and the exercise of power at all levels. Any landholding unit, from the kingdom itself to a single personal estate, was known as a *dar*. The lord of any *dar*, from the sultan to a district governor, could be called a *makk*; alternatively, any lord except the sultan—and including the holder of a single estate—could be entitled shaykh (a title also applied to men outside the landholding elite). While this comparatively undifferentiated nomenclature should not be allowed to conceal

the existence of the hierarchy within which it was employed, it does provide the useful insight that the principles governing the behavior of landholding noblemen at all levels were similar. The rudiments of this expected behavior were delineated at the district level by George Alexander Hoskins; the lesser nobles "all acknowledged the head of the family, that is, the reigning Melek, contributed to his support and defense, submitted to his laws and commands, and served him in war."[13] Equally implicit in Hoskins's analysis are patterns of deference and subordination and the right to maximize wealth and power within one's own fief. The former will be discussed here, the latter below.

If the Funj nobility was united through its characteristic system of family relationships, it was nevertheless dispersed in space by the realities of the system of feudal landholding. Some of the regions of Sinnar possessed a strong sense of local identity; for example, the *makks* of Fazughli were believed to be a surviving line of the kings of medieval Alodia, while the nobility of Qarri sometimes called itself the `Abdallab after a leader of olden days who was said to have united the Arabs of the north to resist the initial conquest of the Funj. While the historicity of such legends may be questionable, the traditions of regional self-assertion which they conveyed are not, and the unity of the Funj kingdom depended—sometimes precariously—upon their subordination to the will of the central authority. Of fundamental importance in maintaining the cohesion of the nobility was an established pattern of periodic visitation and communication, most easily visible at the level of relations between the sultan and the provincial governors, although probably replicated within the provinces also.

The first link of any vassal to the capital of his lord was the fact that he was born and reared there. His customs, values, and native language were acquired through youthful acculturation from his maternal kinsmen; one may recall young Sha` al-Din's childhood acquaintance with his future wife. Furthermore, the ceremony by which a vassal was invested with a fief (and acquired his coronation-wife from the family of his overlord) took place in the lord's capital and not in the district he would govern. Similarly, when a governor reached the age of retirement he might well adopt some variation of the proposal placed in jest before Bruce by al-Fadil, the *manjil* of Atbara: "I will give you my daughter for your wife, and you shall be second man in the government of Teawa [the capital of Atbara]; and as my intention is to go next year to Mecca, you shall then be appointed to the government of Atbara, while I go to Sennaar, and procure an office fitter for an old man."[14] The personal ties between a provincial lord and the capital were also maintained during his period of rule between youth and retirement. That the provincial lords were expected to spend a significant portion of their active lives in Sinnar is implicit in the fact that the sultan's complex of court buildings included a chamber for each to use for his official duties. Further evidence is provided by the frequent presence of many or most of the provincial governors among the witnesses to sultanic documents; since these were issued at all times of year, it is not possible to argue that the provincial lords came to the capital only, or even most frequently, during one season

of the solar year, or merely to attend festivals whose dates were set according to the Islamic calendar.

One occasion on which the provincial lord came before the sultan was for the payment of tribute, an annual event. Krump's account of the reception of the *manjil* of Qarri reveals the existence of a dramatic and colorful ceremony:

> On the seventh [of May 1701] a great solemnity was held on account of the arrival of the Shaykh of Qarri. He had under him the whole kingdom of Nubia up to the Red Sea, and was bringing the king many hundreds of slaves, horses, camels, and a large sum of money as his tribute to Sinnar. The ceremony was as follows. The king rode out of the city to meet him, accompanied by his court, numbering about one hundred, partly shaykhs, partly soldiers on horseback, along with several hundred slaves on foot and armed with lances. As they approached each other the Shaykh of Qarri dismounted and kissed the king's foot, upon which the king ordered him to remount. They then rode together into the city, to the great square (bigger than the square in Munich). In front of the king went three hundred slave girls who served him and his concubines. They had covered their hips with a silk scarf but all the rest was bare. They wore silver bands on their arms, and their hair was decorated with very many silver coins, and also some Venetian sequins, all of which rustled . . . . As soon as they came into the square, the king placed himself on the right-hand side with his court, and the Shaykh of Qarri was on the left. The slaves, who were barefoot and carried lances and shields, divided themselves into two parties and marched toward each other with dreadful cries as if they were going to fight . . . . [After the mock battle] the king himself with his soldiers rode against the Shaykh of Qarri as if they wanted to fight.[15]

From the perspective of constitutional usage, it would seem that this ceremony included twin rituals of subordination on the part of the *manjil* and of his reinstatement in his position by the king; the mock battle between the soldiers of Qarri and Sinnar, culminating in a feigned clash between the principals themselves, may be interpreted as a reenactment of the ancient battle by which the Funj were said to have overcome the ʿAbdallab and established their sultanate. In the particular case recorded by Krump, bad relations prevailed between the sultan and the *manjil*, and the latter returned to Qarri within two months; lords who stood in the good graces of the king might well have remained longer. During their residence in the capital, they would have been vulnerable to the sanctions which could be brought to bear through their family relationship to the king.

Visits by an inferior nobleman to his overlord were by no means confined to the occasions on which he paid tribute. While many and diverse practical motives undoubtedly existed, in constitutional terms it was said that one came in obedience to the summons of the superior, "the one who has called you."[16] While the sultan could summon anyone including (indeed, primarily) the

highest nobility, each nobleman in turn could summon his subordinates. The threat of such a summons directed by a high official of the central government against al-Fadil the *manjil* of Atbara helped Bruce escape from his involuntary residence there,[17] while a second contemporary example survives in the form of a letter by the unpopular and soon-to-be-deposed regent Nasir to the rebellious leader of the district of al-Damir:

> That of which we inform you is that previously our letter came to you with al_Hajj `Abd al-Jabbar, but we have had neither sight nor news of you. Why is the sight of you denied us? Perhaps there is a hindrance? Now it is good for you to see our letter which has come to you again. Do not listen to what people say. The *aman* [truce] of God, the *aman* of God is between us and you . . . . There is no breach in it, nor has any flaw been added to it: God, God upon that! After that has been left behind, the sight of you will not be denied us.[18]

When a nobleman returned to his fief after obeying a summons from his overlord, local people adopted a cautious attitude toward him, fearing that his loyalty to the local tradition might have been compromised. In one Funj province this suspicion was expressed formally in a ritual whereby the returning *manjil*, even before entering his house, had to stand in a public place and confront the curse of a local dignitary: "If you have any evil in your heart for us you will not live to return to your house. If your heart is pure, may God prolong your life."[19] One may imagine that a ceremony such as this would have assumed particular importance on the occasion of the first arrival of a newly invested nobleman at his fief.

If frequent visitations by a lesser nobleman to the court of his superior were one prominent feature of the lord-vassal relationship in Sinnar, a second was the payment of annual tribute and other customary dues, especially on special occasions such as the investiture of a new vassal.[20] No other contemporary account from Sinnar approaches that of Krump in portraying the pageantry of tribute-paying among noblemen, but numerous if scattered references confirm the universality of the practice. The forms of tribute were diverse and depended upon the resources of the vassal's fief; included were horses, camels, cattle, sheep, goats, slaves, gold, imported trade goods, ivory, leopard skins, and probably locally manufactured cloth and iron.[21]

Each nobleman reigned at the pleasure of his superior, who possessed the right to depose and replace him. The *manjil* of Qarri, for example, was described as "the authorized superior over all the kingdom of Nubia, and also of Dongola, whose king he can appoint or depose at will."[22] An instance in which the court of Qarri exercised this right—against the *makk* of Berber rather than Dongola—is recorded in a letter of about 1800:

> To the presence of the Mirifab, Khawawil, Na`imab, Shilitiyab, Suwaykitab, Muhammadab, Inqiriyab and the whole populace [of Berber district]. The Shaykh [of Qarri] greets you. What we are

> informing you is about *makk* ʿAli walad Mustafa. Formerly we asked him, in the place of his father, to exercise stewardship over that which we assigned to his oversight, and he administered it under the conditions of obedience, usefulness, and compliance. I sent to him a messenger with al-Hajj ʿAli walad Ṭimsah for fulfillment, but he did not obtain fulfillment from him. Praise be to God, I have fulfilled what I promised him. The messenger came (back) to us with empty pockets. In all of *dar* Berber he found nothing to present me with, the first time, but a mangy camel! So now I have decided to release him from his *dar*; I have installed *makk* Nasr al-Din and delivered to him all the stewardship and what awaits him. Now you (must) endorse him and follow him. Whosoever obeys him, has obeyed us; whosoever opposes him, we have opposed, and whosoever troubles him after these my words, has troubled himself unto destruction. Beware then, beware of disobedience, and let the disobedient blame none but himself.[23]

A deposition could most easily be carried out during a visit by the subordinate to his lord, so that a vassal unsure of his welcome might choose to risk ignoring a summons. In the case of the deposition *in absentia* cited above, its enforcement was left to the various families of lesser noblemen within the *makk's* fief to whom the letter was addressed; major depositions such as that of a reigning sultan by his court often required the threat, if not the application, of military force.[24]

Whoever defied the command of a superior could be declared a "royal rebel," against whom a state of war prevailed and whose life and privileges were forfeit. Specifically attested grounds for the imposition of this Funj form of outlawry upon individuals or groups include: trying unsuccessfully to depose a sultan, refusal to heed the summons of a superior, withholding the payment of tribute, seizing lands outside one's assigned fief, looting caravans, and taking sides with an army of foreign invaders.[25] The strong political component in each of these offences is evident, but the principle of outlawry applied also to cases in which the execution of justice, rather than the offence itself, was politically charged. For example, when a district *makk* refused to discipline one of his sons who had committed serious delinquencies, the provincial *manjil* sent a pair of agents to investigate. Upon establishing the son's guilt they summarily assassinated him, and his father the *makk* regretfully conceded their propriety in doing so.[26] While outlawry might be decreed against a person of any rank, it is most often visible in the sources as an institution of control within the nobility.

At each level of the hierarchy the provincial and district governor surrounded himself with a court of officials to assist him in the discharge of his duties.[27] The provincial courts were patterned after that of the sultan and included several of the titles indicating the existence of officers with specialized functions; however, an important position was also given to the relatives of the *manjil*. The district courts were not necessarily smaller than those of the provinces, but they consisted almost exclusively of the *makk's* kinsmen, a

reflection of the prominence of the nobleman's family in the distribution of fiefs at the lowest level of subinfeudation. This distinction between provincial and district courts may be demonstrated through comparison between the rosters of officials who appeared as witnesses to official acts at the courts of Qarri (a province) and Shandi (a district). The provincial court of Qarri (see Figure 5) may be examined on the basis of a charter from about 1770 of the *manjil* Muhammad al-Amin b. Mismar.[28] The court roster of witnesses is divided into three major groups: titled officials (positions 1 through 20), relatives of the *manjil* (positions 21 through 43), and holy men (positions 44 through 49). Within the first group, titles reveal the presence of officials corresponding to the Funj officers at the sultan's court, at least one district governor, and a variety of bureaucrats and military officers. However, their ordinal rank within the hierarchy does not follow sultanic conventions. The second group is noteworthy for the prominence given to the *manjil's* brothers. The holy men are few in number, and three of them are said to be personal retainers of the *manjil.*

Figure 5: A Provincial Court: Qarri In About 1770

Title	Name	Rank
	[GROUP ONE]	
Funj officials		
jundi	Hammad	14
sid al-qum	Muhammad	1
sid al-qum	Tammam	13
District governor		
Shaykh of al-Qoz (Berber)	`Abbas	10
Bureaucrats and officers		
shaykh al-musa `id	al-Bashir walad al-Na`im	3
muqaddam al-salatiya	`Abd Allah walad Makadi	5
muqaddam al-khayl	Hasab Allah walad Nayil	7
muqaddam khayl shaykh al-dakhil	`Asa b. al-Qadd	19
muqaddam al-sawakira	`Ajib	9
muqaddam al-qawawid	Bilal	20
`aqid	Murr al-Jawab	15
`aqid	Jad Allah walad Mutaysa	16
`aqid	Amin	17
`aqid	Idris walad al-Sunayb	18
	`Ajib walad Duqays	2
	Wadidi walad al-Kanja	4
	Qandil walad Qabrat	6

Marnati walad Sulayman 8
Muhammad walad Sharnadul 11
Muhammad walad Abu Ikwikir 12

[GROUP TWO]

Sons of Shaykh Mismar (brothers of the *manjil*):

arbab ʿAli 21
arbab ʿUthman 22
arbab Shammam 23
arbab Nasir 24
arbab Diyab 25
arbab Abbakr 26
arbab al-Asid 27
arbab Shawir 28
arbab Unsa 29
arbab Hasan 30
arbab Badi 31

Sons of Shaykh [Muhammad] al-Amin (sons of the manjil):

wakil
arbab ʿAbd Allah 32
arbab Muhammad al-ʿAjayl 33

Sons of *arbab* Shammam:

Muhammad al-Nur 34
Bashir 35

[Others:]

arbab Muhammad b.[late *manjil*]
Shaykh Hammad al-Simayh 36

arbab ʿAbd al-Qadir walad Amina 37
arbab ʿAli ʿAjaylawi 43
Mustafa walad Qalima 38
Hammad walad Mahmud 39
al-ʿAjab 41
sid bayt al-ʿudda Hasan 40
zayyat al-shaykh al-Bashir 42

[GROUP THREE]

From the friends of the *fuqara'*:

Sons of `Abd al-Hafiz:

al-Faqih `Ammar	44
Bilal	45
Hasab al-Quwwi b. al-Hajj `Awad	46
al-Faqih Hamid, who prays with the shaykh [the *manjil*]	47
al-Faqih Kir, teacher of the shaykh's [the *manjil's*] sons	48
[. . .] `Abd al-Salam, the scribe, son of `Abd al-Latif, *khatib* [of the Sinnar mosque]	49

The district court of Shandi (see Figure 6) as it appears in the charters of its later governors had no titled officers but always included bands of the *makk's* kinsmen, following the pattern exemplified at the provincial level by the second group of witnesses. Some of the district court rosters from Shandi also include numerous holy men, a phenomenon of the age of decadence to be discussed in the second part of this book. A conservative and more balanced example may be taken from a charter of the governor Muhammad Musa`id b. Sa`d of 10 May 1805.[29]

Figure 6: A District Court: Shandi in 1805

Name:	Rank:
Sons of *arbab* Idris:	
Ban al-Naqa	1
Miraf	2
al-`Ajayl	3
Salih	4
Salman	5
Sulayman	6
Sons of `Abd al-Salam:	
al-Fahl	7
Balam	8
al-`Ajayl	9
Muhammad	10

Sulayman	11
Diyab	12
al-Zubayr	13

Sons of Salim:

Idris	14
Sa`d	15
Bishara	16
Daf` Allah	17
`Ali	18
`Abd al-Raziq	19

Sons of [. . .]:

Muhammad Abu Likaylik	20
Idris	21
al-Fahl	22
`Abd al-Salam	23
Diyab	24
al-Bashir	25

[Sons of] `Abd al-Rahim:

Hamuda	26
`Abd Allah	27
`Abd al-Rahman b. Ibrahim Warraq	28
Kabashi	29
Ahmad, scribe	30

Each provincial or district lord maintained a relatively fixed seat of government or capital. In the stony and virtually rainless districts of Dongola, the Shaiqiya, Monasir, and Rubatab, the lofty stone castles of the medieval period were refurbished and new ones constructed as required—sometimes also of packed earth. The latter style prevailed on the stone-free plains from Berber to the town of Sinnar, but as the annual rainfall increased at latitudes south of the Nile confluence, earthen buildings were supplemented or replaced by clusters of round wooden houses with conically thatched roofs, the whole being surrounded by a *zariba* or fence of dry thorn boughs. In the provincial seats of Atbara and Alays, for example, only the governor had one or a few earthen buildings, while most noblemen lived in *zaribas* from whose size one could deduce the importance of their respective owners. In the southern hills the house-clusters of noblemen were often situated on elevated sites enjoying natural defenses.

While the external form of the seat of government found diverse architectural expression, its functions, patterned after those of the national capital itself, were in all cases similar. Any capital was a residence—for the lord, his numerous wives and children, the court officials and their families, and the slaves who served them all. The capital was also a treasury for the deposit both of luxury goods accumulated from afar and of basic necessities collected from the subjects as taxes.[30] Within the human community of the capital the residential and storage functions were united in a system of distribution from the lord to his subordinates, both of necessities such as housing, clothing, and food and of exotic luxuries if available. Each subordinate received in proportion to his standing with the lord, which could change daily. The court official (or political prisoner) who on one day received dry and spacious quarters, warm food prepared by the lord's womenfolk, honey from the most remote province in the kingdom, and pepper from the ends of the earth, might on the morrow be transferred to a decrepit hut and presented with no more than a gourd full of raw grain.[31]

A capital always incorporated security arrangements, often misunderstood to be defenses. While the walls of a castle or the thorns of a *zariba* might on rare occasions serve to hinder an assault, their basic purpose was not to exclude unwanted people but to contain highly desired ones—children (especially the *sawakira* and *qawawid*), women (especially the royal wives), servants, and guests or prisoners. Inside the physical structure of the capital they could be kept in a greater or lesser degree of confinement, and their communications with potentially dangerous outside parties could be regulated. Thus, any person's choice of residence within his superior's capital was fraught with political significance. For example, as the eighteenth-century *wazir* Daf' Allah built up an alliance against his master, the Hamaj regent Nasir, "he ordered all the *muqaddams* as well as others to gather at his court [in the town of Sinnar] until he should bring them to the divan of Shaykh Nasir [also in the capital city]—even [Nasir's] two brothers, Idris and 'Adlan, until Idris was living with Daf' Allah without even going into [Nasir's] presence."[32] To no one's surprise, Daf' Allah soon staged a coup against Nasir and made Idris the regent.

Accounts of the Funj kingdom by Europeans commonly describe the larger capitals of the noblemen of Sinnar as "towns." While this term is fully applicable to Sinnar in 1700 or to Shandi in 1814, it carries connotations inappropriate to most of the provincial and district capitals at the dawn of the Heroic Age. The latter may be represented by Qarri in 1701. At that time the capital of the most powerful provincial lord was a large but closed community inhabited exclusively by government officials, their families, and servants, who were supplied with their daily needs and occasional luxuries from the provincial treasury.[33] Passing merchants gave presents to the lord at a caravanserai outside Qarri, but they were forbidden to enter the capital; there is no indication of the existence of a market or of resident merchants.[34] Only in this qualified sense were Qarri and other provincial and district Funj capitals of the early eighteenth century "towns."

5

The Bureaucracy

The social order of Sinnar presupposed the dominance of a class of noblemen over a class of subjects. Previous chapters have introduced the idiom of kinship by which membership in the nobility was defined, the division of lands among the noblemen, and the mechanisms of control by which obedience and hierarchy within the nobility were maintained. Relations with the subjects will be considered below. Yet, the sultan of Sinnar was more than the most eminent of noblemen; he was perceived as being the direct and unmediated master of his kingdom, a head of state. At the fall of the kingdom an observer sensitive to this aspect of government in Sinnar summarized several of the more important functions of state: "The king, whose power is transmitted by heredity, has under him ministers and agents charged with the administration of lands, to receive the tithe, store the commodities, keep the accounts, see to the needs of the commanders of the troops, and maintain the internal police."[1]

The institutions through which the power of the sultan in his capacity as head of state could be brought to bear may conveniently be divided into those entrusted to the territorial noblemen themselves (an inherent limitation upon the extent of state authority) and those delegated to the national bureaucracy and army. Both categories of officials served at the pleasure of the sultan, who in theory could replace any nobleman, bureaucrat, or officer at any time. Moreover, since the right to all titles and offices in Sinnar originated with the reigning sultan, they terminated upon his death unless confirmed by his successor.[2] While in practice the removal of an important official was not a matter undertaken either lightly or frequently, nevertheless the enduring possibility and occasional implementation of personnel changes, particularly at the accession of a new sultan, limited the accretion of powers by the holders of titles and offices.

The influence of the state over the dispersal of lands and authority among the nobility was great in theory but limited in practice. The sultan was agreed by all to be, in a sense, the ultimate landholder;[3] confirmation of this sentiment by vassals at the provincial and district levels may be seen in their use of the conventional phrase, "in the Funj territories," as they described their own fiefs in the opening protocols of their official documents.[4] Perhaps the clearest expression of a conscious recognition of the downward flow of legitimate authority over the land may be found at the local level during the troubled Heroic Age, when the channels of legitimacy were becoming confused. When the *arbab* Na`im b. *al-arbab* Mustafa wished to bestow a part of his fief upon

a holy man, he felt constrained to state why he had a right to the land he was giving away, explaining that "his authority is from [the *manjil* of Qarri] Shaykh Badi b. al-Shaykh Mismar.[5]

In practice the power of the state over the nobility was most commonly demonstrated in the replacement of an incumbent nobleman by a substitute more pleasing to his superior. State support for these sanctions—which were theoretically inherent in the constitution of kinship among the nobility—was particularly necessary in cases where the lord intended to humble and replace not only the vassal himself, but also his whole clan. An illustrative example of the latter and more radical form of intervention is provided by the career of Musa "Abu Jinn" and the rise of the Hammada among the Rufa`a during the early eighteenth century:

> In his day the Awlad Rahma of the Ulatiyin ruled the Dinder. Musa as a young man made his way to Abyssinia seeking his fortune and took service with the king of Abyssinia and amassed great wealth. When he wished to return home the Ulatiyin, fearing him, persuaded the Sultan of Sinnar that he intended to bring in the Abyssinians and the Sultan gave orders that he was to be killed on sight. Musa hearing of this made his way to Sinnar in disguise, gained access to the Sultan and procured the aman [safe-conduct], gave the sultan rich presents which he had brought from Abyssinia and was made Manjil of the Dinder, where he destroyed the Awlad Rahma.[6]

The sultan, for his part, ensured Musa's victory over the Awlad Rahma by sending with him "150 picked men from the Mek's [sultan's] own bodyguard."[7] While the application of force by the state against any single nobleman was almost invariably successful, the simultaneous alienation of several could prove dangerous to the sultan, and of many, fatal; as a group the noblemen were too strong to resist in battle, and through their position at court they could heavily influence that body toward a decision to depose and execute the king.

A second form of state intervention in the tenure of land by noblemen was the creation of new fiefs and titles at the expense of existing provincial boundaries and lords. Such measures could alter permanently the power relationships within the realm, and attempts to implement them inspired relentless hostility on the part of the neighboring nobles.[8] In summary the state, personified by the sultan, assumed responsibility for the maintenance or alteration of the boundaries of its constituent fiefs and reserved the right to remove not only individual provincial lords but also, on occasion, whole provincial elites. The nobility as a whole should acquiesce in such decisions and help enforce them against the interests of one, or a limited number, of their fellow nobles.

The authority of the sultan was not confined to his immediate vassals; rather, constitutional theory maintained that most official acts by all subordinate noblemen were performed in the name of the sultan. This principle became particularly obvious following the Hamaj coup, when "all orders were proclaimed by the vizier as the mouthpiece of his master. The form was—'the

Muk [*makk*, that is, the sultan] says.'"[9] A more limited but highly significant example, antedating the Hamaj coup, may be found in the statement of Krump's informants that the authority of a provincial ruler over his subordinates derived ultimately from the sultan. Thus, the *manjil* of Qarri "governs all of Nubia as far as the Red Sea and Arbaji. Therefore he can (with the permission of the king in Sinnar, who is his lord) root out his opponents with fire and sword, and compel the disobedient to obey."[10]

The delegation to noblemen of the right to speak on behalf of the sultan was most clearly evident in regard to the administration of justice, one of the traditional prerogatives of Funj royalty, the neglect of which constituted grounds for deposition.[11] When giving justice the sultan sat upon a special seat;[12] well known was the high bench outside the palace where, on occasion, he presented himself before the public to give judgment.[13] In each province the judicial authority of the absent monarch was symbolized by a seat left vacant in the courtroom: "It is the custom in all places where the governor is invested with supreme power, to have an arm chair left empty in the middle of the hall where justice is administered, which represents the sovereign, and to which obeisance is made."[14] Bruce made this comment specifically on the basis of observations in the provincial capital of Atbara, but the fact that the practice was universal, as he asserted, gains support from the appearance in other accounts of similar judicial seats at Marawi East, Argo, al-Damir, and Wad Madani.[15]

The sultan reserved the right to intervene directly or indirectly in any legal dispute in the kingdom and to render final judgment. Only the sultan could pronounce the death penalty, and all capital cases in the kingdom were tried by him.[16] Moreover, all cases over which the sultan decided to assume jurisdiction—whether at his own initiative or in response to an appeal—thereby became capital cases, and the party found guilty was executed.[17] Murderers, after sentencing, were often turned over to the kinsmen of the deceased for the carrying out of the sentence.[18] Frequently, the sultan preferred to intervene indirectly by delegating his judicial authority (without the death penalty) to a special magistrate whose jurisdiction was limited to the resolution of a specific dispute. This *'ukkaz* or royal staff-bearer was chosen for his wisdom and acceptability to both contending parties; after traveling to the scene of the dispute and concluding a settlement, the *'ukkaz* would bind the erstwhile opponents by an oath on the sultan's staff.[19]

Certain functions of government lay beyond the capacity or against the inclinations of the noblemen and were delegated to officials of special status—slaves and Islamic holy men. The national treasury, the *khazinat sultanat dar al-zarqa'*,[20] employed a corps of officials, predominantly slaves, who seem to have possessed a tradition of account-keeping using strings of beads,[21] a non-Arabic system of written notation, and perhaps a quinary system of arithmetic calculation.[22] As early as 1700, however, it is clear that on occasion at least some had begun to adopt the practice of writing treasury records in Arabic;[23] while this new skill was no less obscure than the old to the predominantly unlet-

tered nobility,[24] it permitted Islamic holy men to begin to enter the fiscal department at the lower levels. The head of the treasury was a slave official entitled *karalrau* in Funj, but popularly known among Arabic- speakers as the *jabai al-mal*; those familiar with contemporary Egyptian usage described him as the *daftardar*, and in official documents of Sinnar his title was given the form of *muqaddam al-quwwariya*. The routine functions of the *karalrau* included:

> He kept the register of outlays and income, of the quantity of taxes which the various villages were to pay and of the debtors and creditors of state; [he] could be considered as the minister of finance.[25]

> He had on deposit the fabric, grain and goods-in-kind which were collected as taxes. In his custody was the *khazina* or treasury; he made the payments, etc., and could be regarded as the treasurer.[26]

The authority of the national treasury was represented in the provinces by a subordinate *muqaddam al-quwwariya* at the *manjil's* court. These lesser *jabai al-mal*—sometimes known locally as "scribes" from their written records—were held responsible to the *karalrau* and not the *manjil*, so that the treasury possessed a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the provincial lords. The *jabai al-mal* at whatever level he was found was "the great exacter of taxes, and to that end had his agents circulate throughout the lands."[27] The perambulatory tax assessors were called *jarai*,[28] and they appear frequently in the warning clauses of eighteenth-century charters. The nature of their duties made them likely potential offenders against a sultan's grant of tax immunity; thus from a charter of the sultan `Adlan b. Isma`il (28 November 1780):

> And we peremptorily command you, all you shaykhs and *muqaddams*, and the *jarai* who are under them, up to the borders of my kingdom: all, and especially you, O shaykh of the *quwwariyya*, who are at the present time in the fief of Shaykh Muhammad Taktak walad al-Shaykh al-Nur Qandilawi, and who are at the present time are in the fief of Alays, Shaykh Sabat walad Badr and Walad Qadura, O you the aforesaid shaykhs and all your *jarai* . . . let no one of you trouble the [beneficiaries of the grant].[29]

Basic decisions were made and the essential records maintained at the national and provincial levels, so that the district court had no resident treasury agent. The district lord and local noblemen nevertheless played an important role in the collection and storage of tax goods, as will appear below.[30]

Frequent visits among noblemen played an important role in Funj administration, but there existed a second means for communication and the exercise of authority by the sultan which did not depend upon the ability or willingness of a vassal to present himself before his lord. This was the system of official couriers or *mursals*, ubiquitous in the literature of eighteenth century Sinnar. It would seem that each court maintained a corps of *mursals*, many of whom were assigned the task of communicating between their master and a single second party such as the master's overlord or a specific subordinate vassal. Thus the

regent could instruct a district leader to send "your person" (*zolak*, "your messenger") to the royal court,[31] while a *manjil* could say of one of his subordinate *makks*, "I sent to him his person" (*zolahu*, "his messenger"),[32] and Bruce could note that the sultan's *mursal* to the *manjil* al-Fadil of Atbara "was a great friend of Shekh Fidele, and the usual one sent to him at Teawa [the provincial capital]."[33] The mursal not only carried messages but also, like the *`ukkaz*, personally embodied the authority of the master who sent him; in this capacity he could collect tribute, issue an official summons, make arrests, adjudicate disputes, enforce grants of privilege, and declare the outlawry of the recalcitrant. "In these lands whole villages and towns quiver before such royal messengers," wrote Krump, "for they are obliged to provide horses and camels for him and his servants, along with whatever they need or demand."[34]

Military as well as administrative functions were the ultimate responsibility of the sultan as head of state. The sultan's military activities served two goals, one being the defense of the nation's interests against the outside world and the other the maintenance of internal equilibrium, including the superiority of the central government over the provincial lords. The role of the sultan as defender of the national interest was most apparent when the country was attacked. For example, when the Ethiopians invaded Sinnar in 1744 the incumbent sultan, according to the Chronicler, "made possible the victory" by alerting the country to the danger, mobilizing the prayers of the people for divine support, and calling up armed forces sufficient to expel the intruders.[35] Previous sultans had responded in similar fashion to the earlier invasions of the Ethiopians in the seventeenth century and of the Ottoman Turks along the Red Sea in the sixteenth.[36] It is perhaps significant that the one major invasion of Sinnar whose repulsion was not attributed by tradition to the incumbent sultan (the advance of the Ottomans up the Nile in the late sixteenth century) led to an attempted seizure of the throne by the provincial *manjil* who had demonstrated his superiority by defending the country. While the national forces of Sinnar were usually mobilized for defensive purposes, on the western frontier several successive sultans organized national forces for expansive conquest into Kordofan. In some cases the sultan personally led the army into battle; more commonly, however, he would appoint a commander for the duration of the campaign. This officer was entitled *amin jaysh al-sultan* ("the one entrusted with the sultan's army") and was chosen from among the ranks of the high court officials.

Some perspective concerning the size of military forces in the early eighteenth century may be derived from Ahmad b. `Isa's account of the revolt of 1705-1708; an army of 150 horsemen was very small, for a sultan, while one of 1,029 was large.[37] In comparison, the 27 nonclerical courtiers who appear on the charter roster from Shandi given above, if one assumes that all were competent and well-equipped fighting men, would have constituted a respectable force proportionate to the political weight of their district. At an intermediate level, one may consider the case of a defeat inflicted by the national army of Sinnar in which the losers suffered 22 deaths among their noblemen and "a

great crowd" of others, while 200 free soldiers including the commander but not counting the slaves were captured, and only four of any description escaped. Perhaps the defeated force numbered about 500 men and the army of Sinnar rather more.[38]

Wars against national foes were unusual in the history of Sinnar, and the role of the sultan as the supreme military authority was more commonly that of arbiter among the forces of his vassals. A correct appreciation of the influence wielded by the state over internal military affairs requires some analysis of the composition and armaments of a Funj force. The Funj nobility, like their counterparts in some other feudal societies, were warriors. Each noble house constituted a military unit whose power could be measured in part by the number of sword-wielding mounted and armored kinsmen the lord could command—and lucky indeed was the nobleman whose clansmen were strong, numerous, and loyal. At this level of organization the sultan could never hope to be more than the first among equals, and he might well succumb to the ambitions of a fortunate and gifted vassal. Therefore, while the personal participation of noblemen at all levels in the military affairs of Sinnar was a constant feature of Funj history, only rarely was it decisive; the weight of power lay with the one who was able to augment his forces in other ways. In cases of uttermost extremity a lord might call upon his subjects to fight;[39] the subjects of Sinnar, in contrast to their counterparts in some other feudal societies, could not reasonably be forbidden to bear arms in a land which at that time still teemed with lions, hyenas, crocodiles, and other predators upon man and beast. Under ordinary circumstances, however, the subjects did not figure prominently in serious military calculations because the weapons and skills they possessed were not capable of resisting the core of any Funj army, the heavy cavalry. With the exceptions noted above, a Funj army was composed primarily, when not exclusively, of slaves.

The predominance of state authority in the military affairs of Sinnar rested upon the role of the sultan in organizing the acquisition, accoutrement, and distribution of slave soldiers. Each year the sultan launched the *salatiya*, a campaign conducted in whole or in part for the purpose of gathering slaves, the bulk of whom became his possessions.[40] The national scale of this institutionalized slave raiding would have been an appropriate response to the comparative difficulty of capturing large numbers of slaves before the age of firearms, and the practice may have been accompanied by a theory of royal monopoly over the right of slave acquisition; perhaps, as in Dar Fur, the right to participate in raids could be obtained from the sultan in return for a suitable consideration.[41] Thus slaves entered Sinnar as the property of the sultan himself or of individuals previously authorized by the sultan to acquire and possess them. A sultan could expect to benefit militarily from his acquisitions in any one of several ways. Some slaves were sold abroad in return for various luxury goods, including sword blades, armor, horse armor, muskets, cannon, and other weapons. Some were incorporated into the sultan's own bureaucracy and armed forces; noteworthy was the elite corps of 200 musketeers created by Badi III at the

dawn of the eighteenth century, but perhaps more typical were the villages of conventionally armed slave soldiers planted around the capital city "like a wall" toward the end of the 1600s.

One branch of the sultan's army was the infantry, organized into regiments whose officers bore the Funj title *mankarukan*, and which was represented at court by the *muqaddam al-qawawid*. Perhaps more influential were the squadrons of cavalry represented at court by the *muqaddam al-khayl*.[42] All slave soldiers of the sultan received their weapons, and in the case of the cavalry their mounts, armor, and horse armor as well, from their master. In times of demobilization these supplies were stored (and in part manufactured)[43] in the sultanic arsenal administered by the *muqaddam [bayt] al-'udda*. A final method by which a sultan could profit militarily from his slaves was by giving them to vassals whom he wished to strengthen and denying them to those he did not. Traditional stories offer numerous anecdotes illustrating this form of sultanic intervention in provincial or even local disputes.[44] The fact that all the provinces of Sinnar relied upon slave forces deriving primarily from calculated sultanic largesse may be inferred from the observation of Robert Hartmann that the presence of slave troops rather than citizen-soldiers was a characteristic which distinguished the military system of those "tribes" who had recently been a part of Sinnar from that of their neighbors who had not.[45] Further confirmation of the downward distribution of military slaves within the hierarchy of the Funj elite may perhaps be found in the concentration of slave titles—including military titles—at the sultan's court, while provincial charters reveal fewer slave officials and the district charters very few or none. In summary, most slaves entered Sinnar as the property of the sultan, who used them to staff and equip the forces of the central government and to manipulate the relative power of the various provincial and district lords. The historiographical image of the sultan as the protector of his nation against invasion and sedition was thus grounded in social and military reality.

6

The Subjects

The historical experiences of the northern Sudan during the century and a half following the fall of Sinnar have tended to blur the line of demarcation between the erstwhile hereditary nobility and their former subjects; as recently as the eighteenth century, however, this social distinction was still very clear. In analytical terms the subjects and the nobility constituted respectively the producing and the ruling classes within the feudal society of Sinnar. The nature of the relationship between these two levels of society may be clarified and elaborated by adopting a descriptive idiom, first to consider the range of institutions which made manifest the distinction between classes and second, to expose in detail the appropriation of goods and services from the subjects by the nobility. Finally, consideration will be given to the role of the state in mediating between the classes.

Society in Sinnar was regulated by a set of rules which may conveniently be regarded as a code of customary law. One feature of this customary code was the division of responsible adult male society into groups whose status before the law differed one from another. To adopt a nationwide perspective, throughout the kingdom two important groups were the "commoners" and the "men of quality;" their respective status before the law is evident in that the formers' testimony as witnesses in a court of law possessed only a fraction of the weight of that of the latter.[1] Most of the specific institutions that governed the interactions between subjects and nobility, however, were organized to function on a local scale and not at broader levels of social interaction; the class interface may thus be visualized as lying between the inhabitants of each individual sedentary village or nomadic *khashm al-bayt* and its immediate overlord.

Each commoner was considered as in a sense belonging to one particular nobleman, on whose fief he was obliged to live, through whom he was expected to seek justice,[2] and to whom he must discharge his obligations as a subject.[3] An amusing illustration of this principle was given by the travelers George Waddington and Barnard Hanbury. During the course of the Turkish conquest they observed a passionate dispute between a pair of petty noblemen from opposite ends of the district of Dongola over the custody and services of two of their respective subjects who had seized the unprecedented opportunity afforded by the wartime confusion to get married, and who now wanted to live together in a single place![4] A second example is afforded by a sultanic charter of 1780, through which the king confirmed the grant of a group of subjects,

the Marinab, to one of his subordinate rulers.[5] The customary confinement of humble persons to their lord's fief was evident in the parochial attitudes of the caravaneers sent to accompany a traveler from the environs of the capital city across the Gezira; even before reaching the White Nile they had become "alarmed at the idea of going so far from home."[6] Following the fall of Sinnar to the Turks it became possible for male commoners to travel more freely, but the older attitudes survived largely intact in regard to free women of humble estate.[7]

Each fief contained both a population of subjects and a local branch of the governing establishment consisting of noblemen and slaves. Intermarriage between either category of rulers and the commoners was strictly forbidden.[8] The biological cleavage was not absolute, however, for female slaves were enjoined to beget children by any man, including commoners, while the illegitimate children of free women, like those of female slaves, became slaves of the lord.[9] It is possible, although undocumented, that in some individual cases biological ties between a subject and a member of the elite may have stimulated a degree of fraternization in defiance of the socially defined norms of kinship; if such cases ever existed, however, they were certainly exceptional.

The social distance between nobleman and subject in Sinnar was reinforced by sumptuary laws and rules of deferential conduct. At the end of the seventeenth century reports reaching Egypt from Sinnar warned potential travelers that "the king alone sometimes wears a cap, and to be clothed in a shirt one must be a great lord."[10] Within a few years visitors were to confirm that "no one wears anything on the head except for the highest nobility and the king," while sewn garments were to be seen only on important people.[11] While these observations referred to men, similar distinctions were maintained among females; only "women of quality" were allowed to cover the upper part of their bodies, while "the ordinary women and girls are only covered from the waist to the knee."[12] The fact that the differences in dress between subjects and noblemen were more than a natural consequence of the poverty of the former and access by the latter to luxury goods may be inferred from a later episode from southern Sinnar. When the nobleman Idris b. Rajab, *manjil* of Ghule, encountered some Arab-style sewn garments among his subjects, "he seized clothes and tore them to pieces—*puw*!—saying, you are wearing the clothes of my father!"[13] To southern subjects, their rulers were "the clothes-wearing people."[14] If a commoner came before a nobleman he was expected to observe rules of behavior similar to those prevailing at the sultan's court, including the baring of the shoulders, the confirmation of names, and the rules of seating and posture. When a nobleman traveled through the countryside, people should "rejoice at his passing as if it were the greatest of feast days for them" and expose their bodies according to custom. The attempt to rise above one's commoner status, for example, through the acquisition of sewn garments or other objects of conspicuous value, was a crime called *sibla*, and such illegitimate social climbing was severely punished.[15]

Customary law throughout Sinnar recognized subjects and noblemen as two distinct social entities. Between them legitimate kinship ties were impossible, and their interactions were hedged about with rules of dress and deportment that tended to elevate the lord and abase the subject. The substantive relationship served by these cultural forms was the extraction of surplus from the subjects by the nobility. Some of the institutions of appropriation, like those maintaining social distance, were couched in formal terms according to customary law, while others were implicit in the organization of daily life and productive activity. But the formal and implicit institutions of surplus extraction, unlike those maintaining social distance, were not uniform throughout Sinnar; rather, they conformed to the productive potential of each of the three major ecological divisions of the country, although allowing for a variety of local idiosyncrasies. The subjects of Sinnar were required to render services and dues both to the treasury of the central government and to their immediate feudal overlord. While the distinction between these two types of obligations should not be exaggerated, it will be useful to give them separate consideration, for while the welfare of the state depended upon a few simple (but ample) charges against the basic productive activities of each region, that of the noblemen called forth a bewildering variety of assessments against the resources of their subjects. While the evidence at hand does not allow a comprehensive treatment, it suffices to expose significant contours of the subject-lord relationship in the instance of one important group of commoners, those who cultivated the land.[16]

The feudal payments which a subject cultivator owed to his lord consisted of both labor services and various types of products. Some obligations were considered inherent in the lord-cultivator relationship, while others were imposed only upon subjects whose irregular behavior had rendered them liable. Some payments occurred regularly in response to the agricultural cycle, while others were exacted only on special occasions. One set of services required the subjects to supply a certain number of days' labor for the cultivation of the lord's demesne and, in irrigated districts, to provide draft animals to drive the waterwheels. Subjects also owed services as shepherds, herdsmen, and drovers for the nobleman's livestock. If the lord needed a new residence—which occurred frequently in the rainlands where swidden agriculture was practiced—subjects were called upon to construct it, and to open fields for the new demesne.

A second set of dues fell directly upon the subjects and the lands assigned to them. It is important to note that the lord had the right of access to the house, lands, and granary of his subjects at all times, and that it was the lord or his agents who assessed, for the purpose of the levies and taxes, the value of what was found there. The subject paid an annual tax on each building in his possession; since a person's wealth usually found expression in the size of his domestic establishment, this levy was comparatively progressive. Drawing perhaps upon ancient traditions of the region, the first fruits of any harvest were delivered to the lord. Moreover those cultivators assigned to riverbank lands capable of producing sesame, tobacco and especially cotton were obliged to grow these crops and not

others by the exaction of annual levies of a fixed quantity upon riverbank lands, payable only in sesame, tobacco and cotton. The lord guaranteed that some of the labor of his cotton-producing subjects would be devoted to spinning and weaving by demanding a part of the cotton tax in the form of finished cloth; however, he also demanded a day's picking of raw cotton from the fields of each cotton grower. If the riverbank cultivators killed one of the hippopotami which occasionally wreaked havoc in their fields, they paid an additional hunting tax. In the case of lands that were not irrigated, the subject was barred from his own fields following the harvest as the grass which grew up there belonged to the lord and was destined for the maintenance of his cavalry. The nourishment of the nobleman's mounts was supplemented by additional special levies of grain and fodder. In the rainlands, where one of the most burdensome agricultural tasks was the clearing of land for cultivation, it was the lord who, at the appropriate season of the year, lit the first of the brushfires which began the process of clearing. Thereafter each cultivator paid him a special fee, ostensibly in return for the use of cleared land.

Whenever the lord celebrated a special occasion, the subjects supplied all the raw materials for a feast as well as some prepared foods, particularly various forms of bread. Similarly, whenever the lord or his agents visited a village, the subjects were expected to offer them the best available lodging, hospitality that included the slaughter of the best animals at hand and additional presents of cloth or the like. Soldiers were sometimes billeted upon communities, who were then obliged to support them. Only the lord had the right to sponsor a market or a river ferry, and those who made use of either paid a corresponding tax. Each community was held collectively responsible for the good behavior of all its members; if someone committed a murder, started a fire (a serious danger at certain seasons), or physically injured another party, the lord exacted a fine upon the whole community over and above whatever other payments, such as blood-money, might be entailed.[17] Finally, the lord himself did not ordinarily collect the dues mentioned above; rather, he sent an agent, who received an additional payment from the subjects for each of his unwelcome labors. The attitude of the subjects is apparent in the sarcastic lines of a contemporary poet:

> Joy it is [I suppose],
> if syphilis afflicts you in the early rains,
> when you are blind, and your wife's sight is impaired,
> when your children are lacking bread,
> and your virgin daughter is not without frivolity.
>
> Joy it is [I suppose],
> if diseased blood fills your veins,
> or when the vulture devours your liver,
> or when the *makk*'s messenger
> sits in your courtyard waiting for you![18]

Yet, the multifarious feudal obligations of a subject to his lord, however vexatious, were probably secondary to the general taxes levied by the state treasury. In principle these taxes were proportional; in prosperous times the government collected more, and in times of hardship, less. More specifically, however, they were assessed, collected and dispersed in diverse ways according to the prevailing patterns of life and production in the northern, central, and southern parts of the kingdom.[19]

THE NORTH: IRRIGATED FARMLANDS

The zone extending from the northern border of Sinnar approximately to the Nile confluence was characterized by the predominance of irrigated agriculture over all other means of livelihood.[20] The principal productive activities of this zone were confined to narrow strips of agricultural land along the banks of the Nile and of its islands. The habitations of the subjects were arranged in parallel rows of strip villages—in fertile districts almost continuous—immediately inland from the belt of cultivation. Cultivable land was divided into two major categories according to its method of irrigation. (Custom recognized many distinctions of type and quality of land, but these lesser distinctions did not bear upon the question of surplus extraction.[21]) The immediate banks of the river (singular, *jarf*) and of the islands were inundated by the annual rise of the Nile and could be cultivated without further irrigation as the flood receded. (In years of an unusually high Nile, overflow into otherwise barren depressions at some distance from the ordinary course of the river permitted the sporadic cultivation of these *karru* or "basin" lands.) At intervals along the crest of the downward-sloping *jarf* were placed animal-driven waterwheels (singular, *saqiya*) by means of which virtually perpetual cultivation of the adjoining land could be sustained. The amount of land suitable for cultivation in the northern zone was strictly limited, and the possibilities and limits of the existing agricultural technology had been thoroughly exploited and tested long before the rise of Sinnar.

The erosive action of the river's annual rise and fall imposed innumerable small modifications and occasional major ones upon the cultivable terrain, and the distribution of farmland among cultivators was subject to perpetual reapportionment. The sultan held supreme authority over the apportionment of land, and there existed a land-survey official of the central government called the *muhass* ("apportioner of shares"[22]); similarly, the provincial and possibly the district court had its own *muhass*.[23] Under ordinary circumstances, however, the subjects themselves were expected to maintain the survey of their own boundaries, and each northern village had its *dallal*, or surveyor and expert on local land tenure customs. The basic unit of land measurement in the irrigated north was the cubit, consisting of the distance from the elbow to the extended finger-tips plus the width of a man's palm; three, four, or more cubits, as determined by local custom, constituted the rod (*'ud*), and in some villages the *dallal* was entrusted with the custody of a carefully cut pole which

constituted the standard *'ud* for his community. Only linear measurement was employed in the survey of irrigated riverain lands. Each landholding began at the *mirin*, an imaginary line that followed the center of the riverbed (or the middle of the channel if there were islands), and extended inland either east or west (but not both) to the limits of possible cultivation (excluding basins where such were present). The up- and downstream boundaries of a landholding, called *fasils*, were drawn at right angles to the midriver *mirin* and parallel to one another, and the size of a landholding was measured by the linear distance between the *fasils* along the *haram al-sar*, a second imaginary line running parallel to the midriver *mirin* along the east and west banks at the crest of the *jarf*. (In some villages where the *jarf* was unusually wide additional boundaries, also called *mirins*, were drawn across it at intervals, parallel to the *haram al-sar*.) The distance between *fasils* tended to be drawn at the limits of the irrigating capacity of a waterwheel, and each landholding unit—which like the wheel itself was termed a *saqiya*—included both irrigated land and its appertaining *jarf*.

Agricultural production on irrigated land required diverse inputs, including the waterwheel, the draft animals that propelled it, the drover who kept them moving, the overseer of production, the laborers who tended the crop or brought fossil alluvium from the desert as fertilizer, the craftsmen who made and repaired the waterwheel pots and ropes, and a variety of ancillary services. Every community maintained its own elaborate customary code assigning a portion of the crop to each of those who contributed to the productive process. These general terms of customary practice were rendered concrete for each individual *saqiya* at the beginning of every cultivating season by the mutual approval of a contract (*tiddan*) that apportioned the anticipated fruits of that *saqiya* among all those who undertook to earn a claim to a share of them. The products of a *saqiya* holding were usually separated into six major shares which were then subdivided, but the patterns of the further subdivision of these "sixths" varied from village to village, as did the minimum fractional share at which the subdivision process must cease.

Rights in a *saqiya* holding were said to be *rawka*, or held in common by all those to whom a share of its fruits were due; for example, if a fire damaged the crop in a corner of a *saqiya* holding, all the shareholders would share the loss. But the major source of natural variation in the productive capacity of the northern zone was the level of the Nile during each annual cycle, a variation which also determined the relative importance of the *jarf* and the irrigated portions of each holding. A particular merit of the *rawka* system was that it distributed equitably both the opportunities and the risks in years when the Nile was unusually high or exceptionally low. Some agricultural tasks were beyond the capacity of the shareholders of a single *saqiya* or demanded a different form of organization, for example, the construction of a new primary distribution canal (*jadwal*) or the preparation of a new site for *saqiya* cultivation. These major tasks, and often the lesser ones, were performed by village work parties (*faza* or *nafir*), whose services would be reciprocated on another occasion. Similar work parties were also com-

monly mobilized to discharge the community's various feudal obligations to its lord, while for major projects such as the construction of a castle, the services of many villages throughout the district could be summoned.[24] It was in regard to the latter type of communal labor party that the noblemen of Sinnar coined the proverb, "The *nafir* without a master accomplishes nothing."[25]

Custom determined the proportion of any crop that must be delivered to the sultanic treasury—half of all crops produced on the *jarf*, one-fifth of those from artificially irrigated lands, and one-tenth of what grew on the southern rainlands.[26] While these rates had been fixed since time out of mind, the quantity of crops collected varied considerably from year to year according to the weather and the good or ill fortunes of each community. The crucial role was therefore that of the corps of assessors who officially determined the magnitude of each crop, and consequently of the tax to be paid at the harvest. While the primary responsibility for assessment lay with the agents of the district government,[27] their activities were subject to spot-checking by the provincial and national representatives of the sultanic treasury; the *jarai* of the national *muqaddam al-quwwariyya* traveled throughout the provinces, re-examining both the crops and the estimates of the provincial and district authorities.[28] On special occasions, whether in times of exceptional need or of great prosperity, the sultan might charge his agents with the assessment and collection of an extraordinary tax called the *mutra*.[29]

When the crops of a *saqiya* were allotted at harvest time, the claimholders first set aside the assessed *khurj* (a local variation of the classical Arabic *kharaj*, "land-tax") to be handed over to the sultanic treasury, then took their own respective shares.[30] The tax was not considered paid, however, until the crops were delivered by the subjects to the lord's capital, where accountants equipped with the strings of beads that constituted the Nubian abacus recorded the discharge of their obligations.[31] Goods received as taxes were stored at the capital of the lord. For example, the *makk* at Marawi in the Shaiqiyya country, whose residence was a refurbished medieval castle, employed huge grain-pits hewn into the living rock by craftsmen of long ago, who had left Nubian crosses among the marks of their chisels.[32] Insofar as it consisted of a levy upon crops, the sultanic treasury thus existed in the form of numerous storage granaries throughout the kingdom. During the first century and a half of the history of Sinnar, the perambulatory sultanic court had drawn upon these resources in its travels "month by month, from station to station." After the fixing of the capital in Sinnar, the widespread granaries still served to maintain national armies and agents as they moved through the provinces, but it is probable that the local lords, who exercised immediate oversight over the stored tax goods and received a fraction of them as a reward for their services as collectors, came to regard them with an increasingly proprietary air.[33] However, even at the close of the Heroic Age, when the decline of the central authority was well advanced, either the national strongman `Adlan b. Muhammad Abu Likaylik or a forger who thought it worthwhile to simulate his authority could write to the lord

of the district centered on Old Dongola commanding him to pay out a yearly stipend to a local holy man from the district's repositories of the national treasury.[34] Be the letter authentic or bogus, it testifies to the presumption that such a command from the capital would be obeyed in Dongola.

If indeed the folklore of the northern cultivators regarded the domestic visitations of a nobleman's courier as the political equivalent of syphilis, one might reasonably inquire how they could be motivated to political acquiescence. The institutions of appropriation in the agricultural north exploited the strain of population against the limited supply of land, a tension evident by the end of the seventeenth century in the form of the emigration of men to find work in the cities of Egypt and, less clearly but probably with greater frequency, into the rainlands of the central zone.[35] Under conditions of abundant labor and scarcity of land, the lord's ultimate sanction over the cultivator was the threat of expulsion—of exile from his lands, his village, and his family. For example, a northern genealogy from the dawn of the Heroic Age recounts how one branch of a Rubatab family was expelled after failing to make good their claim to a part of their forefathers' land:

> The reason for the emigration of the Awlad Musallim was that they acted unjustly and transgressed both the strictures of God [*hudud Allah*] and the prevailing custom [*al-'ada al-jariya*], in that they isolated themselves [while occupying and defending the land they claimed] to the point that they were cutting the road to the east and the west. For that reason a squadron of Funj cavalry came and killed them all, except for two.[36]

The survivors, significantly, fled southward into the rainlands, where they lost contact with the rest of the family.

Such dramatic measures by a Funj lord in the north were undoubtedly unusual; more commonly, the mere threat implicit in his military might was sufficient to produce compliance on the part of his subjects. But although the mode of coercion it exemplifies is extreme, the story above is thoroughly representative of the typical occasion upon which the lord would intervene with some measure or threat of force—to impose "order" at the height of a heated land dispute between two powerful factions. Since virtually all cultivators in the northern Sudan were embroiled as partisans in some such dispute, and those of powerful factions to a greater degree than those whose lowly status and paucity of affiliations threatened no one, the opportunities for intervention by the lord were limitless, particularly in regard to the more numerous and better organized groups of subjects who might otherwise have threatened his position. In all cases, the lord could be assured of the enthusiastic support of whichever faction he chose to favor. The defeated party, in contrast, was more likely to regard itself as the victim of the specific rivals who had defeated it than as inhabitants of a region in which surplus population was continually, although gradually, subject to expulsion from the homeland through demographic pressures, supported at moments of political crisis by the forceful intervention of their social betters.

THE CENTRAL RAINLANDS: PASTORAL PREDOMINANCE

While the whole northern zone lay within the fiefdom of the *manjil* of Qarri, the central rainlands were divided into a series of smaller but well-populated provinces extending from al-Taka in the east to Kordofan in the west. As in the north, cultivation formed the foundation upon which other economic activities rested; however, with the exception of some districts along the Blue Nile, it was an extensive swidden agriculture conducted with a subtle appreciation of the ecological possibilities of the diverse microenvironments of the central zone.[37] Patterns of transhumance between dry season settlements at permanent water sources and remote rainy season fields were common. Both the diverse feudal dues owed by cultivators to noblemen and the taxes paid to the state were similar (in essence though not always in name) to the institutions of the north and do not require further description; however, the status of cultivators within the body politic of the rainland zone differed materially. On the positive side, in a vast region where land was abundant and labor scarce, no cultivator need fear expulsion, new cultivators were always welcome, and land disputes—though not totally unknown—were by no means the universal key to local politics. Unfortunately, these advantages were outweighed by the predominance within the rainland zone of a second basic mode of livelihood that enjoyed greater prestige than cultivation and which completely dominated the political life of the area: the herding of livestock. The relationship between rainland cultivation and pastoralism may be conceived in abstract terms as the tendency of the accumulated agricultural wealth of the rainlands to be concentrated in the form of livestock. At the individual level, a consistently successful farmer would invest in livestock until he reached the point of diminishing returns in his cultivation, when he would become a pastoralist; conversely, an impoverished pastoralist had no choice but to adopt the occupation of a cultivator. Sometimes whole groups of subjects made one or the other of these transitions, and indeed those whose position was marginal could be observed in "the habit of changing from village to nomad life and vice-versa from time to time."[38] But in all cases cultivators were by definition poorer and in practical terms weaker than the pastoralists.

The pastoral mode of livelihood required seasonal movements, both to take advantage of changing supplies of water and grazing and, in the case of many southerly regions, to escape insect parasites during the rainy season. Discrete pastoral groups evolved in response to these alternative sets of migratory possibilities which, like the institutions of traditional cultivation, had already been thoroughly explored and tested before the Funj period. Within the limits of the carrying capacity of each pastoral group's range, there was a maximum optimal size for each human community at which the number of animals matched the number of hands available to tend them.[39] In practice, however, a successful interrelated group of pastoral families would seek not only to attain this maximum optimal size but to exceed it, the justification being political rather than overtly economic.

Political power was exercised on at least two fronts, one external and one internal. From the perspective of the pastoralist (in contrast to that of the cultivator) the land resources of the central zone were limited, and each group of herdsmen was impelled either to defend the boundaries of the territory it exploited (if the group was comparatively weak) or to forcibly expand them (if comparatively strong). The terms under which these implicit external political conflicts could be acted out were mediated by the state. The provincial nobility, supported if necessary by the national authorities, extended (or withheld) the formal recognition of each pastoral group as a legitimate political unit ("tribe") within the kingdom and defined the boundaries of the homeland (*dar*) within which each group so constituted would be allowed to live. The internal politics of a pastoral tribe involved competition among member subgroups for the use of the limited resources of the *dar* and for power within the tribe itself. As successful subgroups expanded their flocks and herds beyond the maximum optimal level, they were obliged to hire additional herders—usually drawn from the ranks of the poorer subgroups and usually young men at the bottom of a social ladder along which wealth and influence tended to accumulate with age. With their wages, which were pain in kind, these hired hands founded their own herds and flocks or paid bridewealth and started their own families. They also incurred political debts that tended to make them partisans of their benefactor, whose profit from his supernumerary livestock lay precisely in the acquisition of such support. Even a successful program of self-aggrandizement had its limits, however. In their attempt to live together and to coordinate their routine activities, the larger groups greatly exacerbated the strain upon the pasture and water resources of their *dar*; sometimes the larger groups divided amicably for reasons of convenience, but often they were rent by internal animosities, commonly couched in the form of a succession dispute to the chieftainship upon the death of an exceptionally able leader. The division of a hitherto dominant house also opened an opportunity to the claims to tribal leadership of a rival group whose expansion had not yet reached the critical point. These internal tensions, like those between tribes, were mediated by the state, whose recognition was necessary for the legitimate and effective exercise of power. As among northern cultivators, the sharpest internal divisions were often between the strongest pastoral factions, so that the provincial nobleman could be assured of a sizeable sympathetic faction in any case of intervention.

The rate of taxation by the state upon the pastoralists was fixed by custom at one-tenth of the flocks and herds each year. As in the case of the northern cultivators, the role of the government's assessors was crucial; each year the tribal leader was expected to present "a well-verified inventory of his whole stock," and "if it was discovered that any concealment of number, or quality, had been made . . . any fraud, whether real or alleged was punished with great severity."[40] The tax burden assigned for the coming year was then apportioned among the households at a tribal council. Payments were made gradually during the year, with incentives for early payment and a scale of penalties of increasing

rigor for the tardy or noncompliant. The payment of taxes for the year past and the assessment for the year to come were carried out at a point in the seasonal migration cycle which placed the pastoralists within reach of the armed forces of the state. Among northern herdsmen this was usually the dry season when they were obliged to gather at permanent sources of water, while among the great southern tribes it was the rainy season when they were forced to emerge out of the remote south because of insects. In the words of a contemporary observer, "however great their numbers, encumbered with families and baggage as they were, they had always fallen a sacrifice to those troops, well-mounted and armed, that awaited them."[41] As in the north, the threat of force was usually sufficient.

THE SOUTH: ALTERNATIVES TO AGRICULTURE

The greater part of the southern region of Sinnar, which included the hill country of the southern Gezira and adjoining terrain to the east and west in the foothills of the Ethiopian massif and the Nuba Mountains, was inherited by the Funj from their medieval Alodian and Makurian predecessors but never incorporated into the formal administrative structure of provinces. Rather, the plethora of Funj noblemen in the south enjoyed a variety of tributary relationships, sometimes of direct dependence upon the sultan, as in the case of Taqali, but more frequently upon vassals of lesser rank. For a variety of reasons to be discussed below, the precise structure of these relationships before 1762 is not clear.[42] The southern environment allowed both cultivation on the rainland pattern and the herding of livestock; almost all southern subjects engaged in one or both of these activities, and in that regard their relationship to their immediate feudal overlords did not differ greatly from that of their counterparts in the central rainlands. If they also paid taxes in the form of crops or livestock to the national treasury, however, evidence is not at hand.

The distinguishing feature of the southern environment which set it apart from all other portions of the Funj kingdom was the presence of nonagricultural resources whose value, from the perspective of the state, exceeded that to be derived from cultivation or herding. A list of these resources, not necessarily complete, would certainly include honey, iron, the skins of spotted cats, rhinoceros horn, civet, ivory, slaves, and above all gold. Whether produced by hunting and gathering or by mining, each called for the diversion of labor from the basic agricultural activities, a regional specialization evident throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the importation of grain out of the central rainlands to feed the south.[43] The lion's share of the non agricultural commodities produced by the southern commoners passed directly to the nobility as feudal dues and thence, in large part, as tribute to the national government.[44] For example, a subject who killed a leopard or who found an unusually large cache of gold dust must turn his bonanza over to the local lord, who would reward him with more modest gifts appropriate to his station.[45] Some of the feudal dues were payable only in exotic southern products; for example, in

some districts the subject must pay a sum of gold dust to his lord in order to obtain permission to conduct a burial.[46] When subtle measures such as these failed, groups of subjects were forcibly moved to the banks of auriferous watercourses—regardless of the agricultural potential of the surrounding area—and commanded to pan for gold during the months of the washing season following the rains.[47] Since there was little positive incentive for the subjects to turn aside from their life-giving fields and flocks to obtain nonagricultural commodities, the nobility applied a modicum of naked force; the result was a society that differed markedly from the Funj provinces of the northern and central zone.

To secure the labor of their subjects the southern noblemen imposed a condition which may be called "institutionalized insecurity." At the individual level, this meant that any deviant or unproductive southern subject could be enslaved.[48] At the collective level, groups of subjects who attempted to evade submission to Sinnar by seeking refuge in the hidden corners of a vast and thinly populated region were hunted down and raided by the cavalry of the nobility until each band was persuaded to seek the protection of the lord. [49] Low intensity endemic warfare among the subjects themselves was encouraged, for such disputes could be manipulated to serve the nobleman's interests; conspicuously, he might accept slaves captured from among a defeated faction in lieu of tribute from the victorious party. The consequences of the system of institutionalized insecurity, which probably long antedated the period of Funj rule over the southern region, included the relatively small total size of the subject population and its fragmentation into a dozen or more small ethnic groups, each intensely conservative in outlook, often suspicious of or actively hostile toward its neighbors, and conspicuously lacking the elaborate internal structure of political and cultural institutions characteristic of otherwise similar groups who developed in freedom from responsibility toward a state.[50]

THE STATE AS MEDIATOR

A fundamental task of the state in Sinnar was the preservation of a social order within which the relationship between subject and lord constituted an important dimension, and there existed institutions by which the power of the state could be introduced into this relationship to strengthen the hand of the nobleman if his dominance faltered or to loosen his grip if it were excessive. The first set of institutions, already encountered in the preceding discussion, was devoted to the collection of information; one may recall the preoccupation of the national authorities with the identity and status of all, the registers of resident aliens, the ubiquitous royal couriers, the attentive network of Funj princesses at vassal courts, the cycle of visitations by noblemen to the capital, and the seasonal circuits of the royal treasury agents. It was not easy to keep secrets in Sinnar.

One common form of disturbance in the subject-lord relationship was the failure by a chieftain of pastoralists to collect the assessed tax on herds and flocks. In such an instance the central government would send soldiers to the

province; they might simply raid the offending group and carry off man and beast, or they might take the group's leaders as hostages until the arrears were forthcoming. In all cases, the national agents would impose a healthy surcharge upon the delinquents, who thus had every incentive to forestall sultanic intervention by prompt payment.[51] Not all sultanic interventions were necessarily painful to the subjects. In times of hunger and hardship the king was expected to open the granaries of the royal treasury and feed his people,[52] and he often rewarded humble subjects whose loyalty was especially dear to him.[53] The degree to which state intervention in the economic life of the countryside had become accepted and institutionalized is evident in the fact that some features of the internal administration of a pastoral tribe were pegged to the annual tax payment. Since the tax rate was fixed, an increase in the absolute size of the payment implied prosperity, and the tribal authorities were allowed to exact a special excise tax for their own benefit. Conversely, if the absolute size of the tribe's tax fell, redistributive measures were taken to reinforce the position of poor families at the expense of the wealthy.[54]

Aside from these important but simple forms of intervention, the legal system of Sinnar gave the central government access to even the most minute ripples in the social tranquility. To be sure, justice was ordinarily administered by the local lord in the name of the high king, but there were two channels by which the nobleman's authority could be circumvented. First, the sultan claimed original jurisdiction over all cases whatsoever, and if it pleased him to summon the parties to a dispute and to pass judgment, or to dispatch his representative to the scene to do so, no one could gainsay him.[55] A contemporary document describes the sultan's resolution of a boundary dispute in the north which had defied solution by the district and provincial authorities:

> Sultan Badi [IV] sent couriers with them. They were Muhammad al-Faqir walad `Imran and al-Badawi the son of the paternal uncle of the *jundi*, Taktak. Shaykh Muhammad al-Amin b. al-Shaykh Mismar [the Walad `Ajib, or *manjil* of the northern province] sent with them the *arbab* Badawi the son of his paternal uncle. When the couriers of Sultan Badi and of the Walad `Ajib arrived, a great crowd of people of the countryside were present, and the old cultivators who knew the boundaries. [The three couriers then demarcated the boundary under dispute.] . . . . And in the presence of the great crowd the courier of Sultan Badi imposed a fine of 1000 [*qirsh*, or silver coins], payable to the king, upon whomsoever should trespass so much as a hand's breadth across this boundary from east or west. The courier of the Walad `Ajib likewise said: "Whosoever trespasses a single hand's breadth across this boundary is subject to a fine of 1000 *qirsh*."[56]

Second, any subject could appeal the ruling of a local nobleman to the court of a higher lord, and ultimately to the sultan himself.[57] The higher authority always had the right to hear such an appeal but might elect not to do so; a contemporary document records how an appeal to the sultan by a group of north-

ern subjects was referred back to the court of a provincial nobleman for final disposition.[58] Moreover, appeals to the crown were discouraged by making them perilous; a conspicuous feature of sultanic justice was that the defeated party, regardless of the nature or magnitude of his offense, was promptly executed.[59] A final feature of the legal interactions between subjects and the government was that each group of commoners was held collectively responsible for the behavior of all its members. If a person accused of a crime fled, his kinsmen would be chained or imprisoned until he surrendered;[60] if a theft took place in a village, or if stolen property were found there, all community members were fined. The application of these principles gave the lords a powerful instrument of social control over the subjects; while foreign observers might regard the system of collective responsibility as unfair, they were quick to add that it "produced good effects upon the social order."[62] It succeeded admirably in mobilizing the assistance of the commoners in defending it.

In summary, there existed a sharp social division between the ruling nobility of Sinnar and the subjects. In all cases the subjects owed their lords a diverse set of feudal dues and services, and they usually also paid a tax to the state treasury. The modes of payment were adapted to the resources of Sinnar's three major regions: the north, where cultivation prevailed; the central rainlands, dominated by pastoralists; and the south, where the search for gold and other nonagricultural commodities ruled. The central government interposed itself between lord and subject in a variety of ways, as the interests of state might decree.

7

Exchange

The diverse resources of the Funj kingdom afforded many opportunities for exchange between its inhabitants and provided some goods suitable for export to the outside world. Exchange, like other aspects of economic life, was subject to the control and oversight of the ruling elite. The application of this authority was not uniform; one may distinguish three spheres of exchange activity, each with its own categories of participants, characteristic location, commodities and media of exchange, and mode of elite control.[1]

The first sphere of exchange may be designated "local;" it involved the exchange between members of a single community of commodities and services generated within that community. Ordinarily, local exchange did not employ any form of money, nor did it take place at any specific building, location, or time. In addition to the barter of tangible objects, local exchange often entailed the creation of rather elaborate reciprocal obligations that might be discharged in diverse ways into the distant future. The ultimate expression of local exchange was the bridewealth (*sadaq* or *mahr*) customarily paid at a first marriage by the family of the groom to that of the bride. Not only was this payment of fundamental importance in defining the wealth and status of the new couple within its home community, but it also tended to mark the limits of the self-maximizing capacity of the groom's parents.[2] In other words, Sinnar was a society in which wealth did not pass from generation to generation at the death of the parent, but rather at the maturity of the child, ordinarily signified by marriage.[3] While the individual acts of local exchange defied regulation by their sheer number and awesome complexity, it was quite possible for the authorities to apply controls upon bridewealth, an aggregate index of local exchange activity.

The government of Sinnar assumed responsibility for the regulation of bridewealth payments. This function was exercised in the first instance by the district and provincial noblemen. A traveler through northern Sinnar observed that the prevailing bridewealth rate "conformed to that which was set by the local government,"[4] while a provincial ruler such as `Abd Allah b. `Ajib, *manjil* of Qarri, earned a part of his reputation for wise and just rule through his bridewealth policy: "Now Shaykh `Abd Allah was a just ruler, an ardent follower of the faith and an observer of the Qur'an. During his rule he ordered that when women were married smaller dowries should be paid, and the result was an increase in the number of marriages and consequently of births."[5] It was the central government, however, which held the final authority over bride-

wealth rates, enforced through the office of "Supervisor of Bridewealth" (*muqaddam al-mahr*).[6] While the *muqaddam al-mahr* occasionally held a seat at the sultan's court,[7] his activities resembled more closely those of the sultan's tax assessors in that he traveled throughout the country, dealing directly with the subjects, and if necessary overturning the policies of district or provincial noblemen. The office of *muqaddam al-mahr* was revived by the Turkish colonial authorities, and the routine functions of this official were described—with appropriately Romantic flourishes—by a traveler of 1848:

> He is a man of religion and travels around the whole Sudan from village to village and from town to town. He finds out whether there are girls who are willing and able to get married and asks them whether or not they already have somebody in mind. If the answer is YES, then the young man designated is fetched willy-nilly and married to her. He sets the bridewealth himself according to his own good judgment. So that he will not be disturbed in the discharge of his office, the government has given him a *khawas* or servant, who brings contrary-minded fathers back to reason, collects the appropriate marriage-fees for the *nazir* [official] and serves as his general assistant for worldly affairs.[8]

From this description it is apparent that the result of an act of intervention by the government in the bridewealth affairs of a community was the activation of an old northern Sudanese institution known as *kora* marriage.[9] It differed from ordinary marriage in two ways. The amount and forms of wealth that changed hands at marriage were publicly fixed at a uniform standard lower than the prevailing rates, and communitywide compliance was ensured by the practice of public mass marriages of all eligible community members. The political consequences of the imposition of *kora* marriage upon a community may be imagined—a burst of royalist enthusiasm on the part of the young, the poor, and those in love, while the miserly hopes of the prosperous and calculating of that generation were dashed.

The second sphere of exchange activity was regional and sometimes national in scope, and it may best be identified by the location where it occurred, the *suq* or marketplace. This type usually involved the immediate transfer of tangible and portable commodities and lacked the subtle and prolonged intricacies of the local sphere. Most of the commodities exchanged in the marketplace were produced within Sinnar; a few illustrative examples might include the exchange of the animal products of pastoralists for the agricultural goods of sedentary folk, of the iron of the Ethiopian borderlands for the cloth of the Blue Nile and that of northern Kordofan for the dates of Dongola, and the salt of the north for the honey of the south. The distribution and periodicity of markets developed in response to the exchange potential between different groups of producers and the dictates of their respective life-styles and the climate. Northern markets were held at regular intervals throughout the year at specific, otherwise empty sites on the margin between cultivated land and the desert. Each

pastoral tribe of the rainlands participated in an annual fair, held at the border of its *dar* at that season when its migratory cycle brought it into closest contact with sedentary society. Southern markets were confined to the dry season when transport in the region was possible and were situated at a nobleman's capital for security. The traders who appeared in the marketplaces of Sinnar were usually Sudanese and were usually themselves involved in the production of the goods they offered for sale rather than professional middlemen. However, individuals who devoted a comparatively large proportion of their time to marketplace trading were often identified as *jallaba*, a term connoting movement from place to place for the purpose of small-scale trade.

As did so many other rights in Sinnar, the privilege of conducting a market derived ultimately from the sultan but was ordinarily exercised on his behalf by local noblemen.[10] A licensed market sponsor would authorize a time and place for market activities (usually merely endorsing an arrangement long sanctioned by custom) and provide security for those who came to trade. The latter responsibility was particularly conspicuous in the south, where a corps of inviolate messengers entitled "Master of the Road" (*sid al-darb*)[11] would each year negotiate the terms of a fragile and localized truce under which the regional nobility might be prevailed upon to relax their institutionalized insecurity to allow a season of trade among their subjects. At the southern marketplace of Kirin, for example, each participating group of subjects was served by its own "consular representation" at the court of the market's sponsor, the local *makk*.[12] Northern and central noblemen also prided themselves on maintaining the peace and security of their markets.[13] The precise terms under which a subject was allowed to enter the lands of a lord not his own for the purpose of trade were subsumed under the institution of the *adhari* or protector of strangers, commonly a function undertaken by the local noble host:

> An *adhari* is a guarantor whom the stranger selects for himself from among the tribe through whose territory he must pass or where he must spend time. The *adhari* furnishes the stranger with lodging, water, wood for cooking; he must defend him like his own brother if he is molested in his goods or his person. In return for this he has a fixed right in the business which the traveler is able to conduct in the land, if he is a merchant—as is almost always the case.[14]

Access to a Funj market was a privilege, and no market was so secure that one could enter it against the will of its sponsor. The lord's control over access to his market was at all times a significant tool of social control and on occasion a vital one; for example, southern subjects were compelled to surrender firearms they had captured or else be excluded from the markets of the local lords, upon which they depended for salt.[15]

Considerable quantities of gold and numbers of imported coins found their way into the villages of Sinnar, but they passed through the local marketplaces into private hands as commodities, to be hoarded in the form of jewelry both for their beauty and as a store of value.[16] The marketplaces of the Funj

kingdom, as foreign visitors were quick to notice, did not ordinarily use coins: "All is done by exchange of commodities, as in primitive times."[17] The terms of each exchange were settled by bargaining: "In this land it is not the custom that one offers his wares [at a set price], but rather, that the purchaser must say how much he wants to give for them. If the seller is not satisfied with that price, and thinks it too small, he says '*iftah Allah*,' that is, 'open your hand to give more.' This goes on until the seller is satisfied, or until another purchaser offers more."[18] As a result of these practices the marketplace tended to respond to the law of supply and demand, "the value of goods varying according to the scarcity or plenty of one sort of commodity with respect to the other."[19] Closer examination, however, revealed that most exchanges were not simple barter, but rather employed local currencies other than coins. These, which varied in frequency of usage from region to region, included units of grain, iron, cloth, and salt for smaller purchases and cattle or gold for larger ones.[20] In addition to serving as media of exchange, they possessed a commodity value and were bought and sold for their intrinsic worth. Furthermore, as commodities they were subject to taxation.

When the government of Sinnar assessed taxes, it did so in the expectation that most payments would be in kind, that herdsmen would pay in livestock, cultivators in grain or cotton, and so forth. The authorities accommodated the presence of exchange activity among the producers by assessing the taxes not strictly in kind, but in terms of an abstract money of account. In the central pastoral zone, for example, "the different tribes possessing so many camels, or so many other cattle, have a quantum laid upon them at an average value. This is paid in gold, or in slaves, the rest in kind."[21] To implement this system the government of Sinnar was obliged to fix the value of each of the commodities to be accepted as payment in relation to the value of all the others. Since the monies of account used in tax assessment were identical to those employed in the marketplace—usually in their larger denominational units such as a "cow"[22]—and since most participants in marketplace exchange were also producers, whose calculations of profit perforce included the potential value of the commodities exchanged in the eyes of the tax collector, the government of Sinnar in effect was able to determine the limits within which the law of supply and demand would be allowed to operate.[23] The participants in marketplace exchange paid a tax called *quwwar* to the market's sponsor.[24] As were the taxes on production, the *quwwar* was assessed in terms of a local currency, such as units of cotton cloth, but was payable in a variety of forms. If payment was offered in a form other than that in which the tax was assessed, it was the market sponsor who determined the relative value.[25]

The sultan of Sinnar also sponsored a market, but the trade conducted there differed to such an extent that it could be considered a third sphere of exchange. The first distinguishing feature of the sultanic trade was that it involved the exchange of Sudanese products—conspicuously but not exclusively gold, ivory, and slaves—against foreign goods imported from abroad. At the dawn of the

Heroic Age this exchange took place at only one location, the national *bandar* of the city of Sinnar.[26] The nationality and wares of each international trader entering the kingdom were recorded at the border and dispatched posthaste to the sultan.[27] Although it was considered correct for traders to give small presents to the vassal lords through whose territories they passed en route to the capital, they were not allowed to linger in the provinces or to do business there.[28] The resulting concentration of foreign trade in the capital was conspicuous in 1701:

> In all Africa . . . Sinnar is close to being the greatest trading city. Caravans are continually arriving from Cairo, Dongola, Nubia, from across the Red Sea, from India, Ethiopia, [Dar] Fur, Bornu, the Fezzan, and other kingdoms . . . . After Cairo, it is one of the most populous cities. Every day a public market is held on the square [the *fashir* in front of the sultan's palace] in the best possible order.[29]

The cosmopolitan community of foreigners in the capital included men from Egypt, Ethiopia, Dar Fur, Libya, Morocco, West Africa, the Hijaz, the Yemen, India, Syria, Palestine, Turkey, Armenia, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, France, Germany, and Portugal. Since the foreigners had no hereditary position within the body politic of Sinnar, a special social category was created for them. Based upon the assumption that most foreigners were traders, all were called *khawajas* ("great merchants," according to a contemporary definnition[30]), a term which lingered on through the Heroic Age when foreigners were few,[31] and which survives in Sudanese usage today. The favored position of the *khawajas* is obvious in the comment by one of them that Sinnar was "a free city, and men of any nationality or faith may live in it without a single hindrance,"[32] while the fact that *khawaja* status was defined in specific and precise terms by Funj customary law may be inferred from the surviving stipulation, by way of example, that the penalty for striking a *khawaja* was four times that for striking a commoner.[33] A special cemetery was set aside for non-Muslim (usually Christian) *khawajas* who died in Sinnar,[34] and the property of a deceased *khawaja* was officially registered and stored until it could be claimed by his kinsmen or business partners, who were notified in their homeland far away by agents of the Funj government.[35] The *khawajas* were assigned to the oversight of the several high court officials: "All foreigners who come into this kingdom must choose as a protector one of the four highest nobles in the kingdom . . . who is then obligated to help him in all difficulties and distress."[36] This patron, the royal counterpart to the *adhari* of the regional sphere of exchange, provided the *khawaja* with a place to live, introduced him at court and represented his interests there, and undoubtedly kept a close eye on all his activities. It was also the task of the patron to supervise the client *khawaja*'s trading activities.[37]

The sultan (together with the court officials who carried out his will) was generally agreed to be the greatest merchant in Sinnar.[38] Almost all the commodities he offered for exchange—including gold, ivory, slaves, civet, and rhinoceros horn—came from the southern Funj kingdom. It was said in theory

that the sultan exercised a monopoly over the production of gold[39] and that he received one-half of all slaves captured by the *salatiya*;[40] based on comparison with later practices in the same region, he may have claimed one-half the ivory also. In practice, it would seem that the nonagricultural commodities of the south usually passed from the subject producers to their lords as feudal dues, and from the latter to the sultan as tribute, a process of upward concentration encouraged by the bestowal of counter-presents in a different form at each level but undoubtedly accompanied by a measure of "leakage." However imperfect, the sultan's monopolies were sufficient to place at his disposal a predominant share of those trade goods the *khawaja*s desired.

At the opening of his trading activities, each *khawaja* was assessed a fee for his use of the royally sponsored exchange facilities, an obligation analogous to the market dues of the lower, regional sphere of exchange.[41] He was also expected to deliver a portion of his imported goods to the king as a present, "royal greetings" chosen for their intrinsic value, rarity, and appropriateness to the kingly ambience. The next two stages of trade were also exchanges between the *khawaja* and the monarch, but at this point the king often delegated his authority to the merchant's patron or other court official. First, the king or his agent claimed possession of the merchant's entire stock of certain goods, for example, firearms and gunpowder, which only the king could legitimately purchase. Second, the king or his agent exercised a right of first choice over the merchant's entire stock, selecting the quantity and quality desired of all his wares. The king or his agent would then give the *khawaja* Sudanese commodities in payment for the imported wares selected, although often only after a rather prolonged delay. Meanwhile, other members of the royal family and state officials would take their turns in visiting the merchant to accept presents appropriate to their rank and to select wares from what the king had left behind. When the high officials had completed their selection, the king might allow the merchant to expose his wares to all and sundry in the public market, or even to travel from place to place in the kingdom to dispose of his remaining goods. At this stage even a commoner could buy, if he had sufficient wealth and if the merchant had goods which individuals of lowly status were allowed to own. A wise king endeavored to send the traders away content, and if any subject, high or low, failed to pay a *khawaja* for goods taken in purchase, the king undertook to enforce the terms of the transaction. When a *khawaja* had disposed of all the imported wares he had, or could expect to sell, and had received Sudanese goods in payment, he began the process of departure. The king or his agent advised the merchant as to which goods would be most suitable for importation on future journeys and bestowed a farewell present. Sometimes this was small and of primarily symbolic value, but in other instances the authorities encouraged the *khawaja* to accept the advance of quantities of export goods, thus co-opting his services. In either case, when the negotiations were complete the king granted the *khawaja* permission to depart, often couched in the form of a written *laissez-passer*. The merchant

would join an outward-bound caravan and leave the kingdom, as he had arrived, under the royal aegis.[42]

If the institutions enumerated above constituted a restraint of trade to those *khawajas* who expected to receive their reward from the free market's Invisible Hand, they provided a golden opportunity to the ones willing and qualified to join the sultan's commercial establishment as what travelers of the day called "royal merchants."[43] The king was not unaware that his products would bring a better return in Jidda or Cairo than in his own capital, and that choicer goods were often available abroad; therefore, he took the initiative in organizing caravans to the outside world—twice a year to Egypt and the Red Sea, and to other destinations.[44] Each caravan was placed under the guidance and command of a *khabir*, usually a citizen of Sinnar with experience in the outside world.[45] The caravan was accompanied by kettledrums symbolic of the king's authority and, at least on the Egyptian route, by a squadron of cavalry.[46] The caravan was not restricted to royal merchants, and greater of lesser numbers of *jallaba* from among the subjects attached themselves to it in the hope of profiting from their modest ventures.

Some flavor of the internal organization of a caravan may be found in a participant's account of the departure of the summer expedition to Egypt in 1702:

> On the sixth of August [1702] `Abdin, the guide and commander of the caravan, had all the *jallaba* called together before sundown by the customary beating of the kettledrum. After prayers, they placed themselves in a circle on the bare earth, with feet crossed over each other, and he made a speech concerning the four following points. Firstly, tomorrow he intended that they should enter the very dangerous Bayuda desert, full of Arabs and rebellious subjects. *Inshallah*, that is, "if God wills." (The Turks [Muslims] use this word in regard to all future things and intentions.) Because the enemy was very strong each and every one should fight and defend themselves with weapons; if there was an encounter, they should fight and defend themselves like knights to the last man. To this they bound themselves by their customary oath, *wa-Allahi*, that is, "By God!" Then he ordered the caravan, which was more than two thousand five hundred camels strong and could offer stiff resistance to the enemy, that they should not separate far from each other, but should rather march at all times together. Finally, he added that if one or another of the *jallaba* was not completely ready for the journey he should openly say so, so that everyone could help him and he would not be prevented from making the journey. Eveyone assented to this speech, and so that nothing would be missing they prayed, and then returned to their lodgings to the beat of the kettledrum.[47]

Concerning the mutual assistance practiced by caravaneers the traveler elsewhere noted: "This praiseworthy custom is observed, that if a camel falls and dies, people divide the wares that that camel is carrying among the caravan and

carry them to the last place where water is dug out, where they are returned to their owner. But if a camel dies in inhabited land, one is not obliged to take such wares."[48] The defensive precautions were essential, and the price for becoming separated from the caravan could well be death.[49]

Upon arrival at the destination, the *khabir* and other royal merchants disposed of the king's goods and took on a supply for the return to Sinnar. The sultan did not depend on the vagaries of the market at the time the caravan arrived, but kept permanent business agents at major foreign centers to make purchases on his behalf.[50] These agents were posted in Egypt throughout the eighteenth century,[51] in Jidda,[52] in Ethiopia,[53] and possibly elsewhere. In addition to making purchases of foreign goods for the king, these agents were instructed to attract to the Funj kingdom foreigners with goods or skills of particular value. Aside from a new generation of merchant *khawajas*, they would recruit foreign physicians, watchmakers, swordsmiths, gunsmiths, and Islamic intellectuals. These men, on their arrival in the capital, were assigned a patron, exempted from taxation, and attached to the royal court;[54] here as elsewhere in the sultanic sphere of exchange, the king dominated the commerce by controlling the persons of those who conducted it.

8

Kings of Sun and Shadow

Every society creates for itself an ideology, a science of ideas. It defines the terms of discourse within which social realities may be expressed; it explains why society is organized as it is and asserts that this organization is preferable to any other conceivable arrangement. Sinnar was a state society, and its ideology included rationalizations for the subordination of some to others. It was a heterogeneous society comprising several regional subcultures. At the dawn of the Heroic Age, the tensions implicit in these unequal relationships and in cultural diversity had been contained within time-honored institutional vessels; the society was stable, and the ideological sentiments of its constituent groups had been forged into a coherent whole. Ideological rationalizations defined the range of comprehensible social roles and set the patterns of conduct expected of those who occupied them. All of these rationalizations were important to the preservation of society, but not all were equally important to the maintenance of the Funj state; this study is confined to an examination of a few ideological elements explicitly formulated for the purpose of explaining and justifying the existence of the sultanate.

Each of the social institutions treated previously had its ideological justification; for example, a nobleman not only practiced deference toward his inlaws, but also believed as a matter of principle that it was right and proper to do so. In many cases the principles of state ideology greatly resembled those current at lower levels of the social hierarchy. For example, the conduct of the king and his relatives, the Funj elite, in their dealings with one another and with the subjects, should be that of an ordinary family writ large; or again, the protection offered by the sultan to foreign traders resembled the more general institution of the *adhari*. The ideological themes to be addressed here differ from those mentioned above in that the institutional mechanisms for actualizing them were infrequently exercised. Unlike the daily practice of deference toward inlaws, for example, they existed primarily in the form of prescriptive mental constructs (often couched in the form of etiological legends or folk tales) which defined a set of realities infrequently seen. That these ideological principles were frequently invoked by name but rarely acted upon does not by any means imply that they were insignificant. On the contrary, they addressed precisely the most dire of conceivable misfortunes—death by plague or starvation, foreign invasion, the tyranny of the mighty, and the willful practice of evil.

Many ideologies, including that of Sinnar, have extended their sphere of reference beyond the human community and its material realities, that is, they contain elements of religion. While acknowledging its debt to the tradition of religiously oriented scholarship, this study prefers to regard the ideology of Sinnar as a human creation. Human ingenuity may give rise to ideological statements at any time, but it is common for society to borrow its ideological truths from its own historical experience and occasionally from that of influential neighbors. At the dawn of the Heroic Age Sinnar derived its ideology both from its own past and from the belief structures of neighboring lands; the available sources do not suggest that individual innovators had played a prominent role. Some elements of the ideology of Sinnar were Islamic; some were not. All were preserved by the Funj because they contributed to the maintenance of the state, and this common purpose gave them coherence.

The state ideology of Sinnar was structured to serve two aspects of the social dynamic. The first set of ideological forms was general and integrative, expressing the excellence and unity of the society in its relations with the outside world. The second set was hierarchical and particularistic, articulating the authority and legitimacy of the state over each descending level of society while adapting itself in conformity to the cultural peculiarities of the diverse groups of subjects. The Funj king stood at the nexus of both sets of ideological forms, which were united in his person. A contemporary allusion to this duality of the royal vocation as conceived intellectually in Sinnar may perhaps be found in the title attributed to the first and archtypical sultan. ʿAmara I was remembered by his people for three centuries as the "King of Sun and Shadow" (*malik al-shams wa'l-zill*),[1] a title interpreted by modern informants to mean the ruler of day and night, of the north and the south, of light-skinned people and dark, of Funj and commoners, of things seen and unseen, exoteric and esoteric, Islamic and non-Islamic.[2]

Islam supplied the ideological concepts by which the corporate identity of Sinnar within the world of nations was expressed. From an outside perspective as mediated by travelers, Sinnar was recognized as an Islamic state from its inception.[3] Visitors with claims to intellectual or spiritual gifts in the Islamic sense were welcomed and received royal patronage, while the stronger of the early sultans were fondly remembered in later years as men who had contributed to Islam as well as benefited from it, having sent riches to the Holy Cities or to other deserving pious causes abroad.[4] Tradition maintained that the orthodoxy of the state, as represented by its king, was vital to the status of Sinnar in the world at large and even to its right to an independent existence. Thus it was said that when the Ottoman sultan Selim the Grim—having just annexed Egypt—decided to add the newly founded kingdom of Sinnar to his possessions, the first Funj sultan had written him a polite letter to the effect that the proposed conquest was unnecessary as the Sudanese were already Muslims, in support of which contention he appended their Arab genealogies. "When the two writings reached Sultan Selim," it was said, "their contents amazed him, and

he turned aside from the war of [against] Sinnar."[5] Similarly, when the Funj defeated and expelled an invasion by the Ethiopians it was said that the pious prayers of all the nation had contributed to the victory (the sultan remained in the capital to lead the prayers while his army marched forth to victory), that the Ethiopians had been undone by a gratuitously atrocious sacrilege against a Muslim along the way, and that the other great leaders of the Islamic world had sent congratulations and appreciation to the sultan.[6] In short, Sinnar's contacts with the outside world were made comprehensible and legitimate through their conduct in a conventionally Islamic idiom.

All obedient subjects of the Islamic sultan of Sinnar were Muslims by definition and could neither be killed on the grounds of unbelief nor enslaved. The less sophisticated groups of subjects expressed their corporate participation in the Islamic nation through ideological statements such as the assertion that their eponymous ancestors had "come from Sinnar."[7] Some of the external cultural manifestations of Islam, notably male circumcision, were almost universally practiced. Others were conspicuous by their absence; pork and beer, for example, were dietary staples in many parts of the kingdom, including the capital; literacy was rare even among members of the sultan's court; in the outlying provinces not even the noblemen spoke Arabic, and the basic rituals and tenets of the faith were not widely known. Some traits commonly associated with orthodox Islam were either inaccessible to the subjects of Sinnar by virtue of their expense (such as an exotic lawful diet) or positively forbidden to them by Funj sumptuary laws (for example, the wearing of cloth garments). The fact that these empirical deviations may seem unacceptable to a modern Muslim, and have even inspired one twentieth-century European to call the subjects of southern Sinnar *Heiden Neger* ("heathen blacks"), is quite irrelevant; from the perspective of the Funj king, the customs of his subjects in no way compromised their participation in the corporate Islam of Sinnar.

The ideological idiom in which the relations between the government of Sinnar and its subjects was expressed was inherited from the Sudanese past. The idiom was drawn from the cultural lexicon described as "divine" or "Sudanic" kingship, and it invites comparison to that of many other African states.[8] In early times this ideological idiom was common to all parts of Sinnar, but during the Heroic Age it was supplanted by other forms in the northern provinces, a transition to be discussed in Part Two. From an analytical perspective, the pre-Islamic ideology of kingship provided the intellectual justification for the Funj sultanate, a rationale frequently couched in terms of the basic human need for nourishment and communicated through the medium of folk tales:

> Now the start of their [the Funj] rule, according to what passes on people's tongues concerning the beginning of the matter of the Funj, is that they were in a place called Lul . . . . And the common story is that their great ones used to gather at the place of their chief, and they would bring food, and the first to arrive ate the kidney. And they were living at Jayli, until a man arrived from downstream, and

> settled amongst them, and looked into their affairs. He advised them, and it came to pass that when food came, it was set aside until the company was assembled. Then he would get up, and distribute it among them, and they would eat, and the remainder would be left over. So they said, "A holy man: he shall not leave us." So they married him to the daughter of their king, and she bore a son . . . . So at the time when they appointed a new sultan, they would cause him to marry from among the descendants of that woman . . . and this [custom] remained among them until the end of their kingdom.[9]

Thus, in the elder days before the coming of the kings, one is told, there prevailed a Hobbesian state of nature in which the strongest among the strong were the first come and the first served, the foremost among them winning the most succulent morsel of any slaughtered animal, the internal organs. Latecomers, and those who were not "great ones," took whatever might be left. The reforming culture-hero amended this state of affairs; he gathered all the food available, set it aside until everyone had assembled, and then apportioned it equitably. One is specifically informed that when this practice was observed, a surplus would be left over. The response of the people was to venerate the reformer as a holy man and to make him their king—the first Funj sultan. The image of the king as a serenely disinterested reapportioner of food was reinforced by the tenet of customary orthodoxy that he himself never ate.[10] Sometimes the role of the Funj king as culture-hero was expressed in terms other than food: He was the provider of a safe and fertile homeland; he taught people how to extract gold; he instructed them to cover their nakedness.[11] A Nubian king, it was said, could "make live, or make die."[12] Some of the imperfectly documented court rituals of Sinnar should probably be interpreted in this light. In the rainlands, for example, the lords lit the first fires of the year, which cleared brushland for farming and in some cases were also the occasion for a communal hunt.[13] The sultan, at least once at his coronation and perhaps yearly thereafter, broke ground for cultivation with his own hand, thus acquiring the title of Badi, "farmer."[14]

There was a darker side to the world of concepts over which the sultan reigned. The origin of evil, like that of the monarchy, was explained by means of legend. For example, it was said that when the eponymous ancestor of one group of subjects led his sons "from Sinnar" to their subsequent homeland in the southern provinces, he commanded them to bring him a lion's tail—the skins of the great cats being a common form of tribute payment. Because the sons disobeyed this command their father and lord cursed them; henceforth they would become divided among themselves, quarrel for trivial reasons, and require a stern ruling hand.[15] The ideology of Sinnar thus maintained that the consequence of disobedience to the king was fratricidal conflict. Disobedience there was; heretics could be found who advanced the treasonous notion that the "government ate taxes,"[16] and likewise there were scoffers who claimed that even the high king dined, being fed secretly by confidential messengers.[17] Discord followed.

The theoretical terms in which discord was expressed postulated a world of unseen arcana. Evil men became ghostly hyenas at night, emerging from their mortal bodies to feed invisibly upon the vital essence of their victims. They gathered and secreted roots which spelled doom to the one against whom the malevolent force of the tuber was directed.[18] They made images of their victims and thus worked evil upon them.[19] Such practices were known generically in Arabic as *sihr*, sorcery, and among them the hyena-man, called *massass* or "sucker," was particularly feared. While any community in Sinnar possessed the physical means with which to punish those who practiced *sihr*, it was by no means a simple matter to identify them, since their crimes often left no tangible evidence. It was most fortunate for the well-being of society that all the Funj were said to have a special gift for detecting sorcery.[20] If a lesser Funj nobleman should perhaps fail, the sultan, master of things unseen, would not; for example, if a *massass* approached a certain clay pot filled with water which the sultan possessed, the offender would visibly and involuntarily sprout a long, wagging hyena-tail.[21] In short, the responsibility of each Funj nobleman to personify corporate Islam among his people in no way hindered him from participating directly in the non-Islamic religious activities of his subjects, conducting non-Islamic rites, appointing or deposing non-Islamic religious leaders, and manipulating community sentiments through his authority over the invisible world of *sihr*.[22] Even Islamic talismans written in the town of Sinnar were believed to derive special powers by virtue of having been created in proximity to the sultan.[23]

A dramatic and therefore conspicuous feature of the state ideology of Sinnar held that a Funj ruler, be he the sultan himself or a petty lordling, should be judged periodically and executed if found wanting.[24] While the historical record is by no means littered with the corpses of condemned monarchs, the existence of specific institutions for the discharge of evaluations and executions indicates that this was more than a nebulous sentiment. The mortal accountability of Funj kings was rooted in a general customary belief among at least some of the subjects of Sinnar that elderly, crippled, or otherwise incompetent individuals should have their relatives and friends bury them alive or otherwise dispose of them when they became "a burden to themselves and others."[25] The Funj kings were neither exempted from this social foreclosure on the debt of nature nor unique in their subjection to it. If the ideological principle of king-killing was common to all levels in the feudal hierarchy of Sinnar, the institutional forms for its implementation—and therefore its political significance—differed as one descended the social hierarchy. At the highest level, the sultan lived in a world of restricted access and circumscribed physical movement. Not only were the number of intimates with whom he had contact limited, but also many of them had access to him by virtue of their titled position in the state or family relationship rather than at his pleasure. While neither the intervals at which a sultan was evaluated nor the precise constituency who judged him are known, it was said that the latter was a small panel of the highest nobility

and courtiers, and that the official executioner attended the king daily at the evening prayers.[26] It was said that if a sultan faced death bravely, it would inspire the court to elect his son as his successor, while if he flinched, some other eligible but (to him) less desirable candidate might be chosen.[27] The highest ranking Funj noblemen were bound in a manner similar to that of the sultan, to the degree that they succeeded in replicating in their respective fiefdoms the structure and practices of the sultan's court. Thus the ʿAbdallab *manjil* had his own titled executioner,[28] and the life of the *makk* of Fazughli was said to be in the hands of a few great nobles.[29] Noblemen of intermediate rank lived active, mobile lives and were constrained neither by the formalities of an elaborate court nor the proximate wrath of the people. Unlike either their betters or their inferiors, who were expected to face fate calmly, middle level noblemen appear in the historical record in the act of attempting to evade it through preemptive assassinations, sudden flight, surrounding themselves with loyal bodyguards, and moving from bed to bed several times each night. At the lowest level, along the interface between the Funj nobility and the subjects,, the courts of judgment were held annually in a public place. The populace attended *en masse*, and although the nobleman might be accompanied by armed retainers, under these circumstances the subjects not only participated in the evaluation of their lord but also probably were often in a position to impose their verdict if they determined that he must die. The practice delineated one of the limits to the authority of the Funj government over its subjects, and it was promptly abolished when Arab principles replaced those of the Funj.[30]

Some features of the state ideology of Sinnar took cognizance of the disparate cultural and historical traditions of the various groups who comprised the sultanate. As Brocchi expressed the situation, all the inhabitants of Sinnar were subject to the same king, but they were not all subject to the same law.[31] The informants of Bruce interpreted the ethnically composite character in terms of historical events; the founders of Sinnar had made "the prince of the state they have conquered their lieutenant in the government of his own country afterwards," following suitably humiliating rites of subordination.[32] It is known that formalized and legitimate expressions of particularistic sentiment occurred when a provincial lord arrived in the capital to pay tribute and when he returned to his fief to resume rule over his subjects.[33] The Funj district or provincial lord was said to be a "hostage" of the people he governed.[34]

While Sinnar formed a self-contained cultural area it was not hermetically sealed from the outside world, and some of the foreign influences that penetrated the kingdom could not easily be rationalized in either traditional or Islamic terms. For example, plagues of smallpox—correctly perceived as foreign in origin—swept the land at intervals. At the dawn of the Heroic Age it was obvious to all that smallpox accompanied the great royal caravans on their return from the outside world, but the government and the populace adopted different interpretations of how best to respond. The government chose to establish quarantine officers at the frontier who held incoming caravans until they could

be inspected; if smallpox were found, both the caravan and the inhabitants of the port of entry were to be sequestered for a year and a day until the disease had burnt itself out.[35] It is doubtful whether this ruthless but scientifically sound public health measure was ever in fact strictly enforced; certainly periodic plagues of smallpox continued to evade the controls. The populace of Sinnar, for their part, came to view smallpox as one of the exotic trade goods imported by the foreign *khawajas*, and their response was to shield their children against its worst effects by "buying" it:

> The women are the conductors of this operation in the fairest and driest season of the year, but never at other times. Upon the first hearing of the smallpox anywhere, these people go to the infected place, and, wrapping a fillet of cotton cloth about the arm of the person infected, they let it remain there till they bargain with the mother how many she is to sell them. It is necessary that the terms be discussed judicially, and that the bargain not be made collusively or gratuitously, but that one piece of silver, or more, be paid for their number. This being concluded, they go home, and tie the fillet about their own child's arm; certain, as they say, from long experience, that the child infected is to do well, and not to have one more than the number of pustules that were agreed and paid for.[36]

Like the quarantine system of the government, "buying the smallpox" had some scientific basis, for in some instances it might have the effect of an inoculation. Like the government policy, it was not an entirely satisfactory solution. From an ideological perspective, the popular response to smallpox is rich in irony, for the dread disease was the first, and perhaps for long the only, imported trade good widely purchased by the commoners of Sinnar. It was their introduction to the conceptual world of bourgeois commerce, a theme to be developed in Part Two.

The state ideology of Sinnar was a system of beliefs about the nature and conduct of government. In some cases these ideological elements were purely conceptual, while in others they were supported by institutions, but institutions only infrequently activated. The state ideology of Sinnar was constructed from conceptual elements inherited from the Sudanese past and borrowed from the adjoining world of Islam. Sinnar presented itself to the outside world as an Islamic state, and the Funj government regarded all its subjects as Muslims. At the same time there prevailed many practices and beliefs which were not consistent with orthodox Islam. Both Islamic and non-Islamic elements were structured into a coherent whole that served to rationalize and justify the Funj state.

Ideology maintained that through the function of the system of government described previously, the people of Sinnar owed their well-being to the high king of the Funj. The objective fact of internal discord and discontent was explained as a consequence of present or past disobedience, and this in turn justified the harsher aspects of Funj rule, particularly the system of institutionalized insecurity in the south. The Funj nobility in general and the sultan in particular were

believed to possess arcane and magical powers which permitted them to govern the forces of nature, such as those that brought rain, and to strike down those who willfully practiced evil, conceived in terms of sorcery. If any individual Funj lord failed to live up to his high calling, it was said that he would be judged and executed. While few details are at hand, it is clear that ideological accommodations were made to the peculiar sensibilities of the various regional and ethnic groups who comprised Sinnar. The ideological system of Sinnar was not static but changed in response to amendments in the social realities it was called upon to explain and justify. For example, when the opening of royal caravan routes to the outside world in the mid-seventeenth century appeared to bring plagues of smallpox at somewhat predictable intervals, the theory was formulated that the disease, like other things imported by the *khawajas*, could be tamed and incorporated into the social order by purchasing it for money.

Part Two

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ARABS

9

The Principles of the Arabs

The opening of Sinnar to the outside world during the century between 1650 and 1750 increased the exposure of Nubian Muslims to the cultures of neighboring lands. Two of the closest and most powerful of these were the African states of Ethiopia and Dar Fur, societies broadly similar to Sinnar with whom peaceful or occasionally warlike relations could be conducted without serious threat to the internal organization of the Funj kingdom. But the traveler from Sinnar who descended the Nile into Egypt, or who pressed beyond the eastern frontiers into the Ottoman-dominated basin of the Red Sea, found himself in a different world. The specific features of this foreign society that impressed themselves upon visitors from Sinnar probably reflected the preoccupations which had motivated them to leave their homeland; some of these—not mutually exclusive—included the desire to trade, to acquire advanced education, and to discharge the religious obligation of the Pilgrimage. It is not entirely speculative to assert that the Nubian travelers found much that was stimulating and valuable abroad. How else may one interpret such phenomena of the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century as traders from Dongola who spoke Italian, Turkish and Arabic; the eminent holy man who enjoyed a *succès de scandale* on his return from the Holy Cities by virtue of having adopted the latest luxurious mode of attire; or his equally eminent colleague who used Makka as a pulpit for proclaiming himself the Mahdi and launching a vigorous propaganda campaign against Sultan Badi? [1] Certainly, the positive attitude of the Funj government toward the foreign culture of the north and east is manifest in its patronage of the caravan trade and of the *khawajas* who imported and practiced their alien culture—albeit under rather peculiar circumstances—in the capital of Sinnar itself. Both Nubian travelers abroad and foreign visitors to Sinnar contributed to the flow of alien ideas and values into the Funj kingdom.

But isolated examples of interaction and borrowing, however typical of the age of cosmopolitan confidence in Sinnar, do not do justice to the organized and systematic character of the foreign culture which offered the Nubians not only exotic artifacts and esoteric knowledge but also an authoritative paradigm of how life should be lived and society organized. Highly influential media for the transmission of this comprehensive and prescriptive vision were the textbooks of Islamic law which Nubian students abroad laboriously copied as they studied, and which the intellectuals of Sinnar imported at great effort and expense.[2] In addition to their more strictly religious provisions, neither

surprising nor controversial to Nubian Muslims, such textbooks projected a potentially revolutionary image of a preferable culture very different from that of Sinnar, a world based upon antithetical concepts of personal status and community, descent and inheritance, property and exchange, and source of legitimate authority. In short, the "principles of the Arabs" embodied in these legal texts were not compatible with the social order of Sinnar; if taken seriously and acted upon by people in the Funj kingdom, they would constitute a radical challenge to the *ancien régime*.

As increasing numbers of Nubians from all ranks of society were directly or indirectly exposed to the foreign institutions sanctioned by Islamic law, many came to believe that it was their religious duty and in their own worldly interest to defy certain features of their own culture. The chapters to follow describe the cumulative effect of these innumerable small betrayals, which gradually assumed social and political significance as those who practiced them organized and established their own institutions. At first these were enclaves within Sinnar, then power bases from which to assail the high throne, and finally pathetically inadequate substitutes for the old order of the Funj. As the central government tottered and fell, however, the process of reorganization at lower levels of society not only continued, but also gathered momentum under the rule of the Turks.

The inhabitants of urban and religious enclaves had diverse motives and preoccupations, and their leaders—who were often at odds with one another—exercised a wide variety of styles in the conduct of government. What all enclaves had in common, however, was an allegiance to that portion of the Islamic legal paradigm which maintained that private property existed, postulated that such property possessed a monetary value in relation to specie, and defined the terms by which it could be exchanged. The vernacular idiom in which this allegiance was expressed was the employment of coin currencies, a tongue spoken also by the *khawajas* resident in Sinnar and by fellow businessmen in lands to the north and east. While some specific implications of the use of coin currencies will be explored in various contexts below, it is useful by way of introduction to give an initial overview of the penetration of coin currencies into Sinnar during the course of the Heroic Age.

Travelers who entered the Funj kingdom at the dawn of the Heroic Age were invariably impressed with the absence of coin currencies in the villages and regional markets.[3] They found that the use of specie in exchange was almost exclusively confined to those involved in the sultanic caravan trade to the outside world and was therefore concentrated in the first and foremost enclave of alien economic practice, the national *bandar* of Sinnar. Upon arrival in the capital city they discovered that "the most acceptable currency is gold,"[4] which was not minted but either circulated as dust or wrought into rings of one, one-eighth, and one-sixteenth ounce.[5] The production of gold was monopolized by the royal court, and its market value was pegged to that of the regional market currencies and, ultimately, of all commodities. The sultans assumed that their control over the production of "the most acceptable currency" and over the

terms of exchange offered to the *khawajas* would in effect allow them to define the value of the commodities of Sinnar in relation to those of the outside world, and to keep their gold both in circulation and within the kingdom. As commercial contacts between Sinnar and the lands to the north and east increased, however, this assumption was tested and found wanting, for the monetary currents of the day were running heavily against gold.

It was the fate of Sinnar to exist during three centuries when Western Europe extended acquisitive fingers into all but the most remote corners of the globe and to offer—in gold—a commodity of singular attraction. It was therefore in the monetary sphere that the Funj economy was obliged to make its first concessions to what has been called an economic world system, ultimately rooted in Western Europe but mediated, in the case of Sinnar, by the lesser capitalist economies of the southern Ottoman Empire. Students of money in the Mediterranean world have discerned a series of cycles in specie preference; during an age in which gold was relatively abundant, searches were undertaken for silver—whose lesser unit value facilitated the accelerating exchanges of an expanding capitalist economy—while in ages of silver abundance, efforts were made to discover new sources of gold.[6] The seventeenth century was a preeminent age of silver; by the beginning of the eighteenth silver mined in Peru and minted by Europeans had found its way into even the distant marketplaces of China, Malaya, and the Philippines. "This diffusion," it was correctly noted, "was one of the comparative advantages [for Europe] that quickened and broadened the trade relationship between Europe and the Far East . . . the world of silver was vaster and better integrated than the world of gold."[7] During the same period the capitalist economies of Egypt and the Red Sea were overwhelmed with European silver coin through exchanges such as that documented for the case of Jidda in 1700-1701 by the traveler William Daniel: "Suez is a seaport town at the foot of the Red Sea . . . to which port belongs about 40 sail of ships, who trade every year between that place and Judda; their outward merchandise being little or nothing but provisions and pieces of eight [silver coins], and their return all sorts of spices, muslins, silks, precious stones, pearls and amber-grease, musk, coffee and many other drugs."[8] Among the commodities which the silver-bearing merchants of Egypt were eager to acquire was gold, and the prognosis for any gold currency they might encounter—by the inexorable workings of Gresham's Law—could not be sanguine.

The capture of the currency structure of Sinnar by European silver manifested itself in two ways: the export of gold and the introduction of imported silver coins. At the dawn of the Heroic Age gold was flowing steadily out of the country along both the northern and eastern trade routes,[9] but as indicated above, it still maintained its currency role in the metropolitan *bandar*. However, the drain of gold combined with the needs of what one may plausibly assume was an expanding commercial community to create a shortage of coin in the capital. The sultan directed the royal merchants of his caravan to buy coins abroad,[10] and apparently *khawajas* from many lands also found it profitable

to import stocks of coins; in 1700 the *bandar* of Sinnar would have been a paradise for the collector of obscure silver issues.[11] In the long run, however, it would prove impossible to resist the growing regional dominance of European silver, and as early as 1700 one could observe that "the piece of eight is the best coin" (although certainly not the only one) in the *bandar*.[12]

The penetration of coin currencies beyond the national *bandar* into Funj society took two forms: the extension of coinage into the lower level of exchange of the regional market, and the geographical spread of coins across the country from one incipient bourgeois enclave to another. At the dawn of the Heroic Age the national *bandar* was the sole entrepot for the sultanic caravan trade, but the market square before the palace gates also serviced the needs of the inhabitants of the kingdom's greatest city in what was surely by far the largest of the regional markets. As *khawajas* mingled with Sudanese traders, coins began to supplement traditional regional market currencies such as salt and cloth in the conduct of petty exchange. Thus a demand arose for coins of small denomination which silver dollars could not easily satisfy. While some quantity of small denomination coins may well have been imported early in the Heroic Age,[13] it was more common for them to be manufactured in Sinnar. European visitors throughout the Heroic Age were surprised to observe that this industry was conducted on the basis of completely unregulated private enterprise,[14] but in a mode typical of the spread of bourgeois institutions into Sinnar, as the eighteenth century progressed the practitioners of the art changed. In 1700 the typical coiner was a *khawaja* of the capital city, exemplified by the newly immigrated Greek swordsmith who "made a good living by making two small coins out of each large one,"[15] while by 1825 the trade had been, as it were, Sudanized, and even in the provinces one could find families who had practiced it for two generations.[16] The coins themselves also underwent transformation. In 1700 the pioneer *khawaja* coiners applied their skills to the production of cross-shaped iron tokens,[17] but these soon gave way to more orthodox circular medals, either inscriptionless or stamped with a decorative grate, and consisting of copper, copper and silver alloy, or occasionally pure silver.[18] The value of these *muhallaqat* followed no fixed standard but varied according to weight and fineness. By 1800 the *muhallaqat*, in turn, had been largely eclipsed by imported small denomination coins,[19] but they left their mark on Funj society. The historical significance of the *muhallaqat* as a tool with which commercial capitalism captured the regional market level of exchange in Sinnar may be inferred from the fact that it was this petty coinage, rather than the vastly more valuable silver dollars, which came to represent wealth in the generic sense in the popular idiom of the Heroic Age; for the common man of the later eighteenth century, riches consisted of "an abundance of *muhallaqat*."[20]

During the eighteenth century the use of coin currencies spread out from the national *bandar* into the provinces. Villagers who happened to reside along a caravan route learned very early that it was profitable to accept coins, including the ubiquitous Spanish piece of eight, from the *khawajas* who came seeking

provisions.[21] The systematic adoption of coinage, however, had to await the development of indigenous bourgeois exchange institutions and proceeded more slowly. While the process is imperfectly documented, illustrative examples of its early phase would certainly include the appearance of native *muhallaqat* and imported *ashrafis* in the environs of the `Abdallab capital in 1758-1759,[22] and of *muhallaqat* at the capital of Atbara in 1773.[23] A second and definitive stage in the spread of coinage was attained during the later eighteenth century,[24] when the imported silver dollars of Carlos IV of Spain (reigned 1759-1780) rapidly achieved universal acceptance and drove most competing currencies from the markets of Sinnar.[25] The prompt and sweeping success of this currency suggests that an extensive network of coin-based exchange institutions had already developed before its introduction.

The *laissez-faire* policies of the central government in regard to the introduction of coin currencies (there were exceptions, to be discussed below) indicate that the new media of exchange were not usually perceived as a threat. If gold was largely driven from circulation (except through "leakage" in the southern producing districts[26]), silver coin seemed to offer an attractive substitute. Given the comparatively small value of exports and imports in relation to the whole economy of the Funj kingdom, the binding of Sinnar to commodity values established by free market mechanisms in the larger silver-using capitalist world may have seemed of little importance. It was assumed that coins large or small, homemade or imported, could be assigned a fixed value in relation not only to one another but also to the traditional currencies that already existed.[27] This assumption was not correct. While the older regulated structure of commodity values in Sinnar did not disappear overnight, wherever coins penetrated it was placed under erosive assault by the shifting tides of supply and demand. A mundane illustration of the consequences at the grassroots level may be seen in the payment clauses of a land sale document of 22 April 1793: "[the buyer] took as his price three *qism* of gold: that is, calculated in gold: in *dammur* [cloth] the *qisma* is six *tobs dammur*: the whole of the three *qism* in *dammur* at that time being eighteen *tobs*."[28] In form the transaction was conservative, an exchange of land for cloth, the value being calculated in terms of gold; the effect of market forces, however, is evident in the principals' need to specify the relationship of value between cloth and gold at the time of the sale. Or again, from the perspective of a gold merchant of 1814 in the days of the Carlos IV dollar, the value of gold was officially set at sixteen dollars per ounce, yet it could be purchased at the sultan's capital for twelve and, if desired, resold for sixteen dollars in Shandi, for twenty dollars at Berber or Sawakin, or more overseas.[29]

It has been convenient for purposes of formal and superficial analysis to describe the introduction of coin currencies in Sinnar as if it were an abstract process that could be considered in isolation from the daily lives of the men who "spoke the idiom" of capitalist exchange. It would be well to recall that institutional changes are the work of living human beings; the middle-class traders who made or imported coins deliberately intended to defy customary regula-

tions and to establish the value of commodities they purchased by free market bargaining. In the absence of adequate government controls over the currency supply, or over their persons, or policies in defense of the value of gold in relation to imports and coin, or even a tax on commercial enterprise comparable to those on agriculture and herding, they were able to do exactly that. But the terms of existence of this new class were defined not only by these liberties, but also by the internal organization of the bourgeois enclaves in which they lived.

10

The Enclaves

From the perspective of the historian, the adoption of bourgeois institutions during the Heroic Age in Sinnār becomes visible at the point where groups of kindred souls began to form communities organized on the basis of these principles. The two categories of evidence concerning these bourgeois enclaves suggest that two somewhat distinct types existed. The first type of evidence, derived largely from travelers' accounts, may be called in a metaphorical sense "archaeological,"[1] and it concerns the spread of towns. If one distinguishes a true "town" from the administrative capital of a nobleman by the presence of permanent inhabitants—conspicuously merchants—who were not members of the court community, then in 1700 there were probably only two towns (Arbaji and Sinnar) in the Funj kingdom. By the same criterion, at the Turkish conquest the number of towns had multiplied to a figure in excess of twenty.[20] The second category of evidence consists of legal documents and letters produced by or for Islamic holy men of the Heroic Age, who presided over the formation of a series of increasingly numerous and autonomous religious communities. Some of these communities had their origins in the isolated retreats of traditional holy men of earlier times, and many remained relatively small and predominantly agricultural during the eighteenth century. Due to the nature of the surviving evidence about them, however, it is possible to demonstrate in some detail the process by which leaders of the Heroic Age transformed their communities in conformity to bourgeois principles. Moreover, the more successful communities became active in commerce and approached or attained the size, wealth, and character of true towns. Religious communities were considerably more numerous than towns.

One traditional role of the Funj sultan was that of patron to Islam, and from the very foundation of Sinnar the kings had welcomed such religious dignitaries as could be attracted to a land on the frontiers of the faith, bestowing upon them small estates scattered throughout the realm.[3] Memories preserved in one of the oldest communities recall that the estates of a holy man had always been immune from taxation and constituted an inviolable sanctuary where those in distress could seek refuge.[4] The immunities of such a settlement, as recorded by a traveler at the dawn of the Heroic Age, were defended by a prohibition upon all government officials entering it: "By royal decree no state official may come within several miles, or remove a wrong-doer."[5] In the words of a contemporary Funj governor, "we have no access to the associates

of holy men."[6] The sultans periodically renewed their charitable oversight by sending presents to holy man. In 1746, for example, Sultan Badi IV sent a beautiful leather-bound Qur'an to Faqih Muhammad al-Hajj Sa`d, master of a small religious community among the `Ababsa at Nadi. The book had been copied in Sinnar for distribution by the sultan by a court scribe whose colophon showered blessings upon the recipients; in an appropriate response to the changing times Sultan Badi included the admonition to the `Ababsa of Nadi, in this case unnecessary, that the book should be retained by the heirs of Faqih Muhammad and never sold.[7] While one need not question the pious motives of the sultan in such acts of patronage, the establishment of communities of holy men also had political significance. The nature of this significance, however, evolved through several stages.

Many of the earliest holy men were immigrants from abroad, and advanced training in Egypt or the Hijaz retained its prestige long after the educational institutions of Sinnar came to produce enough holy men of Sudanese origin to predominate in number over the foreign missionaries. The holy men of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, native-born and trained, were folk heroes among the commoners, whom they served as healers and teachers as well as spiritual guides; it was they, a traveler noted, "who direct public opinion."[8] The relations between the holy men and the nobility were less comfortable, the historical record being punctuated by episodes of official atrocity reciprocated by awesome maledictions and dire prognostications. But the relationship was not static, and during the course of the Heroic Age the holy men achieved some fundamental victories over their rivals for local authority.

The rising status of the holy men *vis-à-vis* the nobility may be measured according to two indices: the marriage of holy men into noble families and the resolution of disputes. The earliest known attempt by a holy man to marry into a family of local noblemen, possibly in the sixteenth century, resulted in a cruel practical joke. The woman delivered to the holy man as a wife, despite her wedding finery, was merely a court slave, a fact which did not become apparent until the outbreak of mocking laughter at the birth of a son.[9] In the mid-seventeenth century a certain holy man found himself married to the daughter of a local *makk* in the Shaiqiya country, perhaps somewhat against his will, for he continued to reside with his disciples and visited her only in his free time. Political as well as personal dissatisfactions may be sensed in what followed: she commanded the holy man and his followers to come do their religious exercises in the palace.[10] While the holy man himself was unable to refuse, his disciples balked at subordinating themselves so overtly to a worldly lord, and the community dispersed.[11] During the generation that opened the Heroic Age, one finds a holy man willingly and honorably married to the daughter of a district lord, serving as a judge at court and bequeathing that respected office to his son.[12] By the end of the Heroic Age, the holy men had made marriage into the family of the local nobility a standard device for seizing power and supplanting their inlaws.[13] In summary, on the evidence of their attitudes toward

marrying holy men into the nobility, the lords first regarded their presumption as amusing, later as an influence to be tamed and domesticated, then as a force with which one should be allied, and finally as a mortal threat to their own position.

The second indication of the rising position of the holy men in relation to the nobility was the changing role played by each in resolving the disputes of the other. Seventeenth-century anecdotes depict quarrels between prominent holy men, each claiming to surpass his rival in holiness, nobility of descent, and so forth. When such a quarrel grew so intense as to threaten public order, the offenders were disciplined by the secular government; for example, an indignant clerical chronicler sympathetic to one of the disputants in such a quarrel expressed outrage at the actions of the local Funj officer, who locked up the two furious worthies in the same hut for several days to let their tempers cool.[14] In contrast, anecdotes from the late eighteenth century tell how holy men typically intervened to resolve the disputes of noblemen.[15] During the course of the Heroic Age, the tables had been turned.

In formal terms, the customary law of Sinnar accommodated the holy men by creating a special, intermediate legal category for them. As a social group the fuqara' were situated slightly above the commoners but below the *khawajas*; for example, the penalty for striking a faqih was more than that for striking a commoner but less than that for striking a *khawaja*, while the value of a faqih's testimony in court was worth more than that of a commoner but less than that of a nobleman.[16] Fuqara' as a group were excused from prostrating themselves in the presence of the nobility, and they enjoyed personal exemption from taxation and sumptuary laws.[17] In addition to these general concessions which applied to all fuqara', individual holy men of the eighteenth century sought and obtained from the government specific grants of privilege which applied only to them. The terms were often written down in an official charter, and it is through an examination of these documents that the increasingly extensive rights and powers ceded to the fuqara' during the Heroic Age may be ascertained.

A basic concession demanded by the fuqara' was the extension of their own personal tax-exempt status to their family and followers—be they few or numerous—who could then more easily afford to pay the orthodox Islamic dues of *fitra* and *zakah* to them. This concession is particularly conspicuous in charters issued to holy men of the central zone of Sinnar, where the superabundance of available farmland removed much of the impetus for grants of landed property. Thus, typical charters from Taqali grant tax immunities to the holy man, his family, "and all who adhere to them."[18] While this type of charter licensed the limitless expansion of a single community, some fuqara' were less settled (or more ambitious) in their plans for community building and demanded the right to carry their privileges around the country wherever they wished. For example, a confirming charter of Sultan Badi IV gave the recipient tax exemption for himself, his family, and associates "whether settled or traveling, whether they go to the east or the west."[19] Such a grant also freed the members of a

religious community from the traditional restriction on movement by the lower orders in Sinnar and opened the door to increased opportunities for participation in trade. Grants to fuqara' differed from the customary terms of tenure of a noble fiefholder in that the former were unconditional and suffered no temporal restriction; whereas a fief reverted to the crown upon the death of its lord, a grant to a faqih was intended to be hereditary and permanent. Virtually all charters contain a clause to the effect that the family of the recipient "shall bequeath it from heir to heir until God shall inherit the earth and those upon it, and He is the best of heirs."[20]

If the religious communities of old had been a refuge for the outcast and distressed, the fuqara' of the Heroic Age were not necessarily content to lead merely those adherents who joined them voluntarily; they demanded and received administrative authority over ordinary subjects. For example, a charter of the regent Badi gave the leader of the community of al-`Aylafun the administrative authority (*hukm*) over the whole village; a charter of Sultan `Adlan b. Isma`il granted a holy man a group known as the Marinab along with other specifically named individuals,[21] and the leader of the community of Kutranj was awarded the *`azm* (penalty, possibly for tax delinquency) due from six men.[22] Furthermore, the fuqara' sought and received by charter the right to own slaves.[23] Without such official dispensation a holy man could not expect to defend his human property against those motivated by the traditional viewpoint that only a nobleman could own a slave; like the faqih Hammadna Allah walad Mallak,[24] he might find himself obliged to manumit his chattels to prevent their forcible appropriation by the local lord.[25]

In the irrigated districts of northern and central Sinnar, where cultivable land was in scarce supply and extremely valuable, sultanic grants of tax immunities and the allocation of human beings would have been of little value to a faqih without an estate from which to derive a living; many of the surviving charters include the donation of a specific piece of land to the beneficiary. Like the grants of privilege discussed above, these donations were in perpetuity and constituted permanent alienations of land out of the traditional system of tenure. The charters bestowing land specified that the recipient would hold his estate as *milk*, or private property as defined by Islamic law.[26] Moreover, the beginnings of a bourgeois market in privately owned real estate, in its initial and tentative stages, was approved by charter; the central government issued documents confirming the right of a faqih to own land he had purchased from another private person.[27] For example, in 1758 two sales, between fuqara', of land located on the west bank of the Nile north of modern Omdurman were approved by the local *makk*, Shaykh Hamidan of the Jamu`iya fiefdom: "Daf` Allah walad Hammad al-Quwayrah has sold an estate in Hiqaybat to Faqih Taha b. al-Faqih Khojali . . . for sixty *muhallaq[at]*. Its shaykh, Hamidan, and his son Kudnab were present and he [Hamidan] said: 'It is free from the *subul* [feudal obligations].'" In the second sale, between the same principals, the *makk* said: "This estate is not subject to *taknib*, nor *darb*, nor anything else . . . . [It] is free from all *shurur*; it is not subject to *darb*, nor

taknib, nor *mukhla*, nor *kaliqa*, nor any of the customary *subul*, neither *qill* nor *jill*. It is completely free."[28] By the later eighteenth century the sale of land had become so common that official confirmation of private transactions was no longer necessary. However, the growth of the land market brought other problems; since according to the new bourgeois dispensation land could be (and was) sold by court order in the discharge of delinquent debts,[29] it behooved a faqih to request a land-grant charter stipulating that the property conveyed to him could not be sold against his consent.[30] Finally, the holy men petitioned the central government for permission to sponsor markets and received charters authorizing them to do so.[31]

While these examples are merely fortuitously survivals from the charter literature of the day, they illustrate the scope and nature of the concessions wrested from the central government by holy men of the HeroicAge. A faqih who had been awarded land, followers, administrative authority and the rights to travel, found new communities, conduct markets, and recruit or purchase new dependents, all of whom would pay taxes to him instead of the government until the End of Time, was indeed in a position to build up an enclave structured according to new principles. However, during the later years of the Heroic Age two further concessions were extracted by the fuqara'.

If hearsay evidence may be accepted, the earliest known charters were issued by Sultan Badi b. Rubat (1644-1645 to 1681);[32] the oldest surviving documents, however, date from the reign of Sultan Badi IV (1724-1762). As the Heroic Age progressed the sultans were forced to relinquish their monopoly over the bestowal of charter grants to holy men. Even Badi IV had to accept the issue of grants by two of his high court officials, the *amin* and the *qadi*,[33] while during the later eighteenth century his successors could not prevent the wholesale issue of charters not only by the Hamaj regents, but also by the provincial lords of Qarri and their sometime rivals from the west bank, the Jamu`iya, and worse, by district *makks* such as those of Shandi and tribal shaykhs of still lower rank.[34] By the fall of Sinnar even lowly *arbabs* made free to give away bits of the kingdom.[35] As the number of issuing authorities increased, the pace at which land was alienated and subjects ceded by the central government to the fuqara' accelerated geometrically. The only recourse of the government in defense of its traditional rights was an appeal to Funj customary law. Even for fuqara' of the Heroic Age this code carried some weight; for example, community leaders apparently considered it judicious to have their grants—however perpetual in theory—renewed by each successive sultan.[36] Therefore, the fuqara' undertook to change the legal rationale of their charters, to remove them definitively from a setting in which the king's word was law and to transfer them to a strictly Islamic legal context over which they themselves, and not any nobleman, would be qualified to act as judge. This transition is evident in the shift of usage, over the course of the Heroic Age, in those clauses of a charter which defined its relationship to a broader code of law; expressions such as the standard "a sultanic charter and royal document" (occasionally, "cus-

tomary document"), that is, *hujja sultaniya wa-wathiqa mulukiya* (or *wathiqa 'urfiya*), gave way to alien Islamic terminology such as *sadaqa* or *waqf* ("gift of alms" and "charitable endowment," both in the Islamic sense).[37] The petty *arbabs* alluded to above were even willing to specify that their gifts of alms were to be dealt with according to the Maliki rite.[38]

If the rights and property ceded to fuqara' by the sultans and nobility of the Heroic Age provided the constituent elements for the foundation of religious settlements, the task of organizing the internal structure of each community resided with the holy man, its leader. In some cases community leaders were conservative in style, appropriating the manners and insignia of a traditional Funj local lord, and no leader was so radical as to rend abruptly the fabric of traditional local society in the service of a utopian vision. Nevertheless, most leaders of the eighteenth century took concrete steps to make over their communities in accordance with the prototype given by Islamic law, leading ultimately to far-reaching changes which significantly increased their own power within local society. Four important modes of this internal consolidation were the introduction of a new, Islamically based system of taxation, the tightening of control over adjudication and administration, over access to the institution of marriage, and over the land. (Some other changes, although present to a degree in religious communities, were more typical of towns and will be discussed below.)

The fuqara' who so avidly sought tax immunities from the Funj government for themselves had no intention of passing along the privilege; rather, they instituted new systems of taxation based upon Islamic precepts. While these systems differed in detail, a representative example is provided by the one in force at the end of the Heroic Age among the Hawazma of the central rainlands. Although not an integral part of any religious community, they paid dues to nearby holy men as well as taxes to their secular leaders. The two new types of dues owed to the fuqara' were the *fitra* and the *zakah*. The *fitra* was a poll tax, paid on the first day of the feast of fast-breaking at the end of Ramadan, consisting of five and one-third *rotls* (about 2.4 kg.) of grain. The major tax of the new system was the *zakah*, levied separately each year upon precious metals and coin, grain, and livestock. The *zakat al-nuqud* consisted of an annual tax of five per cent upon the value of all coins and ornaments of gold and silver. The *zakat al-'aysh* was levied annually at the rate of one-tenth upon all crops in excess of 1,600 *rotls* (about 144 kg.). The *zakat al-mal* was an annual tax upon livestock, calculated differently for each type of animal. The owner of sheep and goats paid nothing if his flock numbered less than 40, one animal if it numbered from 40 to 120, two if it numbered 121, and one additional beast for each 100 thereafter. Taxes on cattle were always payable in calves, which in turn were subdivided into three categories on the basis of age: unweaned, 1-2 years old, and 3-4 years old. The tax on a herd was levied at the following rates: less than 30 head, nothing; 30-40 head, one unweaned calf; 40-50 head, one calf 1-2 years old; 50-60 head, one calf 3-4 years old; and 80-90 head, two calves 1-2 years old. Larger herds paid

at the rate of one unweaned calf for each additional 40 head. Camel taxes were payable partly in sheep but primarily in young camels classified as follows: male or female less than one year; male or female yearling; female of 2-3 years; female of 4-5 years. The tax on a herd was as follows: less than five camels, nothing; 5-20 head, one sheep for each five camels; 25-36 head, one camel of less than one year; 36-46 head, one yearling; 46-56 head, one female of 2-3 years; 56-70 head, one female of 4-5 years; 70-80 head, two yearlings; and 80-90 head, two yearlings and two sheep. Larger herds paid additional dues at the rate of one yearling for each complete additional 35 head, and in sheep at the rate of one sheep for each five head for any balance in excess of five but less than 35.[39]

One limitation of such a system of religious taxation was that most holy men did not command coercive forces with which to extract arrears from the recalcitrant, but relied upon informal group pressure: "These religious taxes, however, do not appear to have been enforced by any regulation other than custom, the payment of them being in fact left to the conscience of the individual, whose reputation and influence with his fellows would depend on whether he paid his customary dues in full or not."[40] Allowing for some imperfections in its application, however, a system of taxation such as that of the Hawazma provided a regular and handsome income to its beneficiaries, the local holy men.

Expertise in the administration of justice was an important tool in the hand of any community leader. Some imitated the style of the nobleman they supplanted, emerging periodically from seclusion to take a seat on the community's judicial throne,[41] but they were nevertheless the bearers of a new code of law and were jealous of their judicial monopoly within their communities. Although community leaders themselves did not hesitate to litigate in the courts of noblemen when they deemed it to be in their best interests, they strictly admonished their followers against appealing over their own heads to the secular court of "him from whom one does not seek justice, such as the sultan."[42] A community leader who possessed an aptitude for the resolution of disputes and a reputation for miracle working could also expand his sphere of effective jurisdiction to neighboring peoples, who might come to rely upon his services. For example, the leader of al-Damir, like the sultans of old, would send out his staff-bearers to resolve the disputes of his neighbors and the latter, like the Hawazma, might well find themselves paying taxes to the holy man as well as to their secular lord.[43]

The fuqara' sought to expand their jurisdiction not only in the geographical sense, but also by addressing questions that had previously been settled out of court. An example of such an issue was the unchastity of women, an uncommon but serious offense according to customary law. In the case of an unmarried woman, the family of the offender was likely to act directly: "Today [8 March 1701] a *jallab* . . . slit the throat of his unmarried sister, as it had come to his ears that she had been living an immodest life."[44] An accusation of infidelity against a married woman, however, involved at least two families and such summary treatment was not always possible. Doubt had traditionally been

resolved through trial by ordeal, in which the accused woman was made to draw pins from a basin of boiling butter with her bare hands or to pluck a red-hot axe from the coals; if innocent, it was said, she could do either with impunity. The fuqara' now undertook to replace such ordeals by a trial consistent with Islamic law, and in the case of a guilty verdict to replace killing with fines. While this transition was probably quite gradual, a crude time-frame may perhaps be derived from the perspective, in 1825, of the elderly misogynist of Khartoum in whose opinion the abandonment of ordeals in favor of a system whereby any woman with money could avoid chastisement by bribing the judge was an archtypical example of the general collapse of morals that had followed the death of Sultan `Adlan in 1789-1790.[45] No woman's viewpoint is at hand, but the expansion of the faqih's jurisdiction to include a problem hitherto resolved by traditional methods is apparent.

The abolition of trial by ordeal constituted one example of a trend, during the Heroic Age, of supplementing or replacing traditional corporal modes of punishment with fines, which came to constitute an important source of income to the community leaders who acted as judges. It was a sign of the changing times that these penalties were assessed in terms of coin as well as gold, and the result was a division within each community between those who possessed sufficient material wealth to pay and those who did not. While the latter continued to suffer beating, mutilation, and public humiliation in chains, the former discreetly paid their debt to society and went free.[46]

Traditional legal proceedings at the local level were said to have been "verbal, and well-laced with gossip,"[47] suggesting that disputes were often resolved on the basis of equity and local politics rather than by strict point of law. While in many cases the timeless quarrels of a rural community could be translated easily into the new terminology of Islamic law, the outcome was influenced by the increasingly frequent use of written documents, or "contracts . . . written by the community faqih who filled the office of notary—being a person in whom, by virtue of his character, the public reposed its trust."[48] For example, one may consider this ruling of 1173/1759-1760 by the community leader and judge Taha b. Khojali:

> Ibrahim the son of Hamid the son of Mansur filed a claim concerning land against his paternal uncle Muhammad the son of Mansur after the death of his [Muhammad's] brother Hamid.
> He [Ibrahim] said to him [Muhammad]: "I have a right in the land!"
> He [Muhammad] said to him [Ibrahim]: "The land is a legacy out of land belonging to Bariya, their [Muhammad and Hamid's] mother."
> Ibrahim said: "My father Hamid has a right in it."
> Muhammad the son of Mansur said to him: "My mother Bariya gave it to me as a gift of alms. This was during her lifetime when she was

> in good physical health [that is, the grant could not be invalidated as a deathbed gift, which would have to be treated as a will and subjected to the Islamic law of inheritance]. I have the certificate of this gift of alms."
> So in his [Ibrahim's] presence Taha b. al-Shaykh Khojali [the judge] ruled that Muhammad walad Mansur should bring his certificate and his writing.
> [When this was done, and the documents examined, the judge ruled in favor of the certificate-bearer]: "Ibrahim the son of Hamid has been cut off from his paternal uncle Muhammad. There is neither a claimant nor a claim."[49]

One may conclude that the introduction of written records tended to freeze the equity-oriented fluidity of the traditional system, allowing for the inequitable accumulation of wealth and privilege and conferring additional powers upon the literate and legally informed fuqara', who first drafted the documents in defense of property and then passed judgment on the basis of what appeared in them. The settlement of civil disputes was highly profitable to the faqih who adjudicated them, for the winning party was obliged to pay him one-tenth the value of the disputed property as a fee for his services.[50]

One custom whose egalitarian implications did not appeal to the community leaders of the Heroic Age was *kora* marriage. Rather than restrain the tendency of matchmaking to become property-oriented they encouraged it, and marriage alliances became an increasingly important means of consolidating wealth. It would be difficult to find a better example than the one set by Hammad b. Muhammad al-Majdhub, founder and leader of the community of al-Damir.[51] When this distinguished faqih married, he paid 40 *`uds* of irrigated farmland. His son Mustafa, a somewhat less prestigious match, had to pay 78 *`uds* of irrigated farmland, two slaves, one cow, and one bull. But when Faqih Hammad's daughter Halima married, she brought in a bridewealth consisting of 142 *`uds* of irrigated farmland, four tracts of which the boundaries, but not the dimensions, are known; twelve slaves; one horse and a half-interest in a second; eight head of cattle; five oxen; two bulls; two cows; two *halaqa* (golden earrings); and three *zamilas* of *sunbul* and *mahlab*.[52] For successful holy families such as that of Faqih Hammad, marriage diplomacy was one way of converting prestige into property, and the lesson that a good marriage could be financially rewarding was not lost on those who claimed no divine dispensation. As ambitious parents of the later eighteenth century bid up the price of matrimony throughout the northern province that included al-Damir, the decline in marriages prompted the reigning *manjil* to re-impose *kora*.[53] Although greatly appreciated by ordinary subjects, this policy had no direct effect upon the inhabitants of the religious communities, which lay within the *manjil's* fief but were outside his jurisdiction. The community leaders recognized the problem, but they adopted a different solution.

In the place of the leveling institution of *kora* marriage the community leaders of the Heroic Age substituted a system whereby they encouraged differentiation in wealth and status among their subjects, and then extended a special patronly relationship of responsibility and dominance to those who were less successful in the competition. For example, a young man too poor to marry at eighteenth-century rates might be given a wife from among the "Daughters of the House," a pool of eligible girls maintained by the community leader.[54] These were acquired as children from parents of low status within the community, commonly as gifts of alms: "Jamal Allah b. `Ali has bestowed his daughter `Aysha as alms upon Faqih Taha b. al-Shaykh Khojali, a gift of alms for God and His Apostle, asking for reward in the life to come."[55]

A less extreme and probably more common method by which a leader extended both support and control to the weaker members of his community was by taking up the duties of agency (*wikala*) for those whose powers were limited by advanced age, physical incapacity, minority, or the circumstance of female gender. These forms of weakness did not necessarily imply poverty, and the holy man would be expected to administer the property of his wards. Both personal and property concerns are evident in surviving certificates of agency from the Heroic Age, which typically consist of two parts: the first transfers property from an elderly or female principal to a (presumed) minor, and the second names the community leader as *wakil* over both the transferred property and its titular new master. For example, a woman of al-Damir named Ba`uh bint Balla first gave her son Ahmad five parcels of irrigated farmland totaling 13 *`uds* and then, at the conclusion of the same transaction, signed over Ahmad and his property to Faqih Ahmad Jalal al-Din.[56] A couple named Sulayman and `Aysha gave their son Bilal 34 *`uds* of irrigated farmland, two cows and a calf, 40 goats, 13 ewes with their lambs, and a male donkey; then Sulayman named Faqih Ahmad al-Amin al-Majdhub *wakil* for his wife and children, including Bilal but excluding the married daughters who were subject to their husbands. In this case the *wakil* not only administered the property of his wards, but also arranged marriages for the daughters and managed their bridewealth.[57] In summary, the community leaders of the Heroic Age abolished the regulation of local exchange implicit in *kora* marriage and encouraged economic aggrandizement. While the successful competitors became rich enough to marry into the leader's own family, the weak were given sustenance by the *fuqara'* at the cost of relinquishing control over their property and (in the case of unmarried female wards) their own persons to the holy man.

Many of the fuqara' received grants from the government of Sinnar upon which to found their communities, and most seized every opportunity to expand their landholdings and the size of their communities. One source of additional land and people was the charity of the pious, exemplified by the expeditious absorbtion of a large riverbank estate by the leaders of al-Damir:

> Al-Sayim b. al-Arbab Him has bestowed as alms upon the sons of Faqih Hammad al-Majdhub, al-Faqih Ahmad and al-Amin his

> brother, eighty *`uds* as a *waqf* for God and His Apostle . . . . On the north its boundary is `Abd Allah b. al-Arbab Na`im, and its boundary on the south is Muhammad walad al-Asihib . . . . The sons of Faqih Hammad al-Majdhub have appointed al-Sadiq walad `Ali as authorized *wakil* over the estate, and Muhammad walad al-Asihib, neighbor to the estate, has the power to collect taxes under the guidance of al-Sadiq.[58]

Less typical but more dramatic was the same community's annexation of the fief of a local nobleman dispossessed during the civil wars of the early nineteenth century; the ruling family of al-Damir seized the land, surveyed it, and divided it among themselves and the land-hungry clients attracted by their success.[59] More subtle—and quite undocumented—was the process by which neighboring families who adjoined a religious settlement gradually accepted the jurisdiction of the faqih, paid taxes to him rather than the government, and sought his protection against outsiders, contracted marriage alliances with members of the community, and eventually became a part of it.

Both the charter-holding family and those who joined the community in other ways came to regard the lands to which they had previously held a traditional claim as their own private property; a typical community included one or a few large landowners and many small ones. After the payment of *zakah*, the owner was entitled to a fractional share of the crop (often one-sixth), while the balance continued to be distributed among the producers in traditional fashion. The owner's share was known as the *khurj* (from the classical *kharaj*, "land-tax"), implying that people regarded it as in a sense equivalent to the taxes previously paid to the old owner of the land, the sultan.[60] While the profits to be reaped from landownership during the eighteenth century were comparatively modest as long as the traditional organization of production survived, ownership rights nevertheless constituted a valuable asset. As private property under Islamic law, land could be bought and sold; within the borders of each community there developed a rudimentary market in farmland. A typical bill of sale from the period reads: "Faqih al-Amin b. al-Faqih Hammad has purchased from Fatima bint Qasm Allah two *`uds* in al-Sha`dinabiya for ten *tobs*, and handed over the said price. Its boundary on the south is `Adlan b. Muhammad, and on the north Faqih al-Amin the purchaser."[61] The primitive characteristics of such an exchange included the adherence to the traditional land survey system (the plot sold was identified only by its *fasils*) and the payment in the form of cloth. While it was theoretically possible for any community member to buy or sell land, in practice no one gave up land willingly, and sales tended to be a mechanism by which the rich and powerful members of a community acquired the land of the weak. This is apparent in the fact that a disproportionate number of those who sold land were women,[62] personified by the grandmother obliged to sell off the patrimony of the children of her deceased son "in order to provide them with a way of living."[63] With splendid candor, a fourth-generation community leader from Duffar described the consolidation of property holdings in

his religious settlement: "The sultans were fond of him [Isma`il, the founder of the holy family's fortunes] and married his daughter . . . so that when he died he bequeathed to his sons horses, slaves, gold, silver, land and date palms and our grandfather `Abd Allah, the father of our father, bought up from his weak relations all their date palms and land, which to this very day [20 May 1847] remain our property."[64] Probably neither sellers nor buyers of land during the eighteenth century could have foreseen the value that land ownership rights would come to possess with the introduction of agricultural slavery, a story to be told below.

A dense ideological fog enveloped the social realities of a religious community. The most casual visitor would soon be told that the holy man who ruled had miracle-working powers; it was he who brought the rains, healed the sick and occasionally resurrected the dead, could hear the bleatings of a stolen sheep in the guilty rumblings of the malefactor's stomach. Under ideal circumstances the awesome powers (*baraka*) of the leader would devolve at his death upon an equally eminent *khalifa* or successor, often but not always his son. In practice, however, with the passage of time there was a tendency for the leader's aura of blessedness to rub off on those close to him—members of his family, in the first instance, but eventually also the other members of the community. This dispersal of charisma within a community over time may be most clearly documented in the exemplary case of al-Damir. When Bruce passed through al-Damir in 1774, shortly before the death of the community's creator, Faqih Hammad al-Majdhub, the reputation of the whole community was subsumed under that of its charismatic founder: "[We] came to Demar, a town belonging to Fakir Wed Madge Doub, who is a saint of the first consequence among the Jaheleen. They believe that he works miracles and can strike whom he pleases with lameness, blindness, or madness; for which reason they stand very much in awe of him."[65] When Burckhardt visited al-Damir two generations later (1814), the *baraka* previously embodied in the leader had dispersed in varying degrees to other members. The community leader, called the Great Faqih, was said to be "their real chief, and decides all matters in dispute . . . as every body entertains the greatest terror of his supposed omniscience, it is generally an easy task with him to perform wonders."[66] But the charismatic power was no longer confined to the Great Faqih; "the family of Madjoule, in which this office is established, has the reputation of producing necromancers, or persons endowed with supernatural powers," and indeed some persons outside the Majdhub family also partook of it: "There are many Fakys of lesser note, who enjoy a similar learning, and thus the whole town of Damer has acquired great reputation."[67] Although a measure of this reputation survived into the next generation, a serious rift developed within the Majdhub family, and the Great Faqih relinquished the management of community affairs to a secular official.[68]

Although community leaders assiduously consolidated landed wealth and political power in their own hands, the dissipation of charisma within a community opened the door to certain kinds of social mobility for the humble. One

set of opportunities may be viewed as professional; the vocation of a faqih, to a greater or lesser degree, could be learned, and those who had mastered the vocation could teach it to others. Prominent communities such as al-Damir contained schools where teachers of high professional (although not always equally eminent social) distinction instructed students from near and far. Most of these students, and perhaps some of their teachers, would emigrate at the completion of their labors in the hope of establishing their own communities elsewhere.[69] A second set of opportunities available to the members of a religious community exploited the rights and privileges of the legal status of a faqih in eighteenth-century Sinnar, which the humble and less highly educated shared to a degree with the charismatic ruling family and the learned scholars. These rights included the freedom from taxation by the secular government and from molestation, and the right to travel freely; combined with a reputation for probity, basic literacy, and a network of like-minded individuals in other parts of Sinnar or even abroad, they opened the door to a career in commerce. The ruling families of many religious communities invested some of their own wealth in commerce and mobilized their followers to become traders. The occupation of trader became more appealing as the eighteenth century advanced. No longer did *jallabs* have to swear obedience to the *khabir* of a royal caravan and follow his route and schedule against their own interests.[70] By the end of the Heroic Age, men with small capital could travel freely for the purpose of trade, their modest social pretensions symbolized by the sandals which they carried over thorny miles of road to don at their urban destination to gain admittance to polite society.[71] It was natural for a storyteller of the early nineteenth century to begin his narrative: "As for the fuqara', they set forth on a journey to buy and sell."[72]

Particularly profitable were those lines of trade previously monopolized by the sultan such as the export of gold and slaves to men from the outside world. For example, a document of 1214/1799-1800 illustrates the formation of direct commercial relations between a *khawaja* and the merchant fuqara' of al-Damir.[73] The document, a receipt, indicated that Hasan al-Amin, a junior member of the ruling family, delivered 49 *dafira* (possibly the "Damer mats, made of Doum leaves, [which] are greatly in demand throughout the neighbouring country"[74]) to one Captain `Abd Allah, a foreign trader from the Ottoman world. The captain then named Hasan's brother Ahmad, the writer of the document, as his agent—possibly for the local sale of the *dafira* on the captain's account. A second document from al-Damir demonstrates the ruling family's speculation in, and organization of, a private trade in gold out of the southern provinces, a traffic in which their followers participated as junior partners: "Ahmad walad al-Hajj walad Naqula has contracted with al-Amin b. al-Faqih Hammad walad al-Majdhub [to take on consignment] forty-two complete rolls of cloth [*taqa*] to pan for six *waqiyas* of gold. The term [of the advance] is Jumada I as a limit."[75] The pious but prudent faqih's contract violated Islamic law by failing to indicate the specie value of the fabric advanced,

thus concealing a possibly unfair gain from the loan, and by specifying the profit which the investor, as sleeping partner, would reap regardless of whether a fair reward remained for the active but socially inferior partner who performed the task of procuring the gold.[76] While the document may thus cast some aspersions upon the purity of the ideological commitment of the eighteenth-century holy man who ruled religious communities, it is an unqualified testament to their sound capitalist business sense. The price paid by the leaders of al-Damir for their exercise of this business acumen in the conduct of community affairs was a degree of disaffection on the part of their followers; while the founder and his sons were apparently held to be above criticism, popular resentment found a scapegoat in their bookkeeper, a man who, as an immigrant *khawaja* from Morocco, could be assailed with impunity.[77]

A successful community such as al-Damir adopted a variety of strategies intended to encourage trade. The preservation of good relations with surrounding nomadic groups ensured a healthy climate for the conduct of regional level exchange.[78] In regard to long distance trade, the leadership scrupulously protected the persons and property of traders within their sphere of influence; they exacted no customs dues, offered lodging and supplies at reasonable rates, and even supplied a ferry service on the Nile—very rare in those days. Passing pilgrims could be assured of a pleasant place to camp, with charity if they needed it or a good market for their wares if they did not.[79] The community was willing to bend its own customs and mores to accommodate traders; wheat and *dukhn* were grown to provide bread to suit the tastes of foreign traders from the north and west, while tobacco, beer, and prostitutes were discreetly available for those who did not observe the standards of the community members themselves. "This is the reason why Damer flourishes," concluded Burckhardt, "caravans never being averse from staying here a few days."[80] The growth of commercial capitalism in the religious communities of the eighteenth century is perhaps most clearly visible in the emergence of a private traffic in slaves. As late as 1814, for example, the vigorous but modest market of al-Damir offered few if any slaves, yet only a generation later it had become one of the largest entrepots of the northern Sudan, and slaves were the most common and valuable commodity to be found there.[81] The religious community of al-Damir had become a town.

The twenty or so towns which arose in eighteenth-century Sinnar formed a second type of alien socioeconomic enclave within the Funj body politic. The townsmen shared with the religious communities a commitment to the market economy and Islamic law, but in most cases the urban enclave was larger—sometimes much larger—than the religious community, while its political terms of existence and cultural style tended to differ. Two distinct historical processes contributed to the rise of eighteenth-century towns. The first was the desire by provincial noblemen to defy the monopolistic privileges of the sultan and to appropriate for themselves the wealth available from the long distance trade. The second was the desire of the newly formed Sudanese middle class to break all

traditional barriers to the unrestricted conduct of commerce. The collaborative interaction between local nobles and local bourgeoisie ensured that although many new towns evolved from provincial or district capitals, they were more than mere copies of the sultanic *bandar* of earlier days.

At the dawn of the Heroic Age the sultan's monopolization of trade was a grievance to noblemen, who revenged themselves for exclusion from participation in the royal caravans which passed through their fiefs by petty harassments and extortion of "presents" from the merchants.[82] A few powerful lords, it would seem, were occasionally allowed to send their own merchants with the caravan to Egypt, but this was a privilege and not a right.[83] A few weak lords, it is certain, undertook careers of banditry to claim by force what they probably regarded as their rightful share, a shortsighted policy if successful and a fatal one if not.[84] As the eighteenth century advanced, many local lords took initiatives to organize a new type of trade in collaboration with the rising merchant class. One sign of the new policy was their appropriation of the status of *bandar*—previously confined to the town of Sinnar—for their capitals.[85] A second was the establishment of permanent commercial agents in neighboring lands to manage the foreign end of their new trade.[86] A third was the appointment of an Islamic *qadi* to adjudicate the affairs of the *khawajas*, *jallaba*, *fuqara'*, and all those of middle-class personal status.[87] These three institutional changes delineated major contending forces of the eighteenth century urban dynamic; town against town, nobleman against merchant, and old verities against new.

The logic of the marketplace maintained that some geographical sites were better suited to the growth of towns than were others. For example Shandi, situated at the point where travelers from north, south or west could strike east for the easiest possible desert crossing to the Red Sea, was a site superior to that of Berber, a good port of call for travelers on the north-south road but too deep into the northern desert to become a base for east-west crossings; both, with their fertile hinterlands, were superior to Qarri, a settlement chosen for its defensive position among the crags of the Sixth Cataract. While both Qarri and Shandi (and quite possibly Berber also) became *bandars* during the eighteenth century, by the logic of the marketplace they could never be equals; Shandi must prevail. The Funj constitution, in contrast, maintained that both Shandi and Berber were seats of district *makks* subordinate to the *manjil* of Qarri, and the widening discongruence between the distribution of economic and formal political power set the stage for a long struggle as the eighteenth-century *manjils* of Qarri attempted repeatedly to reassert their authority by force. They also improved their competitive position somewhat be relocating the provincial capital at al-Halfaya, whose strategic position in market terms resembled that of Qarri, to be sure, but which at least enjoyed a fertile hinterland. Al-Halfaya promptly bloomed into a moderately prosperous town.[88] To adopt a nationwide perspective, the declining economic weight of the sultan's capital in relation to that of the new towns of the provinces produced an identical discongruence; the national *bandar*, at best, had become *primus inter pares*.

The commercially minded noblemen of the eighteenth century began to trade on their own behalf, not only within the kingdom but also with the outside world: "The brother of Mek Hamze [of Ra's al-Wadi, Berber district] had lately gone to Souakin, on his way to Arabia, with several slaves and fine horses, which he meant to offer as a present to the Sherif Hamoud, the chief of Yemen, expecting, of course, some suitable presents in return. Speculations of this sort are often made in these countries."[89] That this example given by Burckhardt was not an isolated instance is confirmed by the fact that by the fall of Sinnar many noblemen had commercial agents.[90] But the trade of the noblemen of the Heroic Age differed from the old sultanic commerce in that the nobles did not monopolize it; they usually relied upon the initiative of the private merchants in organizing caravans and selecting goods and destinations. The office of *khabir* became a private entrepreneurial profession and the sale of security to caravans a major industry among strategically located tribes. In each of the urban enclaves of Sinnar there grew up permanent colonies of private merchants from other parts of Sinnar and abroad. Typically, each group of traders would specialize exclusively in one route and those products suitable to it; each group would form a discrete residential quarter in the town and would become a corporation guarding jealously the trading skills and commercial contacts vital to the profitability of the branch of trade peculiar to them.[91]

The nobleman-as-trader observed some of the forms of the old sultanically administered commerce, such as the reception of greeting presents from private traders and the occasional exercise of the right of preemptive purchase. However, the traditional system of administered prices had collapsed under the cumulative pressure of market forces, a change reflected in the most common form of taxation imposed by noblemen during the last years of Sinnar. The nobleman would temporarily close their markets to private traders when shipments of their own goods arrived, so that their wares would be sold first while the demand was keenest and the prices highest.[92] The policies of the noblemen doomed them to becoming merely merchants among other merchants, a dangerous position for feudal lords in an increasingly commercial age. It prevented them from taking measures against the merchants in defense of the commoners—should they be so inclined—and denied them their support—should they have need of it. The sultans of the eighteenth century remained active in commerce,[93] but they were subjected to the same institutional pressures as were their vassals in the provinces. The occasional sultanic caravans which still set out for Egypt could pass unmolested through the troubled provinces even as late as 1814,[94] but their economic importance had paled to the verge of insignificance in the shadow of private commerce.

If the merchants had clearly become indispensable to the nobles, the reverse proposition was by no means so obvious. On the eve of the Turkish conquest,, for example, the predominance of the *makk* of Shandi within his *dar* rested precariously upon the diversity of its inhabitants and their susceptibility to divide and rule tactics,[95] while his contemporary counterpart at Berber found his

"feeble authority" being continually "slighted by the wealthier inhabitants; the strength of whose connections counterbalances the influence of the chief."[96] As merchantile interests in each new town solidified, rudimentary political institutions were formed to serve them.[97] In al-Damir, for example, between 1814 and 1825 the commercial interests retired the leader of the old holy family to a clerical position, called "Shaykh of Religion," while substituting a worldly "Shaykh of the Town" to administer its affairs.[98] Other towns produced an official called the "head of the merchants," who was elected by the merchant community to defend its political interests—often, as in Berber, with considerable success.[99] Finally, during the Heroic Age there arose some towns (Arbaji, al-Damir, El Obeid) which were merchantile from their inception and had no resident hereditary lord at all; their constitutional challenge to the feudal premises of Sinnar was unqualified and direct.

The middle-class inhabitants of the urban enclaves were reluctant to submit themselves to the justice of the kings, a prejudice justified ideologically by the Islamic orthodoxy of the new bourgeoisie and on more practical grounds by the shortcomings of Funj customary law (for example, its reliance upon corporal punishments) in the regulation of commercial affairs. A model solution had already been found during the later seventeenth century when there was only one urban enclave and most merchants were Muslim *khawajas* from other lands: the establishment of an Islamic court for them. In their desire to accommodate the *khawajas* the sultans of the day had appointed a judge for each *madhhab* represented among the *khawajas*.[100] As new towns arose during the eighteenth century, a number of them acquired *qadis* of their own; it would seem that Berber, which attracted many folk from the Red Sea area as well as Upper Egypt, had a Shafi`i *qadi* for a time, but most of the new judges were Maliki.[101]

The establishment of an Islamic court in a town which was also the capital of a nobleman created a potential for conflict between the *qadi* and the lord in his capacity of judge, and between Islamic and customary law (*shari`a, `ada*). While both legal systems made theoretical claims to universal jurisdiction in Sinnar, in the early years of the Heroic Age it would seem to have been the practice to guide disputing parties to whichever court suited their personal status in Funj society. For example, when in 1768 a party of fuqara' resident in the northern province undertook to obtain a ruling against a rival faction directly from the sultan, they were politely but firmly ordered to submit their claim for consideration in the local Islamic court of the *qadi* of Qarri. In the words of the *manjil* of the northern province: "The Awlad al-Faqih Khojali complained to Sultan Nasir, may God increase his years, in regard to their dispute with the people of al-Jali walad Walad Umm Maryum. The king referred them to me [the provincial governor] and said to me: 'Apply the *shari`a* to them before the *`ulama'*, and he who has a right should get his right.' So I referred them to [the *qadi* of Qarri], Faqih Dayf Allah."[102] In contrast, when a party appealed to an Islamic court, the court first screened the eligibility of the party concerned to Islamic adjudication; if

apparently involved in serious and violent crimes, he might be turned over to the justice of the king.[103] The segregation of middle-class affairs from those of society at large presupposed that the juridically Islamic element within any given community was clearly defined and relatively small. But the town *qadis* of the eighteenth century, like the leaders of the religious communities, undertook to extend their jurisdiction geographically and to expand their competence to include questions—and therefore people—hitherto subject to customary law. As the middle class attained increasing prominence in the capitals of even the most powerful lords of the later eighteenth century, it was no longer feasible for the noblemen to allow them what amounted to extraterritorial status; some formal accommodation between Islamic and customary justice became imperative.

One possible method of rapprochement was devised by the early nineteenth-century *manjils* of the north in collaboration with their *qadis*. Court records issued over the period 1800-1811 reveal that it became customary for the *manjil* and the *qadi* to hold court simultaneously; after hearing a case, the king and the *qadi* would each issue a document, witnessed respectively by the traditional courtiers and the local *'ulama'*, and the victorious party was then said to have obtained vindication by both *'ada* and *shari'a*.[104] The viability of this rather ingenious system, however, depended upon two conditions of doubtful reliability; the collaborating *qadi* must maintain the confidence of the juridically Islamic community, and his verdict must in every case coincide with that of the king. An expression of the first difficulty may be found in the records of a dispute heard by the *qadi* of Qarri. After the judge had issued his ruling, the defeated faction promptly assembled a rival group of local Islamic dignitaries more sympathetic to their cause in the hope of having their collective opinion accepted as superior to that of the *qadi*. In response to this challenge, the *qadi* himself felt obliged to collect the endorsements of local Islamic dignitaries sympathetic to him. While this particular judge defended himself successfully, the underlying lesson was obvious: a *qadi* was at the mercy of the consensus of middle-class opinion and opposed it at his peril.[105] As the middle class grew stronger within each urban enclave, it gradually became politically possible for the *qadi* who defended their view of the world to defy the king openly, at least within the limited field of the administration of justice. For example, the last *qadi* and the last sultan of Sinnar, whose sphere of influence by that time (c. 1810-1820) did not extend far beyond the capital city itself, engaged in a bitter struggle for legal supremacy. The *qadi* arrogated to himself the right to impose the death penalty, hitherto the exclusive prerogative of the sultan, while the king abandoned the extreme penalties of old-fashioned justice to make his court more competitive and vigorously wielded his traditional right of review over all other courts to reinvestigate and overturn the rulings of the *qadi*.[106] This duel between Funj and Islamic justice, like the broader conflict between the feudal order and commercial capitalism of which it was symptomatic, was cut short by the Turkish conquest of 1820-1821.

The economic institutions of the urban enclaves resembled those of the religious communities but became ever more complex and sophisticated in response to the needs of the growing bourgeois community. The Turkish conquest of Sinnar did not interrupt this evolution, and the full range of institutions did not become complete nor their social effects apparent until the nineteenth century (discussed below). At the impressionistic level, however, it is well to point out that by 1820 the new towns had developed a distinctive life-style and ethos that differed considerably from the old order.

The archtypical agent of the new dispensation was its missionary, the itinerant trader: "One is sure to see them everywhere, clad in white and bearing on the back a great straight sword in the form of a cross, driving before them a donkey, robust and well-nourished . . . . Their profits are very small, but their sobriety is proverbial and their overhead nil . . . . Thus they achieve an honest well-to-do status, very rarely wealth."[107] If one followed these men to their home town of Shandi, one could observe a large and vigorous market, where both regional goods and luxury items of the old sultanic trade circulated freely against Spanish silver.[108] The larger exchanges did not take place in the market, however, but were arranged privately by professional brokers, who on days of slack trade could often be seen seeking a competitive edge by lurking along roads near the town in the hope of being the first to make contact with an arriving caravan.[109] Prominent merchants did not haggle in the marketplace; when visited by travelers, they revealed no more of their activities than the fact that they had their agents in (for example) Sinnar, Shandi, Dar Fur, Kordofan, and Egypt.[110] The town itself consisted of up to several hundred rectangular buildings of packed earth and perhaps some poorer quarters of round, conically-roofed and thatched *tukuls*, the predominant rural dwelling. The houses of the wealthy might rival a nobleman's palace, having a rooftop patio or second story and a bathing pool. The town also contained specialized buildings to service the needs of the new order—caravanserais, warehouses, mosques, and schools. The population of many of the new towns exceeded 5,000, twice that number in the largest.

On a market day when court was in session all classes of the realm mingled in the streets. If a Friday, in the capital, the sultan himself might be seen in his procession to the mosque for the noon prayers, but noblemen were not usually conspicuous among the throngs of middle-class townsmen about their business, commoners in from the countryside for barter or litigation, and slaves. The slaves of the local lord, armed and well dressed, made themselves conspicuous enforcing the public order.[111] The slaves of the middle class were also conspicuous, but as beer sellers and prostitutes; nor did certain modernizing noblemen hesitate to convert their slave-women's traditional duty of begetting children for the master into the bourgeois enterprise of exchanging sex for cash.[112] Men and women from the countryside could be identified by their traditional garments, the waist-wrapper and wide straw hat (*keskesega*) or natural "Afro" hairdo; respectable townsmen wore sewn garments and shaved their heads to permit the wearing of skullcaps and turbans. A few very holy men even appro-

priated the horned cap of the Funj nobility, but this was considered mystically eccentric rather than offensive; except for state occasions, the lords also had come to prefer the turban.[113] Gone were the days when an entire provincial capital such as Qarri would be summoned to mourn the death of a courtier's wife by communal dancing, self-mutilation, and rolling in the ashes of the feast-fires;[114] while such rites still survived in the countryside and perhaps among the humble folk of the *tukul* quarters, respectable townsmen were given simple Islamic burials.[115] The consumption of food remained a socially sensitive issue; no one ate in public, but class distinctions were keen behind closed doors. Those of the middle class who laid claim to religious distinction often refused to eat the food of a mere nobleman, which often included pork, beer, or other substances not appropriate to an orthodox Muslim, or at least demanded a separate serving-bowl,[116] while the overall culinary mark of middle-class status was the consumption of wheat, rice and lentils imported from Egypt. In truth, only the urban traders, goldsmiths and coiners possessed the balance scales with which these foods were customarily weighed for sale.[117] Humble folk visiting a town, like the poverty-feigning traveler Burckhardt, could buy traditional Sudanese foods in the marketplace and pay a townsman for the use of a private place in which to eat them.[118] It was often possible to identify a person's position in society by his name, and the surviving records of various urban or religious community courts delineate (not always infallibly) the distinctions in naming customs among the orders. Figure 7, drawn from legal documents and other literature of the Heroic Age, offers some representative names appropriate to each social status.[119]

Figure 7: Names Representative of Social Status

Nobles:

`Adlan	Dakin	Kudnab	Rubat	Shawir
`Ajayl	Diyab	Mismar	Sabat	Taktak
`Ajib	Kamir	Qandil	Shammam	Tombol
`Amara	Kannan	Rajab	Shanbol	Unsa
Badi				

Middle Class:

`Abd Allah	Amin	Ibrahim	Musa	Taha
`Abd al-Rahman	Babikr	Idris	Mustafa	Tayyib
Abu Zayd	Bashir	`Isa	Sadiq	`Uthman
Adam	Hammad	Ishaq	Salih	`Umar
Ahmad	Hasan	Khalid	Sulayman	Yusuf
`Ali	Hashim	Muhammad		

Commoners:

`At	Ganob	Kamitri	Kudri	Shakkak
Balla	Halhol	Kamon	Kundab	Shakola
Burr	`Iltod	Kando	Kurayb	Shammam
Delgo	`Irsod	Kannan	Kushnab	Shankoka
Denga	Jabarjil	Karadim	Marit	Shanun
Dirmas	Jagdol	Kardagal	Marnati	Shawwar
Doba	Kabid	Kareng	Maryuda	Sorit
Doka	Kadenga	Karikri	Nagola	Susiwi
Dugal	Kaikol	Kashob	Saboba	Tabrib
Dunsa	Kalshob	Kodab	Sakoda	Wadida
Fitlob	Kamir	Kudnab	Sakota	Wati
Gadora				

Slaves:

`Abd al-Sayyid	Khayr al-Sayyid	al-Sabr Ni`ma
Allah Jabuh	Qism al-Sayyid	Sa`d Allah
Fadl al-Karim	Rish	Shol
Fadl al-Mawla	Rizq Allah	Surura
Jabali	Rofa	Tayyib al-`Ishra
Jad al-Karim	Sabah al-Khayr	Umm Qadus
Khadim Allah	al-Sabr Fadl	Zayid al-Mal

The Islamic laws and bourgeois ambiance of the early nineteenth-century towns and religious communities gave the middle class more numerous opportunities to procure slaves and greater security of ownership once obtained. The earliest slaves were acquired by the most prominent representatives of the new order, who employed them as personal servants in a manner similar to that of the nobility. For example, a court record of 8 Karama III [Jumada II]1174/6 December 1760 reveals a middle-class parody of noblemen's mores worthy of the pen of a Molière or a Cervantes. The leaders of one of the religious communities, being unable to afford individual concubines, resolved to purchase one in common. They formed a partnership and obtained a concubine. The girl was then made to consort with the pious worthies in descending order of precedence, with the lamentable outcome that the first and senior of them promptly impregnated her, thus removing her from circulation. The outraged partners sued for redress and obliged the offender, who as the community's leader was also its magistrate, to step aside in favor of a somewhat less partisan judge, his brother. The latter attempted to soothe the lusty litigants by paying out the

value of their shares in money, "but they refused that." He was therefore obliged to summon all the learned men of the community and try the case in public. With the assistance of community pressure and the appropriate provisions of two standard legal handbooks he forced the partners to reconcile themselves to a compensation appropriate to their class—a sum of money.[120] The use of slaves as household servants remained a constant feature of middle-class society thereafter; bridewealth among the bourgeoisie often included a slave,[121] and in the economically more developed districts, by the mid-nineteenth century no free woman would marry at all without assurance that the "woman's work" of her household (notably grinding grain and fetching fuel and water) would be done by others.[122]

One consequence of domestic slavery among the middle classes of the Heroic Age was a gradual change in the role of women, who found themselves relieved of their traditional contributions to production. Symbolic of their new status was the invention of the social fiction that the female of the species cannot swim—a skill hitherto vital to rural folk in a land where cultivated islands were numerous but boats were few.[123] But the most visible manifestation of the new respectability of bourgeois women was their adoption of the modern *tob*, an enveloping robe which covered not only the lower body but also the torso and head, a strikingly beautiful garment, but expensive and awkward, rendering most forms of physical labor impossible.

In addition to domestic service, slaves were also set to work in their masters' fields. While this use of slaves by the middle class in Funj times was very modest in scale in comparison to the deployment of agricultural slaves by noblemen and to what followed the Turkish conquest (both to be discussed below), by 1821 it was well recognized that obtaining agricultural slaves was one means by which ambitious commoners could achieve upward social and occupational mobility: "some men make cloth of their cotton, and work themselves in the fields. Those who enjoy a measure of wealth [*aissance*] employ slaves of both sexes for the latter work, and devote themselves entirely to commerce."[124] It was a profitable discovery, and the great age of agricultural slavery in the Sudan would soon follow.

The towns of the early nineteenth century, despite their Funj heritage and aspects of secular worldliness, came to share with the religious communities a strong and increasing measure of commitment to orthodox Islam. If one example of this trend may stand for many, let it be the introduction of compulsory public prayer in al-Halfaya between 1790 and 1800; the town authorities punished the recalcitrant and provided instruction to those who had not yet learned the requisite formalities.[125] The contribution of the middle class—in contrast to the commoners and, to some extent, to the nobility—was apparent in their choice of conventionally Islamic personal names and confirmed by their allegiance to the *shari'a* courts. Furthermore, they were willing and able to spare the labor of their sons to educate them in the schools of the fuqara', sometimes locally, sometimes in the religious communities, and occasionally even abroad.[126]

With the support of the middle class as well as occasional charitable gifts by noble patrons, intellectual activity in Sinnar during its last years took on a life of its own. In addition to religious duties and basic literacy and computational skills, schools of the day inculcated values appropriate to their constituency. One instructional manual, entitled *Advice for Life in the Temporal World*, counseled reassuringly in the words of the Prophet: "Nothing is more fitting than to accumulate wealth and to be in commerce."[127] The more advanced legal and theological treatises of the higher curriculum were read and interpreted in this spirit.[128]

As increasing numbers of townsmen and members of religious communities were exposed directly or indirectly to the new educational system, a twofold cumulative intellectual effect began to make itself felt. People of education began to sense that they were different from their forefathers, and they undertook a search for their own identity. Sometimes this quest took the form of probing the history of the Funj state itself; lists of kings and the mighty deeds of their reigns were written down, reflections upon the diverse ethnic traditions of Sinnar were given, and chroniclers such as Ahmad b. ʿIsa described in detail and commented upon the events of their own times, during which, they correctly sensed, the world had changed forever.[129] For others, the relevant past lay in the story of the coming of Islam to the Sudan, a tale recounted with keen historical perception and human insight by Muhammad al-Nur b. Dayf Allah through the biographies of his *Tabaqat*.[130] But for those whose intellectual perspectives were more modest, the salient question was that of their own place, and that of their family, in the new order; the response was an outpouring of creative genealogy writing (which continues to the present day), by which each tribe, village, and family staked its claim to descent from one of the distinguished Arabs of Islamic antiquity.[131]

The second consequence of the new intellectual ferment was a broadening of horizons, a realization that Sinnar was becoming an integral part of a larger world with its own past history and present priorities. This rising consciousness is apparent in the evolution of dating systems as they appear in legal documents. From olden days the commoners had possessed a stellar calendar of 28 "months" of 13 days each, which served most frequently to mark the stages in the annual agricultural cycle, although a noteworthy occurrence of any year might be recalled by the name of the "month" in which it took place.[132] The passing years could be distinguished one from another only through the recollection of major (and usually unpleasant) events—a plague of smallpox, a low Nile flood or the famine that often followed, or the death of someone near and dear. Within each community or district, years worth remembering were given names: for example, in the hinterland of al-Rusayris 1902 [?] was known as "The Year of Bloody Sunsets." A number of early documents reflect this perspective in that they were dated only by reference to some such locally noteworthy event, for example, "in the year in which Hadar b. Hammad b. Abu Raʾs died."[133] The perspective of traditional local lords was similarly parochial but more self-

centered; they tended to date documents to the year of their own reign in which they were issued.[134] At the dawn of the Heroic Age, even those few who marked off the linear flow of time according to the Islamic calendar often used a set of names for the months that would not have been generally understood outside the Sudan.[135] During the early nineteenth century, however, these irregular usages vanished from the written record and were replaced by the standard Islamic calendar. Sinnar had fallen into step with the world's march through time.

As knowledge of the outside world accumulated, thinkers of Sinnar struggled to incorporate it into their frame of reference. Who were the English? The French? How powerful was Sinnar in comparison to Iran? To Borno? Were there powerful kings who were not Muslims? Was the Millennium at hand?[136] A chronicler of the reign of the regent Nasir (1788-1798) reflected: "People have mentioned that in a single age there were four [rulers known for their generosity]: these were Shaykh Nasir in Sinnar, Sultan `Abd al-Rahim in Dar Fur, Murad Bey in Egypt, and Ahmad al-Jazzar in Syria. Nasir was inferior to them in the extent of his kingdom."[137] On another frontier, as nineteenth-century merchants explored beyond the southern and western borders of Sinnar, they encountered nations hitherto unknown; the genealogists of the northern towns and religious communities, richer in humanity than science, soon found a place in the Arab pedigrees for such unlikely `Abbasids or Ashraf as the Oromo, Dinka, Maba and Fertit.[138]

A particularly influential channel for the broadening of perspectives came with the plunge of the intellectuals of Sinnar into the contemporary agitation for Islamic reform. They opened correspondence with such prominent international figures as Ahmad b. Idris al-Fasi,[139] and although Shaykh Ahmad did not himself visit Sinnar, one of his disciples, Muhammad `Uthman al-Mirghani, arrived in 1232/1817-1818. He toured Dongola and Kordofan (then under Fur rule) before entering the capital of Sinnar to receive a hero's welcome; ill-wishers and the envious were miraculously confounded on every hand.[140] Men who had corresponded with people of the stature of Shaykh Ahmad or experienced the charisma of the Mirghani felt themselves to be more than the leaders of pious little congregations of the orthodox scattered across a Funj polity that must have appeared seriously compromised by non-Islamic usages; they had become members of a powerful worldwide mission. Under the guidance of a later generation of leaders, they were to construct new organizations of broader scope—whose potential, however, was not to be realized until after the Heroic Age. Meanwhile, outside the towns and religious communities of Sinnar, life went on.

11

The Warlords

Each eighteenth-century enclave constituted a node around which elements of the surrounding local society gradually reoriented themselves and crystallized into a new form. This social reorganization created new concentrations of wealth and power in places not sanctioned by tradition and under terms of existence unknown to the *ancien régime*. It also produced, in legally oriented Islamic orthodoxy, an ideology at odds with the realities of the old feudal order. As the Heroic Age advanced, the bourgeois Islamic counterculture spread out from the enclaves and began to influence the course of national politics. The agents through which this influence was brought to bear were a set of gifted leaders—usually provincial or district lords, but occasionally merchants, holy men, or nomadic chieftains—who perceived the new system's potential for the unprecedented concentration of wealth and power and exploited it to advance their own interests at the expense of those of the central government. Their program, executed piecemeal, demanded destroying the old order, and its success in doing so depended at each step upon armed force; therefore, the new leaders may be termed "warlords." They shared an allegiance to bourgeois Islamic orthodoxy, but they found nothing in their ideology to ameliorate their own mutual rivalries or to grant any one of them legitimate precedence over any other; to the end they preserved as a figurehead a Funj sultan they would no longer serve.

Food made of sorghum or millet was *`aysh*, "the staff of life," to the people of Sinnar, and any change in the system of production and distribution of bread grains would certainly bear important social consequences. During the Heroic Age the warlords, in collaboration with the merchants of the new middle class, instituted new patterns of distribution which violated the principles of the old feudal order and began to undermine the position of the producers while bringing unprecedented riches to the elite. It was a traditional duty of any lord to feed the people of his court, an obligation discharged by means of the taxes-in-kind gathered from the commoners.[1] The feudal order contained no built-in mechanism, however, for provisioning the middle class of a true town, who were not courtiers. The new towns of the Sudan, as someone said of nineteenth-century Kobbé (in Dar Fur), were "always hungry."[2] One solution was for the lord to place the surplus grain collected as taxes upon the open market instead of hoarding it as a reserve against hard times as the old order required. The second was for the lord, in his capacity of merchant, to organize the importation of

bread grains from other parts of the Sudan; early nineteenth-century Shandi, for example, relied upon the *makk's* grain caravans from Abu Haraz.[3] In either case the profit-oriented warlord required practical assistance in the distribution of his grain, for while tradition gave him the right to gather food, it allowed him no other legitimate way of disposing of it than by giving it away to the deserving or needy. The requisite services were provided by the merchants of the new middle class, who purchased grain (or gold, or other commodities collected as taxes) from the warlords for resale as a speculative venture elsewhere, often within the "hungry towns" of Sinnar itself but sometimes as far afield as the pilgrim-burdened Red Sea ports of Sawakin and Jidda.[4] The private papers of Farah walad Abu Zahr, an early nineteenth-century merchant of the Sinnar area, afford two illustrative examples of such wholesale purchases—on credit—from local noblemen, Shaykh Muhammad Kamtur, *manjil* of al-Bahr, and Ibrahim walad Rahma, probably of the family of hereditary *amins* and *jundis*:

> Shaykh Ibrahim walad Rahma has taken from Farah walad Abu Zahr six camel-loads of grain for eighteen *waqiyas* [of gold] he owes the shaykh. The settlement will be via the first one who comes to his dwelling; he will settle in that hour. Six *waqiyas* are no longer due him after the grain.[5]

> Farah owes Shaykh Muhammad Kamtur ninety-two *waqiyas* of gold, and this is written in my hand.[6]

Presented with a choice between hoarding tax grain for possible future acts of charity and investing it promptly for immediate profit, the warlords decided to invest.

The commoditization of grain opened another set of opportunities to the merchants; in addition to buying tax grain from the warlords, they could deal directly with the producers. Between these classes arose an exploitative debtor-creditor relationship called *sheil* (literally, "carrying") based upon the application of the principles of Islamic law and monetary exchange to the ecological realities of grain production in Sinnar. It was not uncommon for a producing household to run short of grain during the hungry weeks immediately preceding the harvest. Under the old order, it had been the duty of the lord to open the stores of tax grain on such occasions and feed the people. Under the new dispensation the lord's *shunas* were committed to the market, and it was the merchants who possessed stores of grain; hungry producers perforce turned to them. The needy farmer would borrow "an advance of grain or seed valued at a price substantially above the estimated price of the next harvest. The borrower must settle the loan by returning at harvest time enough grain to make up the monetary equivalent of the loan," often five or six times the quantity borrowed.[7] The social consequences of the *sheil* system could be seen in any eighteenth-century town: "The most wealthy man of Berber, next to the Mek, was pointed out to me, with the observation that he possessed about two thousand [Carlos IV] dollars, which he gained last year, during the famine, by hap-

pening to have a full-stocked granary."[8] Through extension of the *sheil* system into the countryside each town gradually acquired a dependent hinterland of permanently indebted peasants. At an impressionistic level, even by 1814 the impoverishment of cultivators was conspicuous in the immediate environs of a town such as Berber or Shandi, in contrast to those of more commercially isolated districts.[9] Meanwhile, a multitude of private entrepreneurs were moving out to pioneer small new markets in more remote parts of the commercially unsophisticated countryside.[10]

From the perspective of the merchants the indebted hinterland and good credit with prominent noblemen were more important than the urban marketplace, as evidenced by the fact that the Awlad Shanbul, a prominent merchant family based in Arbaji, suffered little visible loss of wealth or status when the town itself was obliterated during the civil wars.[11] Rulers of the day faced a moral and political dilemma. One possibility, exemplified by the leader of a religious community in the Gezira, was to defy profit, renounce force, and defend the commoners. "This man was esteemed another Joseph among the Funge," wrote Bruce, "who accumulated grain in years of plenty, that he might distribute it at small prices among the poor when scarcity came."[12] A number of conservative feudal lords and holy men of populist sympathies seem to have elected this policy, but its shortcomings were exposed during the civil wars as the peaceful rural communes were systematically ravished by the hungry troops of the warlords, and the Josephs among the Funj were hurled into their own looted grain-pits.[13] The hard-nosed warlords were more successful, but their choice of partnership with the middle class bound them firmly to the tail of a rapidly maturing tiger. The spread of the *sheil* system combined with the commercialization of tax commodities implied the definitive end of the regulated economy, the subordination of the most basic of commodity values to the dictates of supply and demand calculated in coin, and the proportional decline of their relatively fixed revenues in relation to the growing wealth of the private merchants. While the last independent *makk* of Shandi struggled to monopolize the local grain trade "as much as he could,"[14] if the warlords were to meet the challenge posed by the rise of the middle class, stronger measures were clearly required.

The fragmentation of economic power in Sinnar into numerous urban foci carried as its necessary corollary the construction of new institutions with which to defend them. The price of neglect in this regard was high, for in military terms the middle-class townsmen were no match for the armored and disciplined slave squadrons of the great nobles, and unlike a passing caravan or nomad encampment, a town could not be discreetly withdrawn from a superior enemy's line of march. Old Dongola, Berber, Shandi, al-Halfaya, Arbaji, Alays, and Sinnar itself were each overrun and razed at least once during the eighteenth century. While this periodic destruction of towns kept the aggregate power of the urban merchants within manageable limits, it neither corrected the underlying system nor contributed to prosperity; the same warlord who benefited from

the taming of merchants in general would nonetheless seek to defend his own. The warlords of the Heroic Age invested a major portion of their new wealth in the acquisition of slave soldiers with whom to defend it. A crude perspective on the numbers of military slaves brought into Sinnar during the period may be gained from examination of the sultan's own forces; numbering about 14,000 in 1773, by 1821 they had more than doubled to 30,000.[15] At the later date, moreover, the sultan's units were matched if not considerably outnumbered by the troops of the other warlords.

The Heroic Age was conspicuously and increasingly oversoldiered; yet it was not only the sheer numbers of soldiers which cast a shadow upon national politics, but also the attendant changes in the organization and command structure of the army. As the sultan's monopoly on the acquisition of slaves was broken by the growth of a private traffic, the warlords could often purchase their regiments and squadrons in their own town markets; where that failed, a lord might organize his own *salatiya* and conduct raids on the sultanic pattern.[16] Slaves procured and trained by the warlord himself, rather than entrusted to his command by their owner the sultan, swore allegiance to their commander and not the central government. After 1744 the offices of *muqaddam al-khayl* and *muqaddam al-qawawid*, through which the cavalry and infantry had exercised a legitimate influence at the sultan's court, were abolished, although they not only survived but also multiplied at the courts of the warlords.[17] Similarly, after 1765 the court office of *muqaddam bayt al-ʿudda* disappeared, for the soldiers who received their weapons and armor from the various warlords could not be expected to deposit them in the sultan's central arsenal in Sinnar between campaign seasons.[18]

The forces of the warlords were divided along traditional lines into elite units of cavalry and regular regiments of infantry under the command of slave officers. Each unit had a name, being often called after its owner and commander, and *esprit de corps* was high. It was said that "a simple soldier who had shown proof of valor in war could advance through all the ranks,"[19] and the promotion of several officers may be observed in their titles as witnesses to charters:

	1810[20]	1813[21]
Muhammad walad Kab	*mankarukan*	*arbab*
Muhammad b. Jamil Allah	*mankarukan*	*arbab*
Muhammad b. Faraj Allah	*mankarukan*	shaykh
Tayfara	*mankarukan*	shaykh

When members of different units encountered each other, particularly in the presence of the catalyst of beer, fights over the reputation and merits of their respective corps were common.

The drawback to a large standing army, from a warlord's perspective, was its expense. According to traditional Funj principles a lord must supply his men

with food, clothing, and arms, but as the numbers of soldiers increased during the Heroic Age this responsibility became an intolerable burden, and the lord's largess dwindled in frequency and quantity to the occasional donation of meat, grain, and beer for feasts. A truly destitute soldier could still appeal to the lord's charity, but in general the new forces of the Heroic Age were expected to be self-sustaining. The warlords devised two mutually complementary methods of financing their new supernumerary armies. The first was to treat military activity as a profit-seeking enterprise and to give the soldiers a vested interest in its gains—a one-tenth share was typical. While the warlord who collected the lion's share of the booty profited most, each of his units could not only support itself by loot, but also replenish its own ranks and grow through the capture of slaves. The disadvantage to this approach was that soldiers in bivouac produced nothing; regular and successful raids were as necessary as paychecks, and a steady supply of fat and conveniently located victims had to be found. Since hungry soldiers tended to descend upon the towns and capitals to congregate in threatening and unruly mobs, or even became bandits, some warlords decided that the domestic tranquility was best served by the occasional sacrifice of a peaceful and prosperous nomadic clan or inoffensive community of southern hill-folk. The legacy of such attacks was rebellion and more raids; as the traditional society of Sinnar lost control of its organs, it began to feed on itself.

An alternative method of supporting the new armies was available in the central zone of Sinnar where land was abundant; the troops were settled in garrison communities with their families and put to cultivation. Initiated at an early date by the Funj sultans,[22] by the fall of Sinnar these garrison settlements had multiplied to the extent that they dominated the Blue Nile valley from above the capital city almost to the confluence.[23] This system supported very large numbers of infantrymen but appears to have been inconsistent with the vocation of the cavalry. The lightly armed infantry units, well suited to slave raiding and gathering loot, shared both the particularistic regimental loyalties of the horsemen and their propensity toward pressuring the government through demonstrations and riots, but because they could not ordinarily stand against a cavalry charge they could never replace the squadrons.[24] If a warlord however chose to maximize the grain-producing rather than the looting potential of his garrison settlements, he could support both himself and large numbers of cavalrymen, while sacrificing the revenues of commoners irrevocably alienated by pious *waqf* endowment or savage raids. As Sinnar neared collapse, its rulers relied to an increasing degree upon the agricultural labor of military slaves.[25] Infantrymen who bartered their lord's weapons for food and clothing were no longer punished; they had become field hands.[26]

Travelers at the fall of Sinnar noted that the percentage of slave and free cultivators in various parts of the kingdom differed. In the perceptive words of Lord Prudhoe, "the proportion of each depends upon the state of society of the district." In the heavily garrisoned environs of the capital "the great majority" of cultivators were slaves, while in the Shaiqiya country of the north, where

the very limited supply of farmland inhibited the establishment of garrison settlements, there were "hardly any."[27] According to the estimates of Eduard Rüppell only about four per cent of the population between Wadi Halfa and the Fourth Cataract were slaves, most of them retainers of the local lords rather than cultivators.[28] Burckhardt estimated that the population of the Nile valley between the Fourth Cataract and Sinnar included about 12,000 slaves; while the absence of an estimate of the total population makes a direct comparison with Rüppell's estimate for the north impossible, it is clear that his figures would be roughly similar.[29] In isolated instances northern *makks* seized[30] and bourgeois northern landowners bought[31] slave cultivators to shore up the declining agriculture of their debt-ridden urban hinterlands, but only along the Blue Nile did slave agriculture come to replace the labor of free commoners to any substantial degree before the coming of the Turks.

While the warlords manipulated the rise of a private commerce in grain and slaves to consolidate their control over the regions they governed, they also undertook to free themselves from the interlocking network of compulsory marriages, princely hostages, visitations, and filial deference by which the Funj noble "family" maintained its internal discipline and cohesion. Because this system rested upon matrilineal principles it was singularly vulnerable to assault at the ideological level as un-Islamic, while the patrilineal model of Arab tradition as construed by middle-class genealogists provided an alternative appealing to the warlords. At the political level the Funj system was vulnerable because the combined will of the Arabizing warlords could be directed unanimously inward against one man—the sultan—who did not need to be destroyed, merely "converted" to the Islamically respectable path demonstrated by the warlords themselves.

Throughout the Heroic Age the Funj had to endure a sustained and often scurrilous propaganda campaign. "Pagans from the White Nile" was the mildest of epithets,[32] while the more imaginative calumniators devised intricate fables of how the founders of Sinnar had been barbarians of obscure ancestry and unclean habits who had come paddling down out of the primitive southern swamps on bundles of reeds.[33] The right of such people to rule over any Arabs, let alone `Abbasids and Ashraf, was questionable in the extreme. The response of the indignant Funj was to discover the fact, hitherto unknown, that in reality they were not only Arabs, but also Umayyads. Their counter-propaganda is exemplified by a document which appeared among the Northern Funj in Dongola, purporting to be a letter from a sultan "Muhammad Badi `Ajib" (otherwise unknown to history) to Qandil walad Badi, *manjil* of the Northern Funj, and other community leaders. The following excerpts expose both the content of the Funj propaganda and the method by which its message was disseminated in Dongola:

> This is a document from the sultan Muhammad Badi `Ajib to the Banu Umayya living in the province of Dongola, to the commanders of the clan . . . to the *manjil* Shaykh Qandil walad Badi [and others] . . . . You have sent to us the son of our brother the *manjil* Isma`il

> walad Qandil with correspondence from all of you asking that there be sent to you the origins of your fathers back to the Companions of the Prophet . . . . Truly, O my people, from your documents you may know your origins to be great; for us there is nothing but greatness . . . . Firstly, we inform you that you are of the Banu Umayya, Companions of the Prophet . . . . [There follow several patrilineal chains linking the *manjil* Qandil and his associates to the Umayyad leader Mu`awiya and others.] And so you have seen the facts. The tongues are silent, and the slave `Aziz may see the excellence of the observance of discretion in regard to injurious speech! O my people, after the son of my brother, Isma`il b. Qandil comes before you, gather at [the place of] Faqih Muhammad Abu Dalaq . . . . After that promulgate this: assemble the slaves of the province with the mounted praise-drummers, and when they are assembled, read this publicly as an announcement to all creation that you are Umayyads, from the nobility of your origins that endure.[34]

Through statements such as this the Funj convinced themselves that they were Umayyads, nor would the latitudinarian eighteenth-century genealogist who had just made `Abbasids of the Dinka be so churlish as to reject the rather modest claim of the royal clan; doubts faded over time, and the Funj won recognition as Arabs among Arabs.[35] But the actual adoption of any system of patrilineal descent, however distinguished, would imply the end of the hereditary Funj nobility as traditionally constituted. The overthrow of political and cultural institutions entailed much more than an intellectual debate over the respective merits of various sets of spurious ancestors.

The Unsab dynasty of Sinnar was overthrown in a coup in about 1718.[36] The victorious rebels replaced the incumbent sultan with what would have appeared a thoroughly traditional substitute, his maternal uncle the sid al-qom Nol. Yet, from the perspective of hindsight Nol founded a new dynasty. This was not, as the chroniclers of a later and Arabized generation believed, because his "*nisba* to the Unsab on the female side" removed him from "the sequence of the preceding [kings]"[37] (which sequence they erroneously assumed to have always been patrilineal); rather, the accession of Nol marked a dynastic revolution in Sinnar because despite his own traditionally defined qualifications, Nol was an Arabizer. By intention or force of circumstance he founded the patrilineage of Sinnar sultans that was to endure, with many vicissitudes, until the fall of the kingdom. After a brief reign Nol was succeeded by his son, Badi IV, and their combined reigns (1718-1762) constituted the opening phase of the Heroic Age.. They were the first warlord sultans.

As long as Nol reigned the Unsab could be reassured that nothing had really changed, and conservative policies continued during the minority of his son Badi and the stewardship of Doka the Good *Wazir*, and particularly during the ascendancy of Badi's maternal uncle Isma`il, *wazir* from 1142/1729-1730 to 1156/1742-1743. But with the fall and execution of Isma`il, the maturity of the young sultan, and the successful repulsion of the Ethiopian invasion of

1744 which made Badi a national hero, this illusion abruptly vanished. From a traditional perspective, the fact that Badi was the son of Nol did not even make him properly Funj, much less a monarch, and the new king flaunted his defiance of the old system of succession by allowing his own sons to run loose in the kingdom perpetrating outrages for which they were not punished, rather than secluding them in the palace quietly to await coronation or execution.[38] He sought the support of groups outside the traditional structure of power in Sinnar and generously repaid their services; notable were his ample grants of land to fuqara' who wished to found communities and his military reliance upon a group of immigrant Fur-speaking knights-errant from the west, the Musabba`at. A tradition sympathetic to the Unsab expressed it thus:

> He killed the remainder of the Unsab, and took from the people of noble lineage their ancestral estates. He took the side of the Nuba [in this context, a derogatory epithet for non-Funj, not to be taken literally], and gave them the estates of the old nobility. For example, he made shaykhs of Fur people such as Khamis walad Janqal [of the Musabba`at] and took their side against the Funj and the family of the former kings.[39]

While the Funj suffered repression, Badi made a bold bid for the support of other elements in society by offering them positions at a vastly expanded sultanic court, which he increased from less than twenty offices in 1744 to more than sixty in 1752.[40] The traditional courtiers retained about one-third of the positions, but another one-third were granted to prominent fuqara' and the remainder to representatives of the numerous petty noblemen known as *arbabs*. The alliance between Badi and the *arbabs* was natural but revolutionary, for both shared a vested interest in overthrowing the Funj system of succession in favor of the new "Arab" patrilineal constitution articulated by genealogical theorists among the fuqara'. Under the old Funj system an *arbab* inherited his status from his mother, and unless he was awarded a noblewoman as a wife, his children would be simple commoners. Badi's empathy for the *arbabs'* marginal status can easily be understood, for if his mother was of the Unsab (this is not known), the sultan himself was an *arbab*; if she was not (this is quite possible), he was a mere commoner. Upon adopting an Arab identity and breaking with the Funj, the status of an *arbab*—like that of a sultan—could be made hereditary in the male line; Badi IV would become a legitimate nobleman, and the sons of the *arbabs* of his generation would also become *arbabs*. By admitting the *arbabs* to his court and granting them hereditary status, Badi split off the lower ranks of the old nobility and converted them to loyal defenders of the Arab constitution and the legitimacy of the dynasty of Nol.

The witness rosters of the newly expanded court reveal that a gradual change in the reckoning of descent was taking place throughout the elite. Before 1752 only the Islamic professionals of the sultan's court had identified themselves as the son of a father or forefather (for example, Faqih Ya`qub Hamiran [1729]), while the Funj noblemen and slave officials were known only by their titles and a

single name (for example, Shaykh Diyab, Shaykh of Qarri [1729]).[41] The latter usage effectively concealed the practice of matrilineal descent among the nobility and the absence of known parentage among the slaves. However, the custom was not Islamically respectable, and by 1752 most of the secular noblemen, like the clerics of 1729, had begun to search for paternal ancestors and now identified themselves as the sons of their fathers (for example, Shaykh Sulayman walad Badi, Shaykh of Alays [1752]).[42] Meanwhile, the clerics were not content with equality and began to inflate their names through the addition of descriptive epithets or even a third generation: Sharif Salim walad al-Shaykh Ja`afar al-`Alawi (1752); al-Faqih Madani walad Muhammad walad Madani (1752).[43] Within the next decade the high secular noblemen responded by beginning to add a third generation to the names by which they wished to be known: Shaykh `Adlan walad Subahi walad Saqar, Shaykh of al-Bahr (1762).[44] One pushful *arbab*, in an excess of pious patrilineal enthusiasm, even added a fourth: *Arbab* Yusuf walad Abbakr walad Ahmad walad `Alwan (1762).[45] The fuqara', not to be outdone in Islamic respectability, soon produced al-Faqih Muhammad walad Daf` Allah b. al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Turayfi (1765) and al-Faqih Hijazi walad Abu Zayd walad al-Shaykh Idris walad al-*Arbab* (1765).[46] The quest for patrilineal legitimacy reached its apogee in 1781, when the grandson of the modest cleric cited in note 41 resolved to have the last word and entered his name as: *al-Katib al-Shahid* al-Faqih Khidr b. Ibrahim b. Ya`qub b. `Abd al-Raziq b. Muhammad Hamiran (1781).[47] The noblemen conceded, in a victory of convenience over respectability; it was bootless in any event to match pedigrees with a faqih. Indeed, as the troubles of the kingdom deepened between 1780 and 1791, the court was stripped of its name-sensitive ecclesiastical supercargo, and the remaining noblemen all abandoned the third generation of their own names.

The adoption of patrilineal pedigrees for the purpose of witnessing charters did not in itself necessarily imply the immediate adoption of patrilineal succession by all who used them; the charter rosters, as were the contemporary genealogies, were ideological documents. Noteworthy were those noblemen who either missed the point of the new Islamic naming system or who, like the lonely representative of the old Unsab dynasty, resolved to defy it by naming female ancestors: *Arbab* Muhammad Bint al-Quwaydi (1762),[48] *Arbab* `Ali walad `Aysha (1778),[49] *Arbab* Muhammad walad Kamir (1778),[50] and al-Hajj `Abd Allah walad Amina bint Balila al-Unsabi (1765, 1780).[51] One courtier allowed himself to be set right by orthodox opinion: *malik* al-Daw walad Hawa (his mother)(1780),[52] became *malik* al-Daw walad Jamil (his father)(1781).[53]

The adoption of multiple names by the secular authorities had the unintended consequence that in many cases it became possible to identify persons of slave status by virtue of their now pejoratively singular names: for example, *mankarukan* Kab (1778).[54] In time the slaves, who were often persons of power and influence, resolved to remove this visible stigma by following the

new custom themselves. If the slave had a known father, and particularly if the father had ben a slave and a Muslim, a name similar to that of a free man could be constructed: for example, *mankarukan* Muhammad walad Kab (1810).[55] Other slaves were the sons of slave women belonging to the nobility and not allowed to marry but nevertheless enjoined to produce children for their masters. In such cases it would have been theoretically possible for the slaves, as did the lesser noblemen cited above, to identify themselves as the sons of their mothers. However, since the slaves did not participate in the dynastic marriage system their matrilineal ties bestowed neither power nor honor, and by the early nineteenth century the general preference for patrilineal descent had attained a level which inspired such individuals to identify themselves as the sons not of their mothers but "of the house:" for example, Idris b. *al-bayt* (1810).[56]

The evidence of the naming practices in the sultanic charter rosters after 1745 is perhaps sufficient to demonstrate an uncertainty concerning succession principles among the Funj elite of the Heroic Age and a drift of preference toward patrilineal descent. In several cases the actual implementation of patrilineal principles in a province or district may be specifically substantiated through other sources. Tradition asserts that the northern *manjil* ʿAjib III, a contemporary of Sultan Nol and perhaps one of the conspirators who brought him to power, secluded his sons at his own capital (therefore they could not have been sultanic hostages) and that "his descendants [through the male line] succeeded him without break until the conquest of the Sudan."[57] In 1791 Sultan Badi b. Dakin granted the province of al-Taka to a Shukriya patrilineage prominent in the region ever since,[58] while the *manjil* Ahmad b. ʿAli rose to prominence out of his province of al-Bahr by following ʿAjib's example in the seclusion and training to battle of his own numerous sons.[59] Among the Kababish of the northwestern desert the last matrilineal succession was that of Shaykh Keradim, who founded the Nurab patrilineage subsequently dominant during the nineteenth century.[60] The transition among the remote and isolated Meidob, culturally akin to the Funj but not a part of Sinnar, did not take place until the early twentieth century,[61] at which time some chieftains of subsections of the Kawahla along the Ethiopian border could still be found who traced their descent "on the distaff side,"[62] while their neighbors, the Funj *makks* of Abu Ramla, still passed the title from maternal uncle to sister's-son.[63] These are merely a few fortuitously documented examples of what was probably common in the Heroic Age—the adoption in practice of a patrilineal system of descent already demonstrated by the sultans and sanctioned by prevailing ideology.[64] The abandonment of the Funj dynastic marriage system removed the significance of the marriage rites that had always accompanied a lord's coronation and investiture. The Funj princess was replaced by various surrogates, sometimes a new wife of any description, sometimes a slave woman to be made a concubine, and sometimes, for merely ceremonial purposes, a little girl.[65] The genealogists of the new "Arab" patrilineages of the nobility took cognizance of these current events by projecting the lost Nubian heritage

backward into the distant past, thus "explaining" the rise of their putative Arab ancestors to power through a process of ancient intermarriage with Nubian princesses of antiquity.[66]

The adoption of patrilineality by the warlords freed them from the constitutional restraints of the Funj kinship system and granted each of them a self-perpetuating autonomy consistent with his economic and military might. However, it also brought problems. The multiplicity of sons who enhanced the power of Shaykh `Ajib or Ahmad walad `Ali had an unfortunate tendency to prey upon the populace like the unruly offspring of Badi IV during their father's lifetime, and to slaughter each other to the verge of extinction after his death. The new noble patrilineages improvised *ad hoc* rules of succession as they struggled in vain with the problem of maintaining political cohesion over time. Among the Hallanqa, for example, it was said that "the son of the ruling sheik retained that title even when he was not elected on his father's death by the tribe, and received a third part of the revenue from the newly-chosen sheik."[67] It would be difficult to devise a formula better calculated to promote divisiveness. The warlords, as had their predecessors, sought to make strategic marriage alliances; no holy man, however orthodox, dared to suggest that a nobleman should limit himself to only four wives. As the diverse lords sought allies by contracting marriages on every hand, one observer aptly described the situation that resulted as a "connubium."[68] But in the disorganized world of many power centers and uncertain political fortunes that had replaced the orderly hierarchy of the Funj, it was not easy to make all the correct matches and avoid all the burdensome ones.[69] Diplomatic marriages of the Heroic Age, however numerous or astute in conception, rarely brought lasting security.

As the reign of Sultan Badi IV lengthened, the persecuted Unsab nobles succeeded in assembling a powerful coalition against him. They turned first to the nobility of the southeastern territory of Fazughli, whom the Funj—perhaps with a measure of aristocratic contempt—called the "Hamaj" (approximately, "riff-raff"). This disdain was misplaced as well as impolitic, for Fazughli had only been conquered by Sinnar a long generation before, and its lords, although now converted from Christianity to Islam, were mindful of their descent from medieval Alodia. For them, the Funj were upstarts and the rest of Sinnar a vast irredenta.[70] Other disaffected elements were gathered to the cause of the Hamaj from among the new men of the eighteenth century; as their conspiracy ripened, the Hamaj emerged as a heterogeneous collection of neo-Alodian noblemen, warlords, slave soldiers, merchants and holy men. Their leader was Muhammad Abu Likaylik, a young nobleman from Fazughli, who had fought his way to a high military command in Kordofan. To Abu Likaylik and his successors belonged the second phase of the Heroic Age in Sinnār, the Hamaj Regency (1762 – 1821).

12

The Hamaj

After the Hamaj seized power in 1762, the family of Muhammad Abu Likaylik governed Sinnar under shifting winds of fortune until the Turkish conquest. While the political history of this period forms the burden of Part III and will be discussed below, it is important to emphasize here that despite the turbulent events of the age the Hamaj introduced a dramatic series of institutional reforms. Abu Likaylik and his successors were more than warlords; they embraced a comprehensive and forward-looking vision of a new social order dominated by the middle class, and they sought to establish a new political constitution adapted to the social realities emerging in their day. One of these was the geographical division of the kingdom into an economically advanced and a traditional feudal zone, while a second was the beginning of conflict between the middle and lower classes within the former area. The moderate policies of the Hamaj bought time for Sinnar but could not heal these divisions in society, which were to be thrust into stark prominence with the coming of the Turks.

The Hamaj began their rule by staking a special claim to the southern provinces; a traveler to Sinnar in the time of Abu Likaylik emphasized that the most important governorships in the kingdom were Fazughli in the southeast, Kordofan in the southwest, and Alays, which lay in between.[1] Abu Likaylik took upon himself the rule of Fazughli—where Alodian traditions were strongest—as his personal fief,[2] while his comrade `Adlan walad Subahi was given command of the northern Berta-speaking province of al-Bahr.[3] Kordofan was a war zone, partly because of the acquisitive attentions of Dar Fur and the state-building aspirations of Sultan Hashim of the Kordofan Musabba`at,[4] but also because the Hamaj regarded the area as their major source of slaves for the burgeoning garrisons. Alays too became a bleeding frontier as the Hamaj struggled to contain a new wave of northward Nilotic expansion into the Gezira.[5] Hamaj rule of the southern provinces contrasted with that of the northern zone in that there were few institutional changes; the nobility continued to extract gold, slaves and other goods from the commoners through traditional feudal methods and rationalized their right to do so through traditional ideological arguments. However, the south was not left totally untouched by the advance of the northern bourgeoisie. Arab traders made their way into the southlands, paused to barter for gold or slaves in defiance of feudal prerogative, tarried to evangelize as if the southerners were not already Muslims, and in the end settled down to rule under the overlordship of the Turks. In the case of Kordofan the

opening of a heavy slaving front to service the needs of the northern warlords severely compromised the claim of the Nile valley authorities to be a legitimate government, but here also the crisis was postponed until after the fall of Sinnar.[6]

In the northern and central zones of Sinnar the most conspicuous feature of the regency was its reliance upon Islamic holy men. All the regents delegated the routine civilian administration of Sinnar to one or more fuqara' as their personal *wazirs*. The Hamaj continued the policy introduced at the end of the reign of Badi IV of seating numerous prominent fuqara' at the royal court, but they went farther; they erected a single, hierarchically organized national magistracy which incorporated not only the urban *qadis* and the leaders of the older religious enclaves, but also the numerous petty fuqara' who, by the fall of Sinnar, had dispersed from the schools of the older enclaves and entrenched themselves in many sedentary villages of the northern and central zones. The *qadi* of the town of Sinnar became the Great Qadi of the national magistracy; his appointment came nominally from the sultan as titular head of state, and he in turn appointed the inferior judges. These lesser magistrates, like the Funj noblemen of an earlier age, maintained a sense of corporate identity and preserved good relations with the superior judges by visiting them periodically with presents. It was possible for litigants to appeal the verdict of a local faqih to the higher courts and ultimately to the Great Qadi himself.[7] In addition to their functions as magistrates the local fuqara' served the Hamaj as tax collectors; typically, their own lands were exempted, and they were allowed an Islamically sanctioned tithe of what was collected from the lands of others, while the second tenth customarily collected (from irrigated land) belonged to the government.[8] Nomadic groups remained outside the jurisdiction of the national magistracy and paid taxes through their shaykhs.[9]

The appointment of a faqih as *wazir*, the establishment of the national magistracy, the opening of the royal court to holy men, and the appointment of fuqara' as village tax collectors were all attempts to integrate the religiously oriented elements of the new middle class into the structure of government. The towns presented a thornier problem. In those without a resident nobleman, one approach was to designate town shaykhs and grant them status at court similar to that of a traditional nobleman; thus, the Shaykh of Arbaji sat at the sultan's court with the provincial *manjils*, and the Shaykhs of al-Halfaya and Dabarki graced the court of the `Abdallab.[10] Yet many urban centers were not represented in this way, and in the case of towns that were also capitals for a warlord it was assumed—not always correctly—that the interests of the nobleman and his townspeople were identical. For example, when the people of Arbaji heeded an appeal by the central government to oppose their traditional *manjil* and to endorse a Hamaj appointee, the discomfited warlord responded by obliterating the town and mercilessly looting his disobedient subjects.[11]

The final element the Hamaj attempted to integrate into their system of government in the northern and central zone were the warlords. Stripped of

their Funj identity and plunged into endless fratricidal feuds by the adoption of patrilineal succession, they were beyond control through traditional methods. In the place of Funj kinship discipline the Hamaj substituted the profit motive by selling titles to the candidate for a vacant or disputed office who offered the most generous payment. Burckhardt's harsh assessment that the Hamaj government sold the *makk*-ship of Berber "to the highest bidder, after the [previous] Mek's decease,"[12] is confirmed by a document issued in about 1800 by the newly appointed Hamaj client *manjil* of Qarri:

> The shaykh greets you [the leading families of Berber]. What we are informing you is about *makk* ʿAli walad Mustafa. Formerly we asked him, in the place of his father, to exercise stewardship over that which we assigned to his oversight, and he administered it under the conditions of obedience, usefulness and compliance. I sent to him a messenger . . . for fulfillment, but he did not obtain fulfillment from him . . . . The messenger came [back] to us with empty pockets. In all of *Dar* Berber he found nothing to present me with, the first time, but a mangy camel! So now I have decided to release him from his *dar*; I have installed *makk* Nasr al-Din and delivered to him all the stewardship and what awaits him. Now you must endorse him and follow him.[13]

After investing heavily in the purchase of an office, the new title holder was often reluctant to pay anything else to the treasury until he had recouped his downpayment; being no longer obliged to visit his overlord periodically to deliver tribute or face the superior's wrath, the lord of an outlying district such as Berber could afford to neglect regular payments. If the Hamaj wanted tribute from Berber, they had to send a force to collect it.[14] The consequence was a stimulus for the Hamaj to tax by raiding the districts within easy reach of the regent's squadrons, and the large cattle-owning tribes of the central zone were particularly vulnerable. The more distant groups simply seceded from Sinnar; for example, in 1791 the shaykh of the Shukriya, perhaps after paying a suitable fee, was given his independence, and the province of al-Taka disappeared from subsequent government records.[15] The sphere of the regents' effective influence in the north gradually shrank to the Blue Nile valley, extended briefly and sporadically by armed forays. Perhaps the sale of offices by the regents may be justified as a means of filling the treasury at the expense of the quarrelsome new Arab patrilineages who were doomed and determined to feud in any event, but it did not promote just and orderly administration.

If the difficulty of incorporating the warlords into the new administrative system was perhaps understandable, it was not so easy for the Hamaj to excuse the ungratefulness of the town shaykhs and fuqara' who owed their position in government to the reforms of the regents. A major weakness of the new Hamaj constitution for the northern and central zones was that it did not clearly define the duties which the middle-class elite would be expected to discharge in return for the offices and distinctions newly granted to them. In times of crisis the

Hamaj could only beg the bourgeois leaders to make themselves useful in some way. For example, as the Turkish invaders swept into northern Sinnar in 1820, the Hamaj strongman of the day pleaded with the fuqara' for support in terms exemplified by the following letter:

> From the presence of . . . Shaykh Muhammad, son of the late regent `Adlan . . . . to the presence of Faqih [Ahmad] walad al-Faqih Ibrahim al-Fardi and all the fuqara' of the Fardiyin. He greets you abundantly. That of which we inform you is, that in all our days we have never demanded anything from the tribes living in the Gezira, nor from their cultivation, in stress or in peace, but have regarded them in their condition as friends. At present we are encamped on the Dinder mobilizing the tribes of the east and the nomads. As for you, our distinguished fuqara', the reason for our truthful appeal and our common cause together through thick and thin, is that after receiving my letter which has come to you, you and all your fuqara' should exert yourselves anew and to the utmost in the affair of God and toward attending to our very important needs. [We ask] a true determination, without neglect, or scorn, or half-hearted treatment. As you ask about the Turks of the sultanate of Egypt, we [first] heard that they were coming [back] in 1180/1766-1767. This is an outrage to all Muslims, so leave all your affairs and direct your attentions to the matter. If God wills, Our Lord will thwart their expedition and send them back to their place.[16]

The fuqara' did not support the Hamaj but quickly made peace with the conquerors; the regents' erstwhile civilian *wazir* negotiated the surrender of the capital and was soon busy assessing taxes upon his countrymen for his new masters.

Most of the inhabitants of northern Sinnar during the Hamaj period were free commoner cultivators. While some individuals of this class were able to seize the opportunities of the Heroic Age to become traders or fuqara', none of the socioeconomic changes taking place in Sinnar benefited the majority who were left behind. The commoners did not write chronicles and legal documents, nor did they receive royal charters. They left their mark upon the historical record indirectly, through the words and deeds of men of other classes who, for a variety of motives, attempted to defend their interests or exploit their grievances. For example, the exalted nationwide reputation of the "Joseph among the Funge," the holy man who distributed hoarded grain at low prices during times of hardship, is eloquent testimony to the grievance of the commoners against the *sheil* system and the threat of eviction from land and community that accompanied the spread of private landownership and the birth of agricultural slavery.[17] The same set of grievances as seen from a petit-bourgeois perspective reappears in the tale of Bilal, a humble but respectable *jallab* from Arbaji who returned out of the south with a few slaves to find his homeland in a state of famine. When Bilal attempted to buy food from Jawhar Mawla, a rich merchant known to be hoarding grain, the *khawaja* refused to grant him

credit "even though his signature and intentions were well-known" and made him haggle all day for a few loaves. The term used for granting credit was literally "to write him the bread-money," an idiom which invites reflection upon the vulnerability of a commoner, who unlike the relatively sophisticated Bilal might not be able to write so much as his name in consummating a bourgeois loan transaction. Nor is it difficult to imagine the plight of a man whose credit rating was not as immaculate as that of Bilal. The credit policy of the *khawaja* in the story of Bilal was further contrasted (favorably) with that of the average merchant of Arbaji, who absolutely refused to sell hoarded grain, and (unfavorably) with that of another, who under divine inspiration gave away what he had been hoarding, died, and received his Eternal Reward. The whole anecdote was deemed worthy of inclusion in the text of a chronicle of Sinnar; although for dramatic purposes the narrator placed these events in the legendary famine year of Umm Lahm (1684), in reality they reflected the social conditions of the Chronicler's own day—the early nineteenth century. The moral of the story was given by the Prophet himself: "The hoarders are accursed!" and in the more measured words of the Islamic jurisconsults, the *`ulama'*: "Verily, thou shalt not profit from the famine-price of bread."[18]

A second set of grievances, articulated in 1825 by an anonymous village faqih from Abu `Ushr on the lower Blue Nile, concerned the administration of justice under the regents' national magistracy. One complaint of a typical commoner as he attempted to defend his rights before the new Islamic judges was their tendency to ignore the traditional concern of customary usage for equity and to hew to the letter of the law. This was particularly true if the case was appealed from the village level to a higher court, where written documents became absolutely essential.[19] That this system militated against the success of an illiterate litigant is self-evident, and most commoners could not read and write. The sizeable minority of commoners who spoke To-Bedawi, Nubian or Berta rather than Arabic would clearly have to seek justice elsewhere. Other grievances arose in reaction against the preference of the Islamic magistracy for monetary fines over corporal punishment. A wide variety of common crimes were punishable by fine, including insulting speech, assault, false witness, adultery, theft (if the stolen property were recovered), and homicide (if blood-money were accepted by the bereaved party). "Punishment in kind had been in use sixty or seventy years ago [c. 1754-1764]," the last Great Qadi told Brocchi, "but in more recent times had entirely died out."[20] While the substitution of cash fines for mutilation and the like may seem progressive from the viewpoint of a modern reader, to a contemporary commoner who quite literally had no money, the reform appeared in an entirely different light; it introduced a separate and lighter set of penalties for crimes committed by the classes who possessed money. From the perspective of a commoner, this could only appear to be a corrupt collaboration between bourgeois criminals and bourgeois judges. As the Faqih of Abu `Ushr expressed it, "at one time they used to cut off the hands, nose or ears of thieves, as is done even now in Cairo. But that practice

fell into disuse many years ago, when the fine was found to be more useful to the judge!"[21] The introduction of bail—for those who had money—inspired a similar reaction: "Now all thieves were supposed to wear chains for a greater or lesser period of time—if not otherwise, at least when appearing before the judge to carry on their trial. Some, to avoid this very obvious disgrace, would offer the *qadi* a sum of money, and if it were not enough to satisfy the avarice of that particular *qadi*, he would not be ashamed to say by how much it would be appropriate to augment it."[22] There is no objective reason to believe that the judges of the national magistracy were personally corrupt (perhaps a few were); the fundamental fault lay rather in the fact that the system of Islamic justice favored the literate, moneyed classes over the commoners. One crime which remained punishable by imprisonment rather than fine was debt; the bourgeois creditor who foreclosed upon his peasant client could not expect to wring blood from a stone.[23]

The *Tabaqat* of Wad Dayf Allah, which often reflects the viewpoint of the lower orders of the Hamaj period, all but ignores the judges of the national magistracy; however learned and influential, they were not among the much-loved religious figures who became the folk heroes of their day. Many other fuqara', however, did earn the affection and respect of ordinary people, in part because they shared the attitudes of the commoners and defended them whenever possible. For example, they organized vigilante bands of subjects to protect crops and livestock from the predations of the soldiers.[24] A representative figure was Faqih Muhammad Nurayn of the village of Abu Khurs (d. 1224/1809-1810), of whom it was said that "whenever people were afraid of the authorities they would gather around him, and then no on would be able to trouble a single one of them."[25] The fact that Muhammad Nurayn and the Faqih of Abu `Ushr were not isolated malcontents, but represented a strong tradition of rural radicalism among the village fuqara', may be inferred from the regents' gradual disillusionment with their performance as tax gatherers and magistrates: "Being a turbulent, rascally people, who direct public opinion, the last ministers of Sinnar began to bypass them in order to cut them down to size. At that, they began to repeat that the ruin of the kingdom was at hand."[26] "O Sinnar, a fire is coming to you!" proclaimed al-Hajj Mahmud al-Majdhub (1201/1786-1787).[27] The fact that the populist fuqara' were right did not make their message more palatable to the regents.

During the last years of the kingdom the schism between the legalists and the populists among the Islamic intelligentsia, broadly representing the interests of the middle and lower orders of northern Sinnar, was felt at the royal court itself. The stimulus was the arrival in the capital from Qarri of the eminent Faqih Ahmad b. `Isa, a man of impeccable juridicial credentials but who chose to represent the populist cause. He created—or had created—a new court office for himself bearing the title "Great Faqih," obviously inviting comparison to the Great Qadi of the national magistracy. The Great Faqih claimed an ultimate power to pardon and thus to overrule even the verdicts of the Great Qadi.. His

authority was said to rest upon "public opinion . . . the universal consensus concerning his moral excellence [*virtù*]."[28] But the Great Faqih also drew upon older sources of legal authority, for he pronounced his pardons while seated upon the Funj throne, which the last sultan, Badi VI, was willing to vacate for this purpose. Badi's collaboration with Ahmad b. `Isa and the populist cause went farther; he used the sultan's traditional prerogative to intervene in any lawsuit to disrupt the Great Qadi's middle-class justice and overturn his verdicts:

> If the Melek or Sultan encountered a condemned man with chains on his feet along the wayside, he would inquire what his crime might have been. If those standing by said he was a thief, [the sultan] would ask if the [Great] Qadi had not eaten up his property, and as an act of mercy, would reinvestigate the case. Such would be the fact; [the sultan would find that the Great Qadi] had put him in irons as soon as he demanded justice from him.[29]

The last sultan also delegated to the Great Faqih the traditional royal responsibility for feeding the hungry and extending patronage to the deserving. To support these charitable activities the Great Faqih was authorized to receive a tithe on all agricultural production, but the methods by which this should be collected are unclear.[30] While the sultan and the Great Faqih vied with the Great Qadi and the regents for judicial supremacy in the capital city, the process of social disintegration and class differentiation in the countryside continued to advance.

The regents recognized the growth of social tension in northern Sinnar and took a few modest steps to alleviate it.. First, they attempted to moderate the pace of social change by leashing the wildly ballooning credit market. Capitalists of the day were evading the prohibitions of Islamic law against the exaction of unfair interest through the device illustrated above by the gold-panning contract from al-Damir; they made their investments in one form (such as cloth or coin) and specified repayment in another (such as gold), the difference in market value between the two supplying the creditor's margin of profit.[31] Some perspective on the actual gains from such transactions may be inferred from Abu Likaylik's rather modest antiusury law: no creditor could legally charge more than fifty per cent interest over six months.[32] Toward the end of the Hamaj period the institutions of monetary exchange and credit had developed to the extent that the business cycle characteristic of capitalism became noticeable. When the virulent plague of 1224/1809-1810 decimated the population and interrupted everyday life, the Chronicler specifically cited the economic collapse as an event in itself; he called it a "great crash" (*hadda 'azima*) and observed that for the rest of the year prices remained very low.[33]

Second, the regents attempted to tap the wealth of the new middle class for state purposes. They did not introduce new taxes on ordinary forms of market commerce, which would have been expensive to collect and extremely unpopular with the majority of urban merchants and local warlords alike. Rather, they

concentrated upon the smaller but richer segment of the new bourgeoisie who had advanced beyond trading into speculation in land, grain and slaves. They introduced a stiff levy on land sales, by which the seller must pay to the government one-third the market value of the property transferred.[34] Slave-owners must pay an annual tithe on their chattels.[35]

The capstone to the regents' economic reforms was the minting of a national currency. The best-known Hamaj coin was the silver *riyal* bearing the name of the regent Idris, but there may have been other issues.[36] Hamaj coinage bore great symbolic significance, for by the traditions of the Islamic heartlands the right to coin money was one of the prerogatives of a sovereign monarch, and the minting of a high quality and widely accepted coin was one mark of a great one. Perhaps the regents also hoped that the issue of a silver *riyal* equal or superior to that of Carlos IV would help restore the central government's control over the price structure of Sinnar. If such was their intention, the project was not successful; the superior silver coinage of the Hamaj, like the gold of Sinnar, immediately fled the country or vanished into private hoards. The only known *riyal* of Sinnar to leave a mark in the documentary record was wrested from the reluctant purse of an impoverished *khawaja* by a remote Egyptian debtors' court.[37] The fate of the regents' coinage was perhaps emblematic of the destiny facing all of their palliative economic reforms, which were destined to be crushed between superior contending forces.

13

The Family Incorporated

In 1820-1821 the Turkish armies of Muhammad `Ali Pasha, ruler of Egypt, overran and conquered the kingdom of Sinnar, and in the years that followed the sphere of Turkish authority was gradually extended to embrace the approximate borders of the modern Sudan. While the story of the new central government which replaced that of the Hamaj has been told elsewhere,[1] in a sense the true "fall of Sinnar" lay in the reorganization of society on the regional and local level that spelled the final demise of traditional Funj institutions. The Turks divided their new possessions into two zones at a latitude not far south of the Funj capital. The northern zone was ruled directly by a hierarchy of Turkish officials; its inhabitants were considered Muslims and could not legally be enslaved. The southern zone was declared open for slave catchment and was farmed out for administrative purposes to a motley assortment of concessionaires. Turkish colonial policy thus ordained that the ultimate fate of Funj institutions in the two regions would not be identical; the north will be considered here, the south in the chapter to follow. Within the northern zone three features of Turkish policy were particularly influential in defining the rules by which the folk of Sinnar would have to seek their new destiny. These were the establishment of orthodox Islamic legal institutions, the introduction of a new system of taxation, and the encouragement of slavery.

Turkish rule in the north created a vast and relatively orderly realm. Within it men were mobile, freed from feudal ties to land and lord,[2] and claims to private property not only enjoyed the general sympathy of the authorities, but also could be enforced in their particulars through the system of colonial *shari`a* courts. To select as an illustrative example a case whose modest substance underlines the normalcy of such proceedings, in about 1834 two sisters in central Dongola and an unknown third party inherited equal shares in a sword. The weapon itself was far from Dongola in the hands of a leader of al-Damir. On 24 December 1834 the sisters appeared before their local judge at the town of Khandaq and asked him to help recover their inheritance. With their approval he drew up and sealed an authorization that allowed the man ho actually had the sword to exercise agency over it (to the extent of the sisters' shares). When the opportunity arose four years later, the sisters came to al-Damir and presented the document of the *qadi* of Khandaq to the *qadi* of al-Damir. The judge in al-Damir arranged for each sister to sell her share to him for an appropriate sum of money, and they departed (19 August 1838).[3] Not all claims were resolved as

easily as this one, but the authority of the colonial court system was omnipresent—although not omnipotent—throughout the northern zone.

With rare unanimity both contemporary observers and subsequent students of the Turkish Sudan have agreed that the colonial system of taxation was excessive in its demands, arbitrary and irrational in its distribution of the tax burden, and savage and corrupt in its execution.[4] Yet, no bloodstained chronicle of specific outrages should be allowed to obscure a more radical feature of the new Turkish taxes: they were collected in coin and not in kind. In some instances concessions to necessity had to be made and payments in kind or labor services accepted, for the productive resources of Sinnar were overwhelmingly agricultural. As Governor Khurshid explained in a letter to his master in Cairo when Muhammad ʿAli protested these irregularities and demanded an end to compromise: "If my Sinnarians were to cultivate ten times as much as they are doing, they would still have only grain and animals to give you, and not money."[5] But the official policy of demanding taxes in coin never wavered, and in the end it was enforced. The conversion of grain into gold was accomplished by delegating the requisite economic alchemy to the nascent Sudanese middle class. "The hitherto-absolute value of the land and its fruits now became conditional upon its incorporation into a network of commercial and credit institutions through which coin, slaves or other commodities suitable for the payment of taxes could be secured .... the cultivator who failed to gain access to the Philosopher's Stone of commerce quickly became dependent upon a more fortunate individual who did."[6]

The search for slaves was one of Muhammad ʿAli's motives for invading the Sudan, and during approximately the first twenty years of colonial rule the Turks themselves actively raided and gathered slaves in southern Sinnar and beyond. The Turks also encouraged slave trading and slave holding by the Sudanese through the device of accepting (occasionally, demanding) slaves in lieu of coin in payment of taxes; by about 1840 the trade by Sudanese had been stimulated to the extent that the government could gradually abandon its active role in slave procurement. Some of the slaves captured were pressed into Muhammad ʿAli's army, but many remained in the Sudan; the government used them to pay the colonial garrison, either directly or by obliging Sudanese notables to purchase them in return for coin, gold, cloth, or foodstuffs which would then be issued as salaries to the troops. Government payments in this form injected very large numbers of slaves into the economy of Sinnar, not excluding those parts of the kingdom where the precolonial market had been quite modest.[7]

"The misfortunes of some," in the words of a proverb, "are the advantages of others." Not all the folk of northern Sinnar enjoyed equal access to the institutions through which coin and slaves could be procured, and the Turkish period witnessed a painful division of the house between those who achieved wealth and power (within the limits of their position as subjects in a colonial society) and those who failed. The necessary condition for successful adaptation to the demands of the colonial age was the possession of bourgeois skills and values;

with the backing of Turkish blades, the middle class of the northern Sudan thoroughly reorganized the institutions of agricultural production, crushing out all but a few vestigial remnants of Funj society. The losers in this differentiation of classes in the northern Sudan did not deliberately keep written annals of their failure, but they appear often enough in the documents of the successful, in the bitter roles of debtor, rejected petitioner, excluded heir, abandoned wife, trespasser, troublemaker—or emigrant.

The archtypical institution for the organization of capital in the Turkish Sudan was the "company," a European term swallowed whole as a concept but imperfectly digested lexically by Sudanese Arabic as *kubaniya*. The famous companies of the nineteenth-century Sudan were constituted by foreigners in collaboration with the colonial government and are best known for their role in the conquest of the south. The more successful companies were often dominated by a single family, or by two families in partnership closely linked by marriage, and it is this feature of their organization which invites comparison to the social changes taking place at the local level in the northern Sudan. Under the conditions imposed by the colonial system on the towns and villages of the north, it behooved each family to reconstitute itself as a miniature capitalist *kubaniya*. It was the Family Incorporated that survived and even achieved prosperity under the rule of the Turks, and which imposed its will and designs on its more traditional or less fortunate neighbors.

An elementary principle of bourgeois enterprise in Sinnar had been the diversification of risk; no trader willingly confined himself to one commodity, however profitable. The application of this principle by the family companies of the colonial period inspired four types of investments which a gifted manager and entrepreneur could weld into a profitably functioning whole. One was commerce in the strict sense, deriving its profit either from the transport of commodities (notably but not exclusively slaves) across space or from the hoarding of commodities (notably but not exclusively grain) through time. A second wise investment was agricultural land, not as a speculative venture for advantageous resale, but for its productive potential, security, and prestige. A third strategy was the deployment of slaves as a labor force for the acquired farmlands. Finally, a risky but extremely valuable investment was acquisition of lower-ranking government offices, particularly magistracies, which the Turks, like the Hamaj before them, were more than willing to sell. The practical utility of a local judgeship is illustrated by the following episode. Khojali, the local magistrate, loaned money to a man named Muhammad, who owned a horse in partnership with a third man, `Ali. When Muhammad proved dilatory in repaying his debt, the judge bought the horse from `Ali and treated it as his own. Muhammad's only recourse was to sue his creditor in Khojali's own court, with the following results: "Muhammd walad `Atiqa has renounced his claim to half the horse which Khojali walad al-Faqih Taha bought from `Ali walad Na`im. The debt which he owed to Khojali walad al-Faqih Taha has been forgiven . . . but his suit for what he claimed in the horse has been cut off."[8]

Not all families adopted exactly the same set of investment strategies. Some emphasized the traveling trade, others landholding and grain speculation, and many failed to find even a modest niche in government. All, however, made their choices within the same framework of possible investment options, and all built their fortunes through a series of shrewd investments. Each of these at some point entailed the exchange of commodities, and it will be useful to consider the forms through which these exchanges were conducted in isolation from the social dynamics of their contents (which latter will be discussed below).

The forms of exchange practiced by the family companies of the nineteenth century resembled those of the enclaves of Sinnar in their conformity to the tradition of capitalism sanctioned by the *shari'a*, but they differed from their antecedents in their degree of maturity and sophistication. All commodities were evaluated in coin, the fluidity of conversion between various kinds of assets facilitating their prompt exchange for profit or the payment of taxes. A refinement further facilitating exchange was the invention of a system of fractional shares, patterned after the traditional division of rights in a crop (for example, in that of a date palm) and employing similar terminology. The need for such a system in regard to slaves, for example, was made clear by Lord Prudhoe's observation (Khartoum, 1826): "If two slaves of different masters marry, the children become their joint property; and it is not unusual for six or even more masters to possess as property a single slave."[9] While in some cases even six masters might be content to cooperate, in others one or more co-owners might well prefer to convert their rights into another form of value. This was made possible by the share system, which was coming into use in Lord Prudhoe's time: "Muhammad b. Abu Qur'an and his wife Fatima bint al-Faqih al-Nur have sold to Muhammad b. al-Faqih Musa one-third [share] in Fadl al-Shaya bint Sitt al-`Arifa for seven and one-half *riyals* [24 May 1826]"[10] The general acceptance of the share system by the end of the Heroic Age permitted investors to distribute their risks across a variety of enterprises, or to pool their assets for a common venture. Inherent in the nineteenth-century share system was the assumption that the asset being subdivided was exchangeable for money; in any given instance, the extension of the share system to an asset hitherto held by traditional tenure also signified its commoditization.

Credit institutions were refined during the late Heroic Age, and their use became much more widespread. Two were common before the fall of Sinnar and have been discussed above, the *sheil* system and the *qirad* or "partnership" between an investor and an active partner. Two other credit institutions became common during the Turkish period in response to the commoditization of land. The first was the mortgage (*rahn*) whereby a landholder transferred ownership and usufruct rights to a second party in return for a sum of money (usually from one-half to two-thirds the market value) and the option of regaining the property by repaying the sum borrowed within a limited interval, ordinarily one year.[11] "Husna bint `Alob testifies . . . that she has taken and received from the man `Ali al-Tom a sum to the amount of three Majidi *riyals*, and that she

has mortgaged half a *khashm* [share] of land in the *saqiya* of Muhammad `Ali al-Tom against that sum."[12] Under the terms of the second form of land transfer, *amana*, the creditor received the bulk of the usufruct while the original landholder retained ownership and the right to reclaim his property into the indefinite future by repaying the loan; he might also receive a share of the crop.[13] The prudent use of *amana* permitted a landholder to convert his landed wealth into more fluid working capital for other types of investment. Perhaps that was the motive of Muhammad in initiating the following transaction: "Dhiyab b. al-Faqih Muhammad b. `Awuda has given Muhammad b. `Abd al-`Aziz b. Bilal 8 *fardas* as an interest-free loan. Further, he has given him 8 *fardas* on consignment for four *qurush riyal* over and above the previous money, against [the collateral of] 4 and 1/8 `*uds* of land on `Isa Island . . . . As for the crops, the owner's share [*al-khurj*] is 1/7, of which Dhiyab will take 2/3 and Muhammad 1/3."[14] A very important feature of both mortgage and *amana*, given the conditions of Turkish rule, was that the creditor assumed the burden of paying the taxes due from the transferred property. While land was a particularly reliable form of collateral, it was also possible to borrow against the security of other forms of capital such as slaves, particularly for short-term loans. For example: "Muhammad Ahmad al-Mu`aysa testifies . . . that he owes the Faqih Ahmad Muhammad Muhammad `Awad al-Sayyid the sum of one hundred ten (110) Majidi *riyals*, which he has in his possession. The beginning of the term [of the loan] is 15 Rabi`a I [1296] and the end is 1 Shawwal [9 March – 18 September 1878]. The collateral for that is the slave-woman [*khadim*] Kasir and the slave girl [*farkha*] Nahid."[15]

By the end of the Heroic Age a higher level of sophistication in credit institutions had been attained as investors began to exchange the obligations due them. The most common exchange of credit was the incorporation of mortgage claims as assets to be handed over at marriage, often under the rubric: "If the money comes, it is bridewealth; and if the land comes, it is bridewealth."[16] For example: "He has bestowed upon her as bridewealth a *khashm* in the *saqiya* of the mosque, its boundaries given at the beginning of the document. It is mortgaged by the grandmother of his son `Abd al-`Aziz; if the *khashm* comes, it is bridewealth, and if the money comes, it is bridewealth."[17] At this level of exchange the actual written documents which defined the assets to be exchanged—whether wills, contracts, or certificates of indebtedness, bridewealth, *amana*, or mortgage—became very important. While in theory most interpretations of Islamic law maintain that a mere written document is without force (the binding authority lying in the testimony of suitable and sufficient witnesses to the legal act)[18], in practice the legal documents of the late Heroic Age approached the status of negotiable instruments rather than aids to the memories of witnesses. For example, a groom might offer as part of his bridewealth payment "one-half what is in the document of his mother . . . in regard to land—but without the date palms and animals."[19] The question of the possible misuse of negotiable documents was raised in the case of Babikr

al-Faqih al-Husayn: "[He] testified that he has received the legacy [in slaves] of his mother, which was with his paternal uncle the Faqih Ahmad Muhammad . . . who has turned it over to him in exchange for a document in which are [various trade goods]. Babikr has received all [the slaves], but the document has been taken from his paternal uncle, who said: 'It is lost, and if it is found, do not do anything with it.'"[20]

In summary, the mature family capitalism of the late Heroic Age encouraged the fluidity of exchange through the evaluation of all commodities in coin and the subdivision of whole entities into negotiable shares. Credit institutions included the *sheil* system and the *qirad*, the mortgage and *amana*, and a rudimentary market in the exchange of debt obligations was born. The legal documents which described such exchanges approached the status of negotiable instruments.

The Family Incorporated wielded its wealth and command of capitalist institutions to expand its interests in space and to extend them through time. Expansion in space followed two patterns, depending upon the choice of investment strategies adopted; families who chose to maximize landholding and slave agriculture would tend to enlarge a single centralized nexus of properties, while those who preferred to emphasize the traveling trade would establish branches in urban market centers throughout the northern zone of the Turkish Sudan. The two patterns were not mutually exclusive, but the former was perhaps the more common, appearing in most of the cases to be discussed below. An example of the less frequently documented second pattern is provided by a chronicle of the descendants of an old holy family of the Matamma area.[21] The founding father, Hamuda,[22] probably lived in the seventeenth century, and his descendants through successive generations—Sanhuri, Mudaththir, Sanhuri,[23] and Ahmad al-Rih [died 1236/1820-1821]—continued to reside in the family enclave. During the Turkish period, however, the descendants of Ahmad al-Rih dispersed to the following locations, some of which are identified anachronistically in twentieth-century terms by the chronicler: al-Matamma, 'Atbara, al-Rusayris, al-Fashir, Khartoum North, Omdurman, Shandi, al-Duwaym, al-Rahad, Berber, and al-Taka. The family chronicle specifically identified several of Ahmad's heirs as merchants (singular, *tajir*) rather than fuqara', landowners, or government officials, but the record is incomplete and the vocations not mutually exclusive.

The Family Incorporated retained the traditional custom of transferring the bulk of its assets from the senior generation to the junior at the maturity of the latter, and it is therefore bridewealth certificates that offer the most accurate standard for comparison of the wealth of individual families of the later Heroic Age. Traditional families who were not successful capitalists did not ordinarily keep written records of their bridewealth transactions; occasionally, however, a disputed dower found its way into court records. On 15 May 1869, for example, a Ja'ali womn sued her husband for the unpaid balance of her bridewealth, consisting *in toto* of 22 ewes which the husband had paid and one female camel

which, she said, he had not.[24] Considerably more wealth was at stake in the marriage in 1277/1860-1861 of Taha b. Ahmad walad Taha, possibly a soldier, to a woman of a Shaiqi officer's family (many men of the Shaiqiya served in the Turkish colonial army). Most of the assets transferred were evaluated in coin (although the space left by the court scribe for the total value of the bridewealth was left blank). It was typical of most bridewealth contracts that payment was to be made in two installments. The bridewealth consisted of:

> *Down payment*:
> 1 red cow, worth 150 *qirsh*
> ¼ share in a red donkey, worth 10 *qirsh*
> ½ share in the date palms of the groom's two parents (the precise locations are given), worth 130 *qirsh*
> 2 *`azm* [shares] in a waterwheel, held in partnership with Ahmad Mahmud and his sons, worth 50 *qirsh*
> 6 and ½ *fadayat riyals*
> 1 *nadar riyal*
> shares in date palms that will come to the groom from his maternal uncle, Hamid walad `Abd al-Hamid, worth 25 *qirsh*
>
> *Deferred payment, due seven years after the marriage:*
> 1 *waqiya* of gold
> 2 silver bracelets
> 20 *riyals*.[25]

If the families of Taha and his bride may qualify as middle class on the basis of the presumption of government office, the comparatively generous size of the bridewealth, and its evaluation in monetary terms, nevertheless the forms of wealth transferred remained largely those traditional to a northern Sudanese community. The new bride received not so much as a fractional share in a single slave, and there is no evidence of an active commitment to capitalist investment activities.

A very different kind of wealth appeared in the marriage certificate of al-Hajj `Ali Jifun, a Matamma merchant of modest but respectable means.

> Al-Hajj `Ali Jifun has bestowed bridewealth upon his wife Khadul bint Ahmad Muhammad `Awad al-Sayyid.
> The downpayment [*al-sadaq al-hadir*] is:
> The slave girl Jabali the Ethiopian
> Of sheep and goats, ten sheep and ten goats
> Two cows
> The Hammadiya she-camel and her two offspring
> He has handed over the aforesaid, and relinquished possession and ownership.

> As for the balance of the bridewealth [*al-sadaq al-ghayib*], he has bestowed upon her as bridewealth:
> Two head of slaves
> Of sheep and goats, ten [sheep] and fifteen goats
> Two cows
> Of gold, six *waqiyas*
> The day for the payment of this to her is three years from its [the document's] date [1 Rajab 1298/31 May 1881].[26]

The wealth of al-Hajj `Ali thus consisted entirely of trade goods; there is no indication that his family, in joining the urban community of Matamma as it arose in the early years of the nineteenth century, had retained any rights to agricultural land at all. Although not particularly wealthy, al-Hajj `Ali was thoroughly committed to maintaining himself through bourgeois methods. A second feature of al-Hajj `Ali's marriage contract, representing a radical departure from traditional usage, was the presence of a *halal,* a marriage settlement or counter-gift to the new couple by the family of the bride: "Her [the bride's] father Ahmad Muhammad has bestowed upon her: two *waqiyas* of Sinnar gold; the slave girl called al-Karim Yadri; a pair of silver anklets; and twenty-two Majidi *riyals.* All that is mentioned is present."

The payment of *halal* was an institution peculiar to the Family Incorporated and appeared only in those bridewealth certificates which testified to the solid bourgeois status of the participating families either by the sheer magnitude of the wealth transferred or, as in the case of al-Hajj `Ali, by its exclusive or predominant composition in the form of trade goods. If traditional bridewealth among commoners may be interpreted as an exchange of the material wealth of the groom's family for the labor services and reproductive capacity of the bride, then middle-class matrimony with *halal* may be viewed as an arrangement between two domestic *kubbaniyas* for the pooling of capital assets and the maintenance or enlargement of the Family Incorporated over time.

The marriage contracts discussed above came from respectable but modest families; their simplicity of form and brevity serve well for illustrative purposes, and as rough indicators of family wealth they may perhaps be construed as representative of a broad and numerous segment of the middle class. However, they do not do justice to either the size nor complexity of the vested interests of one of the more successful and influential families of the late Heroic Age. A marriage contract prepared for such a family is no more pleasing specimen of *belles lettres* than any other 3,200-word legal document, and a description of the contents in abbreviated form may perhaps prove equally instructive. The example chosen for analysis is the bridewealth certificate of a Shaiqiya lady named Fatima bint Salih b. Madani, issued on 3 September 1847 on the occasion of her marriage to one of the prominent men—and subsequently the leader—of the eminent Shaiqiya holy family, the Nidayfab.[27] Fatima's bridewealth invites comparison with that offered three-quarters of a century before by Hammad al-Majdhub,

the founder of al-Damir, as presented above. Clearly, the *faqih* families had come a long way during the Heroic Age, although the two lists of property are not exactly comparable due to the importance in the Shaiqiya country of date palms, which cannot be cultivated with success in al-Damir.

The first substantive clause of the bridewealth certificate offered by Muhammad Salih b. al-Faqih Muhammad b. al-Faqih Ibrahim b. Ibn al-Nidayf stated that the property to be transferred was worth 1,000 *riyals*. While a few other bridewealth payments of this magnitude are extant, it would seem that 700 would probably be a more representative figure for the rates current among locally prominent families. Most of the Nidayfab property transferred, as befitted a family that emphasized investment in landholding, consisted of land or date palms, together with some livestock. Each asset was described in appropriate legal terminology; the location and boundaries of each plot of land were given, the location and type of each group of date palms specified, and the gender, breed, and color of each animal noted (except in the case of sheep and goats, for which gender sufficed). These legal descriptions employed the terminology of traditional tenure and also of the fractional share system; while the changing significance of these terms in regard to land tenure will be discussed below, for impressionistic purposes the names of the units transferred suffice: *saqiya, 'ud, 'azm, hufra, khalfa, shiqayqa*. The most important elements of the bridewealth were rights to farmland, some perhaps held by the Nidayfab from time immemorial, but others—as explicitly stated by the certificate—acquired by purchase or mortgage in the recent past:

> 1/3 *khashm* in the *saqiya* of the mosque . . .
> 1/3 *khashm* in al-Ulimid
> 1 *`ud* and 2 *`azm* of an *`ud* on the island of al-Hajj . . . .
> 2 *`uds* in al-Sardiya East . . . .
> 1/3 *`ud* in al-Sardiya West
> 2 *`azm* of an *`ud* in the land of Mahmud in al-Sab . . . .
> 1/3 the property held by mortgage, as written down in the document of [the groom's mother], in al-Sardiya East and West, as bounded in the text of that document.
> 1/3 *khashm* in the *saqiya* of Walad Wati. This one-third *khashm* is held by mortgage for money of an amount specified in the documents of mortgage.
> 2/3 *`ud* on the island of al-Hajj . . . .
> 2 *`azm* of a *khashm* in the *saqiya* of Mariya, in the land which [the groom's father] purchased from Muhammad b. Ahmad b. `Atiyat Allah and his wife . . . .
> 1 and 1/3 *`azm* of a *khashm* in the *saqiya* of Walad Wati, which [the groom's father] purchased from Miryam bint Hammad . . . .
> 2 *`azm* of a *khashm* in the *shiqayqa* of Ju`ayli in al-Zuma, in the land which [the groom's father] purchased from his sister . . . .

1 *`azm* of a *khashm* in the *saqiya* of `Isa
1 *`azm* of a *khashm* in the land which [the groom's father] purchased from his sister . . . .
1/3 *`ud* on the island of al-Hajj, which [the groom's father] purchased from Dar al-Salam bint `Ali.

The bridewealth certificate described the process by which these gradually accumulated land rights came into the possession of the groom. The block of landholdings constituted "one-third the bridewealth of [the groom's mother] from her husband [the groom's father], as laid forth in the bridewealth document of the said [mother], for all [her] bridewealth . . . has come to the said Muhammad Salih [the groom], some by purchase/sale, and some as a gift of alms." Having thus consolidated his ownership of the capital assets embodied in his mother's bridewealth, Muhammad Salih then invested one-third in his marriage to Fatima. However, he also paid out from his other resources a substantial quantity of rights to date palms and livestock:

3 *hufr* [of date palms] in the *saqiya* of the mosque
3 *hufr* in the *saqiya* of the mosque . . . .
3 *hufr* which he purchased from Rahmat Allah . . . .
3 *hufr* which he purchased from `Ali b. Rahmat Allah . . . .
3 *hufr* in Lower Subayqa . . . .
3 *hufr* in the *shiqayqa* of Ghubashi . . . .
3 *hufr* adjoining the land of al-Jarjuri . . . .
1 yellow cow and its issue
1 and ½ *`azm* in a white horse, in partnership with Shaykh Muhammad
1 and ½ *`azm* in the colt of the above
1 and ½ [additional] *`azm* in the aforementioned horse (but whatever she shall bear after the downpayment of the bridewealth is not included in it)
1 *`azm* in the black filly, in partnership with Muhammad al-Amin . . . and its issue
½ the green, pregnant donkey with its offspring
3 ewes with their issue

This completed the 1,000-*riyal* bridewealth payment of Muhammad Salih, to be delivered in the customary installments. The marriage transactions were not yet complete, however, for among people of such wealth the family of the bride was also expected to contribute:

And as for her *halal* from her two parents, Salih b. Madani . . . and his wife Halima bint Khidr, they bestow as *halal* upon their daughter Fatima:
½ the slave girl al-Tamiya bint Sa`da, with her issue

½ the green donkey, with its issue, as written in the body of this document under the bridewealth
2 ewes and their issue
1 goat and its issue
4 *hufr* of date palms [in various locations]
3 *`uds* of date palms [in various locations]
1 *khalfa* of date palms in the groves of the bride's paternal grandfather [lacuna]
2 *`azm* in the slave girl Hadd al-Zayn bint al-Raw
1/3 [of an *`ud*?] including land and date palms
3 big *sumit* [beads]

In view of the wealth invested in this highly successful marriage, one may only regret not having received an invitation to what must have been a memorable wedding feast.

The various branches of a family such as the Nidayfab were united not only by descent, intermarriage, and interlocking property interests but also by a common identity as a family of *fuqara'*. The overall supervision of the family's affairs and its relations with the outside world (not least the government) was vested in a single leader, the *khalifa*, elevated by common consensus of the family upon the death of his predecessor. The *khalifa* administered the family mosque and the endowments of property bestowed for its maintenance by the pious from among the Nidayfab and others. He served not only as a religious leader but also as a clearinghouse for information that concerned his community; he conducted correspondence on their behalf, represented them in lawsuits, and facilitated their commercial activities by providing hospitality to travelers and storage for trade goods.[28] He also handled many financial transactions for his followers, exemplified by this receipt found among the papers of the contemporary leader of the Majadhib: "We have received from Faqih Muhammad b. Ahmad b. al-Faqih Mansur 150 Majidi *riyals* from the property of `Abd al-Qadir b. Bakhayt, and given them to Fatima bint al-Tayyib, the wife of `Abd al-Qadir."[29] The office of *khalifa* was a prize worth struggling for, and as the secular managerial skills mentioned above began to outweigh the possession of spiritual gifts and powers as a criterion for leadership during the later Heroic Age, many of the *fuqara'* families of the northern Sudan experienced bitter disputes between rival candidates for leadership. Only a year after his marriage to Fatima, Muhammad Salih became a protagonist in one such bid, its prize being the management of the Nidayfab. The decisive factor proved to be the attitude of the colonial government in the person of Ahmad, the magistrate of Marawi district. The course of the dispute and the criteria by which it was resolved are best seen through his eyes:

> On [29 October 1848] news reached us that Faqih Muhammad Khayr al-Nidayf had died . . . . The *fuqara'* of the Nidayfab asked us who should be their khalifa in place of the deceased. There was con-

> tention among them concerning who was to become *khalifa*; some of them said al-Nidayf, while others of them said Muhammad Salih Muhammad. When the discussion had grown long, they asked our opinion and that of the elders [*ajawid*]. We said to them: "It is better that the said Muhammad Salih become the *khalifa*, for during the lifetime of the late Faqih [Muhammad Khayr] he was entrusted with the affairs of the mosque—the Friday prayers, the two festivals—and he was responsible for the mosque duties of hospitality and management of its cultivation. The said al-Nidayf is not his equal in that regard." When we had spoken these words to them, all agreed that he should be the *khalifa*, and they entrusted the affairs of the office to Muhammad Salih.[30]

But in truth the gathering did not yet agree, and one less prominent family member who still objected had to be silenced by the judge. "If you had anything to demand of him you should have brought him to court," snapped the magistrate, "and whatever was your right by law you would have taken from him." The malcontent subsided, and the new *khalifa* assumed office. Yet, it is difficult to believe that the judge's outburst convinced the man who objected that his grievances were unjustified: Muhammad Salih, he had said, was unfairly taking his land.

In the irrigated districts of northern Sinnar exemplified by the Shaiqiya country or al-Damir, the supply of cultivable land was strictly limited, and the growth of one man's property entailed a corresponding reduction in the holdings of another. No one gave up land willingly, and as the middle class began its career of aggrandizement during the eighteenth century it did so, in the words of a practitioner, through buying up the land and date palms of the weak. The colonial system of the nineteenth century accelerated this process, for the imposition of land taxes in coin abruptly raised the threshold of what constituted "weakness" to a vastly higher level and bestowed upon those who did possess coinage a correspondingly irresistible leverage over those who did not. For example, where could one turn for help in paying taxes if natural disaster struck?

> Muhammad Qamr . . . . testifies: "I have failed in my cultivation of two *khasm* adjoining Khalifa al-Nidayf in the *saqiya* of Samadiya . . . so he [the *khalifa*] has paid the taxes to the government for the year [12]94/1877-1878, and I have relinquished everything from my two aforementioned *khashm* to him—date palms and *dom* palms, wood and *saqiya* [crops] from all my cultivation, together with half the large date palms [held] in partnership with the Awlad Ibrahim.[31]

Once an unfortunate landholder had given a rich man the right to cultivate his land in return for shouldering the tax burden, it often proved difficult to recover it. The prosperous families who profited from the misfortunes of their neighbors were careful to keep records of each increment to their assets:

> Muhammad walad Mazari came before us and testified . . . that Faqih Muhammad `Awad al-Sayyid was already cultivating the twenty-five `*uds* in al-Talh, and that although the said Walad Mazari is the agent of `Abd Allah, Faqih Muhammad `Awad al-Sayyid has already cultivated this land for the land tax—so let no disturber disturb him.[32]

> `Aysha and her son relinquish and abandon their shares of *saqiya* land located in the *saqiyas* of the said Muhammad Salih . . . . He took possession in the [present] year 1279/1862-1863 and paid the land tax due from them.[33]

> Fatima bint `Ali walad Rashid has testified . . . that she has sold eight `*uds* on the island of Umm Raqayba, and likewise *karru* [land]. "I have sold it to Faqih Ahmad b. al-Faqih Jalal al-Din al-Majdhub for five *riyals*. He has [already] had possession of it for three years.[34]

As an endless series of small personal disasters stripped one small cultivator after another of his lands, the Families Incorporated stood ready to absorb them. The precolonial technique of buying up the properties of the weak continued to flourish, in a fashion exemplified by the *faqih* cited in note 52; on a single day (17 May 1846) he and his brother as equal partners recorded the following new land purchases in the villages surrounding Matamma.[35]

Quantity	*Location*	*Price*	
6 `*uds*	al-Hilyu	12 *riyal*	12 *qirsh*
13 `*uds*	al-Karayda	13 *riyal*	13 *qirsh*
10 `uds	al-Mulayh	4 *riyal*	12 *qirsh*
10 `*uds*	Jabir		19 *qirsh*
3 `*uds*	Jabir		9 *qirsh*
7 `*uds*	al-Mariha	5 *riyal*	12 *qirsh*
5 `*uds*	al-[Talh?]	6 *riyal*	12 *qirsh*
3 `*uds*	al-Hilyu	3 *riyal*	12 *qirsh*
25 `*uds*	al-Karda	8 *riyal*	12 *qirsh*
6 `*uds*	Sankali	6 *riyal*	12 *qirsh*

If the purchase of land outright was the most satisfactory technique from the perspective of the acquirer, it was often easier to obtain initial control of another person's land through mortgage or *amana*, possibly to be followed at a discreet interval by absorption through assumption of the tax burden, as illustrated above. For example, a team of business partners carefully described to their local court exactly who their dependent clients were, how much each of them held, and what proportion of each of these holdings had been surrendered to the creditors as *amana*.[36]

Owners	Landholders	*amana*
Awlad Muhammad al-Amin	5 *`uds*	8 *`uds*
Awlad al-`Ajabayn	12 *`uds*	5 *`uds*
Awlad al-`Ajabayn	3 *`uds*	[lacuna]
Awlad Shawish	7 *`uds*	7 *`uds*
Awlad al-`Ubayd	10 *`uds*	10 *`uds*

By the end of the Heroic Age, it had become common for a piece of lands to be identified not by the name of its owner, but by the mortgage or *amana* holder.[37]

On the evidence of the surviving documents from Sinnar, before the Turkish conquest it was unknown for a man to own land outside the enclave of his home community. The relatively uniform justice of the *Pax Turanica*, however, made possible the extension of one individual's landholdings throughout the northern Sudan. That this was at first a venture to be conducted cautiously may be inferred from the testimony of a woman who traveled from Kassala to al-Damir in 1851 to confirm her property rights in court:

> Madina bint Ahmad walad `Ali b. Fasalid, from al-Taka, presented herself [before the court at al-Damir] to give evidence concerning her lands . . . . [There follows a description of five holdings, totaling 18 *`uds*, in various villages near al-Damir] . . . because the aforesaid came from the land of al-Taka. She wanted to record a declaration at the order of her mother . . . and sisters . . . for fear of forgetfulness and the duplicity of time—for verily this world has no security.[38]

By the end of the Turkish period, however, the novelty had worn off; it was possible for a man from El Obeid to own land at al-Halfaya,[39] for a man from Handub near Sawakin to own land on the Nile near Berber,[40] for a man in al-Damir to own land in the Rubatab country,[41] or for a Shaiqiya groom to offer his bride a cow situated in the Ja`aliyin country.[42]

The family companies of the nineteenth century not only expanded their landholdings in space and secured them through time but also consolidated their grasp of them by transforming the terms of their tenure. It will be helpful to recall that under the traditional Funj system of tenure (to choose the important example of *saqiya*-irrigated land) a customary contract, the *tiddan*, had determined the division of the fruits of each unit of land between the government-as-landowner, the laborers, and those who supplied draft animals, the machinery of irrigation, and other tools and services. In the eighteenth-century enclaves private ownership began to replace that of the government. The new landowners bought, sold, bequeathed, and bestowed their land according to bourgeois Islamic principles; however, "ownership" of land continued to mean the right to receive an owner's share [*khurj*] of the crop, and the *khurj* remained fixed by custom, often at the rate of one-sixth. In most cases the precolonial landowners lacked the leverage to impose a renegotiation of the *tiddan* to increase their share of the crop, for they knew of no other means of making their land produce

than by maintaining the traditional system of labor, craft, and animal inputs virtually intact.

Agricultural slavery, introduced in some localities before the Turkish conquest and universally thereafter, provided an alternative system of crop production and gave the landowner the power over free cultivators necessary to break the traditional forms of tenure definitively. A traditional laborer had a customary right to a share of the crop, but a slave did not. The pressure upon free cultivators is evident in the range and diversity of the nineteenth-century *khurj*, which was cut loose from its moorings in customary law by the competition of the alternative system of slave production and allowed to adjust itself according to the forces of supply and demand. In the more fertile districts such as Dongola and the Shaiqiya country the owner's share of a crop was doubled to one-third, while in the rocky districts of the Fourth Cataract, where neither slaves nor the increased coercion of free cultivators could greatly increase production, it sank below one-sixth.[43] Having overcome the constraints of the traditional *tiddan*, the landowners were free to reinterpret their previous rights to a share of the fruits of a unit of land to rights in the land itself. This transition is evident in the change of terminology used to describe *saqiya* holdings during the transitional period. The traditional landholding unit lay between parallel boundaries that extended from the middle of the river to the edge of the desert; under the new system the exceptionally valuable *jarf* lands of the riverbank were often severed from the adjoining machine-irrigated lands and might well have different owners.[44] An old-fashioned *saqiya* holding was said to be *rawka*, or the common property of those who possessed a right to a share of its fruits, while a holding under the new form of tenure was said to be *maqsuma*, or quite literally divided up into a number of discrete parts, each of which had its individual owner.[45] While the older system had distributed the risks of cultivating a *saqiya* holding among all those who shared in its fruits, under the new a misfortune which damaged only one part of a *saqiya maqsuma* was exclusively the concern of that portion's owner. For example, a very common complaint resulted from the erosion of *jarf* lands and their reduction in size by the Nile flood. Therefore, the new *jarf* owners began to maintain that each *jarf* holding had not only lateral boundaries upstream and down, but also a definite *rih* or specified breadth; the *rih* provided the legal grounds for attempting to demand a compensation in land corresponding to their losses by erosion from the adjoining *saqiya* owners.[46]

Another peculiarity of the new landholding system was its instability over time. Customary law in Sinnar had recognized no share in (the fruits of) a *saqiya* smaller than one-twelfth; those who might acquire a lesser claim, for example through inheritance, were compensated in another form and their landholding rights extinguished.[47] The strictures of the *shari'a* as applied by the colonial courts, however, did not permit the compulsory extinction of land rights even with compensation, and the result was a spectacular fractionalization of land during the nineteenth century. By the early twentieth century folklore spoke

of the little orphan girl who was said to have inherited 1/10,500th of a *saqiya*, while perfectly sober legal documents abound with fractional shares such as 8,145/72,864ths or 12,193/48,576ths of a *saqiya*, and contemporary British land registrars struggled in vain to win popular support for the rather modest proposal of establishing a new legal minimum ownership share of 1/576th of a *saqiya*—a plot about the size of a billiard table.[48]

> The proliferation of claims to ownership of miniscule parcels of land provides an index of the degree to which the concept of private property had pervaded the land tenure system of the northern Sudan during the nineteenth century. But it also implies that in many cases ownership rights—like individual shares in a modern corporation—might well be less significant than those of the manager who organized production and took responsibility for the burden of taxation.[49]

A similar tendency toward the fragmentation of ownership rights and the consolidation of managerial control may also be documented for agricultural slaves. For example, a court record of the late Heroic Age describes how a man's slaves were divided upon his death into a number of fractional shares, the value of each share being assessed in terms of Maria Theresa dollars; the shares were then distributed among his heirs. However, all the slaves remained in the possession of one man, who undertook to pay the other heirs regularly the cash value of their respective shares in the earnings of the slaves.[50] But slaves were comparatively cheap and could be replaced; land remained the most rewarding field for the exercise of acquisitive managerial talents.

As the land fragmented into shares, to be freely sold, mortgaged, or encumbered by amana, the terms of the new bourgeois tenure became increasingly complex. A sale document of 1295/1878-1879 assured the purchaser of a plot of land near al-Halfaya not only that the seller had the legal right and capacity to dispose of the property, but also that the land itself was unencumbered: "There is no fraud in it, nor any deception, nor any document for money, nor any stipulated date, nor any mortgage, nor any [prior] commitments."[51] This recitation of the proprieties of bourgeois ownership, couched with unintentional irony in the form of the immunity clauses of a traditional sultanic charter, constitutes a fitting epitaph for the land tenure system of Sinnar.

The investment strategies of most family companies of the nineteenth century included the acquisition of landholdings and agricultural slaves. The archtypical pattern is exemplified at the level of the microcosm by the investor from al-Matamma who obtained *amana* rights over a plot of land at Abu Dulayq in the Butana, proposing to have it cultivated by a slave in which he owned a one-quarter share.[52] In the central rainlands, exemplified by the hinterland of al-Masallamiya on the middle Blue Nile, bourgeois investors of the late Heroic Age imported slaves and developed a more intensive variation of the region's traditional transhumant pattern of dry season cultivation of the riverbank and wet season cultivation of the rainlands of the interior: "Most of the inhabitants

[of al-Masallamiya] are merchants, called *jallabs* in their own language. Nearly all of them own lands which consist of rainlands away from the Nile (al-Masallamiya is two hours from the river) and riverain land watered by machine as in Egypt. Most of these machines were introduced since the Turkish conquest. The richer people own broad lands in the interior which are cultivated by their slaves during the rains."[53]

These aggrandizements of landholdings were not accomplished without a struggle. Even in the rainlands, where the traditional swidden agriculture decreed that in any given season large tracts must be left fallow and where labor must have been in short supply, "all land has a name"—the name of the tenants under the traditional terms of tenure.[54] These traditional tenants did not yield passively to the claims of the new bourgeois slave-lords. For example, court records from the area around the Blue Nile village of Abu `Ushr document the resistance of two groups of commoners to the ambitions of their local magnate; as early as 1862 they conceded that he had already and wrongfully obtained possession (*hawz*) of their lands, but they denied that the ownership (*milk*) was his. The landholder found no difficulty in having his property rights successively confirmed by Turkish and Mahdist courts, but the displaced commoners did not give up; they were apparently still clinging to their patrimony in 1908, when a British magistrate found them guilty of trespassing on it.[55]

The squatters of Abu `Ushr were comparatively fortunate, for the social consequences of land aggrandizement and the introduction of slave cultivation by the family *kubbaniyas* were mild in the rainlands compared to the irrigated north. For example, in 1157/1744-1745 the *manjil* of Qarri had granted a plot of riverbank land at the northern edge of (modern) Khartoum North to a certain family. At the coming of the Turks these traditional landholders were brushed aside by the enterprising family of Ibrahim `Abd al-Dafi`, Grand Mufti for the Turks and archtypical colonial collaborator. But with the death of the Mufti and the rise of the Mahdi, a member of the evicted family named Muhammad Nur reappeared, squatted on his ancestral lands with his Funj charter, and allowed himself to be hailed into court. The complaint submitted by the Mufti's sons eloquently describes their father's businesslike reorganization of the traditional system of irrigated cultivation:

> Long ago, at the first appearance of the Turks and the lapse of the Sudan into unbelief, their father Ibrahim `Abd al-Dafi` opened up desolate wasteland in the area of Shanbat. There were trees and boulders; both riverain land and rainland were empty of cultivation. He cut down its trees and made it ready for cultivation. He made in it a well at the side of the road, from which passers-by could drink freely according to what God Most High has approved. He built in it a dwelling where nearby folk could seek refuge, and on the riverbank a settlement for the abode of the cultivators. Then he designated slaves, male and female, assigning them to spend the day drawing water and to return to their settlement on the cultivated riverbank at night. Our father did not cease to possess and profit for about fifty

> years, until his death on 14 Dhu'l-Hijja 1300 [15 October 1883]. Then we afterward did not cease to have possession, nor did we give it up, until this Muhammad Nur troubled us. We demand that he be prohibited from this troubling.[56]

The only unusual feature of this story was its ending, for the Mahdist authorities, who had no reason to love such a prominent opponent of their cause as the Grand Mufti, recognized the charter and claim of Muhammad Nur. More commonly a man who went to court to prevent his lands being swallowed up by the rich would be informed by the judge (as was the lone objector to the investiture of Muhammad Salih as *khalifa* of the Nidayfab) that however painful the process might be, it was all perfectly legal. In the irrigated north, many landless victims of the prosperity of the Family Incorporated saw only one solution: for example, when two men appeared in court in 1863 to assert their *amana* rights over the lands of five whole families of their native village, they explained to the judge that their clients could not appear to confirm or deny their managerial authority, being simply "absent."[57]

14

Vampires of the Borderlands

As the victorious Turkish army marched into the newly surrendered city of Sinnar, many of the conquerors must have shared the disappointment expressed by the expedition's mineralogist, Frédéric Cailliaud; the fabled gold, slaves and ivory of the Sudan were nowhere to be seen. According to men of the city, these treasures originated in the depths of the unknown lands stretching away to the southern horizon. As Turkish raiders penetrated the southlands over the next few years the initial mystery faded, but the riches seemed as remote as ever; patrols returned with tales of vast waterless wastes transformed overnight into a sea of mud in which horses floundered to their bellies, of silent, tractless swamps the size of an Ottoman imperial province, and of rugged mountains ascending, range upon range, into parts unknown. The same Turkish regiments which had fallen with irresistible fury upon the peaceful little districts along the Nile banks now found themselves dwarfed by the terrain, surrounded and outnumbered by determined and incomprehensible foes. The initial invasion had spent its force; of treasure, there was none.

During the first decade of Turkish rule diverse armor-clad Funj noblemen rode in voluntarily out of the south to surrender, or submitted graciously to the commander of a passing patrol; in its weakness, the new government was quite willing to employ their services as governors over large parts of the southern zone. In the west, makk `Umar of Taqali promptly and peacefully surrendered to Muhammad Bey the Daftardar (1821-1824).[1] In the Gezira, after crushing the plots of several pretenders to the Hamaj regency, in 1242/1826-1827 the Turks accepted the surrender of Idris b. Muhammad `Adlan and made him manjil "of the Funj mountains," with his capital at Ghule; southern lords from as far east as Gubba and as far south as Fadasi scurried to seek security under his legitimatizing overlordship.[2] On the Blue Nile the Shaykhs of al-Bahr and Fazughli were reinstated as Turkish vassals, although these arrangements were not destined to endure.

The institutions through which the Turks exercised authority over the Funj lords in the south were similar to their counterparts under the sultans. The Turks manipulated local dynastic disputes to their own advantage,[3] summoned to their capital lords whose performance was inadequate and held them hostage,[4] or dispatched squadrons to assist southern nobleman in restoring order or collecting taxes.[5] They imposed the payment of tribute upon the southern lords, specifying that part must be paid in gold and part in slaves.[6]

While the absence of statistics prevents precise comparison, on an impressionistic basis it is reasonably obvious that these tribute levies were at least as large as those of the Funj, and they may have been considerably greater. A particularly burdensome feature of the Turkish tribute assessment was the demand for slaves; in this regard the requirements of the colonial government unquestionably exceeded greatly those of the Funj. One southern lord, the makk of the minor Berta fiefdom of Kiri, explained the problem and the lamentable measures required for its solution:

> The Funj kings did not (they could not) enslave the Bertas. They had a few slaves which they bought from outside their country. There were augmented by a new form of punishment they introduced. Murderers and wizards (sahar) [sahhar, practitioners of sihr] were ordered to be handed over to them to become slaves, instead of being killed, as they were by Berta custom. To pay the Egyptian [Turkish] "tulba" [tribute] which included a certain number of slaves, the Fungs used to buy slaves from outside their country, anyway at first. Later under the heavy taxes . . . the Bertas became poor, and the destitute started selling their children. And finally in the Mahdia they lost their freedom altogether.[7]

The Turks did not recognize the corporate status of the southern subjects as Muslims, but rather regarded them as heathen ripe for enslavement; the southern noblemen were caught between the demands of the colonial government for man-flesh and the strictures of the feudal constitution which obliged them to defend their subjects against enslavement.

From the Turkish perspective, the southern noblemen proved dilatory in delivering over slaves. Worse, with the introduction during the second decade of Turkish rule of the jihadiya, the new colonial army composed of slaves, the south provided a refuge for slave soldiers who deserted from the ranks.[8] Moreover, refuge was also given to rebellious fellow noblemen from other parts of Sinnar; for example, at one point makk Timiki of the Ingessana harbored no less than seventeen other makks, only a few of whom belonged rightfully to the Ingessana fief. His raiders struck with impunity from Gubba and al-Rusayris to Ghule.[9] Finally, the southern lords attempted to preserve their districts by rigorously isolating them from contacts with the outside world; a traveler who approached the Ingessana or Gumuz without prior approval and an appropriate escort might well be killed on sight.[10] Given these disadvantages in the use of Funj noblemen as colonial agents in the south, it is not surprising that the Turks sought alternative methods of rule, in some cases by governing southern districts directly, and in others by selecting more pliant tools.

The provinces east of the Blue Nile provided the Turks with few reliable Funj clients; rather, they afforded sanctuary to bitter opponents of the regime such as makk Nimr of Shandi. Moreover, the turbulence in the east provided an opportunity for encroachment by the reconsolidating Ethiopian state. The Turks established their control in the east only after prolonged struggle, and

they ruled their conquests directly; during the course of the conflict the Funj manjil of al-Bahr was replaced by a Turkish kashif.[11] A second zone over which the Turks asserted a direct and unmediated control was the White Nile, which the introduction of river navigation by the colonizers had transformed from a barrier to be forded into a highroad across southern Sinnar and out into the lands beyond. Finally, between 1821 and 1855 the Turks attempted to establish direct control over those districts—south of Fazughli proper and west of the Blue Nile—from which they expected to be able to extract large amounts of gold through the importation of modern mining techniques. By mid-century these efforts had proven vain, and the Turkish officials and garrisons were withdrawn.[12] In all cases the direct exercise of Turkish rule in parts of southern Sinnar eliminated the higher Funj noblemen and crippled the authority of the lesser ones, while the southern subjects were stripped of any defense against enslavement. As the Turks reached the limits of their power and fell back, a new social group stood ready to fill the power vacuum.

Some northern traders of the eighteenth century had taken advantage of the collapse of sultanic control of exchange in Sinnar to journey into the southlands in search of gold. The Turkish regime, while it attempted to enforce certain trade monopolies, generally encouraged the migration of traders into the directly administered parts of the south by providing physical protection, middle class Islamic justice, a ready market for slaves and other southern products, and by removing both the feudal encumbrances upon movement of subjects in the north as well as the restrictions on the enslavement of subjects in the south. Furthermore, the colonial transformation of agricultural production in the irrigated portions of the north had the effect of expelling a large number of men from their homes in Dongola, the Shaiqiya country, and the lands of the Rubatab and Ja`aliyin. The consequence was a wave of migration during the nineteenth century by northern men, predominantly from the districts named, into southern Sinnar and beyond.

The most common term used by contemporaries to describe the migrants was jallaba, meaning a traveling merchant of limited means. The designation had positive connotations and was accepted by the migrants themselves, who often tended to view their activities as trade and perhaps as an extension southward of the middle class trade patterns characteristic of northern Sinnar during the Turkish period. Although they might find themselves frontiersmen by force of circumstance, they desired nothing more exotic than an opportunity to return to their homes on the northern Nile with enough wealth to stay there. For example, Gustav Nachtigal wrote concerning the jallaba in Dar Fur: "These remarkable people are often absent for ten years from the homes which they have somewhere [on the Nile] . . . though one should not conclude from this that they have no affection for their homes and people."[13] A similar theme runs through the boatmen's songs collected by Ernst Marno in the southern swamps; thus, a young man addressed his sweetheart far away: "If I bring my venture home, I will not lack for a welcome; all our hopes lie in the profit!"[14]

But the road south was perilous, and the attempt of the migrants to maintain ties to kinsmen and loved ones in the north was often doomed. The records of northern families are dotted with entries such as this: "Its date is [. . .] Saturday morning, in the year of the death of Ahmad walad `Awad al-Majid. It is thought that he died in the west; his family brought me the news."[15] Or again, on 11 May 1866, a young woman of al-Matamma appealed to the judge of her local court, explaining that her husband had traveled off "outside the country [al-dawla al-`Uthmaniya]" to Dar Fur, Fertit, and the "Nuba Rivers" without providing her with a proper means of support. The judge granted her a stipend, to be charged to her husband upon his return.[16] But by 1869 it seemed that the husband would never return, and the woman was granted a divorce.[17] Since the lady belonged to a prominent merchant family of al-Matamma, it is doubtful that she was starving; rather, it would seem that her husband was being written off by his in-laws as a speculative venture that had failed. A final example: A man named Hasan left his home in the Shaiqiya country to go to "the rivers" of the southern Sudan, leaving his wife and daughter in the care of a guardian and his meager property—a few shares in date trees—in the custody of a prominent holy man. Hasan was long in the south; his daughter died, and his wife (or was it now his widow?) became pressed for money. For six years (1876-1882) the wife's guardian struggled to recover Hasan's property, directing the holy man to "gather" and liquidify Hasan's assets and to hand them over in the form of Turkish majidi dollars. As the years passed and the holy man did not pay, the guardian took a stricter tone, reminding him that Hasan's property had merely been left with him for safekeeping, and constituted a debt which the guardian would not consider paid until the cash value of the property was delivered. It would seem that the holy man (whose correspondence has not been recovered) refused to pay on the grounds that Hasan might still be alive somewhere, for in his last recovered appeal the exasperated guardian protested: "until now no news or reply from him has come. Every time anyone from the rivers comes to us we ask about him, but they do not give us news. To this date we have no news!" Without additional facts it is impossible to determine whether it was the holy man or the guardian who was best serving Hasan's true interests, but the disintegration of an impoverished northern Sudanese family and the disinheritance of one of its native sons is obvious.[18]

The dangers and temptations of the southern trade made orthodox bourgeois commercial arrangements unreliable. For example, during the 1850s a family of the Ja`aliyin from the village of al-Huwiya near al-Damir assembled some capital and formed a qirad partnership with one of their number named al-Tahir. He, as the active partner, set off on an expedition to Kordofan with a working capital of 32 Carlos IV riyals, 26 majidi riyals, and 13 riyals "yashnak." After reaching Kordofan al-Tahir died, and the family sent out his brother al-Tayyib to take over his capital and contractual obligations. But when al-Tayyib promptly followed his predecessor to the grave, the money was wrongfully given over to a third brother, Muhammad al-Amin, who in turn passed the sum

along to his son and settled down to live in El Obeid, showing no sign of returning to the north. By 1861 the irate investors from al-Huwiya were ready to sue and filed their complaint before the judge of al-Damir. But the judge's options were very limited; he appointed an agent to recover and properly dispose of the sum, if possible, but there is no indication that the agent was successful in doing so.[19] In short, the conditions of life in the southern zone tended to render illusory the initial hopes of many northern migrants for a speedy and profitable return. Some migrants, perhaps including the wayward capitalist Muhammad al-Amin, were willing to cut the ties binding them to their homeland and to seek a new life in the south. Probably this attitude was even more common among the numerous migrants too poor to leave behind a trail of legal documents, who made their way south without any capital resources whatsoever, and who from the beginning were forced to fend for themselves by skill, guile, or raw violence. From the perspective of southerners, these wandering bands of misnamed jallaba were better perceived as "Watawit," a migratory plague of predatory "bats."

The Funj rulers in the south regarded all merchants as social inferiors, an attitude which not only influenced their relations with the Watawit but also extended to the solid northern bourgeoisie of the Families Incorporated. Thus, when Governor-General Charles Gordon appointed the distinguished merchant-collaborator Ilyas Pasha the governor of Kordofan, makk Adam "Umm Dabalu" of Taqali "sent to El Obeid to inquire if all the Turks and other 'Whites' had died, as the government had now given high positions to men who were merely merchants, instead of to persons of high descent . . . . 'I pay for goods I buy from merchants,'" snorted the makk, "'but I do not pay tribute to them!'"[20] Although the Funj nobles sometimes allowed a limited number of the more respectable variety of merchant to enter their domains under strict supervision for the conduct of trade, they rigorously excluded the bulk of the Watawit by directing their subjects to kill them on sight. The impoverished northern migrants thus tended to congregate in those parts of the south which were not under Funj control—the banks of the White Nile and the gold-bearing districts of Belà Shangul.

At the time of the Turkish conquest the White Nile banks as far north as Aba Island were dominated by the Shilluk, a populous and independent nation which maintained orderly relations with the provinces of Sinnar that almost surrounded it, relations which were "peaceful" within the limitations of the prevailing system of institutionalized insecurity.[21] The Turks were unable to co-opt the Shilluk leadership, and attempts to extend direct control from the river to the hinterland faced stiff resistance; northern boats passed cautiously through the Shilluk country for decades, and only in 1863 was a provincial government established. In the interim, the path to conquest had been smoothed by profound changes within the Shilluk community itself. As had the adjoining adjoining districts of southern Sinnar, the Shilluk kingdom had long been accessible to a limited number of select northern traders under terms dictated by the local lord, the Shilluk reth, who like his Funj counterparts on either hand

personally dominated and controlled the external trade of his territory. The comparative cultural familiarity of the Shilluk, combined with the reth's success in keeping his land free of Turks, made the Shilluk kingdom an attractive destination for nineteenth-century migrants out of the north. Moreover, the Shilluk rulers of the early decades were powerful enough not to feel threatened by the newcomers; in contrast to the beleaguered Funj lords of the Gumuz or Ingessana, they welcomed the immigrants. It was a fatal mistake.

As late as 1843 the community of migrants in the Shilluk kingdom was still small and clustered near the capital under the watchful eye of the reth, but it swelled rapidly thereafter, especially in the far north of the kingdom. Traditional traders continued to conduct officially approved exchanges with agents of the reth, exploiting the contemporary boom in the ivory trade.[22] The greatest growth in commerce, however, lay in the seizure of slaves, particularly from among the neighboring Dinka. The introduction of firearms and the vast expansion of the market for slaves in the north triggered an unprecedented explosion in the slave trade, a commerce from which the reth may well have been able to profit in various ways but which he was quite unable to regulate or dominate. The newcomers established residences and families in the northern part of the Shilluk kingdom; they made friends and forged business and political alliances with the like-minded among the Shilluk. As the bourgeois lifestyle became entrenched, reth Nyidok gave the immigrants and their friends important positions at his court.[23]

By the end of the 1850s the middle-class community had acquired enough influence to precipitate a crisis in the Shilluk body politic. Migrant merchants chafed under the reth's elaborate customary restrictions and controls on trade,[24] while some Shilluk—forbidden by their king to acquire firearms and subject to numerous other traditional constraints on personal conduct and self-aggrandizement—longed to be "emancipated from the tyranny of the reth and his councilors."[25] That many other Shilluk regarded the migrants and not the reth as the cause of the troubles became apparent in 1859 upon the death of Nyidok and the accession of Kwat Ker. The new reth mobilized his supporters and attacked the bourgeois partisans (September 1860), overrunning the trading center of Kaka and inflicting a serious defeat. The immigrants and their Shilluk supporters regrouped under the leadership of the arbab Muhammad Khayr, a locally prominent man from Dongola who had served as a military officer and high courtier in Taqali before establishing himself as a trader in Kaka.[26] The faction purchased guns, hired mercenaries, and counterattacked the following year; Kwat Ker was defeated, and the kingdom fell to the jallaba. The victory of Muhammad Khayr was not strictly a foreign conquest, for it had relied upon the support of the pro-bourgeois Shilluk faction which had grown to prominence during the reign of Nyidok. But the issues at stake in the war, including the liberties of outsiders and the traditional constitutional constraints on private commerce, precluded the simple restoration of a better-humored but conventional reth. The Shilluk polity would go on to enjoy an eminent posthumous

existence as the textbook exemplar of an idealized, timeless, and exotic "divine" monarchy; but in real life the victorious bourgeois faction applied to Khartoum for the recognition of Muhammad Khayr as the "makk of the Shilluk." The Turks saw their opportunity and dispatched an army instead; the arbab fled, his faction disintegrated, and by the end of 1863 the new colonial government was in place. With the backing of Turkish guns the jallaba no longer needed the support of Shilluk collaborators. There followed a systematic enslavement of Shilluk, commencing with the less populous and more accessible communities. By 1900 the size of the Shilluk homeland had been reduced by half.

The major gold-producing districts of southern Sinnar, inhabited largely by Berta-speaking peoples, experienced the full weight of direct Turkish rule from 1821 to 1855.[27] The inhabitants saw resident garrisons, officials, European technicians, a visit by the Egyptian viceroy himself, and an abortive attempt to construct a planned colonial metropolis in their midst. The Turkish presence prevented local Funj chiefs from establishing anything more than nominal ties to the manjil of Ghule; they were obliged to confront the colonial power with neither a single recognized mediator nor a unifying leader in resistance. Some communities compromised, others fought back, and all suffered from exorbitant tribute, forced labor services, and unrestricted enslavement. By 1855, however, the attempt of the Turks to administer the lands of gold directly had led to bankruptcy, and the colonizers were ready to fall back upon some form of indirect rule. Changes within Berta society during the period of unmediated Turkish dominance, however, had rendered a reinstatement of Funj overlords on the model of Ghule or Gubba impossible; the Berta had fallen prey to the Watawit.

The migrants who entered the Berta country during the Turkish period differed greatly in resources and temperment. Some were well-capitalized merchants, while others begged or stole; some were disciplined and devoutly religious men who viewed themselves as missionaries, while others drank, gambled, killed without cause, and indulged in every sort of excess. All shared a common sense of identity as "sons of the Arabs,"[28] a concept embracing the whole complex of bourgeois Islamic institutions and values developed in northern Sinnar during the Heroic Age. All sought a greater or lesser degree of prosperity on the southern frontier; for some, this meant no more than a meager maintenance from the writing of amulets,[29] a schoolteacher's fees for training the sons of local chiefs.[30] or gifts received in return for offering hospitality to travelers along a trade route.[31] For many, this was not enough. The Berta country became an Eldorado for the "sons of the Arabs" because the Watawit were willing to ignore the traditional social structure to the extent of regarding the southern subject class as "`abid," literally "slaves." A brisk market opened in "orphans," "lost children," and "abandoned wives"; even the daughter of the nearby manjil of Gubba was kidnapped and enslaved.[32] The practical implementation of this system may be illustrated by the fantasy of a poor but ambitious immigrant named Muhammad; when the young orphaned ward of

an Amam village chief helped him pack his donkey while traveling, the Arab said to his companions:

> See that little `abid, how skillful and industrious he is? If we come back from the Koma, I want to buy him from the agur [chief] and take him back to Agoldi. There I'll give him a dammur [cloth garment] and a few armbands, have him circumcised, teach him to shoot and send him out with the hunters against the [other] `abid. After two or three years he will have brought in a few other slaves, and I can then head out to catch a few "chickens" [nubile female slaves].[33]

Muhammad's fantasy was realized by many others, and the ambitious among the Watawit perceived that the chain of profitable transactions could be extended and multiplied indefinitely. Leaders arose who stood ready to turn their bands of slave gunmen against the whole body of southern subjects; the Watawit were ready to advance from trade to politics.

The surviving Funj petty noblemen in the Berta country constituted an obstacle to the designs of the Watawit. None had the power to forcibly exclude the Arabs, as did the manjil of Gubba on the far bank of the Blue Nile, but each resisted the enslavement of his own subjects as best he could. Yet, each local makk was also obliged to produce slave tribute for the Turks, and in the absence of the restraining oversight of a manjil each did not scruple to seize his neighbors. The leading Watawit placed their gunmen at the service of a few selected Funj makks, cemented the alliance in traditional fashion by dutifully marrying their daughters, and proceeded to carve out little bourgeois principalities for themselves: "They found the country organized on the feudal system of the Fung Kingdom and ruled by petty meks who were the descendants of the local meks of Fung times. By a combination of diplomacy and violence they succeeded in getting rid of or subduing this Fung squirearchy."[34] Only in the next generation did it become clear that the Watawit had also perverted the Funj system of descent and founded their own Arab patrilineages. The introduction of tax payments in specie by the Turks gave the commercially active Watawit a second form of leverage over the Funj "squires," for the impecunious noblemen were often obliged to turn to them for loans with which to pay their assessed tribute. For example, makk Ghormaz of the Berta fiefdom of Ghezan borrowed a sum demanded by the Turks from his Watawit neighbor `Abd al-Rahman "Tur al-Ghuri." The debt went unpaid for several years, but when the opportunity presented itself the Watawit leader descended with an army upon the debtor's hapless son, Bakurig Bugul, demanding either a large sum in gold or the fief itself. As the subjects of Ghezan failed to pan quickly enough to discharge his debt, `Abd al-Rahman annexed Ghezan. Bakurig Bugul's overlord, makk Abadero of Fazughli, objected to the seizure but could not prevent it.[35]

The Turkish withdrawal in the later 1850s took place amid this political transition, and the colonial authorities, mindful of the fact that the tribute-gathering abilities of the Watawit exceeded those of the Funj, decided to strengthen

the hand of the Arabs. They extended official recognition to three of the more prominent immigrant leaders (one of whom eventually conquered the others and absorbed their realms). In the years that followed slaves poured out of Belà Shangul to the markets of the Sudan and Ethiopia, while the corresponding internal social convulsions reduced Berta speech and traditional ways to communities in a few isolated pockets, usually mountainous, whose existence the Watawit tolerated because they were valuable as slave-breeding and raiding grounds. In contrast, the comparatively humane quality of Funj government in southern Sinnar, even during the Turkish period, may be crudely measured in the sheer survival of the languages and customs of the Ingessana, Gumuz, Uduk, Maban, Koma, the various communities of "Burun," and of those Berta who had the fortune to fall under the authority of Ghule. When the opportunity arose, groups of subjects often fled with their Funj leaders out of Watawit-administered territory to the relative security of Ghule.[36]

Turkish colonial rule in southern Sinnar, particularly in those districts governed directly, greatly stimulated the spread of slavery and the slave trade. The Turkish system perverted or destroyed the traditionally protective relations between southern subjects and southern rulers and imposed new and antagonistic relations between the folk of the southern provinces and from northern Sinnar. But the nexus of colonial institutions which bound southerners to the demands of the slave market of the north did not end in Khartoum; they extended on down the endless copper wire of the telegraph to the imperial metropolis of Cairo. From the broader perspective of Cairo, by mid-century the slave trade had fulfilled its empire-building task and was becoming somewhat of an international embarrassment; under the pressure of Egypt's European creditors, laws were promulgated prohibiting the trade, and European officers were sent to the Sudan to enforce them. A final assessment concerning slavery in Turkish Sinnar must contend with an unusually passionate subsequent historiography determined to divert attention away from the slaves of the nineteenth century themselves and toward the personalities of their masters—not least, the European officials of the later Turkish period.

The European "Turks," as had their predecessors, recruited and commanded slave armies of jihadiya. There is not so much as a rumor that even one of them might perhaps once refused to accept a single tax payment on the grounds that it was the product of slave labor. The European officers attempted to justify their own patent collaboration in the colonial slave system by advancing the theory—historically incorrect—that domestic and agricultural slavery had always been an integral part of northern Sudanese society and could therefore only be eradicated very, very slowly. If such temporizing arguments usually sufficed to disarm the European critics of slavery, they also allowed the European officers in the Sudan the liberty to pursue seemingly contradictory policies in regard to the slave-trading bourgeoisie. For example, Charles Gordon, during his years of service in various capacities, may be observed now in the attempt to co-opt the services of the leading slave traders for his government, but again

in the act of ruthlessly persecuting the lesser jallaba, to whom he denied "all right to pity, these barbarians [who] do not merit the least regard or consideration."[37] One dominant historiographical tradition of the twentieth century has been content to personalize the institutional and policy contradictions of the later Turkish regime as if they were merely reflections of Gordon's complicated psyche (or, mutatis mutandis, of his European associates), while a subset of writers particularly sympathetic to the victims of the slave trade have found the jallaba a convenient scapegoat.[38] From the perspective of the jallaba themselves it was obvious that the Turkish government of later years, behind its fog of platitudes and self-deceptions, was in effect taking steps not so much to suppress the slave trade as to monopolize it.[39]

A second group of twentieth-century historians, writing out of sympathy for the vision of a united Sudan, have accepted their opponents' premise that the jallaba were primarily responsible for what took place during the slave trade period, but argue that the jallaba were selfless missionaries of an allegedly higher culture and that the evils of the day have been much exaggerated. Essential to this interpretation is the belief that nineteenth-century Sudanese slavery was a benign if not actually beneficial institution. This claim is usually supported by the assertion that slaves or their offspring were integrated into northern Sudanese society at the family level through processes similar to marriage or adoption, culminating in manumission and full acceptance of the newcomer into northern society: "A slave in the Sudan was above all a human being, a member of a society or a family."[40] Written records of the period give little support to this comfortable interpretation.

From a legal perspective, slaves in Turkish Sinnar were classified as beasts along with other livestock, or occasionally "talking animals."[41] These brutes in human form were given bizarre and derogatory names: "Slave of the Master," "Sea of Lusts" (a woman), "Patience is a Blessing," "Patience is a Bounty," "Ugly," "Bounty of the Master," "Happy," "Bumpkin," "Bounty of the Generous," "Goodness of the Master," "Feathers," "Mother Pipe," "The Master's Share," "Good Morning," "Flame," "God Brought Him," and not least, "Increase in Wealth." It is difficult to believe these names were bestowed to facilitate the integration of their bearers into northern Sudanese society; rather, they served the contrary purpose of maintaining the separate and lowly status of the slaves and their children. The weight of social pressure against the assimilation of slaves or their offspring through marriage was substantial; such events may have occurred on rare occasions,[42] but they have left no trace in the documentary record.[43] At the beginning of the colonial period, when Nubian burial customs still prevailed and funerals were expensive, dead slaves were left where they fell for scavenging animals or—if their demise had occurred in an inconvenient location—were tossed into the river.[44] (By mid-century, in most districts both masters and slaves were given simple Islamic burials.) The nineteenth-century Sudanese bourgeoisie, in contrast to some other Islamic peoples, had no scruples against selling slaves born in the household (singular, muwallad): "Ahmad Muhammad Abu

Shamma and his son Muhammad Nur testify . . . that they have sold to Ahmad Muhammad Salih al-Nidayf three-quarters in the man-creature Fadl al-Mawla, red of color, of medium build, with the scarifications of his country, a muwallad, and his mother Rabi`a bint Rofa."[45] Even third generation household slaves were not secure from transfer to outsiders.[46] In addition to being the objects of simple sales, slaves might find themselves handed over as loan collateral,[47] or as compensation to a wealthy man who had relieved their former owner (but threatened his landholding rights) by paying his land tax.[48] Slaves' lives were further complicated in many cases by the existence of multiple owners. In the case of female slaves, for example, the co-owners often demanded sexual access proportionate to their ownership share and then litigated over ownership of the offspring; the resolution of such a dispute in court frequently meant the separation of a mother from her children.[49]

By the end of the Heroic Age slaves were being purchased not only by owners who desired their services, but also by speculators who hoped to profit from fluctuations in their market value. For example, during an interval of three days in 1877 a Koma woman named Fadl al-Saq, having been certified not pregnant and who was no longer desired by her previous owner, was sold five times in succession to different men for the respective prices of 53, 66, 72, 70, and 74 riyals.[50] In view of the comparatively high prices she commanded, it is probable that Fadl al-Saq was a concubine, but it is difficult to believe she would have accepted the proposition that her owners regarded her as "above all a human being, a member of a society or a family." Legally manumitted slaves are clearly identified in the documentary record by the designation ma`tuq, "freedman." In comparison to the volume of slaves appearing in nineteenth-century documents these freedmen were not only extraordinarily rare, but also clearly remained in a servile status; shares in a freedman, like those in a true slave, could be bought, sold, inherited, or given as alms.[51] Moreover, the manumission of a slave too old to work need not be construed as a purely charitable act; it cost the owner nothing, provided him with spiritual rewards, and excused him from the obligation to maintain his now unprofitable property.[52]

In conclusion, by about 1850 the final demise of the society of Sinnar was evident in two mortal demographic hemorrhages, the flow of displaced northern folk into the southern provinces and beyond, and the return march of enslaved southerners. Both the jallaba and the slaves, in very different ways, were victims of specific Turkish colonial policies. At a deeper level, thy were also victims of an older and broader historical current—the coming of capitalism—whose institutions, in the guise of "the principles of the Arabs," preceded the Turks into Sinnar, paved the way for their conquest, and served them well after their triumph. During the generation that followed the colonial conquest, the surviving Funj lords of southern Sinnar struggled against the new order, but by mid-century their efforts had been crushed, subverted, or confined to a few historically irrelevant enclaves. The Heroic Age in Sinnār was over, and the modern Sudan was born.

MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY

Part Three

TO THE FIRE

15

To the Fire

The political drama of the Hamaj period in Sinnar (1762-1821) unfolded upon a stage whose contours and scenery were determined by the underlying social setting described above. The plot foreordained by the broad, disintegrative social forces at work assigned an ill-fated destiny to all the political protagonists. The events of the Hamaj period, however, are visible to the modern historian largely through a literature of sources which spotlight the individual qualities and deeds of prominent men, while illuminating only briefly and in passing the obstacles and opportunities afforded by the material and cultural setting that surrounded them. Nor is there any indication that the heroes of the day possessed a clearer vision than the authors of the sources in which their memory lives on; both were limited by a passionate but blind allegiance to the values and ethos of the declining nobility. Having considered the determinants imposed by the course of social history, it is fair and appropriate, in conclusion, to examine the deeds of the political leaders of Hamaj Sinnar, insofar as possible, within the context of the world they themselves perceived.

The archtypical hero of Hamaj Sinnar as he appears in the literature of the day was the "knight" (*faris*), always a warrior on horseback, ideally of noble birth, preferably not a slave, and certainly not a man of common origin. The knight was contemptuous of death, loyal to his family, his friends, his troops, and his honor; he sought fame, fulfilled his oaths, and never abandoned a just cause even if he defended it against the world. He was temperate in his bodily appetites, avoided vice, and governed his subordinates with justice and moderation. Whenever circumstances permitted, he gave generously. Desirable but less essential positive attributes were wealth, literacy and Islamic piety. The failings of knights, as they appear in the judgment of contemporary sources, were often an excessive or immoderate display of otherwise admirable qualities; for example, excessive bravery in combat could become suicidal, excessive generosity or judicial leniency could impair effective administration, and excessive loyalty to family could lead to the unjust sacrifice of friends and troops (or vice versa). The presence of undesirable qualities such as lowly birth, stinginess, drunkenness, or sexual deviance was not entirely unknown. The account to follow offers many specific examples of heroes struggling to measure up to each tenet of the knightly ideal.

Two general political themes predominate among the exceedingly complex and bloody events of the Hamaj period: the struggle to seize and hold the pro-

gressively more elusive and nebulous reins of central authority in Sinnar, and the increasingly unsuccessful attempt to defend the geographical confines of the kingdom against centrifugal forces within and foreign foes without. This study has imposed a further, and admittedly somewhat arbitrary, degree of order by establishing periods within the Hamaj era, largely on the basis of which prominent individual seems to have held the initiative in the course of events. The enigmatic figure of Muhammad Abu Likaylik dominated the period from the Hamaj coup of 1762 until his death in 1774. For the next eleven years the forces opposed to the Hamaj gradually consolidated their position under the leadership of the sultan `Adlan, but this royalist insurgency failed in 1785. For many Sudanese, it was the fall of `Adlan which marked the beginning of a conspicuously new form of government, and for them the years from 1785 to 1803 under the regents Nasir and Idris epitomized the Hamaj era at its best. However, this age also experienced the first extensive collapse of mass political loyalties in Sinnar, as signified by the appearance in many parts of the kingdom of autonomous Arab "tribes" under the names by which they would thereafter be known; meanwhile, the zone subject to the regents shrank to the valley of the Blue Nile, and the agents of acquisitive foreign powers began to appear.

During the years from 1803 to 1809 the Hamaj elite itself disintegrated through bitter internecine feuds; effective power lay with the leaders of the cavalry squadrons, among whom the slave officer Tayfara enjoyed a certain, although by no means uncontested, preeminence. Tayfara rescued and trained up to manhood the young Hamaj strongman of the next and last generation, Muhammad `Adlan, who with grim ferocity reimposed a degree of order on the Blue Nile between 1809 and 1820, only to fall to an assassin's blade during the course of the Turkish conquest. Most of the prominent leaders of the Hamaj period in Sinnar were highly capable men and masters of the traditional arts of exercising power; their failure was that of a social order, not of individuals. The choice of perspectives indicated above reflects the stated bias of the present study—that of sympathy for Sinnar against the outside world and for the old order against the disruptive forces of change. It should be obvious that those with different loyalties would tell a different story.

Figure 8. Sultans and Regents of the Heroic Age

Dates:	*Sultans:*	*Regents:*
1136/1724	Badi IV	
1175/1762	Nasir	Muhammad Abu Likaylik
1182/1768-9	Isma`il	
1190/1775-6	`Adlan	Badi wad Rajab
1194/1780		Rajab wad Muhammad
1200/1786		Death of Rajab
		Interregnum

1202/1787-8	Idris, Awkal	Nasir wad Muhammad
1203/1788-9	Tabl, Rubat	
1204/1789-90	Badi V	
1205/1790-1	Hasab Rabbihi	
1206/1791-2	Nuwwar	
1207/1792-3	Badi VI (First Reign)	
1213/1798-9	Ranfa	Idris wad Muhammad
1218/1803		Adlan wad Muhammad
		Muhammad wad Rajab
1220/1805-6	Interregnum	Husayn wad Muhammad
	Badi VI (Second Reign)	
1221/1806-7	Ajban, Badi VI	
1236/1820-1	Fall of Sinnar	Fall of Sinnar

Figure 9: The Family of Muhammad Abu Likaylik

Kitu

Badi

(1) Muhammad Abu Likaylik — Rajab

(3) Rajab — (2) Badi

Isawi

Ibrahim

(4) Nasir

Ali

(5) Idris

(6) Adlan

(8) Husayn

Nasr

Qasim

Abd al-Aziz

(7) (Muhammad)
Wad Rajab

(Muhammad)
Wad Ibrahim

(Muhammad)
Wad Nasir

Muhammad
(wad) Adlan

Note: The regents are numbered according to the sequence of their rule. Only the major third-generation contenders for power are given.

16

The Days of Muhammad Abu Likaylik

Through the poetic vision of affectionate hindsight, Muhammad Abu Likaylik was a legendary figure whose very origin was the substance of heroic myth. It was said among his own descendants that his mother, Umm Najwar, was a daughter of the *makk* of Jabal Dali in the province of al-Qarbin. As the most beautiful virgin of her land, she was chosen as a human sacrifice to be cast into the waters to appease the wrath of the Powers who were punishing the people with drought. At the last moment she was ransomed by a passing northern nobleman of distinguished Arab descent, who returned her to her father's care—no longer a virgin—and then departed for the north. The year was 1716. When the boy reached the age of circumcision, Umm Najwar gave him the inscribed sword left behind for him by his sire and sent him forth to join his father's people. After many privations and adventures, it was said, the boy reached his kinsfolk in the north. There he was reared by an uncle, for his father had passed away.[1] Hostile traditions preserved by the heirs of the Funj royal house stripped away much of the romance and all of the claims of distinguished Arab ancestry from the story of Abu Likaylik's origins; he and his sister Umm Najwar were said to have been ordinary hostages sent to Sinnar in typical Funj fashion by their father, the *makk* of Jabal Dali.[2] The reputation of Abu Likaylik was no less illustrious during his own lifetime—witness the impression he made upon the traveler James Bruce indirectly through other political leaders of the day—but contemporaries were much more reticent concerning his origins. Bruce was told in vague terms that Abu Likaylik was born in the Gumuz-speaking district of Gubba, far to the south of Jabal Dali,[3] while the Chronicler cautiously stated: "Among that which is said is, that the said Shaykh Muhammad Abu Likaylik was the son of Badi b. Kitu, and that it was customary for them to be named shaykhs."[4] Significant also was the Chronicler's refusal to commit himself in regard to the ancestry of Abu Likaylik's lifelong companion and right-hand man, `Adlan walad Subahi: "He became famous with Shaykh Muhammad, but it could never be verified whether or not his family had previously been shaykhs—God knows."[5] Bruce was told that Shaykh `Adlan came either from Gubba or the Berta-speaking districts of Fazughli.[6] A third set of traditions sympathetic to Abu Likaylik were formulated in later years by staunch supporters of the Hamaj cause, such as the Jamu`iya. The intent was to emphasize Abu Likaylik's putative Arab ancestry at the expense of his maternal links to the Funj petty nobility and to excuse his southern blood; accordingly, his mother was said to have been merely a southern slave girl in the harem of one

or another of the northern *makks*.[7] These traditions may be rejected because they deny the southern origin attributed to Abu Likaylik by contemporaries and by rival traditions, and because they not only disagree among themselves as to who the distinguished northern father of Abu Likaylik may have been, but also systematically contradict the lineage attributed to him by the Chronicler, by contemporary court documents, and by Abu Likaylik's own seal.[8] In conclusion, one may infer that Abu Likaylik was probably from the ranks of the lower nobility of southern Sinnar, was sent to the sultan's court as a hostage in customary fashion, and was raised up as a soldier in the corps of *qawawid*.

The setting for Abu Likaylik's rise through the ranks to a position of military preeminence was the troubled western province of Kordofan. Although the Funj had laid claim to Kordofan at least as early as the middle of the seventeenth century, the region remained a bone of contention between Sinnar and its western neighbor, the kingdom of Dar Fur. During the generation preceding the rise of Abu Likaylik the central figures in the turbulent political life of Kordofan were the sultans Janqal and his son `Isawi, of the Musabba`at, exiled Fur dynasts of an earlier line who hoped to use Kordofan as a base from which to regain their ancestral throne in the west.[9] By 1734 `Isawi had expelled the heirs to the Funj provincial governate of Kordofan, shaykhs `Umar and Tahir of the Ghudiyat; `Umar's son, `Ali Karrar, the future governor, grew up with his father in exile at the Funj court.[10] The western province was temporarily abandoned to `Isawi, and the numerous jallaba settlers from northern Sinnar, who had made homes in central Kordofan and founded the new towns of Bara and El Obeid, complained vigorously to the Funj sultan concerning their mistreatment at the hands of the Musabba`at.[11]

As soon as his hands were freed by the defeat of the Ethiopian invasion of 1744-1745, Sultan Badi IV turned his victorious forces westward.[12] The commander of the expedition was Shaykh `Ali walad Toma, the *muqaddam al-khayl*,[13] but the army was accompanied by a host of luminaries including the *amin* Bishr walad Yunus,[14] the *manjil* of Qarri Shaykh `Abd Allah, and his brother Shammam.[15] Conspicuously absent was the general who had defeated the Ethiopians, Khamis walad Janqal of the Sinnar Musabba`at; presumably Sultan Badi deemed it neither charitable nor politic to dispatch Khamis against his own brother, `Isawi. Among the soldiers were men of modest origins but stellar destiny: Abu Likaylik himself, his comrade in arms `Adlan walad Subahi, his nephew Badi walad Rajab, and several of his sons.[16]

At first the expeditionary force encountered little resistance, having arrived in Kordofan during one of `Isawi's periodic attempts to seize the throne of Dar Fur. The Sultan of the Musabba`at soon returned to Kordofan, but feeling himself overmatched by the army of Sinnar, avoided a direct engagement. An `Abdallab account of the campaign described how `Isawi's nomadic irregulars gradually began to harass the Funj over the course of the next year, cutting off stragglers, preventing the supply of food to the force, and systematically filling in the wells on every side.[17] Men began to go mad from thirst, and the horses of

the cavalry perished.[18] When `Isawi was satisfied with his opponents' state of discomfiture, he sent his armored knights against the remnants of the Funj force. At the Battle of Qihayf he destroyed most of the leaders of the Funj army and then pursued the remnants under Shammam wad `Ajib to Shamqata, where he killed the `Abdallab leader and inflicted a second rout. The year was 1747.[19] It was said that after the disaster at Shamqata the surviving Funj soldiers wrote a letter to Sultan Badi extending condolences upon the loss of so many brilliant commanders; under the circumstances, the king must have read this missive as a demand, with thinly veiled mutinous overtones, for competent leadership.[20] Meanwhile, Abu Likaylik had begun to earn his reputation as a leader of men. It was said that he "rallied the troops of the [Funj] *makk* and saved them from destruction .... [He] prevented the flight of the troops; his outstanding courage became famous among the rest of the soldiers .... He left his mark upon the hearts of the soldiers, whose spirits inclined toward him and whose every head submitted to him."[21] In his reply to the soldiers' letter Sultan Badi had little choice but to "send to them [the command that] all the soldiers who had been with Walad Toma were to follow Shaykh Muhammad Abu Likaylik."[22] The newly promoted commander led his battered troops back to Sinnar in defeat. The year was 1748.[23]

It was several years before Sultan Badi prepared a new attempt against Kordofan. In 1751 he sent out a force under `Ali Karrar b. `Umar al-Ghadawi, heir to the old Funj governate of Kordofan.[24] `Ali Karrar managed not only to allow `Isawi's general Mustafa to obliterate his army at Metewa, but also to survive the massacre himself by having been elsewhere at the time; rumors in Kordofan spoke of treasonous collusion between `Ali Karrar and Mustafa, although the Funj authorities seem to have been convinced of the Ghadawi's loyalty.[25] At this point Abu Likaylik was sent to rescue the situation; resistance melted away before him, and Kordofan would remain in Funj hands as long as he lived. The year was 1755.[26]

Between 1755 and 1762 Abu Likaylik became a force to be reckoned with in the political life of Sinnar, yet hints in the historical record suggest that this public career was neither naturally congenial to him nor entirely of his own choosing. From the perspective of his own social betters, the young Abu Likaylik must have appeared initially to be a perfect and compliant tool. On the one hand, of course, his courage, competence, and reputation among the troops were legendary. But on the other, Abu Likaylik was severely handicapped in the conduct of public affairs, not only by his comparatively lowly birth and illiteracy—the latter a shortcoming he shared with most of the Sinnar elite—but also by a crippling speech defect.[27] Perhaps it is not a coincidence that a soldier of humble origins who also stuttered would avoid the verbal gymnastics of polite court society—Abu Likaylik seems to have removed himself from the capital whenever possible[28]—or allowed his highly educated secretary to take advantage of him (briefly), or permitted his name to follow those of fluent and blueblooded nonentities on the court rosters of a kingdom he himself had come

to rule.[29] As events were to prove, however, those who assumed that Abu Likaylik could be manipulated to their own ends found themselves radically, when not fatally, in error.

The successful coup of 1762 against Sultan Badi and the reorganization that followed were the work of many men with diverse reasons for demanding sweeping changes in the government of Sinnar.[30] The initial impetus, however, came from the surviving members of the displaced Unsab dynasty and the traditional courtiers who saw their position eroded after 1745 by Badi's expansion of the royal court, his expropriation of estates to reward non-Funj participants in the Ethiopian war such as Khamis b. Janqal, and his repressive measures against his critics. The method employed by the conspirators was thoroughly traditional. A quorum of the court gathered before Abu Likaylik in Kordofan and pronounced the verdict of his deposition:

> Court: "We have renounced this *makk*, so what is your design concerning him?"
>
> Abu Likaylik: "I accept this. I say to you, 'You no longer have a king.' We do not have a lord, so you depose him, and leave my design until what will happen has happened."[31]

The conspirators gathered their forces and began a march on the capital. Abu Likaylik opened secret negotiations with Badi's son Nasir, offering him the throne. With the aid of the conspirator Harun, the *amin*, who remained in Sinnar, Nasir escaped from the capital and joined the advancing army at the crossings of the White Nile.[32]

Meanwhile supernatural measures were taken to ensure the success of the coup:

> According to what people tell, they [the conspirators] asked one of the Fellata *`ulama'* to 'doctor' the *makk* for them, and to unbind his rule. So he asked them for an image of the said *makk*. They [the conspirators] asked [Sultan Badi] for the *faqih* Hijazi b. Abu Zayd, who was imprisoned by the *makk* at Hillat al-`Akura. They asked for the release of the *faqih* [to them], and in their request was that they would kill him. The *makk* rejoiced at that because he had been afraid to kill him, and of the intervention of the prayer of [Hijazi's spiritual master] Shaykh Idris [wad al-Arbab]. So he sent him to them as a prisoner. When he came to them they honored him, and asked him for that image, and he made it for them. They robed it in the garb of a king; the Fellata 'made medicine' with it and sent it back to them. They then set out toward Sinnar.[33]

The advancing army laid siege to the capital and issued a summons to Badi, "saying, 'Come out! You have the *aman* of God.'" They cast the "doctored" image of the *makk* into the air, "and it brought them the good news that *makk* Badi had departed." The king came out, "submissive and small," and withdrew to the east.[34] It was Sunday, 2 Ramadan 1175/27 March 1762.[35] Abu Likay-

lik and the other conspirators were welcomed into the capital without a struggle by their collaborator Harun.

Muhammad Abu Likaylik reached the apogee of his political power upon his entry into Sinnar; for more than a year following the coup his name appeared at the head of the court roster of charters issued by the conspirators' new sultan Nasir.[36] Enduring precedents were established; Abu Likaylik and his successors would be addressed as "shaykh" and known by the title of regent (*wazir*). Yet, in some respects Abu Likaylik's position was anomalous, for although powerful *wazirs* had existed before in Sinnar, none had ever claimed that the title alone bestowed the privilege of any seat at court, much less the position of court leadership and still less the right to bequeath such a position to one's heirs.[37] Abu Likaylik and his heirs broke with tradition, demanding for themselves the hereditary title of wazir and for that title a position at court. Precisely which position, however, was to remain an open question for many years. Abu Likaylik came to power as the leader of a coalition representing diverse interests. Since virtually any move he made would inevitably alienate some of his heterogeneous supporters, the decisions taken early in his period of power were often critical, particularly those which defined his relationship to the monarchy, the territorial lords, and the high courtiers of the capital.

One faction which had every reason to support the coup of Abu Likaylik were the surviving partisans of the Unsab dynasty, who had been protected by the *wazirs* Doka and particularly Isma`il during the minority of Badi IV, but subjected to murder and the confiscation of their estates after 1745.[38] By enlisting the support of Nasir b. Badi, however, Abu Likaylik sacrificed the sympathies of the defenders of the old dynasty even at the moment of his victory, and it is likely that they were among the prominent "Funj" whom the new regent purged following his accession to power.[39] By virtue of this decision, Abu Likaylik bound the fortunes of his own house to those of his archenemy Badi—for the strength of royalist sentiment precluded a seizure of the throne by the regent himself. Rather, Abu Likaylik undertook to incorporate his own family into the dynasty of Nol as if he were a newly annexed provincial *manjil* by arranging for the marriage of his sons to women of the royal clan;[40] this policy required the preservation—or perhaps restoration[41]—of royal matrilinearity and the system of *sawakira*.[42] At the same time, Abu Likaylik set himself up in rivalry to the sultan as a major center for the gathering and distribution of royal wives.[43] But while Abu Likaylik was adept at manipulating to his own ends the matrilineal loyalties of others, he distanced himself from the traditional discipline of those kinship ties; his family, for better and for worse, would observe patrilineal principles.

In the eyes of contemporaries, Abu Likaylik's coup represented the victory of the "Hamaj," a term which to them had a geographical and perhaps an ethnic significance more specific than its generic and pejorative meaning of "mixed peoples" or "riff-raff." To Muhammad al-Sayyid walad Dolib, for example, the pre-coup Hamaj of 1738 had been the people who lived south of the "Arabs" of

northern Sinnar, west of the Ethiopians, and east of the "Noba" (from whence sprang the Funj), whose home lay west of the White Nile.[44] Toward the end of Abu Likaylik's administration the traveler Bruce confirmed the prominence at the capital of men from the southern Gezira and the Ethiopian borderlands, and it was said that Abu Likaylik himself took direct control of these Fazughlian territories as his personal fief.[45] Without disputing the overall importance of the Hamaj as a group in the coup of 1762, it is nevertheless possible to formulate a more precise assessment of the territorial constituency who backed Abu Likaylik's rise to power by comparing sultanic charter rosters from before and after the coup. Within three months of seizing power, Abu Likaylik had ousted the hereditary lines of territorial governors in the provinces of al-Qarbin, Alays, and al-Bahr—in the last instance replacing the incumbent manjil with his friend `Adlan walad Subahi.[46] Furthermore, he restored to the governance of Atbara Shaykh `Ali walad Hasan, who had ruled in 1743-1744 prior to Sultan Badi's personal assumption of power, but who had been ousted by Badi between 1744 and 1752. The remaining provinces of Kordofan, Qarri, al-Taka, and Bayla—and the town of Arbaji—were apparently seen by Abu Likaylik as sympathetic to his cause. Abu Likaylik's coup may thus be viewed in geographical terms as an alliance of disgruntled peripheries against the central government and the provinces adjacent to the capital which it most closely controlled. In contrast to his preservation of the institution of the royal *sawakira* which gave his family a royal lineage to which to cling, Abu Likaylik allowed the atrophy of the office of *muqaddam al-qawawid*, which virtually vanished from court rosters after 1762.[47] Princely hostages were at least as numerous as they had ever been, but the interests of Abu Likaylik were best served by a relaxation of discipline in this regard; after 1762 hostages might as soon be sent to the regent himself as to the household of the king.[48] Many of the military functions of the *qawawid*, moreover, were taken over by slave soldiers.

The author of the Funj Chronicle identified the instigators of Abu Likaylik's coup as the *muqaddams*, or high courtiers without territorial governates, including not only those specifically entitled *muqaddam* but also the family of the hereditary *amins* and *jundis* and the holy men at court.[49] Significantly, these three groups of courtiers retained their offices following the coup, nor was there any immediate attempt to set the clock back to 1745 by expelling the crowd of supernumerary *faqihs* and *arbabs* first admitted to court by Badi after the Ethiopian war. It is noteworthy, however, that between 1763 and 1765 Abu Likaylik's own rank on the court rosters of sultanic charters fell from the first position to the third, pride of place being taken by Harun walad Yunus and a series of his brothers over the years 1765-1781.[50] Perhaps it was this tactical setback at court which first inspired Abu Likaylik to undertake a more ambitious program of constructing alternative institutions of government; further provocations, moreover, were soon to appear.

When Sultan Badi withdrew from his capital in defeat he fled to Sawakin and thence into exile at the court of Ras Mikael Sehul in Ethiopia.[51] There,

opponents of Abu Likaylik prevailed upon him to return cautiously to Sinnar, so that by 1767 he was in residence at the provincial court of Atbara, within the borders of his own country but in discreet proximity to the Ethiopian frontier. The violent but ambiguous response of the Hamaj authorities as recounted by Bruce testifies to the insecurity of their own position. It was said that `Adlan walad Subahi ordered the *manjil* of Atbara to kill Badi, which he did; Shaykh `Ali owed his restoration to the governate of Atbara from which Badi had deposed him to the success of the Hamaj coup. However, Abu Likaylik then allowed the regicide himself to be executed, ostensibly on the technical grounds that only a sid al-qom could legitimately kill a king, and only with a sword (Shaykh `Ali had used a lance).[52] The fall of Shaykh `Ali may have been a punishment for the *manjil's* willingness to entertain the former king at his court at all, but it should probably be seen rather as a concession to royalist opinion; in support of the latter interpretation, it was certainly a significant gesture that Shaykh `Ali's nephew al-Fadil was chosen as his successor, thus keeping the governance of Atbara within the same family.[53]

The death of Badi made Nasir the logical avatar of the royalist cause, and it would seem that during the year following his father's demise he began to take counsel from the enemies of Abu Likaylik. When the regent learned of this he deposed him (1182/1768-1769 [54]) and granted him a safe-conduct into exile; Nasir, however, fled no farther than the Gezira village of Hillat al-Buqra:

> Then he tried to deceive some of the Funj, conspiring with them to pounce upon Shaykh Muhammad [Abu Likaylik] and kill him and those with him. That reached Abu Likaylik, and he dispatched to him Badi walad Rajab and Ahmad walad Mahmud, *shaykh al-quwwariyya,* with many troops. They came to him at Hillat al-Buqra, and Shaykh Ahmad walad Mahmud went in, for between him and the king was a great and fiery enmity. Upon entering he asked for the *makk*, and said to him, "Who are you?"
>
> "I am *Qarn al-'Ilj*," he replied [that is, Muhammad "*Qarn al-'Ilj*," the contemporary Shaykh of the Hamran]; (55) the shaykh's nickname had the literal meaning of "cotton waste."]
>
> But he [Shaykh Ahmad] cursed him, saying, "Any *qarn al-'ilj* (cotton waste) I ever knew was on a whore!"
>
> He replied, "He is hidden."
>
> It is said that when they wanted to kill him, they found *al-Manta'* [a legal text] on his left. He knew how to write, and by God, his script was fair!. But they went in and killed him.

Nasir died on 27 Sha`ban 1183/26 December 1769; [57] meanwhile, Abu Likaylik had made a king of his brother Isma`il (1182/1768-1769 .)[58] This time, there was no question of repudiating the king's killer.

From the perspective of the Chronicler the fall of Nasir also marked a turning point in the career of the regent: "Then the royal authority passed to Shaykh Muhammad Abu Likaylik, and he made a clean sweep of all misdeeds and injustice. He dealt justly with the subjects, who prayed blessings for him, and his lineage has passed down to the present day. He took the royal authority from the hand of the Funj."[59] The principles upon which Abu Likaylik began to erect an alternative government for Sinnar during the latter years of his life were family loyalty among his own kinsmen and the Islamic legal principle of agency (*wikala*).[60] His reforms presupposed the superiority of his own slave-augmented regiments. Bruce's account of Sinnar in 1773 exposes some of the method of Abu Likaylik's later years. The regent had appointed a kinsman or friend named Kitu (whom Bruce believed to be his brother) as the governor of the capital city and a separate judge for the province of Kordofan "in his interest;" he had a "factor" to look after his financial affairs, while the new *manjil* `Adlan walad Subahi stood to arms a short distance outside the capital and the regent's trusted nephew Badi walad Rajab commanded the forces of Sinnar in the province of Kordofan.[61] Court records of the period reveal other measures. Between the last known charter issued by Sultan Nasir (1765) and the first of Isma`il (1770), Abu Likaylik devised the office of "Shaykh of the Compound of the King's Son," a position destined to be a permanent addition to the constitutional practices of Sinnar through which the Hamaj would closely guard the heir-apparent to the throne.[62] This contemporary evidence may be supplemented by traditions recorded at the fall of Sinnar by Lord Prudhoe: "All [the king's] children, except one, were sent to Abyssinia, and if that died, another was brought thence to supply his place."[63] An official who may have exercised analogous duties in regard to other members of the royal family was the *muqaddam 'aylat al-malik*, who was not usually represented on court rosters.[64] The roster of the 1770 charter of Sultan Isma`il contained reference to two courtiers of this transitional period, not found before or since, who probably figured in Abu Likaylik's plans to consolidate his power; these were the wakil Bahr, son of Sultan Khamis of the Sinnar Musabba`at, the *wakil al-dar* Badi walad Quda'. While the precise duties of these "agents" are not certain, the general significance of *wikala* in the context of Hamaj government is illustrated by an instance in which a later regent, when called away from his administrative duties in the capital to do battle elsewhere, "left behind as his *wakil* [a certain kinsman] who was very just."[66}

A prominent feature of Abu Likaylik's governmental innovations was his reliance upon Islamic holy men. He employed his friend the *faqih* Muhammad walad Abu'l-Hasan in the capacity of spokesman to compensate for his own difficulties in communication, and the latter exploited the possibilities of this situation to the fullest extent—"his word became law," as the Chronicler put it.[67] Another clerical advisor was the *faqih* Da'ud b. Muhammad b. Da'ud b. al-Shaykh Hamdan of Kitra (near modern Wad Madani), with whom, it was said, Abu Likaylik would consult "about all his affairs." [68] Significantly, the

faqih Da'ud had spent most of his life as a successful merchant before experiencing the call to a religious vocation; Abu Likaylik's attempt to legislate the toleration of usury within reasonable limits might well reflect the counsel of such an advisor. Finally, Abu Likaylik initiated or encouraged the emergence of the national magistracy described above.[69] The single surviving document issued by Abu Likaylik himself is a letter addressed to a provincial authority of Qarri commanding him to remove his officials from the religious community of the Awlad Dolib at al-Kadaru and to offer restitution for any damages or assessments they might have made. "If they have taken even a single razor from there," ordered the regent, "take it from them and return it to its owner!" However, the general tone of the letter was comparatively gentle and conciliatory, the regent assuring the `Abdallab government that he was "not blaming anyone."[70] Thus the letter may be interpreted as evidence both of Abu Likaylik's increasing reliance upon the religious dignitaries against the traditional nobility and of his tact and caution in implementing this new policy. The response of the noblemen was deferred until the days of Abu Likaylik's successors.

As the days of the great regent lengthened the question as to whom—if anyone—should succeed to his office became increasingly acute. Abu Likaylik himself gave preference to his nephew Badi walad Rajab; it was said that he made this choice not only in recognition of Badi's abilities but also to forestall the bitter rivalries which were already much in evidence among Abu Likaylik's numerous and ambitious sons.[71] Badi's prolonged absence on the Kordofan front, however, invited attempts to ease him out of the line of succession. On one occasion, for example, the *faqih* Muhammad walad Abu'l-Hasan, a personal enemy of Badi, summoned Rajab, the eldest of Abu Likaylik's sons and the head of his father's household (*khashm bosh abihi*), and delivered to him the great copper kettledrum that symbolized royal authority in Sinnar. It is doubtful that Rajab was literate, but perhaps he had the *faqih* read to him the inscription that it bore:

> The drum of the land
> The drum of Sultan `Amara the son of Sultan `Adlan
> Whose ancient forefather came from Lul.
> Sultan Badi the son of Sultan Nol caused it to be made.
> May God grant him victory!
> Amen.[72]

Rajab took possession of the drum without the permission of Abu Likaylik, who overruled the *faqih*'s actions and "reproved him for that."[73] The ambitions of Rajab, however, could not so easily be reversed.

The career of Abu Likaylik ended, as it had begun, with war in Kordofan. In about 1770 the Kordofan Musabba`at acquired a new and indefatigable leader in Hashim b. `Isawi, and in 1772 Hashim, probably with Fur backing, launched a major invasion of Kordofan.[74] Abu Likaylik himself took a force westward

in support of Badi walad Rajab, but the tides of war flowed against them. In August 1772 Bruce reported the rumors then current in Sinnar: "News are brought (Aug. 1.), that the people of Darfoor [the Musabba`at] have marched with an army to take Kordofan, which, it is apprehended, they will soon do, being about 12,000 horse, and an infinite number of foot. There are, at Kordofan, about 1500 [Sinnar] horse, with Mahomet Abou Calec; who, it is thought, will fall back on Sennaar, if not surrounded."[75] Bruce's informants were either terrified or opponents of Abu Likaylik, as their exaggerated assessment of the invaders' strength and estimation of the regent's probable response indicate. Still, the truth was grim enough; at Mulbas, Hashim inflicted a crushing defeat upon the *manjil* of Kordofan, probably the Ghudiyat shaykh Idris walad `Ali Karrar.[76] The victorious commander of the Musabba`at went on to occupy El Obeid, the provincial capital, and the *manjil* of the province of Kordofan vanished from the court rosters of Sinnar for almost twenty years. Abu Likaylik was not surrounded, however, nor did he fall back upon Sinnar; rather, he summoned additional reinforcements for Badi walad Rajab's command from the Nile. Later in 1186/1772-1773 Makk Sa`d of the Ja`aliyin came south to hold the western approaches to the White Nile crossing at Alays, where Banu Jarrar raiders in Hashim's service had but recently plundered an eastbound caravan; Makk Sa`d was destined to remain at his station for thirteen years.[77]

Meanwhile, however, the old warrior's life had run its course, and in about 1189/1774-1775 he passed away.[78] Badi walad Rajab returned precipitously to Sinnar to assume the office of regent, leaving the command in Kordofan to his nephew Dakin, apparently a young man and under the tutelage of a *faqih* named Muhammad al-Kannayr. Hashim expeditiously rolled up the remaining Hamaj forces, killing Dakin but graciously bestowing upon his mentor the *faqih* Muhammad a camel with which to flee back to Sinnar.[79] The personal qualities of Abu Likaylik impressed all who met him, and his reputation long survived his passing; seventeen years later, in the distant land of Dar Fur, the traveler W.G. Browne was told that "a king of the name of Abli Calik is [still] the idol of the people of Kordofan where he reigned."[80] But the most touching tribute to Abu Likaylik was that of his closest comrade at arms, `Adlan walad Subahi: "Between him and Shaykh Muhammad [Abu Likaylik] was a true affection, so that [when the regent died] he also wanted to die; God received the prayer, and he died."[81]

17

The Days of King 'Adlan

Among the royal princes who watched the *amin* Harun open the city to Abu Likaylik and the Hamaj conspirators in 1762 was a young grandson of the departing *makk* Badi by the name of `Adlan. Since Badi was notorious among citizens of the capital for failing to discipline his own errant sons, it is not likely that their children, in turn, would have been confined in traditional fashion; one may imagine that `Adlan had enjoyed a privileged but relatively normal boyhood. Yet, family pressures upon a potential heir to the throne of Sinnar—in the case of `Adlan, admittedly, a rather remote potentiality—were very intense even under the best of circumstances. By the time `Adlan reached manhood he had learned to handle himself with such consummate circumspection that the historian is denied virtually any access to insight into his character. `Adlan never made a memorable statement nor fought a battle; indeed, there is little indication that he ever left the town of Sinnar as long as he lived. He bore the unenviable nickname of Abu Jidri, "Father Smallpox," probably because of scars left by a youthful encounter with the dread disease.[1] Much of `Adlan's life must have been spent politely obeying the dictates of men he despised. In the end, however, he would earn his place in the annals of Sinnar as the last king who wielded power, a formidable leader of men who commanded an alliance of many of the most flamboyant warriors of his day in an attempt to cast down the Hamaj regency and restore the kings. In 1762, however, the immediate problem facing the young `Adlan was simple survival.

The early years of Abu Likaylik's rule must have been a time of uncertainty and danger once-removed for `Adlan, as the new regent and the old *amin* jockeyed for power; the fate of `Adlan's grandfather and uncle demonstrated conclusively that the new dispensation would be singularly casual in shedding the blood of royalty. If the accession of *makk* Isma`il in 1768-1769 marked a turning point in the general constitutional history of Sinnar, it brought about a more dramatic transformation in the life of `Adlan; as the new heir-apparent, it was he who first experienced the watchful oversight of Muhammad walad Khidr walad Nayil, Shaykh of the Household of the King's Son—"in the interest of Abu Likaylik," as Bruce might have added. It was from this closely watched vantage point that `Adlan viewed the regent's purge of his kinsmen "the Funj," the rise to positions of influence of upstart holy men, the murmurings of many traditional nobles, and the growing rift between Badi walad Rajab and the sons of Abu Likaylik. Perhaps `Adlan first encountered many of his future partisans

during this period as their duties brought them to Sinnar and their curiosity to the gate of his compound, but he dared not risk the displeasure of his keepers. The years passed, and `Adlan watched and waited.

The death of Abu Likaylik precipitated a general scramble for power. Badi walad Rajab abandoned Kordofan to the Musabba`at, and his army of the west marched on the capital. To forestall the ambitions of the sons of Abu Likaylik he formed an alliance with *makk* Isma`il and was duly invested as regent to the exclusion of his Hamaj rivals.[2] His alienation from his kinsmen, however, opened the door to plots by royalists who hoped to use the occasion of Badi's isolation to be rid of the Hamaj completely: "Then the Funj gathered under *makk* Isma`il to take from Badi the several instruments of government. When Badi heard of it he fought with the *makk* for an interval of two months. Then he deposed *makk* Isma`il, and they sent him to Sawakin."[3] By the close of the eventful year 1190/1775-1776, `Adlan occupied the uneasy throne of Sinnar.[4]

`Adlan scrupulously avoided antagonizing the new regent Badi, whose reputation was little inferior to that of Abu Likaylik himself. "No one in his time was his equal in chivalrous glory," boasted the Chronicler, "and in justice likewise."[5] It was said that Badi had fought eighteen major battles in the west and had never known defeat, and many tales were told of his knightly courtesy. On one occasion, for example, the commander of his enemies sent a message to Badi on the eve of battle: "You are a knight, and I am a knight, but I have no sword such as yours!" As the opposing forces approached each other, Badi borrowed a weapon from one of his men and dispatched his own to his foeman, saying: "By the life of Rajab [his father], I have never given up a better one than this—may the fear of God relieve him of it!" In the heat of the battle which followed, Badi struck down the enemy general and regained his sword. In his personal life the new regent was pious and austere: "One day he was seated in his divan. He saw a spider, and reflected on it. He said to those sitting with him, 'Whence does it eat?' They said to him, 'From the grace of God.' So he swore that the 'slave of the *makk*' [himself(6)] should neither taste of prosperity, nor recline upon it.[7]

The one surviving document issued by the regent Badi (24 Sha`ban 1192/17 September 1778) accords well with the image attributed to him by chronicle and legend. In substance, it is a confirmation of rights previously granted by the late Sultan Isma`il (under the aegis of Abu Likaylik) to the prominent *faqih* Barakat walad Madawi, *khalifa* to Shaykh Idris walad al-Arbab and leader of the religious community of al-`Aylafun.[8] It confirmed the right of Shaykh Barakat to rule his community and to conduct a market there, while admonishing outsiders in general and soldiers and tax-collectors in particular not to trouble the shaykh or his people. If the grant of lands and immunities to holy men had been a typical feature of royal charity in Sinnar since time out of mind, the bestowal of the right to conduct a market as well was an innovation and testified to the alliance between the Hamaj leadership and the new breed of commercially oriented

faqihs of the latter eighteenth century. Also of significance in understanding the subsequent career of the regent Badi was the composition of the particular group of courtiers who accompanied him when the document was issued and who witnessed it. The *amin* Harun was present, and Shanbul, *manjil* of the new eighteenth-century urban shaykhdom of Arbaji; so were two of the Hamaj officials charged with the supervision of members of the royal family. The balance of Badi's entourage consisted exclusively of military officers, twenty-three in number and divided approximately equally among *muqaddams*, *mankarukans*, and *arbabs*—the latter including the two eldest sons of Abu Likaylik as well as those of Badi himself.[9] In short, the interests of the court and army, of religion and commerce, were well-represented; conspicuous by their absence, however, were the traditional territorial lords. Moreover, although Abu Likaylik had appointed and deposed territorial lords in his day, it was Badi who first formalized and made explicit the claim that the Hamaj regent had the right to invest or depose all territorial governors at his pleasure.[10] Public opinion would remember the regent Badi as a noble warrior and a ruler both fair and just.[11] Unfortunately, these virtues were not enough.

Shaykh Badi, upon his accession to the regency, inherited a difficult situation in his vast northern province. For years the dominant figure in northern politics had been Muhammad al-Amin b. Mismar, a famous knight at whose birth the eminent *faqih* Khojali b. `Abd al-Rahman (who died in 1155/1742-1743[12]) had foretold that "no one in his days should prevail against him"—although the holy man had also warned that his nights would prove dangerous to him.[13] In truth, the career of Muhammad al-Amin was punctuated by dramatic reversals of fortune. He came to reign as *manjil* of the north during the generation which followed the `Abdallab disaster at Shamqata; he flourished under the personal rule of Sultan Badi but shifted his allegiance to the Hamaj cause in time to survive the coup of 1762 as Abu Likaylik's shaykh of Qarri.[14] Muhammad al-Amin's accord with the Hamaj was fragile, however. Circumstantial evidence suggests that he may have been one of the conspirators who supported the ill-fated attempt to restore Sultan Badi; what is certain is that between 22 October 1765 and 10 January 1768 Abu Likaylik deposed Muhammad al-Amin and invested a rival candidate, `Ajib b. `Abd Allah, as *manjil* of the north.[15] The conspicuously servile character of `Ajib's rule is evident in a document issued during his first brief period of power, by which he signed over his judicial authority over a certain legal case to the local representative of Abu Likaylik's new national magistracy.[16] Within two or three years, however, Muhammad al-Amin had regained effective control of the `Abdallab court,[17] and by 1772, when Bruce visited him, he was again the master of the north. The *manjil* did not open his heart to his guest and may well have attempted to mislead him deliberately. Bruce referred to him as "Mahomet Wed Ageeb" and described their encounter as follows:

> He seemed to be a man of very gentle manners; was about 30 years of age; had a thick black beard and whiskers, large black eyes, and a

> long thin face, which marked his constitution not to be a strong one . . . . He inquired very particularly about my reception at Sennaar, which I told him only in part, and among other circumstances, the report at Sennaar, that he was gathering his forces to the assistance of the king [the then-sultan Isma`il] against Adelan [`Adlan walad Subahi] and Abou Calec . . . . He spoke contemptuously of the king of Sennaar, but very respectfully of Adelan and Abou Calec, any one of whose little fingers, he said, was sufficient to crush the Mek [sultan], and all who adhered to him.[18]

Bruce, it would seem, was completely gulled by the *manjil's* charade of ill-health, drunkenness, drug addiction, and weakness of character, so that he felt free to make light of Muhammad al-Amin's rumored royalist sympathies—particularly since the *manjil's* healthy respect for the power of Abu Likaylik was probably authentic enough.

Badi walad Rajab, when he succeeded to the office of regent, could not afford the luxury of underestimating Muhammad al-Amin. From his perspective, there was no legitimate *manjil* of Qarri,[19] and he resolved to restore order to the north. Badi appointed as his candidate a son of Shammam (who had died at Shamqata) by the name of Nasir,[20] and the forces of the central government deposed and captured Muhammad al-Amin, whom Badi sent into supervised exile in the southern province of al-Qarbin.[21] Nasir, however, soon proved to be an extremely unpopular ruler, and Badi replaced him with the pliant `Ajib b. `Abd Allah, who had spent the interim as a client petitioner in the regent's entourage.[22] But there was one who did not forget the famous northern warrior in his lonely disgrace and who bore him no grudge for his ingrained royalist sympathies, the regent Badi's new king, Sultan `Adlan.

A second region of Sinnar which soon attracted the attention of the regent Badi were the provinces east of the Blue Nile. `Abd Allah b. `Awad, the *manjil* of al-Taka for almost twenty years, disappeared from sultanic charter rosters after 1770 and may well have passed away;[23] in an age of transition from matrilineal to patrilineal principles the question of who should succeed to his office was undoubtedly complex.[24] The Chronicler, reflecting in this case the viewpoint of the central government, said that Badi "sent to the Shukriya for their submission to him, but they rebelled against his authority."[25] Shukriya traditions have preferred to view the events that followed as an unjustified meddling by the government in their tribal affairs. "A certain Youssif," as one version of the story put it, "was anxious to be sheik of the tribe and had enlisted the Mek's (the regent Badi's) support;" however, his candidacy within the tribe was suppressed by `Awad al-Karim "Abu `Ali."[26] The regent then threw his support behind the candidacy of a representative of another tribe of the region and began warlike preparations, for from the perspective of the capital the new and unauthorized eastern shaykh threatened all the Blue Nile settlements and particularly Arbaji.[27] Badi "closed the river against the Shukriya and sent out an expeditionary force under Shaykh `Ajib of Qarri, `Isawi b. Muhammad Abu

Likaylik, and Shaykh Qandilawi; traditions speak also of the presence of the Sinnar Musabba`at.[28]

The hardened troopers of Badi's army anticipated the fruits of victory by casting lots for the wives and daughters of the soon-to-be-defeated Shukriya, while the local allies of the Hamaj took advantage of an opportunity to kill one of the sons of `Awad al-Karim. The latter advocated a policy of extreme caution, for he commanded only a handful of armored horsemen, and his people could not expect to stand against a cavalry charge on the plains; many of his kinsmen, however, cried out for revenge.[29] The Hamaj force advanced eastward into the rural hinterlands of al-Taka, and there, in rough terrain, Hallanqa partisans of `Awad al-Karim fell upon them, killing the `Abdallab *manjil* and the son of Abu Likaylik.[30] Qandilawi led the discomfited army back into the Butana, where he was joined by his local supporters. There, at Jabal Mandara, `Awad al-Karim struck at last, routing the Hamaj and their allies, killing Qandilawi, and seizing vital war materiel: "Large numbers of horses, coats of chain mail, cotton and steel horse armor and weapons fell into the hands of the Shukriya, who from that date adopted the practice of fighting on horseback in a similar to the Hamaj."[31] The year was 1193/1779-1780.[32] Not long thereafter Badi arranged for the assassination by treachery of `Awad al-Karim "Abu `Ali," but his authority passed with little dispute to his grandson, `Awad al-Karim "Abu Sinn," and the rebellion of the easterners continued.[33] Badi enjoyed greater success in subordinating the eastern Rufa`a of the Dinder, who were afflicted with a severe famine,[34] and he was able first to appoint and then depose their chieftain, Ahmad walad Ali, as *manjil* of al-Bahr, replacing him with the Hamaj loyalist Subahi walad `Adlan walad Subahi.[35] In the north, meanwhile, he had replaced the late `Ajib b. `Abd Allah with one `Umar, a new `Abdallab *manjil* loyal to the Hamaj.[36] Events were to prove that these victories would benefit Badi but little; they succeeded only in angering powerful men, "great men of the Funj, whose attitude Shaykh Badi had caused to change."[37] The king `Adlan watched and waited.

While Badi was involved in the affairs of the upper Blue Nile he ordered his trustworthy ally Shaykh Shanbul of Arbaji and Subahi, his new *manjil* of al-Bahr, to deal firmly with the eastern nomads.[38] Then he took the step which directly precipitated his downfall; he had Nasir, one of the younger sons of Abu Likaylik, punished by beating. For the other brothers this proved to be the final outrage and a golden opportunity; when Nasir failed to recover quickly, the sons of Abu Likaylik "through his illness contrived to come with him to Sinnar."[39] There, for the first time, *makk* `Adlan emerged from the political shadows to orchestrate the conspiracy against the regent Badi. He attempted to enlist the support of other disaffected parties; the Shukriya, cautious after the treacherous assassination of their leader, were irreconcilable, but the deposed *manjils* Muhammad al-Amin and Ahmad `Ali rallied to the king's cause. Another important ally was the prominent holy man Hijazi b. Abu Zayd, who had enjoyed a brief period of influence following the Hamaj coup but had since

fallen into disfavor.[40] It was he who persuaded Muhammad al-Amin to stake his life on the success of the revolt: "If any other had come to me," said the exiled *manjil*, "I should have killed him, but you I have spared."[41] The conspirators began to gather horses and arms in the capital, and the tide of rumor began to flow against the regent. One day, when people gathered in the *fashir* to observe the coming-out ceremony of the king—perhaps as he made his way across the square to the mosque for the Friday prayers—a religious dignitary of the kingdom was overheard to say: "With two, Shanbul; with three, Badi!" If the signs of Fate were being correctly read, the regent's days were numbered.[42]

The conspirators struck first at Shanbul and Subahi and brought them to battle at al-Suwaydina in al-Dakhila. Seeing himself hopelessly outmatched, Shanbul disdainfully swore not even to strike at his opponents with his sword: "so he took a staff," as the Chronicler put it, "and fettered them with fetters of nobility." This moral victory, however, cost Shanbul his life; Subahi—apparently a very young man—was taken prisoner, and the victors confiscated their horses, arms, and probably their military slaves.[43] It was a Monday, the "Day Two" of the prophecy. When news of this defeat reached Badi, he rode up out of the south and crossed the Blue Nile at Arbaji to spend a last night with his family. There he brought out his best garments, perfumed himself, and prepared mentally for mortal combat; at dawn he rode out, and people said that his body was quivering with wrath. Upon his arrival at the capital a delegation came out to meet him, saying, "Enter Sinnar, and learn who is with you and who is opposed to you." But he refused, swearing "that he would not tire the Muslims for three days; if the mastery were his, 'people will see what I do, and if I die, the kingdom will never be at peace.'"[44] On Tuesday, the "Day Three" of the prophecy, Badi rode westward from the capital to meet his foes. There survives an eyewitness account of the ensuing battle:

> When the ranks drew close he [Badi] put his son Kitu at the head of the army, while he held back to observe them. When they met, Kitu and those with him were defeated. Then he himself met them, and did not turn back or falter in his movement. No one was with him except the *manik*, that is, [in the Funj language] the *sais* [groom]. The people of the regular army were all looking for him, and saying, "Badi?" When he drew near to them he summoned them by name, and each said to him, '*manjil*." There was not a knight among them who had not placed his sword before him.[46] Then he was killed; may the mercy of God be upon him.[46]

The heirs of Muhammad al-Amin would say in future years that it was he who had brought low the regent in single combat with swords; it was said by others that Ahmad walad ʿAli then slew him as he lay.[47] There is no record of the fate of the *manik*, the "little armor-bearer" who accompanied Badi into battle, seated on the back of the warrior's mount.[48] It was the first battle in which factions of the Hamaj had faced each other as enemies. The year was 1194/1780..[49]

Following the battle the victors "all gathered in the middle of Sinnar, each with [something] different in his heart."[50] The fall of Badi united the Hamaj, for no rival arose to contest the accession of Rajab b. Muhammad Abu Likaylik to his long-anticipated regency. The allies, for their part, were not forgotten; Muhammad al-Amin was restored to the throne of Qarri and Ahmad walad `Ali to that of al-Bahr, while the *faqih* Hijazi returned to the roster of honored courtiers.[51] Sultan `Adlan, as always circumspect, had nevertheless emerged a leader to be reckoned with. Rajab, having paid off his political debts and restored order to all but the eastern provinces of Sinnar, felt free to turn his attention to the long-neglected lost western provinces of Kordofan. In Dhu'l-Hijja 1196/7 November – 5 December 1782 his forces routed Hashim of the Musabba`at and reconquered Kordofan "in the name of `Adlan Abou Guederi, sultan of Sinnar."[52] Rajab sweetened the annexation with gifts of land and confirmation of privileges to local holy men[53] and augmented his forces through slave raids against the Nuba—an activity which the Chronicler dryly viewed as "busying himself with blockading the mountains."[54] Another target of Rajab's "blockades" may have been the district of *makk* Abbukr of Taqali, who had declared his independence from Sinnar during the interim.[55] In sum, Rajab's days in Kordofan were far from idle,

As the years of Rajab's engagement in Kordofan lengthened, Sultan `Adlan "considered what the Hamaj had done to his grandfather *makk* Badi and his paternal uncle *makk* Nasir and his father *makk* Isma`il.." The king began to prepare a stroke to liberate the monarchy from the Hamaj; "he strengthened himself," said the Chronicler, "and many supported him."[56] The organization of Adlan's coup was conditioned by certain political realities. The king could not distance himself from the capital without exciting suspicion, yet as long as he remained there he was personally vulnerable to the Hamaj governor Rajab had left behind there when he rode west, his brother Ibrahim. Therefore, the revolt must begin in the provinces and spread to the capital, and at its initial stages the central role of the king must be concealed.

`Adlan turned for support to the northern provinces; "he opened his heart and corresponded with Shaykh [Muhammad] al-Amin walad Mismar and the Awlad Nimr."[57] The northern *manjil* not only was a valuable ally of proven sympathies but also had achieved a working accord with `Awad al-Karin "Abu Sinn" and the Shukriya, who were not on speaking terms with the central government itself. From Sultan `Adlan's perspective, and even more from that of Muhammad al-Amin, Muhammad walad Nimr (supported by his brothers—collectively, the "Awlad Nimr") was an attractive candidate for the throne of the Ja`aliyyin, a jurisdiction whose rising entrepot of Shandi gave it an importance far above its titularly district status. Sa`d, the incumbent *makk* of the Ja`aliyyin, was vulnerable for both tactical and constitutional reasons. He had been a *makk* in absentia, having spent the greater part of his reign campaigning in Kordofan, and even as `Adlan's plot matured Sa`d remained in the west in the service of the regent Rajab. In constitutional terms, perhaps all would have agreed that the pre-

ferred successor to the late *makk* Idris of the Ja`aliyyin would have been his eldest son al-Fahl,[58] but al-Fahl had unfortunately predeceased his father.[59] When *makk* Idris died in turn, Abu Likaylik had invested his eldest surviving son, Sa`d, who thus held a plausible claim to legitimacy according to patrilineal principles. From the perspective of Funj constitutional usages, however, Sa`d's right to rule was at best imperfect, for he lacked the correct matrilineal connections to his immediate overlords, the *manjils* of Qarri, and it was precisely these matrilineal ties which the royalist conspirators now sought to activate.[60] During Muhammad al-Amin's previous intermittent periods of power in the north, he had already applied traditional matrilineal principles against the claims of the absent Sa`d. In 1772, for example, Shandi had been held by Muhammad al-Amin's sister Sittina, not only because she was the widow of the late al-Fahl and the regent for his young son Idris, but also because she was the living bearer of `Abdallab constitutional supremacy over the throne of Shandi. By 1784, however, Idris walad al-Fahl was no longer a viable candidate,[61] and the royalists instead chose to support the claims of Muhammad walad Nimr, who not only was the grandson of the late *makk* Idris through the appropriate female line, but also had accepted the dynastic discipline of Qarri by taking an `Abdallab wife.[62]

It was difficult to keep secrets in Sinnar, and the Hamaj had particularly ample grounds for doubting the loyalty of Muhammad al-Amin. In 1198/1783-1784 Rajab decided to act and sent his brother Nasir back from Kordofan with 700 horsemen and full disciplinary authority. The *manjil* awaited Nasir on the east bank of the Blue Nile near the southern border of his fief at al-Hilaliya, and there his knights, although heavily outnumbered, repulsed Nasir's attempt to cross the river in force.[63] Nasir retaliated by formally deposing Muhammad al-Amin and investing in his place his brother, Badi walad Mismar. Badi set up his court on the west bank at Wad Madani, doubly protected by Nasir's encampment in the Gezira and by the nearby Hamaj stronghold of Arbaji under the late Shaykh Shanbul's son, Madani.[64] Muhammad al-Amin then mobilized his Shukriya allies and struck against Nasir's flank, the town of Arbaji: "[They] put its fighting men and such as were scattered in different parts to the sword, and razed it to the ground and left it desert, though it had been the fairest town in the Gezira, populous and prosperous in trade, with fine buildings and schools of learning and religion, inhabited by men of wealth and well stocked with provisions. But from that day forward it lay waste until now."[65] Arbaji's "wonders of which only he who had seen them could relate" were gone forever,[66] and probably the Chronicler was not alone in his horrified awe at the obliteration of an entire eighteenth-century town. If there was no precedent in the annals of Sinnar for such an event, more examples, alas, were soon to follow.

Thus far Muhammad al-Amin had borne the full brunt of the fighting in the revolt, whereas the sultan had not yet committed himself irrevocably. As the Chronicler expressed the situation, "[Muhammad al-Amin and the Awlad Nimr] agreed with the *makk* [`Adlan] that in the event of a real war, he would seize Ibrahim [b. Muhammad Abu Likaylik] and those of the Hamaj who were

with him, and execute them."[67] The sack of Arbaji was war indeed; now, if ever, the king must show his hand. Toward the end of 1199/1785 'Adlan suddenly arrested Ibrahim, a Hamaj-sympathizing son of the amin Harun named al-Zayn, Ahmad walad 'Ali, the manjil of al-Bahr, and Taktak the son of Qandilawi; shortly thereafter, in Muharram 1200/4 November – 3 December 1785, he had them publicly executed in the *fashir*.[68] Furthermore, "he imprisoned the daughters of Muhammad [Abu Likaylik] and gave them as concubines to the Ja'aliyin [Awlad Nimr] and others who were with him," the "others" including his slave officers.[69] (The correct traditional formula to be pronounced by noblewomen who found themselves transferred from one husband to another in such circumstances was: "The dead [man] was our lord, and the living [man] is our lord."[70]) Looking back upon this event a Sudanese noble of a later, Arabized generation would comment sarcastically that such Muslims must belong to a new and unorthodox *madhhab*, "we . . . who kill our brothers and take their wives."[71] Yet, seen in the context of traditional marriage diplomacy in Sinnar, 'Adlan's actions constituted a logical and doubtless time-honored method for dissipating the potential matrimonial resources of any powerful man. That did not, by any means, make them more palatable to Rajab.

Legend asserts that the news of the disaster was brought to Rajab in Kordofan by his dead brother's court poet, remembered only by his nickname of al-Na'san ("Sleepy"), who had cleverly evaded the deadly trap set for him by 'Adlan and escaped from Sinnar. He addressed Rajab in verse:

> May the God of Resurrection recompense you for your brother,
> Who strode like the mighty eagle.
> This side and that are bent on slaughter;
> Disaster is upon you.
> I come not of my own accord.[72]

Shaykh Rajab gathered his forces and marched out of the west. 'Adlan stayed his hand until they had come within sight of the capital and there, in Dhu'l-Qa'da 1200/26 August – 24 September 1786, struck at a place called al-Turus.[73] Rajab died in the otherwise inconclusive battle which followed, and his partisans fell back in confusion. They encamped at 'Abud, relying upon the hospitality of the holy men of this religious community. "Their counsel was divided," said the Chronicler; makk Sa'd advocated a campaign northward to regain his throne and divert Muhammad al-Amin, while many wanted to return to the friendly terrain of Kordofan. Nasir, the most likely successor to Rajab if the regency were to be preserved, insisted that the force remain in the east.[74] Nothing was decided. The only consolation for the Hamaj army was that Sultan 'Adlan had fallen seriously ill and was undergoing a lengthy and inconclusive course of treatment; their foes did nothing to take advantage of their discomfiture.[75] Still, time slipped away, and after almost two years in camp, "in the end they decided to scatter in flight."[76] But it was not yet the end.

The *faqih* Hijazi b. Abu Zayd had not enjoyed his honored position at `Adlan's court for more than a year after the fall of the regent Badi; by 1781 he was absent from court circles.[77] Although perhaps sympathetic to Rajab, he did not accompany the army of Sinnar against Hashim in Kordofan, and in the west Rajab came to lean upon another holy man, al-Hajj Mahmud al-Majdhub. The latter, like many holy men, was gifted with the second sight, and during Rajab's angry march back to Sinnar to avenge Ibrahim, he was heard to say, while beating his horse with his staff: "The Ḥamaj-blow which has broken the first of them will vanquish the remainder of them!"[78] Hijazi, when he heard of this, was horrified: "How can al-Hajj Mahmud say that? They will throw the saying back at him." Then he realized the truth; the holy man was foretelling the fall of Rajab at al-Turus—and also his own death. During the difficult months following the battle Hijazi sought his own vision of the future and at length was rewarded. At the very moment when the Hamaj army was ready to disperse, "the emissary of the *faqih* Hijazi came to them and ordered them to return, bringing the good tidings: 'The victory is yours! I am coming!' They rejoiced."[79] Having taken heart, the Hamaj army appointed Nasir b. Muhammad Abu Likaylik as their leader and pretender to the regency.[80] Indeed, they could wait no longer, for in the meantime Sultan `Adlan's illness had taken a turn for the better. The year was 1202/1787-1788.[81]

When the ailing sultan learned that the Hamaj had bestirred themselves and chosen a leader, he readied an army composed of "all the *muqaddams* of the Funj" and sent it forth under the command of the *amin* Rahma walad Kitfawi and the *manjil* Muhammad al-Amin. The force also included a new corps of military pages whom `Adlan had recruited as a part of his traditionalist restoration, under the leadership of Muhammad "Abu Rayda" walad Khamis of the Sinnar Musabba`at.[82] The two armies met near the town of al-Tayyiba at a place on the Blue Nile called Intarahna. This time the battle was brutally fought and decisive:

> They fought, and the troops of King `Adlan were slain in a fearful slaughter; many of the best *muqaddams* perished in it.[83]

> The host of the *makk* was defeated . . . . many of the *makk's* troops were killed, some of them drowning in the river, and [the Hamaj] drove them until they entered Sinnar [again].[84]

The losers sought consolation and found excuses; the royalists had succeeded in killing Nasir's brother, `Ali, the most famous knight among the sons of Abu Likaylik,[85] and the followers of Muhammad al-Amin would claim that Nasir had purchased the treachery of many of the *makk's* horsemen with red Abyssinian gold.[86] But Sultan `Adlan himself was not to be consoled, and he blamed himself for not having been present at the battle. A few days later, he died. "He was just to the subjects and an irresistible opponent to his foes," wrote the Chronicler by way of epitaph. "It was said that he died by poison—or by magic."[87] It was also said that the king died of simple grief.[88]

18

The Regency, 1785 - 1803

From the perspective of the outlying provinces of Sinnar, it was by no means obvious that the rise of Abu Likaylik in 1762 had constituted a turning point in the history of the kingdom. Political life at the distant sultan's court had always been characterized by intrigue, and outbreaks of violence were not unknown. There was nothing unusual about disputed successions, nor about the presence of a strong *wazir*, nor about quarrels between such a figure and the king he served. It was the series of dramatic events following the death of Sultan `Adlan which stamped indelibly upon the minds of even the lowliest and most remote people of Sinnar that a new age had begun. In the most northerly districts, for example, it would be said in later years that the regent Nasir and his successor Idris were the first of the Hamaj to actually rule the kingdom.[1] Under the hands of Nasir and Idris both the sultan of Sinnar and his "divinely guarded and protected" capital city were brought low.

Following his victory at Intarahna, Nasir advanced to al-Labayn on the northern outskirts of the capital; there he waited, for the king still lived and his army, even in defeat, was still dangerous. The tactic of prudence was shortly repaid by the death of King `Adlan; the *makk's* wives hurriedly buried him under the floor of one of the storage rooms of the palace complex, and his general Abu Rayda, having commandeered every boat in or near the city, had them ferried across the river to his estates at al-Tarfaya by night. To avoid detection, he threatened any of the mourning women who might weep during their flight with instant decapitation.[2] When the sultan's death became known, the royalist soldiers "fought among themselves in front of the *makk's* court, in the town, and in the marketplace."[3] At length they decided upon a candidate for sultan named Idris—apparently a young man under the tutelage of a *faqih*—but meanwhile the tightening Hamaj siege "subjected the people to ever-increasing agony; the world for them grew narrow, and there was nothing in it."[4] Worse was to come.

The new regent rode around the great city to its southern limits to take advantage of the prevailing winds and, as night fell, set it afire. The scenes which followed must have resembled those recorded forty years later by Lord Prudhoe, who witnessed the destruction by fire of a Gezira village named Selleck:

> Many reed bundles of cotton were piled up outside the straw houses. Two minutes after we had arrived flames burst from a house where a woman was making mereesa [beer]; the wind was strong, and house

> after house caught fire with amazing rapidity, the dry thorns between [that is, the *zaribas* surrounding each family compound] communicating the flames. Each family rushed from their straw huts, and when they saw the danger ran back to save their cotton, angareebs, and few articles of furniture. I was astonished at the numbers of silver bracelets and gold ear-rings, ornaments for the head, or strings, which the women and girls wore . . . . All was confusion . . . . The nearest well was five miles distant, no water was to be procured. The women shrieked . . . and we tore our skin and clothes among the thorn hedges endeavouring to save the houses and property.[5]

In one respect, that of scale, Lord Prudhoe's description cannot do justice to the burning of Sinnar; Selleck possessed and lost but fifty houses, while at that time the Funj capital numbered its population in the tens of thousands.[6] As the inhabitants of the city gathered their portable wealth to save it from the flames, Nasir released the Hamaj troops and sent them into the city to loot, "sacking it and laying it waste." A few royalists "came out and skirmished a little that night, then disengaged when they began to fear a battle. They did not [really] fight; no, they were defeated without a battle."[7]

Following the destruction of Sinnar and the dispersal of `Adlan's army, Nasir set about eradicating the royalist threat permanently, a task which led him to impose an unprecedentedly rigorous control over the occupant of the throne and to bring to ground the principal surviving royalists wherever they might flee. Upon entering the ruined capital Nasir appointed a king named Awkal, then pursued the soldiers' candidate Idris into historical oblivion beyond a place called al-Sali, where he vanished from written memory.[8] After seven months Nasir had Awkal executed and replaced him with Tabl; the year was 1203/1788-1789.[9] Meanwhile, Nasir had prepared for an advance northward against the royalist partisans Muhammad al-Amin of Qarri and Muhammad "Abu Rayda" b. Khamis, who in the interval had invested their own candidate, one Rubat, as anti-sultan. The campaign was destined to prove costly in royal blood. In 1204/1789-1790 the Hamaj force engaged the royalists at al-Halfaya, and Tabl was killed;[10] Nasir replaced him with Badi b. Dakin, who survived until the next major engagement, a year later, in which both he and his rival Rubat, perished.[11] Nasir's next sultan, Hasab Rabbihi, fared little better; appointed upon the death of Badi in 1205/1791, he passed away later in the same year. In 1206/1791-1792 Nasir, having achieved a partial victory in the north, returned to Sinnar and appointed a new king named Nuwwar.[12] Nasir soon "perceived that he was a man of sagacity and strength, so he grew afraid of him and made haste to put him to death."[13] Finally, in 1207/1792-1793 Nasir appointed as king a young son of the late Tabl: "When Shaykh Nasir made *makk* Badi king, he was very young. Whenever they took him out on festive occasions Shaykh Faraj Allah al-Hafunra rode behind him, until he grew up."[14] The little king Badi accepted his appointed lot in life and would live to surrender his kingdom to the Turks in 1821. But the nation, having witnessed the rise and fall of eight kings in five years, would find it difficult to take the monarchy seriously again.

`Abdallab traditions concerning the regent Nasir's northern campaign of 1203-1788-1789 to 1206/1791-1792 interpret the episode in personal terms as an heroic climax to the knightly career of Muhammad al-Amin.[15] There is a justice to this perspective which transcends the sources' limitations—notably their foreshortened and inadequate treatment of the *manjil's* earlier career—for from the beginning the Hamaj had doubted his loyalty, feared and respected his abilities, and consistently followed policies designed to reduce him to manageable proportions by crippling his province.

Viewing the Nile Valley from the perspective of Kordofan, Abu Likaylik had sensed the possibility of splitting the province of the Walad `Ajib along the Nile, and upon his falling-out with Muhammad al-Amin following the coup of 1762 he began to take steps to build up a counterweight to the `Abdallab. The agents he chose were the *makks* of the west bank district of the Jamu`iya, vassals of the *manjils* of Qarri. The existence of close reciprocal ties between the Jamu`iya and the Hamaj cause is demonstrated not only by the Jamu`iya "adoption" of Abu Likaylik himself into their tribe's constitutional legend[16] but also by the fact that this legend extends no farther back in time than a certain *makk* Hamidan b. Kudnab, active in 1758 on the eve of the Hamaj coup.[17] When `Adlan walad Subahi gave Bruce letters of passage northward out of the country in 1772, he expected the traveler to pass through the friendly Jamu`iya territory rather than the then-rebellious province of Qarri; the letters of that year were addressed to Hamidan's grandson,[18] "Musnet, the father of Ibrahim."[19] A second thrust of Hamaj policy against the `Abdallab was the appointment of weak and pliable client *manjils* such as `Ajib, Nasir, `Umar and Badi as substitutes and rivals to Muhammad al-Amin. When the regent Badi invested `Umar in about 1193/1779-1780, he also introduced a policy whereby the Hassaniya, Kababish, Muhammadiya, and other west bank and White Nile tribes would be subject to the *makk* of the Jamu`iya.[20] The incumbent *makk* Ibrahim was elevated in rank and status; tradition would recall that he was the first to wear the *taqiya* and carry a copper kettledrum, and he was allowed to impose his rule not only along the White Nile but also eastward across the northern Gezira as far as Kamlin and Abu `Ushr.[21] The enlarged Jamu`iya *dar* absorbed the province of Alays, while the territory left to the *manjil* of Qarri was confined to lands east of the Blue Nile.[22]

As the new regent Nasir consolidated his position in the south during 1203/1788-1789, he sent a force under Abbakr "Wad Wahsh" northward against Muhammad al-Amin at al-Hillaliya; not leaving anything to chance, the regent hired an assassin for the specific task of killing the *manjil.* Although prudent advisors urged Muhammad al-Amin to flee into the north, the women of his household inspired him to make a stand in defence of the family honor. The killers arrived while the *manjil* was bathing; it is told that he calmly completed his toilette, then rode out with fifteen of his sons (one of whom expeditiously beheaded the would-be assassin) and drove the remainder of his tormentors who had survived the fierce initial clash into the river.[23] Only then did he gather his retinue and withdraw to al-Halfaya.

By the end of the year Nasir was ready to take the field himself and "set out for the northern districts to fight Shaykh [Muhammad] al-Amin and [Muhammad] Abu Rayda."[24] He also hired a second assassin—this time, a man with a gun. The Hamaj met the royalists in battle at al-Halfaya early in 1204/1789-1790,[25] with apparently inconclusive results. Nasir's puppet sultan Tabl was killed, and his hired gunman shot the wrong man;[26] however, the regent was not driven from the field. Indeed, he seems to have been confident; his official seal was made to bear the date 1204, and shortly thereafter, when his new puppet sultan Badi b. Dakin issued a charter, Nasir brushed aside the *amin* and *jundi* who had enjoyed pride of place since the earliest days of Abu Likaylik and set his own name at the head of the roster of courtiers.[27] Nasir's confidence was well founded, for under the strain of invasion the royalist coalition began to crack. Muhammad al-Amin antagonized his kinsman `Abd Allah, a son of the late puppet *manjil* `Ajib, who undertook to foment revolts among the vassal lords of the northern districts; specifically, he won the allegiance of one important factional pretender to the throne of Shandi[28] and a leading *makk* of the Shaiqiya. Furthermore, he secretly subverted the loyalty of Abu Rayda. Muhammad al-Amin struck northward and imprisoned `Abd Allah and the Shandi lordling at Wad Ban al-Naqa; then he turned south to face Nasir again, while dispatching his sons and Abu Rayda's Musabba`at across the Bayuda to deal with the Shaiqiya. There followed a battle in the distant north in which the Shaiqiya were victorious; meanwhile, Abu Rayda had deserted the expedition at Jabal Qilif and turned back to Wad Ban al-Naqa. Having liberated `Abd Allah and the Shandi prince, Abu Rayda swore a compact with them, and the conspirators surrounded the lodging of Muhammad al-Amin by night. Abu Rayda sent his men quietly onto the roof, where they made an opening and speared the *manjil* as he slept.[29] The year was 1205/1790-1791.[30]

Following the death of Muhammad al-Amin, "`Abd Allah and his brethren went to [the regent] Shaykh Nasir walad Muhammad at al-Jadid;[31] he made `Abd Allah the shaykh [of Qarri]."[32] `Abd Allah would continue to use a seal of office dated 1205 as long as he lived, but his position in that year was far from secure.[33] The sons of Muhammad al-Amin were still in the north, but they could be expected to attempt to avenge their father's death upon their return. `Abd Allah, moreover, had inherited whatever remained of the royalist cause, including the puppet sultan Rubat and the grim corps of Abu Rayda's Musabba`at, alien warriors who knew that if their cause failed they could expect no mercy from a populace who at best regarded them as "Nuba" and "slaves."[34] Abu Rayda himself, as a second-generation exile who had not only failed to win the modest court office allotted to his people[35] but also had taken up arms against the government, had nothing left to lose but his life. Perhaps these thoughts passed through the mind of `Abd Allah as he and the regent, following his investiture, "set out toward al-Halfaya."[36] Secret agreements were reached; when the regent approached the `Abdallab capital the combined forces of Abu Rayda and `Abd Allah the new *manjil* fell upon him

and inflicted a defeat. Both Nasir's king Badi b. Dakin and the royalist pretender Rubat died. After three days of nursing his wounds[37] Nasir tried again, but his battered soldiers refused to close with the enemy. In early 1206/1791-1792[38] Nasir retreated up the west bank of the Blue Nile toward Sinnar; as he fell back, Abu Rayda cautiously reoccupied his estates on the east bank centered around al-Tarfaya.[39]

The regent responded to the treachery of `Abd Allah by formally deposing him and investing, for a second time, the pliant former *manjil* Badi b. Mismar; Badi's surviving seal thus bears the date 1206/1791-1792.[40] Two documents from the middle years of Nasir's administration cast some light upon affairs in the `Abdallab province. In about 1794 the Awlad Dolib of al-Kadaro complained to the regent that a rival group of holy men, the Awlad Hasab al-Nabi, had unfairly occupied the island of al-Karida, which had been granted to their own forefathers by Sultan Badi b. Nol.[41] In response, the regent wrote a letter (undated, but probably from 1794) to the *manjil* Badi, instructing him to restore the rights and property of the Awlad Dolib.[42] Badi dutifully issued a confirmatory charter (2 Jumada II 1209/25 December 1794) to the Awlad Dolib, in which he included the exculpatory information that the land in question had been a bone of contention not only between the rival groups of holy men but also between the lineage of the former *manjil* `Umar and that of Badi's cousins, the Awlad al-`Ajayl b. Mismar.[43] Yet, these conflicts within the `Abdallab royal house were secondary to the major cleavages between Badi himself and the still unrepentant `Abd Allah, and between the latter and the sons of Muhammad al-Amin. The latter, upon their return from the north, had settled at al-`Aylafun, and although the *fuqara`* of that community tried unsuccessfully to mediate the conflict, `Abd Allah attacked them repeatedly. In the last confrontation the Awlad al-Amin prevailed, and `Abd Allah fled into exile among the eastern nomads.[44] These circumstances allowed Badi to appear to rule, and he may even have held court in al-Halfaya for a time.[45] By 1213/1798-1799, however, the capital had been reoccupied by the fugitive `Abd Allah.[46]

Despite Nasir's military setbacks the northern campaign of 1203-1206 achieved its primary goal, for the royalist alliance was shattered, and no new shadow sultan was appointed. Upon his return, the regent "stayed in Sinnar, and during his time it had the glamour of great royal authority and ceremonial gatherings."[47] Nasir's love of ceremonial display required a rebuilding of the city itself, a modest reflection of whose previous self arose cautiously from the ashes of 1788. A pessimistic visitor would have noticed first the remains of previous grandeur:

> This once-powerful city . . . [is] almost nothing but heaps of ruins, containing in some of its quarters some few hundreds of habitable but almost deserted houses . . . . At almost every step I trod upon fragments of porcelain, and sometimes of marble . . . . What struck me the most, was the workmanship of the doors of the old houses of

> Sennaar, which are composed of planed and jointed planks,, adorned frequently with carved work, and strengthened and studded with very broad-headed nails—the whole inimitable by the present [1821] population of Sennaar.[48]

The vast palace complex—beyond a modest structure assigned to the king and his immediate family—was not reoccupied, and the next thirty annual rainy seasons reduced its walls and towers of packed earth to ruins. The mosque, having escaped both flames and looters and being constructed of durable fired bricks, remained largely intact.

More sanguine observers would have emphasized the signs of returning urban life. Families from Dongola, the Ja`aliyin country, the Ethiopian borderlands, and the Nuba Mountains each built up a new residential quarter for their own ethnic group, while occupational areas were rebuilt for merchants and for tradesmen of all descriptions—butchers, tanners, carpenters, weavers, smiths, joiners, goldsmiths, tailors and sandal makers.[49] The new houses of the major merchants, for example, appeared to foreign eyes as "rather spacious, with one or two stories . . . flanked by high, inward-sloping walls, in which are but rarely seen a few small openings which admit only a dim light. Some of the larger openings, as in Cairo, are adorned with wooden grills; these illuminate the women's quarters."[50] Yet, even the most optimistic assessment would have to concede that the new town of Sinnar, with its modest population of about 15,000, had lost any claim to national preeminence. In the years to follow the men who ruled the kingdom often visited Sinnar—it remained the royal residence—but only occasionally did they consider it advantageous to live there. There was little of substance to distinguish the Sinnar of Nasir's day from the other towns of the realm; there remained only the regent's love of pomp and circumstance.

One of the largest "ceremonial gathering" customarily took place on the third day of the Feast of Fastbreaking at the end of Ramadan. Nasir himself was undoubtedly the central figure of such festivals in his own time, but one may imagine that the little king Badi VI also accompanied him, held in the saddle by the firm hands of his caretaker Faraj Allah. The general atmosphere of the occasion survives in an eyewitness description the last time it took place, when it was Badi, as an adult, who presided:

> Badi, accompanied by his ministers and foremost esquires, deployed all the pomp and magnificence that his expiring power allowed. He traversed the city accompanied by one hundred men of his guard bearing lance, sabre, and shield. A great throng of people followed him, and the women, by their peculiar cries and rollings of the voice, expressed the joy and contentment born of the presence of the monarch . . . . The cortege stopped . . .. to give the spectacle of a simulated combat. Badi's hundred guardsmen divided into two corps. They saluted with their weapons, then advanced toward each other shaking their shafts horizontally, with knees bent, and jumping alternatively from foot to foot. Having approached to a certain distance they crouched, covering themselves entirely with their long

> shields; in this position they performed steps, leaping to the right and left as if to evade the enemy's blade. At the moment of throwing the lance they uttered a sharp cry, which seemed intended to distract the enemy from keeping his guard up and parrying the blow. Lances flew, and were returned by each group to the other. There followed a combat with swords; they raised this weapon above their heads and balanced it there for a time while leaping, with first one foot and then the other, toward the adversary troop. After having delivered several blows with much agility, they retreated. Badi's two ministers and chief esquires rode very beautiful Abyssinian horses who se harness, like the fittings of their sabres, was enriched to a greater or lesser degree with gold. The monarch wore a robe, and over it a tunic of rich Indian fabric. The cap which marked his dignity was of the same material and quilted; its form was round, with two points on the sides . . . . He wore leather sandals like those of the ancient [Egyptians]. His sabre was decorated with gold and silver, and so was the harness of his horse, whose head was surmounted by a plume of ostrich feathers. Near Badi they carried a large umbrella of various colors . . . . The cortege resumed its march. The ministers and six of the esquires marched in front; then came the king. A slave carried a high stool covered with silver, upon which Badi sat, and which served him for mounting his horse. Behind him the troop followed on foot, carrying their lances over their shoulders.[51]

The regent Nasir may well have enjoyed such spectacles for a time, but in the end he tired of them. In truth, he came to show all the signs of a man irritated and bored with the tasks of his office.

The years of peace following the northern campaign gradually exposed the new regent's interesting but rather equivocal personality. His attitude toward women raised some eyebrows: for example, when the report came to him that the victorious royalists had just captured all his wives, he shrugged off the loss, saying: "I should like to forget all of them!"—although he then asked one of his knights to rescue his favorite, Arbadi. It was toward the hero of this exploit, al-Hajj Sulayman, that Nasir was most demonstrably affectionate; the two men were wont to take their afternoon siesta lying together on the same *`anqarib*. Once a large delegation of notables broke in upon them to protest, saying to Nasir:

> "You are the king's regent; it is not seemly for you to do this!"
> "I am keeping him for myself," replied Nasir.

It was said that the two men were so close that they could communicate with each other via extrasensory perception.[52] The regent's attitude toward wealth also inspired comment. On the one hand, he was personally abstemious and prided himself on never having touched gold but once in his life; on the other, he loved to make extravagant gifts to causes he deemed worthy. Among the principal religious beneficiaries of Nasir's charity were the Ya`qubab, to whom

the regent's puppet sultan Tabl made extensive grants of land and privilege.[53] Nasir's bosom companion Sulayman also received an ample supply of "all articles such as could be neither counted nor found elsewhere than with him [Nasir]; he sent him honey in waterskins rather than gourds, and wealth without measure."[54]

After a time the regent's need for diversion led him away from the capital for increasingly extended intervals:

> He used to make visits to the tomb of his family on feast days, visiting them on a she-camel with a saddlebag full of dates.
>
> Or again, he used to go out to al-Sawaqi to have a good time, for he had flocks under the charge of the *arbab* there.
>
> He used to go out hunting toward the area of al-ʿAzaza;[55] people would go out with him to roast the meats, and he only entered the town on feast days.[56]

But if the regent had lost his taste for the routine exercise of power, others could be found in whom this appetite remained keen. "When he tired of ruling," as the Chronicler put it, " Nasir "entrusted affairs to his *wazir*, the *arbab* Daf' Allah walad Ahmad [Hasan]."[57]

Nasir facilitated the gradual accumulation of power by the *wazir* Daf' Allah by making his own erratic interventions in political life memorable for their brutality. One prominent victim was the holy man Hijazi b. Abu Zayd, who "died in Nasir's prison of hunger and thirst."[58] It was said that Nasir feared the supernatural power of the *faqih*, to which he credited the defeat and death of King ʿAdlan, and that altogether extraordinary magical measures were required to break down Hijazi's unseen spiritual powers of self-protection. In the end they chained him inside a cage at the river's edge to die of thirst, and the suffering *faqih's* last words were the thoroughly human plea, "Give me water, and kill me!"[59] Nasir sent his brother to kill the Hadarma[60] and had the *faqih* Najdi strangled. "It became proverbial," noted the Chronicler, "to say: 'as thirsty as Hijazi,' or 'strangled like Najdi,' or 'a Hadarmian slaughter.'"[61] As if in compensation, Nasir made a display of honoring the *faqih* ʿAbd al-Rahman b. Abu Zayd,[62] who died a natural death in his time: "Nasir prepared and conducted his burial, buried him in his tomb, and openly visited it."[63]

As the years passed people's resentment against Nasir mounted, and they came to view his reign as oppressive and tyrannical; eventually the loyalty of even his staunchest supporters wavered. Nasir "increased in generosity toward some of the community, toward some of whom he showed munificence, while increasing in tyranny toward others."[64] Nasir's critical error was the alienation of his brothers;[65] conspicuously, he turned against Husayn "and seized all the possessions and herds he had."[66] The lesson was not lost on Nasir's other brothers. At this juncture the *wazir* Daf Allah intervened to isolate Nasir and harness the anger of the other aggrieved sons of Abu Likaylik for his own

purposes: "He ordered all the *muqaddams* as well as others to gather at his court until he could bring them to the *diwan* of Shaykh Nasir—even his two brothers Idris and `Adlan, until Idris was living with Daf` Allah without even going into [Nasir's] presence. "Firmly bound,' people said. So they concealed their enmity against [Nasir] and went to the troops and conspired against him."[67] Meanwhile Abu Rayda, lord of the Musabba`at, still held his estates across the river at al-Tarfaya, "paying no heed to Nasir but occasionally entering Sinnar alone, by night, and secretly, to have discourse with his friends, and then leaving it."[68] If Nasir was blind to the alienation of his kinsmen, he had lost none of his finely honed antipathy toward erstwhile royalists. On 3 Shawwal 1211/1 April 1797 he and his brother `Adlan led the Hamaj forces across the river against Abu Rayda: "They fought him and devastated the villages of the east bank and plundered them of wealth."[69] Abu Rayda died defending the estates of the Musabba`at, which were then occupied by `Adlan; Nasir returned to the capital.

Within two months of the death of Abu Rayda the revolt against Nasir began; Idris b. Muhammad Abu Likaylik came south from al-Manaqil to `Abud, and `Adlan crossed the Blue Nile to join him. The fall of Nasir, however, was destined to take place in painfully slow motion, for because the capital city no longer contained an effective machinery of state, its capture was no longer of decisive importance. When Nasir learned of the revolt he gathered his forces and advanced toward Idris and `Adlan, encamping at al-Sabil;[70] then the onset of an exceptionally violent rainy season immobilized both armies.[71] Nasir used this respite to devise a plan, according to which he would appeal to all the communities of holy men who might be won over to his cause. One of the dignitaries to whom he appealed was the *faqih* al-Amin b. Hammad Muhammad al-Majdhub, the contemporary leader of al-Damir:

> The regent Shaykh Nasir greets you with many greetings. That of which we inform you is, that previously our letter came to you with al-Hajj `Abd al-Jabbar, but we have had neither sight nor news of you. Why is the sight of you denied us? Perhaps there is a hindrance? Now it is good for you to see our letter which has come to you again. Do not listen to what people say. The *aman* [truce] of God, the *aman* of God is firmly established between us and you. There is no breach in it, nor has anything been added to it. God, God upon that! After that has been put behind us, the sight of you will not be denied. Will not your messenger come to us at this very time?[72]

It would seem that the *faqih* al-Amin did not respond to Nasir's summons, but others did, and before the end of the rains Nasir was able to send to his opponents a delegation of prominent religious notables. He also sent to them "the daughters of Muhammad [Abu Likaylik]," in effect abdicating to his rivals authority over the possibilities for marriage alliances of the family and hence of its future.[73] The delegates were received courteously but found Idris and

`Adlan obdurate; on returning, their spokesman the *faqih* Walad `Abd al-Hayy, addressed Nasir in rhymed prose:

> For you
> In the shoe
>
> Is this:
>
> Either Daf` Allah
> Or the crown
> Or the blow of a sword at sundown![74]

Nasir realized that his position was hopeless and ordered his troops to disperse. He himself returned unobtrusively to Sinnar, and his brothers closed in behind. "When night came, he had fires kindled in the *fashir*, took what he needed, and departed for the southern districts."[75]

News of Nasir's flight reached the rebels at daybreak, and they entered the city. `Adlan tracked Nasir up the river as far as Siru, opposite Karkoj, but abandoned the pursuit upon learning that the regent had crossed the river there and struck out eastward. `Adlan returned to Idris at Sinnar, but no secure government was possible as long as the regent remained at large. Nasir's path led him to Darbarki on the Dinder and then northward to al-Halfaya, where his old enemy `Abd Allah b. `Ajib offered him refuge; then, joined by Daf` Allah his *wazir*, he moved into the Gezira and settled at `Abud. When this news reached the capital Idris set out against him and marched down the east bank of the Blue Nile as far as Abu Haraz. In an act of unintended tribute to the affection which some must still have felt toward Nasir, Idris then selected a picked force of slave troops including neither Hamaj nor Funj and dispatched `Adlan across the river with it to seize Nasir. As `Adlan's force approached Nasir's encampment the unfaithful Daf` Allah broke ranks, removed his helmet, and rode across to join the attackers. Nasir was taken without a fight and brought back to Abu Haraz. There Idris turned him over to Subahi, son of the late regent Badi, who killed Nasir in revenge for his father's death. They buried Nasir at Abu Haraz near the tomb of the *faqih* Daf` Allah al-`Araki. The year was 1213/1798-1799.

Idris was the only Hamaj regent, aside from Abu Likaylik himself, to die a natural death, and the records of his rule testify unanimously to his high personal qualities: "He was a brave man, and just, and mild; he was gentle of heart toward the subjects . . . . He was respected, revered, and frugal."[77] Idris played an active and effective role in government, but he was also remembered for the institutional innovation of entrusting routine administrative affairs to a panel of holy men.[78] This policy was a legacy of Nasir's experience—not that Idris's *wazirs* were allowed to dominate affairs as Daf` Allah had done—but in the sense that Idris, like Nasir on the eve of his fall, acknowledged the collapse of the traditional Funj system of territorial lords by turning to holy men as the

only surviving effective and politically accessible leaders in the kingdom. One of the most interesting innovations of Idris, and illustrative of his orientation toward the new bourgeois order, was his attempt to introduce a coin currency for Sinnar, as discussed above in Part II. Contemporaries preferred to remember that he kept strict order in the market: "In his time all the articles in the market could be left in place without fear—except of the dogs."[79] A second group who benefited from the rule of Idris were the cultivators of the Blue Nile valley, for he sent his brother `Adlan on repeated expeditions against the nomadic chieftains, "and in consequence the inhabitants of the villages enjoyed a period of peace."[80] The raids of the pastoral tribes served as a warning, however, that although the various political units of Sinnar might no longer respond to traditional methods of control, they not only still existed but also waxed powerful.

During his first year in power Idris faced a serious crisis in the Blue Nile province of al-Bahr, a problem whose roots dated back to the foundation of the regency. The northern boundary of al-Bahr lay in the vicinity of Karkoj and was roughly coterminous with the downstream limit of Berta speech among the riverain cultivators. However, the population of the province also included many Arabic-speaking pastoralists, from whose ranks, by olden tradition, the provincial *manjils* had been drawn.[81] Thus, when Abu Likaylik appointed `Adlan walad Subahi shaykh of the province, he may perhaps have pleased Berta sentiment by the choice of a Fazughlian lord, but he also thereby excluded the family or families who had previously supplied the province with *manjils*. Some echo of their resentment may survive in the legend of `Ali "Abu Hunayk," shaykh of the Zamalta section of the Qawasma Rufa`a. It was said that when "the barbarous Nuba [Abu Likaylik's Kordofanian army] came from their mountains in the west," Shaykh `Ali rallied his people in defense of the king, who rewarded him with the gift of a daughter in marriage, wealth, and the right to rule.[82] While impeccable in its treatment of traditional Funj constitutional usages, this tale neglects to mention that it was the lordship of the province of al-Bahr and not merely the shaykhship of the Qawasma that was at stake; moreover, it conveniently ignores the fact that Abu Likaylik, not the king, was victorious. It would undoubtedly have pleased Shaykh `Ali to learn that in the very year in which both Abu Likaylik and his chosen *manjil* of al-Bahr died, his own son Ahmad would succeed `Adlan as the provincial lord.[83] `Adlan's son Subahi, however, remained a thorn in Ahmad's side as long as he lived, and the Hamaj did not fail to exploit this rivalry. When the regent Badi deposed Shaykh Ahmad in 1193/1779-1780 he replaced him with Subahi; only Subahi's capture by the royalists at al-Suwaydaniya and Ahmad's timely support of Rajab's successful coup against Badi permitted him to return to power in 1194/1780. The regent Nasir revived the dispute after the death of Ahmad by turning against his family and reappointing Subahi.[84] When Nasir fell, Shaykh Ahmad's legendary "ninety-nine sons," led by the formidable Muhammad Kamtur, were therefore most eager to press their case before the regent Idris in the most vigorous terms possible.

The *manjils* of al-Bahr had not played a leading role in the royalist movement, but Shaykh Kamtur had taken a lesson from it; a plausible shadow sultan was always a nuisance, if not actually a threat, to the Hamaj powers-that-be. Kamtur produced a pretender named Ranfa b. Badi (which "Badi" is not known), who by his subsequent actions must have been a mature adult of some ability. The regent Idris thus began his administration with a rival monarch and a potentially hostile army at Barankwa,[85] a short distance up the river from Sinnar. Idris responded by marching out against Kamtur in force but upon encountering him entered into negotiations and concluded a truce. The terms of the settlement pleased almost everyone, and the lords rode back to Sinnar to implement them. They deposed the young king Badi and sent him abroad to join his brother Nayil b. Tabl in supervised exile in the Ethiopian lowland governate of Ra's al-Fil east of modern Qallabat.[86] This cleared the way for the accession of Ranfa, who promptly issued a charter confirming the landholding rights of the father of one of Idris's *wazirs*. In the roster of courtiers appended to this document, the name of the *manjil* of al-Bahr was Muhammad Kamtur. The year 1213/1798-1799 drew to a close.

The greater portion of Idris's period of rule was devoted to an attempt to restore the central government's control over the north. The first target of Idris's wrath was Shaykh `Abd Allah b. `Ajib, who not only had seized power in al-Halfaya from the Hamaj client Badi b. Mismar but also had added insult to injury by "certain words he had uttered in favor of Shaykh Nasir when he had gone to him."[88] `Abd Allah, in the meantime, had also prevailed over the Awlad al-Amin, killing eighteen sons of the late *manjil* in a single battle. The survivors fled southward and, failing to win the support of the regent Nasir, had joined the revolt of Idris.[89] When Idris rode out toward the close of 1214/early 1800,[90] he was accompanied by Nasir b. Muhammad al-Amin as the Hamaj candidate for `Abd Allah's governate; Nasir had prepared himself for the anticipated victory by having a shaykh's seal made for himself, bearing the date 1214, before leaving the capital.[91]

`Abd Allah had proven himself to be an effective and popular ruler. One of his accomplishments was to curtail the aggrandizement of the *makks* of the Jamu`iya; when `Abd Allah entered his capital he confronted the aggressive and independent-minded makk Babikr, who was issuing charters on his own authority, and bitter warfare followed.[92] By 1798 `Abd Allah had defeated Babikr and replaced him with the more pliant Idris al-Muhayna, who appears in `Abd Allah's charters as a loyal vassal.[93] Shaykh `Abd Allah earned the reputation of an exceptionally pious and just ruler; it was he who introduced compulsory public prayer to the `Abdallab capital, and many tales were told of his Solomonic verdicts.[94] The two surviving documents issued by his court (1798 and 1800) suggest that it may have been he who devised the unusual *modus vivendi* between royal and clerical justice discussed above in Part II; the earlier document is a simple royal ruling at customary law, but the second—involving the same principals and the identical piece off of disputed land, thereby exposing

the practical failure of the initial ruling—formed one of a pair of rulings, to which the clerical counterpart issued by the *qadi* has also survived.[95] Like his contemporary the regent Idris, Shaykh `Abd Allah had been obliged to fall back upon the services of holy men as his own administrative authority faltered.

Despite his recognized virtues, however, it was said that `Abd Allah labored under a curse laid upon him by a holy man he had once offended. At the crucial moment, as the army of Idris advanced against him (between 13 February and 20 July 1800), `Abd Allah was unable to ride a horse; his army was defeated, and he himself was killed.[96] The victorious regent Idris settled in al-Halfaya and undertook a thorough reorganization of northern affairs. His first step was to invest Nasir b. Muhammad al-Amin as *manjil* of Qarri. "This chief," noted a guest of the *manjil* twenty years later near the end of Nasir's career, "was tall of stature, proud of bearing and agreeable in appearance." On that occasion, perhaps typical of an ordinary working day for the nobleman,

> His costume consisted of two shirts of fine cotton cloth, the one white and the other blue. On his feet he wore leather sandals similar to those of the ancient Egyptians; his hair was also dressed like theirs, and lightly oiled [that is, the *manjil* wore his hair shoulder-length in traditional fashion]. On his upper arm he wore attached some small leather bags containing a sort of amulet, or mysterious papers on which were written certain verses of the Qur'an. His fingers were adorned with big silver rings, and a man of his entourage carried his sword, decorated with silver.[97]

Shaykh Nasir was seen by his own people as a competent and moderate ruler.[98]

After placing his chosen candidate upon the provincial throne of Qarri, Idris remained in al-Halfaya and set about bringing to heel the district lords of the north. Shaykh `Abd Allah's friend the Jamu`iya *makk* Idris al-Muhayna found himself shorn of the province of Alays (which was reconstituted early in the nineteenth century[99]), deposed from office, and confronted with an officially sanctioned *makk* in the person of his dynastic rival Ibrahim walad Nayil. Idris al-Muhayna successfully defended himself and some of his followers against these pressures for two decades and died resisting the Turkish invasion.[100] Jamu`iya traditions have regarded him as the sole legitimate ruler of this period and contain no mention of Ibrahim.[101] In practice, however, it was Ibrahim walad Nayil who administered the reduced Jamu`iya *dar* after 1800, and he did so as an obedient vassal of the *manjil* Nasir.[102] Idris the regent cultivated the Majadhib of al-Damir, holy men who had not rallied to the cause of the regent Nasir and whom he hoped to persuade to adopt a tolerant attitude toward the proposed reorganization of the north; a surviving letter from the regent to the leaders of al-Damir combines a friendly and respectful tone with a practical reminder about the virtues of strong secular government.[103] In regard to the district of Berber which lay beyond al-Damir to the north, Idris advised Shaykh Nasir to sanction the rule of the incumbent

makk `Ali walad Mustafa, who had succeeded his father on the district throne without the formal approval of the central government.[104] These diplomatic concessions by Idris isolated the intervening district of Shandi, the last refuge of unrepentant and unpunished royalists, where nightly the *makk* Muhammad walad Nimr and his kinsmen satisfied their carnal appetites upon the bodies of the daughters of Abu Likaylik. The regent Idris, it was said, could not speak of his sisters without weeping.[105]

The commercial boom of the eighteenth century had given the entrepot of Shandi a practical importance out of all proportion to its constitutional status as a district within the northern province of Sinnar, and Idris's attempt to reassert the authority of the central government over the area called into question a whole nexus of regional accommodations which had grown up over the years. To choose a fortuitously well-documented example, even before the Hamaj coup the old lord of Shandi, *makk* Idris, had taken upon himself the authority to issue grants of land to the founder of the community of al-Damir,[106] a policy which Muhammad walad Nimr, upon seizing power, had been careful to continue;[107] thus the regent Idris would not find it easy to alienate the affections of the Majadhib toward their immediate overlord. Yet, there survived a strong faction among the nobility of the district who had never accepted the rise of the upstart Awlad Nimr and who looked upon the aging *makk* Sa`d as their rightful lord. This veteran Hamaj loyalist, it would seem, rode out from Sinnar with Idris to reclaim his throne at the point of the regent's lance, while Idris was relying upon his influence to facilitate and legitimate the overthrow of the Awlad Nimr. At the crucial moment, however, *makk* Sa`d died;[108] the regent was obliged to devise a new course of action.

The regent remained at al-Halfaya and sent his brother `Adlan northward against Shandi. When the general reached Wad Ban al-Naqa he wrote to Muhammad walad Nimr and offered a reconciliation, promising to extend official recognition to his title and rule. With the benefit of hindsight, the Chronicler would write: "When the letter reached *makk* Muhammad walad Nimr he was surprised at it, and forgot how he and his brothers had acted in the time of King `Adlan of the Funj in the matter of enslaving the daughters of Muhammad Abu Likaylik, for in the hour of his fate he was blinded."[109] The *makk* assembled the Awlad Nimr and rode out to Wad Ban al-Naqa to meet `Adlan; at the last moment the *makk's* brother Sa`d took Muhammad's son Nimr aside, and they watched their kinsmen pass through the pickets of `Adlan's camp. The Hamaj commander promptly clapped his guests in irons and, at greater leisure, proceeded to torture *makk* Muhammad to death. The mother of one of the king's captured sons ransomed him—for 300 ounces of gold, it was said—while the late regent Nasir's old friend al-Hajj Sulayman, who had an eye for attractive youths, secured the release of a second son, al-Fahl. Upon being freed the grateful young man composed a praise-song for the Hamaj general:

Where is the like unto `Adlan,

a man of heart,
rider of a conquering steed against the common vermin,
who avenges the disgrace?

He imprisoned the *harim*,
seized the people who had offended him
and as for the past, forgot what had not gone well for him!

`Adlan sent the rest of the captives back to the regent, who took them to Sinnar the following year and put them to death.[110] Ironically, the fate of the general's enslaved sisters, the ostensible *casus belli*, is not known.

Meanwhile, Nimr walad Muhammad, the fallen *makk's* son and heir, had waited outside `Adlan's camp; when night fell, under cover of darkness he escaped. `Adlan mobilized for a pursuit but was dissuaded by a delegation of the Majadhib of al-Damir, who apparently promised to support whomever `Adlan should place on the vacant Shandi throne. `Adlan then invested Musa`ad, a son of the late *makk* Sa`d, and made his memorable "descent upon Shandi."[111] The city of the new *makk* Musa`ad probably changed little in appearance between 1801 and 1822, when a visitor described it as follows:

> This town . . . must have eight or nine hundred houses and six or seven thousand inhabitants. All these dwellings are rectangular in construction; for the most part they have but one tall story and their roofs are terraces from which rain water runs off through projecting gutters. The residences of the *makk* are remarkable in that they have a second story and are whitewashed on the exterior. The only ingress through which air and light can penetrate these houses are a few small openings situated high in their walls, and so they are usually very dark. This method of construction has as its goal rendering them more difficult of access to the heat and to nocturnal insects. Often, in a small interior court, one sees a sort of pool sunk to floor level and lined with masonry, in which to bathe. These houses are large, commodious, and fresh. They are adjoined by spacious enclosures called *hoshs* [*kochs*], some of which are three hundred feet square in extent. They serve to confine camels, and also perform the function of bazaars for the caravans. The walls of the houses, slightly inclined inward as they rise, are made of unfired bricks or of mud. The town is pierced by some wide streets, sometimes rather well aligned, but the sand which the wind accumulates there makes it difficult to walk about on foot.[112]

`Adlan spent the rest of 1215 and the beginning of 1216 in the north; then he rejoined Idris at al-Halfaya, and the two returned to the capital. In the meantime Shaykh Nasir of Qarri had profited from the intimidating presence of his awe-inspiring southern guests by deposing `Ali walad Mustafa, who had proven unsatisfactory as *makk* of Berber, replacing him with *makk* Nasr al-Din.[113] It

was the end of an age, for never again would a shaykh of Qarri be able to depose a vassal, nor would the lords of Sinnar ride north of the Nile confluence.

The regent's settlement of northern affairs began to disintegrate as soon as `Adlan's army withdrew. The young Nimr walad Muhammad, under the protection of his uncle Sa`d, withdrew eastward to take refuge with the Batahin, with whom he formed a marriage alliance. Sa`d gathered the scattered partisans of the Awlad Nimr, and they proclaimed Nimr *makk* in rivalry to the Hamaj appointee Musa`ad. Traditions of the Batahin recall how they expressed their political sympathies for Nimr by raiding the livestock of Musa`ad's subjects and thus succeeded in drawing out his army to a place called Dahasir in the Wadi al-Hawad.[114] There the Nimrab and the Batahin fell upon Musa`ad's troops and defeated them; Nimr's people occupied Shandi, and Musa`ad fled across the river to al-Matamma. The Majadhib again intervened as mediators and negotiated a division of the realm; Musa`ad would henceforth rule the west bank lands from al-Matamma, while Nimr would keep Shandi and the east bank. Before the end of 1216/1801-1802 this "Cousins' War" had passed into history—and so had the Funj district of the Ja`aliyin. The Batahin wryly observed that their only reward was the dubious privilege of paying contributions to Nimr rather than Musa`ad,[115] while Nimr and Musa`ad vied with each other in giving away additional portions of their little demi-realms to the ever-receptive holy men of the region.[116]

The regent Idris ruled peacefully for about two years after his return from the north, then passed away suddenly on 27 September 1803 while encamped at Jabal Saqadi collecting taxes: "When his brother `Adlan verified his death he concealed it until he had assembled his people and gathered his horses and riders, and then he announced his death."[117] "The people," added the Chronicler with foreboding, "were amazed and perplexed."

19

The Sundering of the Tribes

Each group of subjects in Sinnar lived within a geographically defined *dar* whose natural features limited the number of inhabitants and molded their occupational activities. In this ecological sense, the "tribes" of Sinnar—or, more precisely, their respective *dars*—were virtually immutable structural entities whose names in several cases may be traced back to the foundation of the kingdom or earlier (Dongola, the Shaiqiya, the Ja`aliyin, al-Taka).[1] The political history of such *dars* before the Heroic Age had consisted largely of the appointment or deposition of their lords by the responsible Funj authorities, but as the central government gradually disintegrated during the later eighteenth century the inhabitants of each *dar* in turn, by choice or force of necessity, found themselves politically independent. The uses to which each group put its new independence varied according to the specific circumstances in which they had obtained it, but in all cases independence meant a lowering of political horizons to the parochial level; the affairs of the kingdom mattered less than the good will or hostility of immediate neighbors. Each group turned to internal sources of cohesion and legitimation of authority which lay rooted in the prevailing kinship system, and each asserted its own identity in relation to its neighbors by formulating a fictitious Arab ancestry. Thus the modern Arab tribes of the northern Sudan were born.

The regent Nasir enjoyed hearing himself compared to the rulers of Syria, Egypt, and Dar Fur in his day, who were all famed for their generosity; however, noted the Chronicler, "Nasir was inferior to them in the extent of his kingdom, for it was restricted to part of the Gezira."[2] This perception was essentially correct; with the transitory exception of the northern campaign of 1800-1802, in the days of Nasir and Idris the central government lost control over all the outlying provinces. There was a significant difference, however, between the process of disintegration east of the Nile and the districts of the west and north. The eastern provinces were relinquished to diverse local leaders who could still be expected to interact with the lands under the authority of the central government according to some variation of the traditional pattern. The western and northern districts were more thoroughly alienated, being drawn into the political and economic orbit of the aggressively expansive sultanate of Dar Fur.

The first province of the east to rebel was al-Taka, led by `Awad al-Karim "Abu `Ali" of the Shukriya under circumstances described above. In 1791 the regent Nasir attempted to accommodate the Shukriya leadership and to regu-

larize their relationship with the central government by formally ceding the province to Shaykh `Awad al-Karim "Abu Sinn;" the province of al-Taka thereafter disappeared from the documents of the central government.[3] But the Shukriya notable, as a mere tribal leader supported by and responsible to only his own people, proved a poor substitute for a traditional provincial governor. One result of the regent Nasir's settlement with the Shukriya was the permanent isolation and loss to Sinnar of all the more remote tribes of the eastern provinces. The eastern *makks* would retain some of the customs, insignia, and military accoutrements of Sinnar well into the nineteenth century, but their effective ties with the central government were broken; each tribe in turn made its own terms politically and economically with the Shukriya, the Ottomans at the Red Sea coast, and the lords of a gradually reawakening Ethiopia. The last generation of Sinnar knew no counterparts to the Hamran notables Qandilawi and Muhammad "Qarn al-`Ilj," who had ridden out of the eastern mountains in the regent Badi's day to play important roles in national politics. Or again, as the knights of the Banu `Amr gradually abandoned Sudanese war-horses for Abyssinian ponies, they came to resemble small boys dressing up in their fathers' clothing, for the suits of Funj horse armor they inherited "were far too large and long for the horses that were wearing them. There was no doubt that they had not been made for them, but for war-horses of a nobler height and build."[4] As man and horse seemed to shrink within the inherited legacy of the Funj kingdom, there arose a vague but persistent legend that the men of olden days had been giants.

Another problem exacerbated by the Shukriya settlement was that the tribe's political independence by no means freed it from its ecologically determined patterns of periodic dependence upon the grain of cultivators. The tribal ethos as expressed in poetry of the day might heap scorn upon farmers,[5] but from the beginning of its revolt the tribe had demanded access to the grain of the Nile and its affluent *wadis*—a theme which had already appeared not only in the regent Idris's pride at his defense of the Blue Nile villages against nomadic marauders,[6] but also in the story of the sack of Arbaji as recounted by the Shukriya themselves:

> The Shukriya were in the habit of sending off parties . . . to buy *dhurra* which they brought back to the tribe in the Butana. One of these parties set off and stopped on the way at Arbaji after crossing the river. They were hungry and asked to be given *kisra* [bread] but it was refused; they searched the village and found nothing, but one of them happened to see a *qadah* [bowl] of *kisra* being taken into the house of a bride and bridegroom. He made a dash for it, but the door was shut before he could get there. Thereupon he started to shout and cry out that his brother was being murdered inside the house. All the Shukriya collected, some even crossing the river . . . and the village was sacked. The Shukriya, having found all the food they wanted, passed on.[7]

The tribes which lived between the Shukriya and the river and cultivated the eastern *wadis* found themselves under intense pressure.

The Batahin, for example, had long constituted one of the communities of Sinnar, but their tribal history as recorded by themselves began only with the unleashing of the Shukriya in the time of the regent Nasir.[8] The Shukriya first undertook to break the military elite of the Batahin, to eliminate them as a stock-raising group and to drive them back from the eastern border of their *dar* at Jabal Geili toward the Nile. *Makk* al-Hajj `Ali walad `Abd al-Baqi succeeded in resisting the initial assault but died in a second and decisive battle; his warriors were decimated, and his heirs fell back upon Abu Dulayq, which became the new tribal capital. The Shukriya annexed the territory abandoned by their foes and then invaded the remaining portion of the Batahin *dar* to seize additional livestock and—having thus given the Batahin sufficient incentive to cultivate—to exact a tribute from their crops.[9] The Batahin fought bravely but were worsted. Even in defeat the Batahin retained sufficient strength to counterattack in an attempt to seize enough stock from the Shukriya to reconstitute their tribal economy. The raid, although successful in itself, precipitated a massive reprisal the following year, after which the Shukriya boasted: "So much food was found with the enemy that the Shukriya herdsmen for a whole year never took any from their own houses but lived on the spoils they had captured."[10]

The Batahin were expelled from the last surviving portions of their *dar* and driven back on the Nile, "taking refuge with the `Abdallab and Hamaj kingdom."[11] Having been robbed of their wealth and expelled from their lands, the Batahin fought back as best they could: "From that date the Batahin became the most inveterate cattle thieves in the Sudan and no tribe was safe from their depredations."[12] In 1217/1802-1803 the Shukriya struck again at one group of Batahin refugees encamped on the Nile at Shambat; after the massacre, a survivor succeeded in assassinating the Shukriya leader, Abu Sinn.[13] Meanwhile, the indiscriminate raiding of the Batahin had earned them a collection of new enemies, and by the opening of the raiding season of 1218/1803-1804 the heirs of Abu Sinn had organized them into a formidable alliance; the Shukriya, Kamilab, Marghumab, Juhayna, Bidayriya, and Bisharin all rode out against the Batahin.[14] These events were sensational enough to arouse the central government to a belated attempt to defend its remaining eastern subjects; the new regent `Adlan took measures "to shut off the Shukriya from grain until they obeyed him."[15] But the regent fell within weeks, and the Shukriya did not obey.

A significant epilogue—for the feud simmered on for many years—occurred in 1233/1817-1818, when `Ali walad Birayr of the Batahin waylaid and killed Hammad Abu Sinn and then sought refuge with *makk* Nimr of Shandi.[16] The Batahin, who had helped Nimr in his hour of need and provided him with his first wife, held strong claims upon him, yet Nimr now favored a wife of the Abu Sinn family; when the Shukriya arrived *en masse* at the edge of town to

demand that the killer be handed over to them, the *makk* faced an acute conflict between incompatible knightly values. The episode is noteworthy for the polemical poetry it engendered. Thus Nimr's court poet urged him to protect his guest:

> You Sa`dab drink strong beer and feast on the flesh of the breastbone;
> Your *faqihs* sprinkle sugar on their porridge.
> Now either mount your warhorse and let the men follow you,
> Or turn *faqih* and let Wad Murtada' teach you the Qur'an![17]

In the end the fugitive himself resolved Nimr's dilemma by fleeing elsewhere, and the willingness of the riverain lord to defend his eastern subjects was not put to the test.

South of the Batahin the peoples who lived between the Shukriya and the river were more numerous, better protected by the central government, and capable of a stronger resistance; nevertheless, their experience bore many similarities to that of their unfortunate northern neighbors. The tribal histories of the Kawahla and Khawalda, for example, both begin with a chronologically revealing assertion of their loyalty to the Hamaj government, followed by tales of war with the Shukriya. The Kawahla were pushed to the periphery of the Shukriya sphere of influence, some northward down the Atbara River and others westward against the Blue Nile or beyond.[18] The Khawalda recalled that they had been expelled from the Butana in the days of the regent Nasir and were grateful to him for granting them lands on the Blue Nile;[19] their fellow refugees, the Blue Nile Kawahla, were less pleased with this arrangement, and the two tribes struggled against each other and their immediate neighbors for control of the lands of refuge along the river which unhappy circumstances obliged them to share.[20] Among the neighbors of these refugees were the Halawin, who also entered recorded history during the time of the regent Nasir: "The Halowin obtained from them [the rulers of Sinnar] the rights to all their land and at the height of their power Qasim ruled over the Halowin with his headquarters at Timeid."[21] Shaykh Qasim, a contemporary of the regent Nasir, issued a document in 1204/1789-1790.[22]

From the approximate latitude of Sinnar southward the numerous and powerful peoples east of the Blue Nile were capable of resisting the pressure of the Shukriya, and the central government sought allies among them against the new power in the east. Political authority in the area was concentrated in the closely intermarried elites of the `Arakiyin, holy men of Abu Haraz, and the *makks* of the eastern Rufa`a.[23] The ruling family of the Rufa`a were known as the Abu Jinn, whose forefather Musa had come to power following the Ethiopian war of 1744-1745 under circumstances described in Part I.[24] They constituted unsuccessful rivals to the family of `Ali "Abu Hunayk" for the provincial throne of al-Bahr, and wars between the two factions became

particularly bitter during the days of the last *manjil* of al-Bahr, Muhammad Kamtur.[25] A complicating factor in the political life of the region was a claim to overlordship by the `Abdallab, which may have dated back to the days of Shaykh `Ajib the Great, a figure of the early seventeenth century.[26] The *makk* of Dabarki on the Dinder, the urban center of the eastern Rufa`a *dar*, seems to have held a seat at the court of Qarri.[27] During the reign of the `Abdallab *manjil* `Abd Allah b. `Ajib (1798-1800), Shaykh Ahmad b. al-Radi of the eastern Rufa`a, a grandson of Musa "Abu Jinn," was invested as Shaykh of Dabarki.[28] This arrangement must have seemed threatening to the regent Idris and his ally Muhammad Kamtur, for with the fall of the *manjil* `Abd Allah in the northern campaign of 1800-1802 the office of Shaykh of Dabarki vanished forever from government charters, and the sons of Shaykh Ahmad, Rajab and Abu Rish, were thereafter more commonly to be found in the Ethiopian borderlands at the southern extremity of the Rufa`a *dar*.[29] The regent Idris or his immediate successors sought to fill this power vacuum by appealing to the `Arakiyin, and particularly to their prominent secular leader, Muhammad b. `Ali al-`Araki.[30] The regent had Sultan Ranfa issue a grant of lands and privilege to Shaykh Muhammad,[31] and at some point during the next decade he was made the new *manjil* of the eastern province of Bayla.[32] Thus an age which had begun with the cession of al-Taka to a tribal chief ended with the gift of a second eastern province to an eminent but defenseless holy man.

In Gubba, the southernmost district of Sinnar east of the Blue Nile, the ruling family at the time of the Hamaj coup traced its descent from Shaykh `Ajib the Great; the incumbent *manjil* gave his name and lineage as Wida`a b. Ahmad b.Yusuf b. Shahir b. `Ajib. In Gubba as in many other parts of Sinnar the Hamaj coup seems to have brought about a change in local government. Shaykh Wida`a, it was said, gave refuge to one `Ajab, a son of Badi IV, and gave him his daughter in marriage. When King Badi and `Ajab were killed, possibly by the Hamaj, Wida`a was deposed in favor of `Ajab's son Hammad, who founded a line of *manjils* of Gubba destined to endure into the twentieth century. The last precolonial ruler of the family was Hamdan b. Abu Shok b. Ibrahim b. Nur b. Hammad.[33]

While the Shukriya incorporated remnants of the peoples they conquered into their own tribal structure, some of their victims preferred flight; therefore, a common theme in the history of the period was the escape westward across the Blue Nile of these shattered elements of defeated tribes. Some Batahin refugees, for example, were given land in the Gezira north of Sinnar;[34] the Dubasin, incriminated as instigators of the Shukriya-Batahin "War of the Camel-Saddle" early in the nineteenth century, fled across the river and were granted lands along the White Nile in the western Gezira.[35] Some sections of the Kawahla did not settle permanently along the Blue Nile but migrated on westward into Kordofan.[36] Following the sack of Arbaji, some of the people of the *manjil* Shanbul, thereafter known as the Shanabla, also sought their fortunes west of the White Nile.[37] The most prominent émigrés, however, were

the original casualties of the Shukriya ascendancy, the Bidayriya and Rikabiyin; although Shukriya tradition pursued their defeated foes no farther west than Abu Haraz,[38] it is known from other sources that following the Battle of Mandara the sympathetic Hamaj government passed them quickly through the Gezira and on into northern Kordofan, where a distinguished future awaited them.[39]

During the last quarter of the eighteenth century the Keira sultanate of Dar Fur executed a geopolitical *volte-face*. Sultans Muhammad Tayrab (1752-1753 to 1785-1786), `Abd al-Rahman (1787-1788 to 1803), and Muhammad al-Fadl (1803-1838) turned away from their predecessors' historical preoccupation with the provinces west of Jabal Marra and the rival sultanate of Wadai beyond the western frontier; symbolic of Dar Fur's new eastward orientation was the establishment of a permanent capital at the modern al-Fashir east of Jabal Marra in about 1206/1791-1792.[40] The reorientation of Dar Fur facilitated its exploitation of the weakness of Sinnar. In 1785-1786 Sultan Tayrab invaded and definitively annexed the province of Kordofan, a region long disputed between the two kingdoms and the base from which the sultans `Isawi and Hashim of the Kordofan Musabba`at had periodically attempted to reassert their claim to the throne of Dar Fur itself.[41] As Kordofan was large and comparatively remote from the historical heartlands of Dar Fur, the Keira sultans were obliged to delegate a substantial degree of autonomy to the governors they appointed to the province. Following the conquest of 1785-1786 they divided Kordofan into a southern and a northern administration; the southern governors were Muhammad Kurra (1788-1796) and Dokumi (1799-1803); their northern counterparts were Ibrahim Ramad (1788-1796) and the *maqdum* Musallim (1796-1803). In 1893 Musallim assumed authority over a unified Keira Kordofan until the Turkish conquest of 1821.[42]

The Keira occupation of Kordofan inextricably involved Dar Fur in an established network of relationships which bound the province to the northern riverain districts of Sinnar. To adopt a long historical perspective, the regions shared a common heritage of Nubian cultural origin,[43] a bond periodically renewed in more recent times by migration from the land-hungry districts of the Nile into the vast expanses of the west and south. In the later eighteenth century, Dongolawi Nubian was spoken at Jabal Haraza[44] and perhaps throughout the north Kordofan hills,[45] while the northern settlers at Bara, El Obeid, the oases of the Khayran, and elsewhere formed a very influential political community whose good- or ill-will could significantly influence the success or failure of any Kordofan government.[46] At the time of the Keira conquest, most members of this community were relatively recent immigrants who retained close kinship ties to families on the Nile in the lands of Dongola, the Shaiqiya, or the Ja`aliyin. Another important link between Kordofan and the northern riverain provinces of Sinnar was the dependence of the fuel-impoverished north upon Kordofanian iron. The ore deposits of the northern hills had been exploited since antiquity,[47] and although the local manufacture of iron

declined under a flood of foreign imports during the later nineteenth century, even as late as 1912 a Sudanese geographer of the Nubian-speaking riverain districts would identify Jabal Haraza (admittedly, in retrospect) as the best-known source of swords, lances, knives, axes, hoes, machetes, and throwing-blades.[48] The actual technique of iron production was observed northwest of El Obeid in 1875 by Ernst Marno:

> The inhabitants of this region are Jawama`a, and they obtain iron in primitive fashion from a brown ore found in the area. They erect conical furnaces about one meter in height from clay-like earth. The firing is accelerated by means of two bellows at the base; they consist of deep basin-shaped clay pots with a nozzle, over which a goat-skin is stretched loosely. The ore is mixed with charcoal of *hashab*-wood [*acacia verek*] and poured into the furnace. The metal that gathers at the bottom is a rather impure product, which is reworked into *malot* [weeding-machetes], knives, lance-heads and the like. This refining of iron takes place only during the dry season of the year, for the furnaces must dry out thoroughly for a long time before their use, which cannot take place during the rainy season.[49]

The regional exchange between Kordofan and the northern Nile in commodities such as iron and dates was conducted along a comparatively easy caravan route which debouched on the Nile at al-Dabba.[50] This entrepot developed at the southwestern extremity of the Nile bend in a small, ethnically mixed, and politically neutral zone situated between the larger adjoining districts of Dongola and the Shaiqiya—a center of commercial acumen under the protective patronage of several religious families. The new Keira rulers of Kordofan probably realized that the route to the Nile also offered a potential outlet for exports to Egypt and the wider world—for in addition to the traditional Sudanic commodities of slaves, ivory, and gold, Kordofan supplied a superior variety of gum Arabic in an age when the international demand for that resource was beginning to grow rapidly. However, the outlet to the world market through al-Dabba was dominated by families of private merchants whose good will was essential to the security of Keira rule over Kordofan; the Fur authorities there never attempted to assert a monopolistic royal control over the trade, and in the meantime the regulated sultanic commerce from Dar Fur to Egypt through the western desert along the "Forty-Days' Road" retained its preeminence. Many individuals of northern Nile valley origin, however, took service as merchants with the Keira sultans and achieved prominence in the royal caravan trade along the western route.[51]

Among the motives for the Keira conquest of Kordofan was a desire to eliminate the perennially troublesome Sultan Hashim of the Kordofan Musabba`at, who like his forefathers had used the province as a base from which to grasp at the Keira throne. It was said that one Keira governor was sent to Kordofan with instructions to pursue Hashim even to Egypt, and while that particularly dramatic course of action did not prove necessary, many of the measures under-

taken by the Keira in Kordofan and among the riverain districts of Sinnar may be understood as a systematic attempt to bring low the leader of the Musabba`at by undermining his political organization.

Northern Kordofan had long been known as the land of the Fazara, a term whose precise political content is uncertain; Egyptian traders of olden times seem to have employed it as a general geographical expression for southern lands west of the Nile,[52] while in more recent western Sudanese vernacular usage it has served as a generic term for camel nomads.[53] Perhaps it would be best to visualize the Fazara as a large tribe composed of diverse constituent subgroups. A brief but significant insight concerning conditions in 1773 may be found in Bruce's passing reference to the Fazara, Banu Jarrar, and Kababish; at that time it would seem that a group known as the Fazara still held a prominent position among the northwestern nomads, but other groups, specifically the Banu Jarrar and the Kababish, were powerful enough to deserve a parallel reference.[54] In the years to follow the Banu Jarrar would be known as the foremost direct political heirs of the Fazara, and the Kababish—generally recognized as a new tribe of the eighteenth century—as their arch-rivals for domination of northern Kordofan.[55] Little direct evidence concerning relations between the Kababish and the Keira administration in Kordofan is at hand. However, one may infer indirectly from two types of circumstantial evidence that the governors Ibrahim and Musallim probably supported and encouraged the rise of the Kababish.[56] This interpretation is plausible in the first instance because the dramatic success enjoyed by the Kababish under Keira overlordship could scarcely have been achieved in the face of official hostility; secondly, the correspondingly descendant fortunes of the Banu Jarrar are indisputably linked to the failing career of Sultan Hashim. Like the Fazara they supplanted, the Kababish were a large and heterogeneous tribe; unlike the Fazara, however, many of the diverse constituent subgroups within the Kababish tribe were refugees from the troubles east of the Nile. The Nurab clan, the leadership around which the tribe rose to prominence during the Keira period, were Rikabiya refugees who came west after the Battle of Mandara; other immigrant groups included fragments of the Bidayriya, Kawahla, Rufa`a, Shanabla, Dubayna, and Batahin.[57] The Kababish also absorbed diverse local groups—including, in the end, the surviving Fazara.

The northern riverain districts of Dongola and the Shaiqiya country, separated from the rest of the Funj kingdom by the Bayuda desert and the rugged country of the Fourth Cataract, had long served as a refuge for unsuccessful rebels; the most recent of these had been the `Abdallab *manjil* Hammad al-Simayh, who withdrew into the Shaiqiya country following the failure of the revolt of 1705-1706.[58] Perhaps more by choice than necessity the northern lords of the Hamaj period had maintained an active involvement in the affairs of the central government; thus, although Muhammad al-Amin would confess to Bruce (perhaps with intent to deceive) that he exercised little effective authority over the north,[59] his retinue of loyal noblemen at about that time neverthe-

less included the *arbab* Muhammad, son of Shaykh Hammad al-Simayh.[60] With the subsequent revolt of Sultan `Adlan the heirs of Hammad al-Simayh—henceforth known as the "`Adlanab"—undertook to conquer Dongola on behalf of the royalist cause and imposed their candidate as *makk*. They were opposed, however, by a pro-Hamaj faction under the rival Hannikab *makks* of Maqashi, who seized the centrally located entrepot of al-Dabba and about half the adjacent districts of Dongola and the Shaiqiya; the `Adlanab retained only the upstream half of the Shaiqiya country and the downstream half of Dongola, while their client *makk* of Dongola withdrew from his capital, which was occupied by the Hannikab, and took up residence in the far north at Argo.[62] Such was the situation in about 1790, when Muhammad al-Amin could draw upon the aid of the *makk* of Argo and send an expedition—in the event, an unsuccessful one—against the (Hannikab) *makks* of the Shaiqiya,[63] The `Adlanab flirtation with the royalist party seems to have survived the death of Muhammad al-Amin, for a grandson of Hammad al-Simayh still attended the *manjil* `Abd Allah as late as 1798;[64] thereafter, it would seem, the `Adlanab abandoned what was clearly a lost cause.

The lords of the northern riverain districts shared with their emigrant subjects and compatriots in Kordofan a strong vested interest in maintaining good relations with the western government. In view of the turbulent course of western politics, however, this simple course of action was by no means easy to execute. As long as the Hamaj controlled Kordofan the northern rulers seem to have supported them,[65] but the riverain lords found little difficulty in shifting their allegiance to Sultan Hashim after 1773; Shaiqiya and Danagla raiders even joined the commander of the Musabba`at in his attacks on Dar Fur.[66] From the perspective of the northern riverain lords in the year 1786, Hashim would have been seen as the effective ruler of Kordofan over most of the preceding thirteen years.[67] The initial Keira conquest of Kordofan drove Hashim to the Nile confluence and subsequent pressures impelled him south. The slow passage of the western lord up the river through the bitterly divided provinces of Sinnar over the next decade ignited a long series of small but fierce local explosions from Dongola to Aba Island and left behind rents in the political fabric of Sinnar which the Keira undertook to fill.

Hashim's first place of refuge was near al-Dabba in the territory controlled by the Hannikab *makk* Sabil, to whom he married one of his daughters. From this base Hashim returned to Kordofan during the Keira succession dispute that followed the death of Tayrab, and he held out there for several years. With the reconsolidation of Keira authority over Kordofan in 1206/1791-1792, however, Hashim returned to the Hannikab, to whom he cemented his ties by marrying a second daughter to *makk* Sibayr. At this juncture two important motives inspired Hashim to strike southward. First, his Banu Jarrar supporters were badly mauled in battle, and the Kababish—presumably with Keira backing—laid increasingly ambitious claims to the old Fazara *dar* in northern Kordofan, within which the Banu Jarrar were most emphatically no longer

welcome. Second, during Hashim's recent absence in Kordofan, Muhammad al-Amin had sent his sons from the south with an army against the Hannikab; although they were repulsed, the threat posed by the royalists—who included not only the formidable *manjil* but also the Ja`aliyin *makk* Muhammad walad Nimr and Sibayr's local northern rivals the `Adlanab and the *makk* of Argo—could not be ignored. Moreover, the conveniently timed death of Muhammad al-Amin, the subsequent withdrawal of the regent Nasir from the north, and the temporary anarchy at al-Halfaya in 1206/1791-1792 offered a propitious moment for a counterstrike.[68]

The target selected by Hashim and his Shaiqiya allies was Muhammad walad Nimr's now isolated district of the Ja`aliyin, within which they could also expect to enjoy the support of a fifth column loyal to the exiled *makk* Sa`d. *Makk* Sibayr's son Hammad led the invasion; the Shaiqiya prince occupied the west bank lands of the Ja`aliyin as far as a point opposite Shandi; as they advanced farther south, however, the invaders soon clashed with *makk* Sulayman walad Nayil of the Jamu`iya, who rode north against them. The encounter was inconclusive, but it set a precedent for events to follow.[69] Hashim established a new capital (*matamma* in the idiom of the western Sudan) directly opposite Shandi, and from there he spun out his intrigues over the next five years.[70] He refrained from further antagonizing the Awlad Nimr and did not invite the return of *makk* Sa`d. A prosperous town sprang up around Hashim's *matamma*, and this survived the western lord's departure; by 1802, when *makk* Musa`ad sought refuge there, al-Matamma had taken on an autonomous middle-class life of its own.

Meanwhile, in 1796 Hashim unleashed a major attack upon Kordofan. He was successful enough to occasion the recall of the northern governor Ibrahim, but his invasion collapsed under the blows of Ibrahim's successor, Musallim. Significantly, reports reaching the Nile credited Musallim's victory to the Kababish.[71] Hashim retreated to al-Matamma and launched a vigorous diplomatic offensive; he visited Shandi, the Shaiqiya country, and Dongola, forging a formidable alliance which included the dispossessed Awlad Muhammad al-Amin of Qarri, warriors of the `Uniya section of the Shaiqiya, and his more traditional western supporters, the "Musabba`at, Kunjara, Fazara, Hamar, and Banu Jarrar."[72] Before the end of the year, Hashim and his allies were ready to move south again. The lands toward which Hashim cast his eye were dominated by *makk* Babikr of the Jamu`iya. Endorsed by the Hamaj and unruffled by their meek puppet `Abdallab *manjil* Badi in al-Halfaya, in 1796 *makk* Babikr's writ ran southeastward to embrace what had formerly been the Funj province of Alays, and westward to include Jabal Haraza and Jabal Abu Tibr on the edge of Kordofan. The experience of *makk* Sulayman, his predecessor, had placed him on his guard against Hashim; moreover, he enjoyed excellent relations with the Kababish.[73] Yet, *makk* Babikr's Hassaniya vassals, accustomed to a prominent role in the older province of Alays, chafed at their present subordination and welcomed the invaders from the north.[74] The two armies met near

Jabal Hunayk west of Omdurman in a hard-fought battle which each side would claim as a victory; it was said, however, that *makk* Babikr's northern vassals, the Jimi`ab, suffered conspicuous losses.[75] After the battle Hashim, the Awlad al-Amin, and the Banu Jarrar would ride on south into the Gezira, while the Greater Jamu`iya shaykhdom of *makk* Babikr was never to be revived.

The regent Nasir, in his younger days, had served under Rajab in Kordofan, and his response to the Keira occupation of the province at the dawn of his administration displayed a rather sophisticated appreciation of western politics. There were some historical grounds for optimism, for if the previous rulers of Sinnar had already lost Kordofan twice to western invaders, they had also twice regained it. It had been found useful in the past, when Kordofan lay in hostile hands, to maintain at least a small pied à terre on the west bank of the White Nile; thus *makk* Sa`d of the Ja`aliyin had defended such a position for Sinnar between 1186/1772-1773 and 1194/1780 while Hashim occupied the core of the province.[76] It is therefore comprehensible, though not without irony, that Nasir seems to have chosen the occasion of the Keira conquest of Kordofan to revivify briefly the defunct court office of "Shaykh of Kordofan."[77] It is obvious that the new *manjils* `Ali walad al-Nur and Sa`id walad `Ali did not govern all of Kordofan from 1791 to 1799, but in view of events to follow it is quite likely that they held some lands south of the enlarged Jamu`iya *dar* and west of the White Nile along the southern flank of the Keira sphere of influence. Moreover, although the story is known only imperfectly through remote Fur sources, it would appear that Nasir cleverly exploited the personal weaknesses of Muhammad Kurra, the excessively ambitious Keira governor of southern Kordofan:

> He [Kurra] established himself and made himself and the extreme east [of Dar Fur] more independent than [Sultan] Abd er-Rahman could allow .... At last [Kurra] built for himself on the other side of the Nile [that is, east of the White Nile, within the zone controlled by Nasir] a permanent residence, where he accumulated considerable treasure, which he placed in the custody of his slave Asham. The king observed the conduct of his representative with growing mistrust, and at last sent the Faqih Tahir to the sultan of Funji in Sennar [to the regent Nasir], inciting him against the disloyal official, and leaving him a completely free hand. The sultan [the regent Nasir] accordingly attacked Kurra's strong fortress and plundered his treasure.[78]

In short, Nasir seems to have encouraged a schism between Kurra and his overlord, winning the Keira sultan's approval for subsequent attacks upon the governor of southern Kordofan. One may imagine that Nasir would have watched the varying fortunes and southward progression of Hashim with great interest.

As Hashim and his army approached the Nile confluence, Nasir took direct action: "He went out in search of them with troops. He encountered them [after the battle of Jabal Hunayk, nearby] at Siru [on the west bank of the Nile

north of modern Omdurman]. They made a truce and all returned; Hashim and the Awlad al-Amin entered Sinnar with him, while the Banu Jarrar went their way after receiving presents and robes of honor."[79] After consultation with Nasir in the capital, Hashim went the way of the Banu Jarrar and joined them on the west bank of the White Nile opposite Aba Island, possibly within or adjoining the territory of Nasir's "Shaykh of Kordofan."[80] From this base Hashim raided westward during the next three years; he would live on for half a century in the memory of the Jima`, who lived between the White Nile and the Nuba Mountains, as "Hakem," the wicked "king of Sinnar" who carried off all their horses and camels to break their military power and forbade them to acquire new ones.[81] With the death of Sultan `Abd al-Rahman and the accession of Muhammad al-Fadl in 1215/1800-1801, Hashim summoned his supporters from all quarters for a final assault upon Kordofan. The attack was crushed by the *maqdum* Musallim, newly appointed Keira governor of southern as well as northern Kordofan.[83]

Hashim personally survived the defeat of 1801, but realizing that his cause was lost in the south, he withdrew down the Nile toward his former base at al-Matamma. The *maqdum* Musallim, under specific orders to eliminate Hashim once and for all, took steps to prevent his reemergence as a threat to Kordofan by extending Fur authority eastward to his refuges on the Nile. In the immediate aftermath of the decisive battle it would seem that either some of Hashim's own forces or their Keira pursuers fell afoul of the new Hamaj regent Idris, who at the time of Hashim's defeat was engaged in the northern campaign of 1800-1802. As the Chronicler reported the incident: "In it [1216/1801-1802, the regent's brother and general] `Adlan crossed to the west [bank of the Nile] and was victorious over a king of the Fur named `Isawi and took him prisoner. He returned to Sinnar with him, and he died there."[83] The regent himself described the apparently unexpected encounter with greater detail in a letter to the leaders of al-Damir:

> We set out from the north . . . . The party was exhausted, so we sent out `Adlan with the warriors to the west [bank] to the subjects who are there, saying he should bring [back] something [provisions] in two or three days. Briefly, [some] Kunjara, the people of `Isawi, encountered him on the road; they closed with them and by the grace of the Lord of the Universe, were victorious over them. They killed them with a great slaughter and captured their *malik*, `Isawi. The dead among their other *maliks* were twenty-two *makks*, and a great crowd of the common people were killed. [Those who were] captured from the freemen—without [that is, not counting] the slaves—were two hundred. Our warriors, God be Praised, are safe, and our horses are safe. Only four men of the Kunjara escaped.[84]

As Hashim escaped northward the Keira forces closed in behind and occupied his base on the White Nile opposite Aba Island. Musallim permitted those of the Banu Jarrar who had not fled with Hashim to remain in the area, but he planted

a colony of his own supporters in their midst, granting the newcomers specific rights to the fertile and well-drained qoz lands of the area, the tracts best suited to cultivation. The beneficiaries of Musallim's grant were the refugee Shanabla, who since their flight to Kordofan following the destruction of Arbaji had lived as sojourners in the lands of the Dar Hamid and Kababish; now a charter from the Keira government gave them a claim to lands of their very own.[85] Musallim also reestablished the traditional rights of other tribes resident between the river and the Nuba Mountains, who like the Jima` had been battered for several years by Hashim's raids.[86] As Musallim consolidated his grip northward along the western bank of the White Nile, he seems to have made awards analogous to his grant to the Shanabla in favor of a whole sequence of smaller tribes; these included, in addition to the Shanabla themselves, the Ja`afra, Duwayh, Shuwayhat, some locally resident sections of the Kawahla, the Masallamiya, and Ja`aliyin, and, in the north, the Majidiya and Kurtan. He organized this congeries into a single administrative unit under Shaykh Adam Hammad Dud of the Duwayh. The district, called Sharq al-`Aqaba and directly responsible to the provincial government in Bara, extended from Aba Island to the blind arm of the White Nile called al-Tura al-Khadra' at the latitude of modern Wad Madani.[87] Moreover, it was apparently during the administration of Musallim, and with his blessing, that pioneering groups of westerners, notably the Dar Muharrib, crossed the White Nile eastward and began to stake their claims in the Gezira at the expense of the traditional subjects of Sinnar.[88]

From the perspective of the regent Idris, the rapidly changing situation on the White Nile demanded prompt countermeasures. Having reasserted his own authority over the `Abdallab, Idris no longer had any incentive to maintain as a counterweight the enlarged Jamu`iya *dar*, the sacrifice of which, in turn, permitted the reconstitution of the traditional Funj province of Alays.[89] (Nasir's ephemeral shaykhdom of "Kordofan" vanished). The tangible result of this reorganization was to unleash the Hassaniya. Over the next decades their shaykhs, probably led by Hamaj troops,[90] struck southward, overrunning their upstream neighbors the Husaynat and driving a spearhead deep into Musallim's new White Nile district. The provincial capital of Alays itself was restored to Sinnar, and Musallim's more northerly subjects were driven westward, away from the river.[91] The impetus of Keira expansion on the White Nile was contained.

Meanwhile, Hashim lived, and Musallim was not idle. In the far north the Keira government sought to improve its relations with the riverain lords of the Nile bend and to woo them away from their traditional ties to the former rulers of Kordofan. Illustrative of this policy was the generous present bestowed by Sultan Muhammad al-Fadl upon one of the religious notables of the al-Dabba area: "Sulayman b. Zakariya' al-Baza`a departed from us on Monday, the first day of Safar, for your house with presents for you, to assist the mosque [and] to feed the poor for the sake of God Most High; [namely] sixty head of slaves, one hundred forty cattle, four horses, five camels [camel-loads] of honey, eighty

mithqals of gold, and two saddles of brocade, not ridden upon."[92] It is probable that other notables, and secular lords not least, were also the recipients of similar Keira largesse.. A second factor that favored the improvement of relations between the governments of Kordofan and the Nile bend was the rise in fortune of the `Adlanab under *makk* Shawish after 1800 at the expense of Hashim's former allies, the Hannikab. No longer driven by stronger southern exponents of the royalist cause, the `Adlanab made local peace with their local rivals and won them over to a program of conquest, both north into Egyptian Nubia and south across the Bayuda.[93] By 1820 *makk* Shawish, then in the prime of life, enjoyed an informal yet indisputable precedence over Hashim's aging son-in-law Sibayr, but did not contest his right to the lands of the Hannikab.[94] Sibayr, for his part, allowed Shawish to absent himself from the Shaiqiya country for long periods without undermining his local preeminence.[95] Shawish's ultimate ambition may be inferred from his choice of targets—al-Halfaya. By 1820 his raiders totally dominated the western bank of the Nile from al-Matamma to the confluence, and they also established bases on the more fertile eastern bank, where they lived for years at a time.[96] His attacks on the `Abdallab capital itself exacted a heavy toll. In short, there can be little doubt that the heir of Hammad al-Simayh intended to recapture his forbearer's crown.[95] Shawish's road to the `Abdallab throne, however, led directly through the last refuge of Sultan Hashim; this time, the Shaiqiya would meet the Musabba`at as foes.[98]

At the time of his defeat in 1801 Hashim had been sultan of the Kordofan Musabba`at for more than thirty years, and thereafter the range of his ambitions seems to have declined with his failing fortunes and advancing years.[99] During the last decade of his life his activities were apparently confined to the peripheries of his final refuge in the Bayuda desert. Although fated to end his days as one among many local contenders for power in the fractured districts of the middle Nile, seldom deemed worthy of notice by the chroniclers of riverain events, Hashim retained his resilience and political panache to the last. In typical fashion, he made marriage alliances with local leaders,[100] and in 1897 the "Fazara"—presumably the remnants of his followers—rode out of the north to join briefly the general turmoil of the civil war at the Nile confluence.[101] Hashim's arch-enemy during this period was *makk* Shawish, whose Bidayriya vassals (with the acquiescence of Musallim) struck south and seized Jabal Haraza from the Jamu`iya and also occupied the other north Kordofan hills as far west as Kaja and Katul.[102] Shawish had also established himself as the senior partner of *makk* Musa`ad of al-Matamma and his protector against the ambitions of *makk* Nimr of Shandi; this arrangement left Shawish free to attack the `Abdallab at the Nile confluence without foes on his left flank. Hashim, feeling himself "hard pressed" by the Shaiqiyya,[103] seems to have retaliated by organizing a strike against Shawish's ally, *makk* Musa`ad, an event which the distant Chronicler interpreted in tribal terms:

> In the year 1226/1811-1812 . . . occurred the battle between the Jimi`ab and the Sa`adab, in which the *arbab* Ban al-Naqa was killed. . . . There were killed with him all the *awlad al-firash* [Sa`dab princely heirs] . . . . The Sa`dab were broken, and from that time influence and power passed to the Jimi`ab; all the tribes and authorities stood in awe of them. [104]

As a result of this war the power of the Jimi`ab was greatly enhanced and their heads were raised over the kings of the Jamu`iya and Walad `Ajib.[105]

However impressed these lords may have been, Shawish was not to be deterred and redoubled his assault upon the faction of Hashim. The old sultan was "obliged to retire to Shendy, and to put himself under the protection of Nimr, the Mek of that place, by whom he was afterward killed, having engaged with the Mek's brothers in a conspiracy against him."[106] These events were still fresh news when Burckhardt visited Shandi in 1814. Shawish and Musa`ad settled Hashim's surviving supporters along the river near al-Matamma. Although they permitted the Musabba`at to retain a separate corporate identity under the leadership of Hashim's son `Umar, they reduced them to subject commoners and forced them to cultivate.[107] Perhaps it would have consoled the old western warrior to have known that the Shaiqiya, within the lifetime of Shawish, would face a similar destiny.

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The Days of Lord Tayfara

The maintenance of order and conduct of government in Sinnar had always relied upon the services of trustworthy slaves who staffed the bureaucracies of the national and provincial capitals and fleshed out the ranks of the military corps. As long as the governmental structure of Sinnar remained substantially intact, no one had to preoccupy himself with the political opinion of slaves, for their responses both to their betters and to social inferiors were stereotyped and predictable. In the conduct of relations with their superiors, the slaves of state were docile in the aggregate and obsequious as individuals; thus Bruce would observe that the soldiers of the garrison settlements around Sinnar in 1773 "are very quiet . . . declaring always for their master, that is, the great one set over them.[1] Krump described the promotion of a slave official at a provincial court:

> On the first of August [1701] the Shaykh [of Qarri] clothed beautifully one of his slaves who had been very faithful to him, and made him *shaykh* over a certain village. He summoned the slave, and in the midst of a great throng, gave a speech in praise of him because of his faithful service. He concluded with words to the effect that he would always reward service such as his, but would punish those who did wrong. He then had him clothed in a very beautiful silk embroidered shirt such as they wear, and he girded him with a silk sash. He then put a sword into his hand, which is a sign of authority. After this the slave at once threw himself to the earth on his knees, and touched the ground about thirty times with his forehead. With the sword in his hand he made about a hundred crooked leaps and clownish bends. Finally he called to those present to rise . . . . He then gave a speech in praise of the Shaykh [of Qarri], during the whole duration of which those standing around were asked if it was not true that the Shaykh [of Qarri] was the most powerful, most just, and richest, along with a hundred other titles of honor of the same sort which he gave him. It was a very long speech, and to each inquiry those standing responded affirmatively.[2]

The posture assumed by the slaves of state in their dealings with inferiors, in complete contrast, was one of overbearing arrogance. Burckhardt felt that "among the plagues that await the traveler in Berber, the insolence of the slaves is the most intolerable,"[3] while their patronizing attitude stimulated Bruce's satirical instincts: "The first title of nobility in this country is that of slave . . . Upon any appearance of your undervaluing a man at Sennaar, he instantly asks

you if you know who he is? If you don't know that he is a slave? In the same idea of aristocratical arrogance, as would be said in England upon an altercation, do you not know to whom you are speaking? Do you know that I am a peer?"[4] These were the normal patterns of behavior by the slaves of state in Sinnar, and they manifested a politically healthy flow of authority from the lords to the subjects via the slaves.

Then the days of dissolution set in; no principle or institution of government was secure from armed assault by the ambitious warlords, who greatly augmented the number of slave soldiers and wielded them as expendable pawns in an increasingly devious and futile struggle for power. When the point in the history of Sinnar was reached at which all political questions must be solved through recourse to armed slaves, the political opinions of those slaves inevitably became a matter of decisive importance. While this crisis was long in the building, it erupted into the open in 1803 following the death of the regent Idris. It is perhaps not surprising that when the military slaves came to realize they held the ultimate power in Sinnar they did not always make wise use of it; rather, they tended to exercise the profession for which they had been trained—warfare. It is most unusual that one of them, a man named Tayfara, possessed the strategic insight and political acumen required to bring an end to the civil wars and restore to the kingdom a degree of order which the Hamaj themselves had proven incapable of defending.

Tayfara was a military slave in one of the corps of cavalrymen who served the Hamaj regents. As a man who reached maturity in the days of Nasir and Idris, it is possible that he might have been captured as a boy by Rajab during one of his "blockades" of the Nuba Mountains while on campaign in Kordofan. One may imagine that Tayfara's memories of childhood might perhaps have resembled those of Dgalo Dgondan Aré, a Nuba boy of the next generation who, like Tayfara, was enslaved and removed from his home as a lad. For Dgalo, as a young adult in distant exile, the homeland lived on his recollection as a miniature realm of remote and diminutive scenes and figures—little bejeweled kinglets on horseback, emerald terraces of young grain under a cloudless sun, endless gray torrents of the season of rain, punctuated by lightning, solemn processions of hide-clad priestesses who spoke for the hidden python, grim fortifications of boulders set amid the rocky crags of hilltops, and a primeval forest of exotic fruits and talking animals—the whole glowing with the preternatural light that guards the door between memory and dreams. The most important legacy that Dgalo carried away from his native land, however, was not this brilliant little half-visionary lost world of childhood, but rather a series of folk tales which delineated his native culture's principles of moral conduct. Neither small nor remote, they taught the virtues of courage before the enemy, compassion for the weak, respect for the wise, and reverence toward the Almighty; they warned against the destructive consequences of arrogance and pride, praised moderation in the powerful, and bade every man gird himself to endure stoically the blows of fate.[5] Perhaps there is some ground for the speculation that Tayfara too

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may have carried with him a similar cultural legacy from youthful days before he bore an Arab slave-name. The free men who recorded the events of Tayfara's day, although they poured hatred and scorn upon the generality of military slaves, grudgingly exempted Tayfara from their opprobrium because of his unusual personal virtues. The inner code by which Tayfara seems to have lived could not easily have been derived from his immediate adult environment.

In Tayfara's day the slave soldiers of Sinnar formed cohorts or generations, groups of men who not only shared the same master, but also were about the same age, had been captured at about the same time, and often came from the same cultural background. Not least, they shared the common experience of their service together, and these bonds grew stronger over time. The esprit of each squadron was rooted in its feeling of superiority over other units.[6] Long before Tayfara's time the central arsenal of the sultan had ceased to function, and a soldier received his arms as well as his sustenance from the lord who commanded his corps. The physical appearance of a well-run bivouac of Hamaj military slaves was described by Bruce.

> Adelan's [`Adlan walad Subahi] habitation, two or three very considerable houses, of one storey, occupied the middle of a large square, each of whose sides was at least half of an English mile. Instead of a wall to enclose this square, was a high fence or impalement of strong reeds, canes or stalks of dora . . . in fascines strongly joined together by stakes and cords. On the outside of the gate, on each hand, were six houses of slighter construction than the rest; close upon the fence were sheds where the soldiers lay, their horses picqueted before them with their heads turned toward the shade, and their food laid before them on the ground; above each soldier's sleeping-place, covered only on the top and open on the sides, were hung a lance, a small oval shield, and a large broad-sword. These, I understood, were chiefly quarters for couriers . . . . Within this gate was a number of horses, with the soldiers' barracks behind them; they were all picqueted in ranks, their faces to their master's barracks . . . . A steel shirt of mail hung upon each man's quarters, opposite to his horse, and by it an antelope's skin, made soft like shamoy, with which it was covered from the dew of the night. A headpiece of copper, without crest or plumage, was suspended by a lace above the shirt of mail, and was the most picturesque part of the trophy. To these was added an enormous broad-sword, in a red leather scabbard; and upon the pummel hung two thick gloves, not divided into fingers as ours, but like hedgers' gloves, their fingers in one poke. They told me, that, within that enclosure . . . there were 400 horses, which, with the riders, and armour complete for each one of them, were all the property of Shekh Adelan [walad Subahi], every horseman being his slave.[7]

As the ability of the government of Sinnar to collect taxes effectively gradually withered during the later eighteenth century, the slave soldiers would perhaps have been the first servants of the government to go hungry had they not pos-

sessed potent although irregular means of self-help. Few, indeed, of the lords of the Heroic Age could prevent their hungry soldiers from looting food, which in the central rainlands was usually stored in clay-lined subterranean pits. The following scenes, recorded in 1840, had been rehearsed many times over the previous half-century.

> Soon there stretched out before us a long wide field full of numerous holes. These seemed, above, one and a half to two feet in diameter; but below, some four or six, with a depth of the same. They were pear-shaped, and are said to be used by the natives to store their grain in . . . . When we arrived at the spot we found all in the fullest activity with hands, bayonets, spears, sabers, hooks, axes, sticks, groping in the pits. As each found anything, in it went to sack, bag or dress, and on horse, camel or ass-back away off with it to camp, and left there; the finder was instantly back again to try his luck once more . . . . Besides the grain, the soldiers found beans, wood, mats, supports for mat huts, and many other things.[8]

The attitude of the commoners who found themselves the victims of such raids is manifest in the literature about the rule of the regent Idris. For example, there was the miracle of the *faqih* al-Hajj Nasir.

> There was a woman living in the village of ʿAwad Allah his brother, and one of the *muqaddams* resolved to rob her. She had a grain pit, and he wanted to strip it—so she informed al-Hajj Nasir. He said to her, "I shall not go to him." But she returned to him a second time, and on the third the *shaykh* arose and stopped at the grain pit. He stamped his foot and said, "Here is the grain pit; let nothing escape from it!" When [the soldier] stepped upon the grain pit he felt a stabbing pain in his leg, which overcame him so that he turned away, and they carried him on an *ʿanqarib*. He died before they reached his house.[9]

Lords of the day made it a policy to loose their hungry squadrons upon the lands of political rivals; thus the doomed Shaykh ʿAbd Allah of Qarri was praised for "the extirpation of the robbers who were known as 'al-ʿAkalit;' he caught them band by band and cut off their heads, and so stamped out theft and robbery in his days."[10] The ʿAkalit, however, were by no means simple robbers, but a foraging corps of the regent's soldiers; the unit long survived Shaykh ʿAbd Allah.[11]

In Bruce's day the lords of the military encampments had still served a central government in the capital city. By the time Tayfara took his place in a squadron, however, it was no longer meaningful to speak of a capital city or a central government; the garrison encampments themselves were the only effective centers of power that survived. Within each camp the fortunes of master and slave became linked ever more closely; indeed, it was dangerous for a lord to distance himself from his armed retainers for any reason. The practical significance of this situation was first appreciated by the regent Nasir's *wazir* Daf

Allah, who laid the groundwork for Nasir's ouster by isolating him from the *muqaddams* who commanded the squadrons; when the moment to strike came, he "went to the troops and conspired with them against [Nasir]."[12] Thereafter, the slaves of Nasir, having tasted power through the overthrow of their master, would remain a political force with which to be reckoned.

The regent Idris died on 10 Jumada II 1218/27 September 1803, and when he had been buried his brother `Adlan succeeded him.[13] The festivities were marred by `Adlan's illness, for at the time of his accession he was suffering from an outbreak of the painful and vexing affliction known in Sinnar as *farandit*. While the people of Sinnar were not aware that the usual source of the ailment was the drinking of parasite-contaminated water, all were familiar with the course of the disease, and a reasonably effective treatment was known. The offending "Guinea worms" began to cause pain as they matured inside the body, usually along the bones of the leg; in due course each gnawed its way to the surface and began to emerge through the skin. The treatment required that as the worm emerged—at the rate of a fraction of an inch a day—it be wound delicately upon a small stick held at all times in close proximity to the wound, and kept moist. Sometimes several weeks were necessary to allow a long worm to emerge alive. If the fragile worm broke off before entirely leaving the body, it died, and a massive infection would follow. The treatment required patience and caution; `Adlan did not leave his capital for almost two months.

`Adlan was not the sole survivor among the eleven sons of Muhammad Abu Likaylik, yet by the time he became regent their ranks were growing thin; Rajab, Nasir and Idris had died as regents, Ibrahim had been killed by Sultan `Adlan, `Ali at Intarahna, and `Isawi by the Shukriyya. Of the survivors, Husayn seems to have been a passive and unassertive individual, Nasr and Qasim had few political ambitions,[14] and `Abd al-`Aziz—if he still lived—was a complete cipher. Under these circumstances `Adlan's incapacity could not fail to stimulate the cupidity of the third generation of Hamaj lords, now entering vigorous maturity. Unlike their fathers, they had never been obliged to submerge their mutual rivalries under a single paternal discipline in the service of an arduous national cause such as the Kordofan war. On the contrary, they shared the increasingly parochial vision of the surrounding tribal chiefs, while indulging themselves in the inherited rivalries of their fathers. In the case of the sons of Nasir, this legacy had already become a poisonous vendetta demanding revenge in blood. If `Adlan fell, the succession would probably go to the one who struck first. During his convalescence the new regent sent a trusted commander to Abu Haraz to contain the Shukriyya, and the officer caught wind of the impending storm. "If you don't come out from Sinnar in Ramadan," he wrote to the regent, "you're as good as dead."[15] In the event, `Adlan did not have even that long to live.

Each regent inherited the slave cohorts of his predecessor.[16] Under ordinary circumstances, upon assuming office he would then collect and train up a new generation of servitors loyal to himself; Idris, however, had not enjoyed

a long enough term of office to accomplish this transition, and the slave units formed during Nasir's administration remained the centerweight of the corps available to his second successor, `Adlan. It is probable that the creation of a new corps of slaves would have been high on `Adlan's agenda, not only because some of Nasir's slaves were advancing in years[17] but also because `Adlan himself, as the commander who had carried out Idris's coup against their late master, may not have been a universally acceptable leader. The most prominent officer among Nasir's slaves was Faraj Allah (he who had held young Badi VI in the saddle on public occasions in Nasir's day), but Tayfara—as subsequent events would prove—also enjoyed considerable influence.

Most of the sons of Abu Likaylik named their eldest sons "Muhammad" in memory of their grandfather, with the result that the third-generation contenders for power were all so named and hence were more commonly known in Sinnar by an idiom identifying them as the sons of their respective fathers. The senior contender was Muhammad the son of Abu Likaylik's eldest son, Rajab, the third Hamaj regent and the first of Abu Likaylik's sons to rule. Wad Rajab was eager but lacked a strong personal following, a deficiency he sought to overcome by allying himself with the powerful *manjil* of al-Bahr, Muhammad Kamtur. Kamtur brought into the alliance the reigning sultan, Ranfa, to some extent a personage of his own creation, and as a prince of the old blood Ranfa enjoyed his own circles of support among royalist sympathizers whom the Chronicler rather ambiguously identified as "Funj."[18] Some of `Adlan's own courtiers, perhaps including those inherited through Idris from his enemy Nasir, became not-so-secret partisans of the conspiracy. It was this hostile alliance of which `Adlan's officers became aware during the regent's incapacity of October-November 1803; fortunately, although `Adlan could not yet move against them, his foes did not yet feel themselves strong enough to strike.

The man most justified in hating `Adlan was the son of his most eminent victim, the late regent Nasir. Wad Nasir chose to live at a discreet distance from the capital at the village of al-Kubur,[19] where he built up a strong military entourage. While Wad Nasir himself was understandably circumspect in expressing his own political sentiments, the general tenor of opinion in his house was voiced openly by his younger brother `Ali, "who was bold and reckless and used to abuse roundly all that `Adlan did."[20] `Ali was a warrior famous for his bravery, and it was said that `Adlan was afraid of showing enmity toward him.[21] As fate would have it, `Ali died during `Adlan's first months of rule, and the wagging tongues of the capital lost no time in accusing the new regent of killing him by poison or witchcraft. Toward the end of November Wad Nasir himself appeared in the capital, complaining that his own house was short of food and making a great show of parsimony at the beginning of Ramadan, a moment when other lords were displaying generosity lavishly. If Wad Nasir's apparent poverty was a ruse, it succeeded; no one prevented him from visiting Wad Rajab and the king. He found that the conspirators had already settled

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upon a time and place for `Adlan's assassination and lacked only a willing leader. Wad Nasir summoned his men.

The regent `Adlan was assassinated on the night of 10 Ramadan 1218/24 December 1803; Wad Nasir led the attack, but Shaykh Kamtur struck the mortal blow. At the bitter end the regent's last defenders were some of the slaves of Nasir, led by Faraj Allah and probably including Tayfara. Although overmanned by the conspirators and unable to save their lord, they did succeed in rescuing the regent's young son, Muhammad [wad] `Adlan, who was wounded but still alive. The defeated party fled north to `Abud. During the days that followed most of Nasir's slaves defected and joined Wad Nasir. Those who remained at `Abud—the senior officers, including Faraj Allah and Tayfara—became the core of a new faction, at the moment a very weak one, controlled by the slaves but implicitly organized around the possible future claims of young Muhammad `Adlan. The prince was in effect a hostage of the slaves; while this dependent status curtailed his own freedom of action, it assured him of the slaves' support against the malice of Wad Rajab and Wad Nasir.

The political consequences of `Adlan's death took shape during the remaining days of Ramadan 1218 (25 December 1803 to 13 January 1804). Wad Rajab lost no time in having himself invested as the new regent and then undertook to free himself from dependence upon his more powerful allies by setting them against one other. The point of Wad Rajab's machinations was not lost on Kamtur, who joined with Sultan Ranfa in preparing for hostilities against the new regent. No dramatic moves on their part were required immediately, however, due to the more conspicuous defection of Wad Nasir; he openly repudiated his allegiance to the conspiracy and extended a welcome to the defeated party of `Adlan, who came from `Abud to join him. Wad Nasir, feeling that he had the upper hand, prepared to strike at Kamtur. As Wad Rajab, Wad Nasir, Ranfa, and Kamtur transformed their respective quarters of the capital city into armed camps, Nasir's former wazir Daf` Allah, whose canny and consistent opportunism made him a reliable political bellwether, abandoned Wad Nasir's faction and disappeared. The outcome of the impending struggle was too close to call.

The four factions came to blows in the *fashir* before the gates of the decaying royal palace on a Thursday in Shawwal 1218 (24 January – 22 February 1804). Wad Rajab, apparently believing that he had won over Sultan Ranfa to his cause, took the initiative by riding out openly against Kamtur; Wad Nasir joined him, while Ranfa held back and did not commit his forces. It was Kamtur's finest hour; he accepted the challenge of the two Hamaj lords and in a fiercely fought day-long battle drove both of them from the field. Wad Nasir fled in defeat to his home at al-Kubur to recover from his wounds, while Wad Rajab withdrew to join Ranfa in the palace. The capital lay in Kamtur's hands, and during the next two months his men systematically plundered it. Sultan Ranfa rediscovered his loyalty to the southern *manjil* and loaded his unwilling dependent guest Wad Rajab with chains.

By the end of 1218 (mid-April 1894) Wad Nasir had recovered his strength and was ready to move against Kamtur again. As he shifted his camp to al-Tayyiba in what was clearly a march on the capital, a delegation of prominent noncombatants led by Husayn b. Muhammad Abu Likaylik attempted to mediate the dispute and avoid further bloodshed. Meanwhile, Kamtur's failure to govern as well as conquer was obvious to all, and the *manjil* allowed himself to be persuaded to release Wad Rajab from captivity and to restore much of what his men had looted. Wad Nasir, however, advanced his camp a stage closer to the capital during the first month of the new year (Muharram 1219/12 April – 11 May 1804), and Husayn withdrew from the mediation effort. Other members persevered and won Wad Nasir's grudging consent to a truce; he made the pact conditional upon the approval of Wad Rajab, however, and that was not to be obtained. To be sure, the experience of defeat and captivity had considerably blunted Wad Rajab's former enthusiasm for politics, and he himself was personally amenable, but his mother was made of sterner stuff; with her adamant refusal to make concessions, Wad Nasir's march on Sinnar continued. Before the end of the month (on 11 May 1804) Kamtur and his brothers rode out to confront Wad Nasir. The two armies met and fought at Umm Suwaybina.[22] "It was a great and famous battle, similar to Intarahna," noted the Chronicler,[23] and it was a decisive victory for Wad Nasir. Ranfa's faction of "Funj" was all but obliterated; twelve of Kamtur's brothers fell on the battlefield, and to the end of his days one of the wounded survivors could be driven to the brink of suicidal fury by the taunt, "Umm Suwaybina was enough for him!"[24] Kamtur himself crossed the river to the east bank and withdrew into the south.

Wad Nasir's victory at Umm Suwaybina opened the road to Sinnar, and he entered the capital. The new conqueror made the most of his victory but also accepted the limitations of his power. Sultan Ranfa was allowed to remain unmolested in the palace, and the right of Wad Rajab to the titular honor of regent was not challenged. Wad Nasir sought to end his family's feud with the house of ʿAdlan—and to extinguish it—by marrying considerable numbers of the late regent's wives. In administrative affairs, he tried to recapture the equilibrium of Idris's rule by delegating routine authority to to one of Idris's former *wazirs*, the *arbab* Qurashi, supported by Faraj Allah, Tayfara, and the rest of the slaves of Nasir. Wad Nasir then withdrew from the capital across the river to Kassab,[25] in the old fief of Abu Rayda, and transformed it into a productive base camp for the slaves of his faction. The rest of 1219 (which ended on 31 March 1805) passed peacefully, but there were ominous signs; Wad Nasir and Wad Rajab agreed that Kamtur should be deposed as the *manjil* of al-Bahr, but they could not reach a consensus concerning his replacement. In the end they could do no better than appoint two rival princes, neither of whom dared so much as to approach the province of the bruised and angry southern lord. Kamtur, who read such signs with practiced acumen, gathered his forces again.

At the beginning of 1220 (after 1 April 1805) Kamtur led his riders north on the east bank of the Blue Nile, and both Wad Nasir and Wad Rajab set off

in pursuit from their respective bases of Kassab and Sinnar, separated from each other by the river. Perhaps Kamtur hoped to stimulate revolt in the northern districts; he brought with him a disaffected son of Muhammad al-Amin named Jamma`, who he probably intended to place on the throne of Qarri. Shaykh Nasir of Qarri put an end to that scheme, and Jamma` died a slow death by torture. Meanwhile, the Hamaj lords overtook Kamtur's party near the Nile confluence, and the heavily outnumbered southern *manjil* was obliged to escape across the river to Omdurman. The four princes then allowed themselves to be talked out of further fighting by the *fuqara'* of the area; Wad Rajab withdrew up the Blue Nile to al-Jadid `Imran [26] and Wad Nasir to al-Hurayz, while Kamtur was allowed to cross into the Gezira and make the long ride to his home in the south unmolested.. Wad Rajab then moved south to Wad Madani, while Wad Nasir rode directly to Kassab opposite the capital. He was not pleased with the conduct of Kamtur's old accomplice Sultan Ranfa during his absence, and sometime between 13 November 1805 and 20 March 1806 his men raided the palace and put Ranfa to death.[27] After a kingless interregnum of several months, Wad Nasir brought Badi VI back from exile in Ras al-Fil and restored him to the throne.

Not long after the beginning of the new year (on 21 March 1806) Wad Rajab—his habitually ill-advised impetuosity apparently restored—decided to make real his nominal supremacy over Wad Nasir. His forces marched north to Wad Baha' al-Din,[28] then crossed the river and turned south against Kassab. The two Hamaj heirs met in battle at a place called al-Harraba,[29] and Wad Nasir was victorious. Wad Rajab fled south, probably in an attempt to seek refuge with Kamtur, but Wad Nasir overtook the defeated party and surrounded it at al-`Azaza.[30] After a protracted and painful siege Wad Rajab surrendered under comparatively generous terms; he was deposed as regent and his army dispersed, but he was allowed to go into distant northern exile in al-`Aylafun. Wad Nasir returned to the capital and invested Husayn b. Muhammad Abu Likaylik as the next (and in the event, the last) titular Hamaj regent, then retired across the river to Kassab. The remainder of the year passed uneventfully.

Wad Nasir's hopes for peace were premature, for the exiled Wad Rajab in al-`Aylafun busied himself with revivifying Kamtur's abortive plot for a northern rebellion. Kamtur himself was willing enough, and Wad Rajab succeeded in suborning most of the ruling family of Arbaji/Masallamiyya, isolating and rendering harmless the *manjil* `Adlan b. Shanbul, who remained loyal to the central government. He found another brother of Shaykh Nasir of Qarri, named Shammam, who was not deterred from rebellion by the recent fate of Jamma`. Al-Hajj Sulayman, the former confidant of the late regent Nasir, brought down an assortment of northern warriors from among his kinsmen the Sa`dab. The conspirators assembled from all quarters during 1221/1806-1807 at Abu Haraz and invested one `Ajban as anti-sultan; however, they spent the balance of the year quarreling among themselves and with the Shukriya, and they advanced no farther than Wad Madani. Toward the middle of the following year, however

(1222/after 11 March but before 4 September 1807), Wad Rajab's forces advanced south to `Abud, a time-honored base for assaults upon Sinnar. Then, during the month of Rajab (4 September – 3 October 1807), both Wad Nasir and his younger brother Muhammad al-Qanjari suddenly died.

The community of Wad Nasir at Kassab thus found itself leaderless at the precise moment of Wad Rajab's advance to `Abud, but worse was soon to come. Slaves loyal to the house of `Adlan, chafing at their subordination to the slaves of Nasir—now led by Tayfara—chose this moment to stage a coup in favor of `Adlan's young son. Tayfara's forces expeditiously suppressed the revolt and imprisoned their candidate, Muhammad `Adlan, who was wounded; most of the rebel slaves, however, escaped to join Wad Rajab at `Abud. Wad Rajab and Kamtur saw victory within their grasp, and they paused for almost two months to distribute soon-to-be-won titles and offices to their deserving followers. At length, however, Wad Rajab responded to the prodding of those less sanguine advisers who urged him to carry out his triumph before celebrating it, and on the night of 14 Sha`ban 1222/17 October 1807 his army entered Kassab. Tayfara and the slaves of Nasir, supported by a few miscellaneous disaffected Hamaj lordlings from the excluded houses of Badi b. Rajab and Ibrahim Abu Likaylik, decided to defend themselves against Wad Rajab and Kamtur; to the horror of "respectable" public opinion as represented by the Chronicler, they won. Tayfara followed followed Wad Rajab as he retreated to `Abud; there the dethroned regent turned and fought a second time at nearby al-Tilih (Ramadan 1222/2 November – 1 December 1807), but again he was defeated with heavy losses. At that point Wad Rajab gave up and sought personal safety by fleeing back to al-`Aylafun, abandoning the remnants of his battered army to Kamtur. Tayfara pursued the southern warlord down the river past Wad Madani and almost trapped Kamtur against the deep water on the banks opposite Abu Haraz. At the last moment, however, the *manjil* managed to escape with his riders across the river into the broad eastern lands and then back into the south.

Tayfara found himself at the precise center of a political void left by the death of Wad Nasir and the defeat of Wad Rajab. Perhaps he shared some of the thoughts expressed by the Chronicler at that troubled moment in the history of Sinnar:

> The name "Hamaj" was blotted out, just as they had previously blotted out the name of "Funj" . . . .
> By then all had laid claim [to power], both those who were entitled and those who were not.
> Do not ask [for guidance] from one who is himself asking, "What is to be done?"[31]

While the slaves of Nasir encamped at Walad al-Majdhub across the river from Abu Haraz, Tayfara resolved the dilemma of his historically unprecedented position in Sinnar through a logical and politically responsible—but

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radical—course of action. He named one of his senior colleagues sultan and had himself invested as regent. The new ruler of Sinnar then led his riders back to their homes at Kassab.

The concept of hereditary nobility in Sinnar had been severely battered by the events of the eighteenth century. The old "divine kingship" of the Funj survived only as a set of colorful and peculiar ceremonies conducted in the capital by the harmless Sultan Badi VI, while the Hamaj, an all-too-human family of comparatively lowly origins, had always fraternized and in recent years shared power with members of the new middle class. This process of democratization, however, had its limits. When Tayfara the masterless slave returned to Kassab as self-proclaimed regent and began reordering the affairs of the kingdom, eyebrows rose; would he be able to command the loyalty of men such as the *arbab* Qurashi, who had served as first minister to Idris and Wad Nasir, or of Abu Likaylik's grandson, Wad Ibrahim? Certainly he could expect little sympathy from the lower orders of society, for whom the slaves of state had always been the very epitome of villainy—impious, arrogant, drunken wretches who raped, looted, and abused common folk.[32] Nevertheless, the months passed, and Tayfara ruled.

Tayfara's following included a number of Hamaj heirs, among them Wad Nasir's young son, Muhammad `Adlan, and Wad Ibrahim. Wad `Adlan was definitely a prisoner, but the status of the others was ambiguous; were they hostages or trustworthy partisans? Tayfara decided to regard them as loyal until their actions proved otherwise. Therefore, when Wad Ibrahim asked permission to lead out a raiding party against the "Baqqara"—probably western intruders such as the Dar Muharrib--Tayfara gave his consent; Wad Ibrahim captured much spoil and dutifully sent it to Tayfara at Kassab. Rather than returning himself, however, Wad Ibrahim continued his raiding in the north at the Nile confluence; he joined with some of Hashim's "Fazara" in plundering the religious community at Khartoum and killing its *khalifa*, Ibrahim. This time he did not send his spoils to Kassab, but neither did he make common cause with Wad Rajab, who was in exile at nearby al-`Aylafun. Although Wad Ibrahim was still a youth, noted the Chronicler, he already possessed a firm determination. During his period of liberty over the first half of 1807, he gradually reached the decision to make his bid for supreme power. In about July 1807[33] he returned south toward the capital, but rather than entering it, he encamped at `Abud. The significance of this posture was obvious to all concerned.

Confronted with a plausible Hamaj contender within striking distance of the capital, Tayfara's leading nonslave supporters, led by the *arbab* Qurashi, defected *en masse* to `Abud. Tayfara promptly drew the necessary inferences and adapted his strategy to the new political realities. The sultanate of the slaves had failed. First Tayfara raided Sinnar and captured the leading Hamaj heirs resident there, the Awlad Rajab. Then he struck off the irons of Muhammad `Adlan, renounced his own claims to the regency, and placed the entire slave community at Wad `Adlan's command, saying: "We shall give you the name

[position] of your father."[34] From that moment the fate of Tayfara lay in the hands of his former prisoner, the young Muhammad ʿAdlan.

Fortune smiled upon Wad Ibrahim. By the end of July 1897, reinforced by defections from Tayfara's camp, he was ready to attack; his forces swept through Kassab, routed the newborn faction of Muhammad ʿAdlan, and released the Awlad Rajab from captivity. Then came the reprisals; Wad Ibrahim ferried all the slaves captured at Kassab across the river to Sinnar and, to the delight of men such as the Chronicler, systematically executed them. The young conqueror was prevailed upon to make only one exception, perhaps at the intervention of Muhammad ʿAdlan; he spared Tayfara, "who during his brief rule had done no harm in word or deed."[35] Wad Ibrahim did not make extravagant claims but accepted for himself a role similar to that of Wad Nasir. He recognized his uncle Husayn Abu Likaylik as titular regent and Badi VI as nominal sultan, contenting himself with the titleless office of protector and military strongman. Like Wad Nasir he removed himself a short distance from the capital, but he did not reoccupy the ravaged district of Kassab; he made his headquarters north of the city, at al-Tayyiba and then nearby at Umm Duraysa. The Chronicler, undoubtedly speaking for a substantial fraction of contemporary public opinion, was greatly pleased with the restoration of a Hamaj government and praised Wad Ibrahim for bringing calm after the storm. But the Chronicler's relief was premature, for the civil war was by no means over.

When news of the dramatic events at the capital reached al-ʿAylafun, Wad Rajab—who still regarded himself as the rightful regent—resolved to make his presence known. He summoned his old ally Kamtur from the southlands and rode out to meet him with the knights of his personal entourage. In the vicinity of Abu Haraz a delegation of the ʿArakiyyin appeared before him to remonstrate against his looting of nearby commoners under their protection; Wad Rajab, who had to feed his troops, responded with the arrogance befitting a nobleman, and there followed a battle between his household knights and the vigilantes of the ʿArakiyyin. The latter, as the Chronicler noted, "suffered a great defeat such as they had never before experienced, for [their opponents] were knights deservedly known for courage."[36] Nevertheless, as new bands of outraged commoners led by *fuqara'* gathered on every hand, Wad Rajab took the precaution of putting many miles between his party and the scene of the incident. At al-Tarfaya he met Kamtur at last, but the outcome was quite unexpected; the old southern *manjil* had meanwhile reached an agreement with Wad Ibrahim, and he promptly overpowered Wad Rajab's guard and took him captive. Kamtur's men delivered Wad Rajab to Wad Ibrahim at al-Tayyiba, and the *manjil* returned to his fief. Wad Ibrahim handed over his prisoner to Muhammad ʿAdlan in Sinnar, who killed him in revenge for the assassination of his father.

For Wad Ibrahim the calm that followed the death of Wad Rajab was not peace but paralysis, for if he had indeed achieved an informal mastery of sorts over the central government, that was a regime whose sphere of authority had

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shrunk to a thirty-mile radius around the old capital. He soon discovered that the favorite avocation of his idle soldiers was politics and that the most accessible target for their ambitions was himself; in response, he mobilized them for a plundering expedition eastward along the Dinder, in which he seized loot with which to buy their loyalty, while murdering the *fuqara'* of Walad Abyad, who resisted him. Yet, the tensions remained; conspicuously, Wad Ibrahim's own slave officers resented the authority he had felt obliged to delegate to the *arbab* Qurashi when the latter abandoned Tayfara and joined his cause. Meanwhile, a number of other prominent men he had not favored as he had Qurashi conspired to advance the cause of the fourth and final third-generation Hamaj contender for supreme power, Muhammad `Adlan. But Wad Ibrahim was neither ignorant nor defenseless; when he learned of the plot he killed or drove away the leading conspirators and summoned Wad `Adlan to a final accounting at the village of Walad Baha' al-Din.[37]

Wad `Adlan attended the fateful interview accompanied by a few slave soldiers, probably including Tayfara, whom he rightly valued for his "resolve and determination."[38] The party of Wad `Adlan dismounted and waited in the courtyard of the retreat of a local *faqih*, where they were watched by slaves of Wad Ibrahim's guard; Wad `Adlan himself entered the retreat to face his accusers. Upon passing the door Wad `Adlan was seized and bound; Wad Ibrahim insulted him, and his advisor Wad `Ali loudly urged Qurashi to cut the captive's throat. The dry cane walls of the retreat were thin, and when Wad `Adlan's escort overheard this threat they immediately assaulted Wad Ibrahim's guard, killing some outright and neutralizing the others by presenting the crisis to them as an opportunity to be rid of Qurashi. Having won control of the courtyard surrounding the retreat, Wad `Adlan's escort demanded the release of their lord. When Wad Ibrahim refused they brought fire and threatened to incinerate the retreat and everyone in it if their demands were not met. After a moment Wad `Adlan emerged from the retreat into the courtyard, dazed but unharmed.

> Now the horse of Walad Ibrahim, with the king's caparisons upon it, was standing near, and Abu Sulayman, the slave of [Wad] `Adlan shouted to him: "Why are you stupefied? Mount the mare and plunge your sword into the hearts of these dogs who wished to kill you!" When Walad `Adlan heard him and realized what was before him he sprang upon the mare as it stood and drew his sword.[39]

From that moment in the summer of 1808[40] until the Turkish conquest, Muhammad `Adlan would dominate political life in what remained of the kingdom of Sinnar. As the young warlord consolidated his power during the following months, he did not forget those who had protected him in his extremity and helped him along the way. The older slaves of Nasir were no longer alive, but their sons were promoted to positions of leadership in Wad `Adlan's guard.[41] Tayfara, between 1810 and 1813, he ennobled; the former leader of rebellious slaves would end his career with honor as an *arbab*, Lord Tayfara.[42]

21

The Man on Horseback

Muhammad `Adlan never forgot the night his father died. By the beginning of Ramadan 1803, the ailing new regent `Adlan had recovered his health to the point that he was ready to take a new wife. After the initial days of festivities at court, there came the evening of the ceremony when `Adlan rode to the house of his bride to spend his first night with her. Muhammad accompanied him, and they were attended by a few slaves led by Faraj Allah. In the night there was a sudden clash of arms as Wad Nasir's men struck down the pickets who guarded the horses and weapons. `Adlan quickly left his bride and came to the courtyard where Muhammad and his escort had been sleeping off the effects of the celebration. There were hostile voices outside the compound, to which `Adlan replied. The conversation seemed pointless, and it did not end; the conspirators were stalling for time until Kamtur, who had lost the way, would finally arrive. When he did, the cry went up for `Adlan to come out. The regent did not look well; he took up his staff and went out. Muhammad saw Kamtur give his father two strokes with his sword, but `Adlan seemed not to notice; he cursed the treacherous *manjil* and struck him with his staff. No one prevented `Adlan from mounting his horse and riding off, but then, as if a spell had been broken by his departure, the fighting began. Muhammad was wounded and almost left behind as his guards fled; someone helped him escape through the night, and he overtook Faraj Allah the next morning. It was said that as the dawn came `Adlan had been found lying dead of his wounds along the road to Sinnar, his horse waiting patiently beside him. [1]

Muhammad `Adlan spent the next four years as a hostage, a pawn in the games of powerful men who were his enemies. Faraj Allah took him to join the camp of Wad Nasir, from which vantage point he watched Kamtur's initial rape of the capital and Wad Nasir's half-victories over the southern warlord that followed. As a man with a keen sense of family honor, he probably wondered from time to time whether he should hate Wad Nasir or Wad Rajab the more. Yet, the greatest danger was to come not from his father's enemies but from self-proclaimed friends; with the death of Wad Nasir some of his father's slaves revolted against Tayfara, and Muhammad `Adlan found himself not only wounded again but also in irons. Yet the wheel of fortune rolled, and in the end the slaves not only spared the life of Muhammad `Adlan but also made good their promise to place him in the seat of power.

"The kingdom of Sinnar is very much smaller than that of Dar Fur," wrote a foreign observer in the days of Nasir and Idris, "and its sovereign is considerably less powerful. The soldiers of Sinnar, however, are braver." [2] While the restoration of Sinnar lay beyond the abilities of any individual, it was the personal accomplishment of Muhammad ʿAdlan to halt the fratricidal chaos of the civil wars and to restore discipline to a corps of soldiers in the service of the central government. With them, he defended the dying heart of the old kingdom for another thirteen years. The new strongman of Sinnar possessed the personal gift of inspiring intense affection in his followers; both his squadrons and his *harim* were devoted to him. Pious middle-class opinion as represented by the Chronicler found him praiseworthy: "He was brave and frugal and left people's property alone. All his years were happy without his chasing after women . . . nor did his hand yearn for the stupidity of coveting for himself." [3] Like his grandfather he avoided town and court and spent most of his life in bivouac with his soldiers.

The strongmen of the period of the civil wars, Wad Rajab, Wad Nasir, and Wad Ibrahim, had on occasion used their military power to assault the weak but venerable established national institutions of the sultanate and the regency. Muhammad ʿAdlan inherited a similar position of military preeminence, but he attempted to make it less threatening to the sultan and the regent by accepting his limited role and institutionalizing it. He invented for himself the new title of *manjil al-kabir*, literally "Great Manjil" but perhaps more meaningfully to be translated as "Lord Protector" or "Generalissimo." "He was only a general," as a contemporary explained, "but a person of great authority, who in a government in such disarray in many cases counted for more than the *wazir* (regent)." [4] The measure of Muhammad ʿAdlan's success in this regard was that neither the regent Husayn nor Sultan Badi VI were willing to serve as the legitimizing focus for plots against him. [5] This was not a minor accomplishment, for if the Great Manjil was loved by his followers, he had also inherited the most bitterly intractable of foes. [6]

The rise to power of Muhammad ʿAdlan was accompanied by the onset of a great plague which decimated the country during the following year, 1224/1809-1810. In the midst of the universal suffering, the new commander undertook to consolidate his power. After executing Wad Ibrahim's *wazir* Qurashi to win over the slaves of Wad Nasir, Muhammad ʿAdlan stayed his hand and gave his dynastic rivals ample opportunity to prove themselves loyal or harmless before treating them as enemies. Wad Nasir's heir had fled to the White Nile, but Muhammad ʿAdlan did not pursue him; Wad Ibrahim, who was not well, lived quietly under house arrest at al-Manaqil. The first test of Muhammad ʿAdlan's policy of liberality came with the rainy season of early summer 1809, the time for the collection of taxes in livestock. [Since the loss of the outlying provinces, this had increasingly come to mean assessments upon the western Rufaʿa of the Gezira.] The Great Manjil ordered the Awlad Rajab and the Awlad Husayn to take out the army, and they encamped a day's march outside the capital. There

they decided to revolt; they seized two officers loyal to Muhammad `Adlan who overtook them, and on the following day they marched back against the capital. Muhammad `Adlan was almost alone, accompanied only by a personal guard of about thirty of his slaves. When he learned of his kinsmen's treachery, he performed the afternoon prayers in anticipation of imminent death and then mounted his war-horse and led his guardsmen against the advancing army. "A warrior would have been terrified of his anger," wrote the Chronicler, and fury was sufficient to break the advance of his vastly superior foes, who were stopped in their tracks. At this point the regent Husayn intervened and succeeded in negotiating an uneasy truce; the wayward army returned to its commander, the Gezira nomads escaped taxation, and a year passed quietly.[7] As late as the end of May 1810 the Great Manjil's entourage included the Hamaj knights Qasim b. Muhammad Abu Likaylik; Musa, the son of the regent Badi; three sons of the incumbent regent Husayn; two sons of the late regent Rajab; and Muhammad `Adlan's own son and six of his younger brothers. [8]

At the beginning of the rainy season of 1810, Muhammad `Adlan again sent out his kinsmen to tax the Rufa`a of the Gezira, and again they betrayed him; this time, however, they were much more cautious and did not march boldly against him. They waited. As the immobilizing months of the rainy season passed, Muhammad `Adlan reconsidered his policy of toleration toward his kinsmen and decided to reverse it; he also gathered his forces in preparation. On the first night of Ramadan (30 September 1810) he struck, and over the remaining months of 1225 he captured and executed his major rivals: Wad Ibrahim, Wad Idris, the sons of Wad Nasir and Wad `Ali, and all the sons of Wad Rajab except one, named Hasan, whom he pardoned because of his youth.[9] By rediscovering the traditional Funj value of ruthless dynastic discipline Muhammad `Adlan bought his country a decade of freedom from civil strife. But it was too late; the Hamaj were too prolific to be controlled by the Great Manjil's half-measures, and in due course the deadly logic of the blood feud would exact its inevitable price.

Having liberated himself for the moment from the treachery of his kinsmen, Muhammad `Adlan directed his attention back to the familiar problem of restoring—or at least extending—the authority of the central government. The first to feel the effects of the Great Manjil's new freedom were the Rufa`a of the Gezira; in 1227/1812-1813 the forces of the central government defeated them and killed their *shaykh*. Muhammad `Adlan then turned his attention to the north, for Shaykh Nasir of Qarri had taken advantage of the troubled situation near the capital to extend his own influence southward along the Blue Nile.[10] The Hamaj formally deposed Nasir and extended recognition to his brother and rival, Shammam.[11] However, as Muhammad `Adlan prepared to enforce his deposition of Nasir, who was encamped east of the Blue Nile opposite Muhammad `Adlan at `Abud, Sultan Badi suddenly precipitated a new crisis by fleeing the capital to seek refuge in the south with Kamtur.

Muhammad `Adlan pursued the fugitive sultan up the river into the province of al-Bahr.[12] Near Karkoj Badi went into hiding on the "Islands of Walad Umm Dakula," while the Great Manjil besieged his would-be protectors, the Kamatir, "in the midst of a great tree-covered and rocky wilderness."[13] As the passage of time demonstrated that neither side could achieve a decisive advantage, Muhammad `Adlan accepted his opponents' offer of a truce and withdrew his troops. In due course a delegation of the Kamatir arrived at Sinnar with hostages to ensure their future good behavior, a daughter of Kamtur as a bride for Muhammad `Adlan to extinguish the feud between their families, and finally the runaway sultan to preside over the celebration. Perhaps it was on this joyful occasion that Shaykh Nasir was also forgiven and recognized again as the rightful lord of Qarri. [14] Conspicuously absent from the festivities, however, was Shaykh Kamtur himself.

The next five years passed quickly and without major incident, although rumors began to circulate in the Sudan concerning the rise of Muhammad `Ali, the new "Mighty One of Egypt." A band of refugee Mamluks harassed the northern lords, and in their districts the European visitor Burckhardt found himself under suspicion of being a Turkish spy. On 27 Rabi` II 1235/12 February 1820 the regent Husayn issued the last recovered charter of the central government of Sinnar; while its roster of courtiers bore witness to the troubled times, at least a shadow of normalcy, of continuity, could still be found. A son of Abu Likaylik's old fellow conspirator Harun, named Wawrit, held the combined offices of *amin* and *jundi*, and there were still provincial lords of Qarri, Atbara, Alays, Bayla, Arbaji, and al-Bahr. The financial office of the *shaykh al-quwwariyya* was still occupied, and a surviving son of the regent Idris guarded Sultan Badi's eldest son. Among the Hamaj, the Great *Manjil* Muhammad `Adlan was present, along with the regent's brother, Qasim Abu Likaylik; Musa, the son of the regent Badi; and Husayn's own son, Muhammad. Daf` Allah the indestructible opportunist was present, and so was Tayfara—although Husayn refused to recognize his elevation to *arbab*.[15] There was little forewarning that the final suicidal drama in the history of Sinnar was about to begin.

During the summer rains of 1820 Muhammad `Adlan led his troops out for the taxing of the nomads. While in the field he reflected again upon his father's death; he had avenged `Adlan's assassination upon the families of all the conspirators except the one who had actually struck the fatal blow—Shaykh Kamtur. It was not enough. To be sure, he had made peace with Kamtur, but upon conditions which the southern *manjil* had not entirely honored. Perhaps the Great Manjil did not expect these legalistic technicalities to persuade his councilors, for he told them nothing; at the end of the season of taxing the nomads, probably in early autumn,[16] he led his guardsmen south into the province of al-Bahr. There he fell upon Kamtur unexpectedly; the *manjil* was almost alone, and although he fought bravely the outcome was inevitable. "[Muhammad `Adlan] returned to Sinnar, rejoicing and happy at the victory

that had come to him; he had taken revenge for his father on all who were responsible for his blood-money, and was requited of them." [17]

As the news of Kamtur's death spread his brothers gathered from all quarters of the south. At the provincial capital of Barankwa they swore mighty oaths; they elected their brother Darrar as commander and rode out in revolt against the capital. The Kamatir fell upon Muhammad `Adlan at al-Raraba.[18] Their own traditions concerning this encounter present it as a courteous duel of knights worthy of Froissart; it was arranged by mutual consent through Wad `Adlan's acceptance of their formal written challenge and conducted within a thorn *zariba* to neutralize the acknowledged superiority of the Great Manjil's war-horses. While the traditions of the Kamatir concede that they lost the battle, they claim the consolation of a moral victory in that their knights all fought and died bravely, while Muhammad `Adlan disgraced himself utterly by breaking out of the *zariba* and running away from the battle, returning only at the end to observe the victory his knights had won.[19] The account of the Chronicler, less overtly partisan though broadly sympathetic to Muhammad `Adlan, describes a much less tidy clash of arms. The Kamatir arrived at al-Raraba by night and attacked in stealth. Muhammad `Adlan's troops were encamped in surrounding villages; they closed in quickly upon the southern invaders when the alert sounded, but their commander, thinking all was lost, had fled with his wife and a friend. By morning the Kamatir were thoroughly defeated, and Daf` Allah the opportunist assumed the rather embarrassing task of overtaking his fugitive commander and informing him of his victory. A brother of Kamtur named Sulayman was captured alive and taken to Sinnar as a hostage. [20]

In winter 1236/1820-1821 came the Turkish invasion of the Sudan; a huge modern army equipped with boats, artillery, European military advisors, and an abundance of firearms crawled slowly but relentlessly up the Nile and shot its way with little difficulty through the resistance offered by *makk* Shawish at the gates of the Shaiqiyya country. Muhammad `Adlan questioned *fuqara'* and other travelers from the north; yes, they had seen the invader. The Great Manjil realized that destiny was at hand; he issued a summons to all who would fight in defense of their country and instructed them to muster at the Nile confluence. He sent his own soldiers north under the command of his son `Adlan and prepared to follow them. But while he tarried in a village near the capital, one day in Rabi` II [6 January – 4 February 1821] a group of horsemen arrived before his compound, threw down the gate, and rode in upon him. Their leader was Hasan, the last surviving son of Wad Rajab, whose life Muhammad `Adlan had spared ten years before. With him was the *faqih* Ahmad al-Rayyih al-`Araki – and Daf` Allah the opportunist. They numbered thirty, and he was one; the Great Manjil drew his sword and stood against them. They waited. Suddenly someone crept out of Muhammad `Adlan's own house and silently attacked him from behind, striking with a sword at his leg: "When he collapsed upon his severed limb, they fell upon him with sharp blades and chopped him to pieces." [21]

Hasan b. Muhammad Rajab was unquestionably the leader of the conspiracy against Muhammad `Adlan, but the precise identity of the first man to attack the Great Manjil remained somewhat of a mystery. Some said it must have been one of his slaves, [22] while far away to the north with the oncoming Turkish army Cailliaud would be told that the attackers were two of Hasan Rajab's men named Wad al-`Aqindi and `Abd Allah Niknitt, whom he had paid to perform the unchivalrous assault from behind.[23] But there was another story, advanced by the *fuqaha'* and reported by the Chronicler, according to which the decisive blow was struck by none other than the eminent Shaykh Ahmad al-Rayyih al-`Araki, whose mastery of the mystical arcana permitted him to be both in front of his victim and behind him at the same time.[24] From the more mundane perspective of social history there is much symbolic truth in this interpretation, which would see the last ruler of an independent Sinnar, a secular lord and a nobleman, struck down silently from his blind side by a leader of the new Islamic middle class.

Following the assassination, Daf` Allah the opportunist rode back to the capital to arrange Sultan Badi's ceremony of submission to the Turks. [25]

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Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. People of the northern Sudan have called men of foreign origin who served the first colonial government "Turks," regardless of their language, religion, or national heritage.
2. Al-Shatir Busayli `Abd al-Jalil, *Makhtutat Katib al-Shuna fi ta'rikh al-sultana al-Sinnariya wa'l-idara al-Misriya* (Cairo: 1961), pp. 3-4. This source will hereafter be identified as *Makhtuta*. The *Makhtuta* is a late compilation of several manuscripts concerning the history of the northern Nile valley Sudan in late Funj and early Turkish times. The voice of the author(s) of this composite work, sometimes called the "Funj Chronicle," will be identified in this study as the Chronicler. The translations given here are those of the present writer. An informal but unabridged English rendition of one version of the Funj Chronicle is P.M. Holt, *The Sudan of theThree Niles* (Leiden: 1999).
3. H.L. Wesseling and P.C. Emmer, "What is Overseas History? Some Reflections on a Colloquium and a Problem," in H.L. Wesseling, ed., *Expansion and Reaction: Essays in European Expansion and Reaction in Asia and Africa* (The Hague: 1978), p. 15.
4. Barry Hindness and Paul Q. Hirst, *Pre-capitalist Modes of Production* (London: 1975).
5. Paul Einzig, *Primitive Money*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 1966); George Dalton, ed., *Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies: Essays of Karl Polanyi* (Garden City: 1968); Rhoda Halperin, *Cultural Economies Past and Present* (Austin:1994); and Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Recherches sur un mode de production africain," *La Pensée*, no. 144 (1969): 61-78.
6. Maxime Rodinson, *Islam et capitalisme* (Paris: 1966); Peter Gran, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt 1760-1840* (Austin: 1978); and Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System,* 2 vols. (New York: 1980).
7. For an introduction to some peculiarities of this intellectual tradition, see Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: 1978). Of particular significance is the dominance of the "essentialist" approach, a concept mentioned by Said (p. 246) but perhaps most effectively criticized by Karl Popper; see David Hackett Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies* (New York: 1970), pp. 68-70.
8. If one particularly monumental paragon of Ciceronian balderdash may suffice as an illustrative example, let it be Sir Harold MacMichael's attempt to derive the political behavior of the twentieth-century Sudanese from the alleged tribal antipathies of their putative pre-Islamic Arabian forebears: "The line of cleavage between the two great Arab groups of descendants of Qahtan on the one hand and of Isma`il and `Adnan on the other has not been obscured by the lapse of ages, nor by the

tremendous unifying force of a common religion, nor by continuous intermarriage, nor by migration to distant lands." *A History of the Arabs in the Sudan* (Cambridge: 1922), vol. 2, p. 3. All citations from this work have been adjusted to conform to the conventions of orthography employed here.

9. R.S. O'Fahey and J.L. Spaulding, *Kingdoms of the Sudan* (London: 1974), pp. 33-34. The epithet "king of the Nubian Muslims" (*malik al-nuba al-muslimin*) appears in a marginal note to Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, Mss. Arabes, 1578. For a discussion of this source, see R.S. O'Fahey, J.O. Hunwick, and D. Lange, "Two Glosses Concerning BILAD AL-SUDAN on a Manuscript of al-Nuwayri's NIHAYAT AL-ARAB," *Fontes Historiae Africanae: Bulletin d'Information* 5 (1979): 16-24. The expression occurs in a third marginal note not given in this article; Dr. O'Fahey has very kindly permitted the present author to examine and cite it prior to publication.
10. E. van Donzel, *Foreign Relations of Ethiopia, 1642-1700* (Istanbul: 1979), p. 182.
11. A. Peney, "Mémoires sur l'ethnographie du soudan égyptien, I – Le Sennar; Les Turcs au Soudan," *Revue d'ethnologie* 1 (1882): 399.
12. The Hamaj strongman after the coup of 1762 was variously known by older titles such as shaykh, *wazir*, or "*amin* of the army of the sultan." His true position, however, had no precedent in Sinnar, and it has become a useful convention among writers in English to refer to him as "regent."
13. The felicitous term "Funj Mystique" was coined and first applied in a somewhat different context by Wendy James; see "The Funj Mystique: approaches to a problem of Sudan History," in R.K. Jain, ed., *Text and Context: the Social Anthropology of Tradition* (Philadelphia: 1977), pp. 95-133.

1. THE KING OF THE NUBIAN MUSLIMS

1. For the use of the term *sahib Sinnar*, see the marginalia to al-Nuwayri cited above in note 9 of the Introduction.
2. The perambulatory court of the early Funj kingdom was mentioned in the early sixteenth century by David Reubeni and a century later by the Ethiopian traveler, Zaga Christ. For Reubeni, see Samuel Hillelson, "David Reubeni, an early visitor to Sennar," *Sudan Notes and Records* 16 (1935): 55-66, and Eduard Biberfeld, *Der Reisebericht des David Reubeni* (Berlin: 1898). For Zaga Christ, see O.G.S. Crawford, "The Strange Adventures of Zaga Christ," *Sudan Notes and Records* 31, 2 (1950): 287-296, and Jean de Sainte Marie, *Les estranges évenemens du voyage de son Altesse le Serenissime Prince Zaga-Christ d'Ethiopie* (Paris: 1635).
3. From the travel account of Evliyâ Çelebî: see M.T. Petti Suma, "Il viaggio in Sudan di Evliyâ Çelebî (1671-1672," *Annali dell'Istituto universitario orientale di Napoli*, n.s. 14, 2 (1964): 433-452, and Evliyâ Çelebî, *Seyahatnamesi, Misir, Sudan, Habeş, 1672-1680*, vol. 10 (Istanbul: 1938).
4. van Donzel, *Foreign Relations*, p. 182.
5. Theodoro Krump, *Hoher und fruchtbarer Palm-Baum des Heiligen Evangelij* (Augsburg: 1710), p. 285.

2. THE COURT

1. From the account of Charles-Jacques Poncet, in William Foster, ed., *The Red Sea at the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (London: 1949), p. 103.
2. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 284.
3. *Makhtuta*, pp. 10-11.
4. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 283.
5. Poncet, *Red Sea*, p. 102.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 103; and Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 284.
7. *Makhtuta*, pp. 29, 32, 41, 50. The term *fashir* was also used in regard to the court of the sultanate of Dar Fur, and it survives as the name of an important town in that part of the Sudan.
8. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 285-287.
9. Poncet, *Red Sea*, pp. 102-103; and Giovanni Battista Brocchi, *Giornale delle osservazioni fatte ne'viaggi in Egitto, nella Siria e nella Nubia* (Bassano: 1843), 5, pp. 540-541.
10. Jay Spaulding, "The Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa," *Sudan Texts Bulletin*, Vol. 6 (1984), 37-43, I am grateful to R.S. O'Fahey for calling my attention to a manuscript collected by Mansfield Parkyns and presently in the library of the University of Nottingham which employs the similar expression, *al-malik `Amara dhu'l-tunghas*, "King `Amara, possessor of *tunghas* [*dungas*]."
11. Samuel Hillelson, *Sudan Arabic* (London: 1925), p. 30.
12. Lord Prudhoe [Algernon Percy], "Extracts from private Memoranda kept by Lord Prudhoe on a journey from Cairo to Sennar, in 1829, describing the Peninsula of Sennar," *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, 5 (1835): 49. I am deeply grateful to His Grace, the Duke of Northumberland, for permission to examine the original manuscript from which the published excerpts were extracted. The authoritative character of the king's word was among the attributes given by the introductory praise formulae of Funj charters: "When [the sultan] speaks, he speaks the truth, and when he speaks with justice, he has ordained." Jay Spaulding and Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, *Public Documents from Sinnar* (East Lansing:1989), pp. 14, 29-30.
13. Poncet, *Red Sea*, p. 103.
14. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 540-541.
15. Ed. Cadalvène and J. de Brèuvéry, *L'Egypte et La Turquie de 1829 à 1836* (Paris: 1836), 2, p. 338 (note); and O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, p. 43.
16. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 238.
17. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 45, pp. 247-250.
18. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 235.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 301-302; and Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 344, 540-541.
20. For a discussion of the *`ukkaz* as a magistrate, see below, "The Bureaucracy."
21. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 301.
22. Poncet, *Red Sea*, p. 104.
23. James Bruce, *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile*, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: 1805), 6, p. 375.
24. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 301; Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 541.

dynastic system. From this recent perspective, the older matrilineal line was known retrospectively as the "Unsab" after the name of its last member, Sultan Unsa IV.

4. Yusuf Fadl Hasan, ed., *Kitab al-tabaqat . . . ta'lif Muhammad al-Nur b. Dayf Allah* (Khartoum: 1971), p. 173 (hereafter cited *Tabaqat*). Some versions of the *Tabaqat* identify Badi's mother as Aya (p. 173, note 9); thus, the sixteenth-century sultan `Adlan walad Aya (*Makhtuta*, p. 8) had also been known as the son of his mother.
5. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 16, pp. 109-115 and Document 24, pp. 146-156.
6. J.W. Crowfoot, "Popular Rites in the Northern Sudan: Their Place and Significance," *Studies Presented to F. Ll. Griffith* (London: n.d.), p. 443.
7. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 286.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 283.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 286.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Poncet, *Red Sea*, p. 107; and Robert Hartmann, *Reise des Freiherrn Adalbert von Barnim durch Nord-Ost-Afrika in den Jahren 1859 und 1860* (Berlin: 1863), p. 519.
12. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 286.
13. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 391.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 295. In some unusual cases a woman might elect to support her husband against her blood relatives. For example, when *makk* Nimr of Shandi sought exile along the Ethiopian border after assassinating Isma`il Pasha, the Turkish authorities attempted to have him killed by prevailing upon the father of one of his wives to influence the daughter to betray her husband. At the crucial moment the lady was handed a poisoned dagger, the story went, but with it she proceeded to strike not Nimr, but her father. A.E. Brehm, *Reiseskizzen aus Nord-Ost-Afrika* (Jena: 1861), 1, p. 144 (note).
15. For Qarri, see Khartoum National Records Office [hereafter, NRO] Intelligence 5/1/6, "Note of Turkish Invasion of Sudan," and NRO Dakhlia 112/4/24, "Abdellab." For al-Taka, see NRO Dakhlia 112/6/35, "Shukria;" for al-Bahr, see L.F. Nalder, "Tales from the Fung Province," *Sudan Notes and Records* 14, 1 (1931): 73-75.
16. An oblique reference to the participation of the governor of Alays in the Funj system of dynastic marriages may be found in the comment of Bruce that "it must be a relation of the Mek [sultan] of Sennaar that commands at El-aice" (*Travels*, 6, p. 390).
17. The nineteenth-century notable, Princess Nasra bint `Adlan b. Muhammad Abu Likaylik was called "sultana" because her mother was of the Funj royal house. One may assume that the marriage of her father `Adlan to this woman would have been arranged by his own father, the first Hamaj regent himself. Richard Lepsius, *Letters from Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Peninsula of Sinai* (London: 1853), p. 177.
18. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 433-434.
19. "Copy of a letter of P. Brévédent, written in Sinnar in the month of March, 1699, to the Superior of the Society of Jesus in Cairo," in Giovanni Maria Montano, ed., *L'Etiopia Francescana nei documenti dei secoli XVII et XVIII, T. 2 (1691-1703)* (Quaracchi: 1948), p. 438. For later traditions claiming that some eastern leaders had formerly participated in the dynastic marriage system at either the sultanic or

25. H.C. Jackson, *Tooth of Fire: Being Some Account of the Ancient Kingdom of Sennār* (Oxford: 1912), p. 92; and Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 540.
26. Brocchi, "Giadsidi," *Giornale*, 5, p. 540; Jackson's "Gar el-Sid" (*Tooth of Fire*, p. 93) seems less plausible.
27. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 344, 540; Jackson, *Tooth of Fire*, p. 93; and J.C. Matthew, "Report on Land Customs and Tenure in Singa District . . . 23 March 1909," p. 42. The latter source is a typescript in the Sudan Archive of the University of Durham. I am most grateful to Ms. Leslie Forbes and Ms. Jane Hogan for permission to consult and cite works on deposit there. Future references to this archive will be identified by the notation [Durham].
28. Dimitri Meeks, "Liste de Mots Méroïtiques ayant une Signification connue ou supposée," *Bulletin d'Informations Méroïtiques*, no. 13 (July 1973): pp. 10-12; and Jay Spaulding, "'Gar Mol!' – A Meroitic Survival in the Court Ritual of Sinnar?" *Bulletin d'Informations Méroïtiques*, no. 15 (October 1974): 10-11.
29. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 540.
30. Jackson, *Tooth of Fire*, p. 93.
31. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 344, 540-541.
32. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 301, 356.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 301-302.
34. MacMichael, *History*, 2, p. 360.
35. George Alexander Hoskins, *Travels in Ethiopia* (London: 1835), p. 209.
36. Brocchi, *Giornale,* 5, pp. 344-345, 540-543.
37. For this family, see P.M. Holt, "Four Funj Land-Charters," *Studies in the History of the Near East* (London: 1973), p. 118.
38. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 372; and Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 504-508.
39. *Makhtuta*, pp. 19-20, 22-26.
40. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 504-508.
41. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 286.

3. THE FUNJ

1. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 487. For reasons which will become obvious by the conclusion of this book, the nobility of Sinnar perceived the invasion of the Turks in 1820 as a threat to the social as well as the political order; thus, the Hamaj commander Muhammad b. `Adlan issued a call to arms in defense of Sinnar on the grounds that the Turks "understand neither social rank [*martaba*] nor the absence of it. They have no conception of high class [*khass*] and none of low [`*amm*]." Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 43, pp. 239-241.
2. For a discussion, see A. and W. Kronenberg, "Parallel-Cousin Marriage in Mediaeval and Modern Nubia – Part I," *Kush* 13 (1965): 241-260.
3. *Makhtuta*, p. 7. For a general introduction to the survival of matrilineal practices in the northern Sudan, see J. Spencer Trimingham, *Islam in the Sudan* (London: 1949), p. 179. A reconsideration of the question is given by Christian Delmet, "Islamisation et Matrilinéarité au Dar Fung (Soudan)," *L'Homme* 19, 2 (1979): 33-51. Delmet disagrees with the interpretation offered here, basing his views upon the extant king-lists of Sinnar. These, as constitutional documents created during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, do indeed postulate a patrilineal

secondary level, see Jay Spaulding, "Farmers, Herdsmen and the State in Rainland Sinnar," *Journal of African History* 20, 3 (1979): 341.

20. R.J. Elles, "The Kingdom of Tegali," *Sudan Notes and Records* 18, 1 (1935): 10.
21. Alessandro Triulzi, *Salt, Gold and Legitimacy* (Napoli: 1981), chapter 3; and Jay Spaulding, "Toward a Demystification of the Funj: Some Perspectives on Society in Southern Sinnar," *Northeast African Studies* 2, 1 (1980): 2-3.
22. O'Fahey and Spaulding, Kingdoms, pp. 48-49.
23. J. Longe, "A Note on the Shukria," NRO Dakhlia 112/6/35, "Shukria." Nayil's great-grandson `Awad appears as the governor of al-Taka in the oldest surviving sultanic charter (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 2, pp. 37-41). Oral traditions claim that Sha` al-Din lived in the time of the first Funj sultan `Amara Dunqas, but it is difficult to reconcile a sixteenth-century date for him with `Awad's appearance in 1729.
24. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, pp. 444ff. Oral traditions tell how *makk* Sa` d "Abu Dabbus" of the Ja`aliyin was said to have inherited the right to rule from his maternal grandfather, "the king of the Nubians," but he had to take the rights bestowed upon him from a rival by force. Anders Bjørkelo, "From King to Kashif: Shendi in the Nineteenth Century," doctoral dissertation presented to the Historisk Institutt, Universitetet i Bergen, 1983, and *Prelude to the Mahdiyya: Peasants and Traders in the Shendi Region, 1821-1886* (Cambridge: 1989).
25. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 47, pp. 262-266; Document 50, pp. 274-280; Document 53, pp. 290-295; Document 54, pp. 296-306.
26. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 279.
27. For an example from the Shaiqiya country, see NRO Dakhlia 112/4/21, "Bedayrieh." For an example from the Rufa`a of the Dabarki area, see NRO Civil Secretary 38/C/4, "Land Tenure and Settlement."
28. For examples see NRO Intelligence 5/1/3, "Nisba of Ahmad al-Azhari," and NRO Intelligence 5/1/6, "Note of Turkish Invasion of Sudan." The model of sultanic marriage policy proposed here would seem to have been resurrected by the Khalifa `Abdullahi; for a hostile but not necessarily false account, see Rudolf Slatin, *Fire and Sword in the Sudan* (London: 1896), pp. 520ff.
29. Cadalvène, *L'Egypte*, 2, p. 335; Hoskins, *Travels*, p. 90; John Lewis Burckhardt, *Travels in Nubia*, 2nd ed. (London: 1822), p. 200; and `Abd al-Ghaffar Muhammad Ahmad, *Shaykhs and Followers: Political Struggle in the Rufa`a al-Hoi Nazirate in the Sudan* (Khartoum: 1974), p. 94.
30. According to Krump (*Palm-Baum*, pp. 283, 286) Sultan Badi III had four "legitimate wives" or "queens" and about 600 "concubines." Since Krump was assured that the son of any of these women could be elected sultan, however, all must be regarded as "legitimate wives" in regard to the question of succession.
31. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 270 for Qarri; and Ferdinand Werne, *Expedition zur Entdeckung der Quellen des Weissen Nil* (Berlin: 1848), p. 38 for al-Bahr.
32. For example, at the fall of Sinnar *makk* Tombol of Argo had more than thirty wives, a scandal to which the orthodox *`ulama'* imported from Egypt by the Turks responded by forcing him to repudiate all except four; Cadalvène, *L'Egypte*, 2, p. 335. See also Hoskins, *Travels*, pp. 90, 211.

33. Muhammad `Abd al-Rahim, *al-Nida' fi daf` al-iftira'* (Cairo: 1935), p. 127. I am grateful to Dr. Janet Ewald for confirmation of this point on the basis of her fieldwork in Taqali.
34. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 381, and 7, p. 91; Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 581; Hartmann, *Reise*, p. 533; and Werne, *Weissen Nil*, p. 38. A contemporary example was given by the Chronicler (*Makhtuta*, p. 82), who related concerning `Adlan walad Subahi, governor of al-Bahr: "Whenever he had taken satisfaction from a woman or a slave-girl, he would marry her off to Ahmad, the son of his brother. The Awlad [sons of] Ahmad thus became numerous brethren to the sons of Shaykh `Adlan."
35. Kronenberg and Kronenberg, "Parallel-Cousin Marriage," p. 255. I am indebted in the broad sense to the insights of Claude Meillassoux in regard to the question of the unequal distribution of women within lineages, although in many respects the societies with which he has been most closely concerned do not greatly resemble Sinnar. For an overview, see his "From reproduction to production: a Marxist approach to economic anthropology," in Harold Wolpe, ed., *The Articulation of Modes of Production* (London: 1980), pp. 189-201.
36. J.W. Crowfoot, "Customs of the Rubatab," NRO Dakhlia 112/4/18, "Robatab."
37. Nalder, "Tales," p. 80; M.C. Jedrej, "Some Structural Features of Ingessana Marriage and Affinity," *Africa* 49, 4 (1979): 377-387; C.E. Ecsedy, "An Unknown People of the Sudan: Four Months with the Maiaks," *New Hungarian Quarterly* 14 (49) [1973]: 148; and `Abd al-Ghaffar, *Shaykhs and Followers*, p. 51. A particularly valuable example from among the nobility of eastern Sinnar was provided by the mid-nineteenth century traveler Bayard Taylor. He hosted a banquet for the Shaykh of the Shukriya: "Owd-el Kerim [`Awad al-Karim, the shaykh's son] was included in the invitation, but he excused himself on the ground that he did not dare to eat at the same table with his father." *A Journey to Central Africa* (New York: 1854), p. 378.
38. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 2, pp. 37-41 [position 12]; Document 4, pp. 44-47; Document 5, pp. 48-51; Document 7, pp. 56-59; [all position 4].
39. *Ibid.*, Document 2, pp. 37-41; Document 4, pp. 44-47; Document 5, pp. 48-51; Document 7 pp. 56-59.
40. The account of Ahmad b. `Isa reads: "The span of [Isma`il's] wazirate was fourteen years, but he fell out with the king, who denounced him and sent against him an army of soldiers, at their head Sultan Khamis al-Furawi, sultan of the [Sinnar] Musabba`at, and Shaykh `Ali walad Toma [the *muqaddam al-khayl*]. They surrounded him, seized him, and brought him by force before Sultan Badi, who killed him. That was in the year 1156/1743-1744." Spaulding, "Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa."
41. According to the *Makhtuta* (pp. 20-21), Badi "killed the remainder of the Unsab," an exaggeration.
42. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 9, pp. 66-70; Document 10, pp. 71-75; Document 12, pp. 80-88; Document 14, pp. 90-101; Document 15, pp. 102-108; Document 16, pp. 109-115; Document 18, pp. 119-128; Document 22, pp. 136-140; Document 23, pp. 141-145.Document 24, pp. 146-156; Document 25, pp. 157-167; Document 28, pp. 175-179; Document 32, pp. 192, pp. 192-196; Document 40, pp. 226-231.

43. The *wakil hosh khal al-malik* ranked second in Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 14, pp. 90-191; third in Document 9, pp. 66-70; Document 12, 80-88; Document 23, pp. 141-145; and fourth in Document 15, pp. 102-108; Document 16, pp. 109-115; Document 18, pp. 119-128; Document 22, pp. 136-140; Document 24, pp. 146-156; Document 25, pp. 157-167; Document 28, pp. 175-179; Document 40, pp. 226-231. In two exceptional cases the *wakil* ranked thirteenth Document 10, pp. 71-75 and fifteenth Document 32, pp. 192-196.
44. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 372.
45. Hartmann, *Reise*, p. 518.
46. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 434; Bruce (*Travels*, 6, p. 372) likewise called him "an officer of his [the king's] own family."
47. Sultans Badi I (c. 1608 – c. 1615) and Nol (c. 1718 – c. 1723); see *Makhtuta*, pp. 9, 20. The unsuccessful rebels of 1707 advanced the *sid al-qum* Awkal as their candidate for the throne of Badi III; see Spaulding, "Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa."
48. *Makhtuta*, p. 20.
49. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 372.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 375.
51. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 333-334.
52. Poncet, *Red Sea*, p. 110.
53. *Tabaqat*, pp. 202-204.
54. "The same usages, the same ceremonies, the same etiquette that existed at the court of Sinnar were also to be found at Taqali .... Just as was the government of Sinnar, so also was that of Taqali." A. Peney, "Mémoires sur l'ethnographie du soudan égyptien, III – Daher et Tagala," *Revue d'Ethnologie* 2 (1883): 515.
55. Muhammad `Abd al-Rahim, *al-Nida'*, p. 127.

4. THE NOBILITY

1. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 486, 623. The sultan's rights were questioned, and confirmed, in an Islamic judge's court near the end of the Heroic Age; see Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 55 , pp 307-312. .
2. "Il sultano medesimo possedeva una certa estensione di terreno di sua particolare proprietà;" and Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 487. The distinguishing characteristic of the demesne within a fief, called the *kursi* or *taqiya* (literally, the "throne" or "crown" land), was that in contrast to other landholdings in general and those which came under Islamic forms of tenure during the Heroic Age in particular, "the lands of the Tagia must descend inviolate from sheikh [lord] to sheikh;" E.N. Corbyn, "Report on Land Tenure," NRO Civil Secretary 38/C/4, "Land Tenure and Settlement."
3. References to the demesnes of the ruling families of Sinnar are not uncommon in the eighteenth-century documentary literature. However, it is not always possible to infer to which "king" or "king's son" the estate in question may have appertained; some may have belonged to the sultan's family, while others were clearly the demesnes of vassal noblemen. An apparent reference to the former category of demesnes may be found in a confirming charter of Sultan Badi IV (1732), in which the warning clauses are directed against the shaykhs of *dar walad al-malik*, "the estate of the king's [sultan's?] son;" Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 5, pp. 48-51. Similarly, the estate of the Queen Mother, in the

vicinity of `Abud near Sinnar, is mentioned in Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 27, pp 170-174.

The demesnes of vassals are more probably indicated in references such as the following. A plot of land given as bridewealth in the Shaiqiya country (undated, but c. 1820) bordered upon "the *saqiya* [irrigated plot] of the son of the king;" NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/447. A plot of land at al-Kurayda near al-Matamma, sold during the early years of the nineteenth century, was bordered on one side by the estate of Surur the son of the lord of al-Matamma, *makk* Musa`ad, and on the other by "the estate of the sons of *makk* Musa`ad;" NRO Miscellaneous 1/14/125. A second plot of land in the vicinity of al-Matamma, when sold early in the nineteenth century, was said to adjoin "the well-known *mirin* [*jarf* land] of *makk* Musa`ad;" NRO Miscellaneous 1/14/125. Concerning two pieces of land in the al-Damir area bestowed as bridewealth early in the nineteenth century, it was said that in each case, "on the south, its boundary is the estate of the *makk* [of the Ja`aliyin?];" NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/778, Piece 67. In the Berber area, toward the middle of the nineteenth century, a plot of land given as bridewealth was described as being located in the *jarf* lands of the (erstwhile) *makk* of Berber, and adjoining several holdings of members of his family, the Awlad Timsah; NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/778, Piece 71.

4. Some special consideration may perhaps be given to the present landholdings of the royal family near Sinja; however, the origin of this particular settlement has been obscured by controversy. For an introduction to the complexities of competing claims in this regard, see "Report by Mr. Munro," NRO Civil Secretary 38/C/4, "Land Tenure and Settlement."
5. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 28, pp. 175-179.
6. Indirect testimony to the existence of a demesne system in the province of Qarri may perhaps be found in the behavior of the early nineteenth-century noblemen based in the Shaiqiya country. After years of conflict with the provincial authorities they took service with the Turks and were rewarded with lands near the provincial capital—possibly part of the provincial demesne.
7. "Report by Mr. Munro," NRO Civil Secretary 38/C/4, "Land Tenure and Settlement."
8. "Report of Yuzbashi Mohammed Effendi on Land Questions," NRO Civil Secretary 38/C/4, "Land Tenure and Settlement." A British official of the early twentieth century interpreted the status of *kursi* lands in terms comprehensible to his superiors: "[Rights over *kursi* lands] were exercised by the Mangil [*manjil*] or District Commissioner as agent of the sovereign. As a matter of convenience the D.[istrict] C.[ommissioner]-ship usually continued in the same family (and might be mixed up with the headship of a tribe) but its rights and functions . . . [were] divorced from any question of family ownership/family estates;" E.N. Corbyn, "Report on Land Tenure," NRO Civil Secretary 38/C/4, "Land Tenure and Settlement." For confirmation of this principle in regard to the region formerly under the *manjil* of Alays, see C.E. Lyall, "Rights, dues and customs prevailing among Arab tribes in White Nile Province," *Sudan Notes and Records* 4, 4 (1921): 203.
9. E.N. Corbyn, "Report on Land Tenure," NRO Civil Secretary 38/C/4, "Land Tenure and Settlement."

10. The boundaries of northern districts are well known and their existence is not controversial. For a discussion of the central and southern districts, see Spaulding, "Farmers, Herdsmen and the State" and "Demystification."
11. Cadalvène, *L'Egypte*, 2, p. 325. Similarly, in the Ja`aliyin country (1814) Burckhardt observed of *makk* Nimr that "his relatives are the governors of villages," (*Travels*, p. 249), while Hoskins (*Travels*, p. 211) confirmed the practice with an example from northern Dongola.
12. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 300. It was probably a slave officer similar to the one observed by Krump who appeared in an hagiographical account of a seventeenth-century religious dignitary as the *jundi al-hilla* ("officer of the village"); Ibrahim al-Hajj Babikr, "al-Rikabiya wa-Bani'l-`Abbas: ta'rikh al-Shaykh Ya`qub wa-rihlatuhu," NRO Miscellaneous 1/15/181.
13. Hoskins, *Travels*, p. 89. For some details of possibly representative relationships between lesser noblemen, see Delmet's discussion of *morké* as practiced between "the Funj of Ghuli and the Hamaj of Roseires" ("Islamisation," p. 39).
14. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 292.
15. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 286-288.
16. Thus the throne before the gate of the sultan's palace, where he sat to administer justice, was called "the bench [*dikka*] of him who has summoned you;" (*Makhtuta*, p. 11).
17. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 323.
18. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 31, pp. 190-191.
19. C.S. Seligman, "Note on Darfung, 5/11/30" [based on fieldwork in the very early 1900s], NRO Dakhlia 112/16/102, "Buruns and Allied Tribes."
20. For example, see Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 195. For reasons to be discussed below there is some reason to believe the pecuniary dimensions to investiture were particularly conspicuous in Burckhardt's day; however, it is not improbable that accession presents were a custom of long standing.
21. For a discussion of the forms of tribute available to a lesser nobleman and the means by which such items were obtained from the subjects, see the chapter entitled "The Subjects."
22. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 265.
23. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 57 pp. 318-320.
24. For the respective depositions of Unsa b. Badi and Badi b. Nol, see *Makhtuta*, pp. 19-20, 23.
25. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 245, 256-258, 264-265, 370; Poncet, *Red Sea*, p. 100; P. Brévédent in Montano, *L'Etiopia Francescana*, p. 437; and Bruce, *Travels*, 6, pp. 279, 323.
26. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan fi muluk al-`Arab bi'l-Sudan wa-muluk al-`Abdallab min al-shaykh `Ajib al-awwil ila ta`rikhihi," NRO Miscellaneous 1/20/232.
27. Protocol at provincial and district courts followed a simplified and less formal version of the customs that prevailed at the sultan's court. A visitor to a minor district court on the upper Blue Nile noted, for example, that the more important people sat on *'anqaribs* while the lesser shaykhs sat on mats on the ground; Ernst Marno, *Reisen im Gebiete des Blauen und Weissen Nil* (Wien: 1874), p. 26.
28. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 50 pp. 274-280.

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29. *Ibid.*, Document 54, pp. 365-368.
30. For this function of the capitals, see Frédéric Cailliaud, *Voyage à Méroé* (Paris: 1823), 3, pp. 192, 237.
31. Compare the experiences of Krump at Qarri (*Palm-Baum*, pp. 298-318) and Bruce at Atbara (*Travels*, 6, pp. 277-330).
32. *Makhtuta*, pp. 40-41.
33. The general principle was enunciated by Brocchi: "None of [the courtiers] have a fixed salary [*stipendio*], but are maintained by the largesse of the sovereign" (*Giornale*, 5, p. 434). Instances confirming the principle were recorded by the traveler and political prisoner Bruce at Atbara (*Travels*, 6, pp. 285ff) and by the courtier Krump at Qarri (*Palm-Baum*; contrast pp. 299-300 with pp. 305-306). An extended if jaundiced view of the very similar organization of the capital of the Khalifa `Abdullahi may be found in Slatin, *Fire and Sword*, chapters 11 through 17.
34. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 298-317, especially pp. 304-305.

5. THE BUREAUCRACY

1. Félix Mengin, *Histoire de l'Egypte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed-Aly* (Paris: 1823), 2, p. 225.
2. No single source directly asserts that this principle prevailed in Sinnar, but its existence may be inferred with a reasonable degree of certainty from the actions of Islamic holy men of the eighteenth century. When a sultan bestowed upon them grants of wealth and privilege which were explicitly said to be in perpetuity, they nevertheless observed the practice of having each of these grants renewed by each succeeding ruler in turn. Further support may be derived from comparison with an analogous and rather better documented institution in the neighboring kingdom of Dar Fur; see R.S. O'Fahey, *State and Society in Dar Fur* (London: 1980), p. 22; and R.S. O'Fahey and M.I. Abu Salim, *Land in Dar Fur* (Cambridge: 1983), p. 18.
3. Brocchi, (*Giornale*, 5, pp. 486, 623) explained that the land belonged to the sultan, but that others were given usufruct rights by him at his pleasure. See also Mengin, *Histoire*, 2, p. 225.
4. For example, see Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 49, pp. 271-273 (Qarri); Document 52, pp. 287-289 (the Jamu`iya); and Document 45, pp. 247-250 (the Daniyab).
5. From a document in the private collection of Dr. Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, photocopied and cited here with his gracious consent.
6. L.F. Nalder, "Tribal-Northern District," NRO Dakhlia 112/4/23, "Hamada-Rufa`a."
7. "Report on Land Tenure by Mr. Munro," [Durham], pp. 4-5.
8. For the application of this technique against the `Abdallab, see Part Three.
9. Prudhoe, "Extracts," p. 49.
10. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 315.
11. L.M.A. Linant de Bellefonds, *Diary of Linant de Bellefonds*, ed. Margaret Shinnie (Khartoum: 1958), p. 54; and Eduard Rüppell, *Reisen in Nubien* (Frankfurt: 1829), pp. 22, 45-46.

12. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 629.
13. *Makhtuta*, p. 11.
14. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 283 and footnote.
15. Linant, *Diary*, p. 54; Cadalvène, *L'Egypte*, 2, p. 331; Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 237; and Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 401.
16. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 317, 695. Rüppell (*Reisen*, p. 154) observed that the *makks* in the Shaiqiya country could not sentence an offender to death.
17. Hillelson, "David Reubeni," p. 57; Poncet, *Red Sea*, p. 104; and Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 318.
18. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 613-614. For specific examples from the Heroic Age, see *Makhtuta*, pp. 42, 63.
19. For example, Faqih Ban al-Naqa al-Darir performed this function for Sultan Nayil (*Tabaqat*, p. 109). For the functions of the *`ukkaz* as preserved in the eighteenth century by some leaders of religious communities, see F.C.S. Lorimer, "The Megadhib of El Damer," *Sudan Notes and Records* 19, 2 (1936): 337. In the southern land of Taqali the custom of sealing the resolution of disputes by the swearing of oaths on the king's iron staff was preserved into the nineteenth century (Dr. Janet Ewald, personal communication).
20. Al-Shatir Busayli `Abd al-Jalil, *Ma 'alim ta'rikh Sudan wadi al-Nil*, (Cairo: 1955), pp. 291 (photocopy) and 262 (text).
21. Hoskins, *Travels*, p. 207; and O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, p. 194, note 68.
22. Charles Cuny, *Journal de Voyage du Docteur Charles Cuny de Siout à El Obéid du 22 novembre au 5 avril 1858* (Paris: 1863), pp. 30-31.
23. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 238.
24. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 434-435.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 331.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 434.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 332.
28. Jeanette Wakin advises that *jari* and *jaraya* should be regarded as synonymous with *wakil* and *wikala*; see *The Function of Documents in Islamic Law: The Chapters on Sales from Tahawi's "Kitab al-Shurut al-Kabir"* (Albany: 1972), pp. 96, 118-119.
29. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 24, pp. 146-156.
30. During the Mahdist period Ibrahim b. Muhammad `Adlan, a member of the family of the former Hamaj regents, organized the Khalifa's treasury—at that time called the *bayt al-mal*—along similar lines. See Joseph Ohrwalder, *Aufstand und Reich des Mahdi im Sudan* (Innsbruck: 1892), pp. 150-151, 223-224; and Ahmad Ibrahim Abu Shouk and Anders Bjørkelo, eds., *Public Treasury of the Muslims: monthly budgets of the Mahdist state in the Sudan, 1897* (NY: 1996).
31. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 31, pp. 190-191.
32. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 57, pp. 318-320.
33. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 323.
34. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 295.
35. *Makhtuta*, p. 22.
36. O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, Chapter 3; and Cengiz Orhonlu, *Habeş Eyaleti* (Istanbul: 1974), pp. 64-68.
37. Spaulding, "Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa."

38. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 34, pp. 203-204.
39. For example, see George Bethune English, *A Narrative of the Expedition to Dongola and Sinnar* (Boston: 1823), pp. 46-47, 66 and note.
40. J. Lapanouse, *Mémoire sur les caravannes du Darfour et du Sennaar* (Paris: 1802), p. 97; and O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, p. 56.
41. R.S. O'Fahey, "Slavery and the Slave Trade in Dar Fur," *Journal of African History* 14, 1 (1973): 29-44; and *State and Society*, pp. 135-139.
42. A practical illustration of the division of the army of Sinnar into theoretically balanced corps of infantry and cavalry may be found in the account of the second Ethiopian war given by "Extracts from Sections of Soudan History," [Durham] 404/4.
43. The principle that "weapons are under the administration of the government" survived until the fall of Sinnar (Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 544), although this aspect of central authority dissipated in practice as did the corresponding institutions in other spheres. For some insight into the manufacture of armor in the precolonial Sudan, see A.J. Arkell, "The Making of Mail at Omdurman," *Kush* 4 (1956): 83-84.
44. For example, see the case cited above in note 7.
45. Robert Hartmann, *Die Nilländer* (Prag: 1884), pp. 64, 88.

6. THE SUBJECTS

1. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 317. The traveler elsewhere (p. 572) summarized this situation by saying that all the subjects of Sinnar were subject to the same sovereign, but not to the same law.
2. Guillaume Lejean, *Voyage aux deux Nils* (Paris: 1865), p. 142 (al-Taka province).
3. Marno, *Blauen Nil*, p. 52.
4. George Waddington and Barnard Hanbury, *Journal of a Visit to Some Parts of Ethiopia* (London: 1822), p. 214.
5. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 24, pp. 146-156.
6. Prudhoe, "Extracts," p. 57
7. For example, one may consider the statement of Vice Consul Petherick's servant, a man from Dongola: "You know well the contempt that in my country is felt toward a woman that leaves her home with her husband;" Mr. [John] and Mrs. [Kate] Petherick, *Travels in Central Africa* (London: 1869), 1, p. 108.
8. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 224; Rüppell, *Reisen*, p. 107; and Hoskins, *Travels*, p. 90.
9. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 106; Cadalvène, *L'Egypte*, 2, p. 336; Hoskins, *Travels*, p. 59; and Rüppell, *Reisen*, p. 44.
10. Letter of Benoît de Maillet, 28 July 1695; Montano, *Etiopia Francescana*, 2, p. 138.
11. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 224.
12. Poncet, *Red Sea*, p, 106.
13. Wendy James, *'Kwanim Pa: The Making of the Uduk People* (Oxford: 1979), p. 48.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
15. Jackson, *Tooth of Fire*, p. 96; Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan;" and Janet Ewald, "Leadership and Social Change on an Islamic Frontier: The Kingdom of Taqali, 1780-1900," Ph.D. diss. University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1982, 2, p. 328.

16. See Jay Spaulding, "Taxation in Sinnar," *Northeast African Studies* 6, 1-2 (1984): 127-146.
17. For example, the Chronicler reported that in 1227/1812-1813, "a man from the corps of Faraj Allah [a military officer] was killed in our village of al-Kawiwawi; the village was plundered and dispersed" (*Makhtuta*, p. 71).
18. Samuel Hillelson, *Sudan Arabic Texts* (Cambridge: 1935), pp. 165-167. The poet was Farah wad Taktuk (*flor.* c. 1680-1700).
19. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 125.
20. Some pastoral groups made use of parts of the north; however, since the livelihood of most pastoralists was rooted in the central zone, the governance of herdsmen will be considered in the following section.
21. A detailed discussion of land classification may be found in Bjørkelo, "From King to Kashif," Chapter 5.
22. *Makhtuta*, pp. 59, 77.
23. A detailed contemporary example of the work of the *muhass* at the provincial or district level may be found in [Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, ed.], *Sadat al-Majadhib* [Khartoum: n.d.], 1, [no pagination].
24. I am most grateful to Dr. `Ali `Osman Muhammad Salih for his description of the mobilization of labor for the construction of a nobleman's residence in the kingdom of Koka, a Nubian district immediately north of the border of Sinnar (Khartoum, December 1969). A useful introduction to the organization of labor at the district level may be found in his doctoral dissertation, "The Economy and Trade of Medieval Nubia," Christ's College, Cambridge, 1978.
25. Nalder, "Tales," p. 72.
26. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 309, 430; see also p. 701 for the alternative figure of one-fifth on irrigated land. Subsequent traditions tended to assert that one-sixth, rather than one-fifth, was the share of the government (and later, of the private landowner); see NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/590, "Registration of Minimum Shares in Land in Dongola Province," and NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/591, "Riverain Lands." Allowance must be made for the possible existence of regional variations in the basic pattern of taxation.
27. Brocchi (*Giornale*, 5, p. 277) noted that the crops "were estimated every year by the *capo del paese*."
28. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 24, pp. 146-156.
29. For the term "*mutra*," see A. Paul, "Some Aspects of the Fung Sultanate," *Sudan Notes and Records* 35, 2 (1954): 23. There may be some link between this term and the *midd tara'id* of the immunity clauses from Taqali of Historisk Institutt, Universitetet i Bergen, Sudan Collection, documents SK 3.1/3 and SK 2.1/2; the *midd* is a measure of grain. For the levy of special prosperity taxes in general, see Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 430, and Spaulding, "Farmers, Herdsmen," p. 346.
30. For an introduction to the application of the share system under early twentieth-century conditions, see H.C. Jackson, "Seed-Time and Harvest," *Sudan Notes and Records* 2, 1 (1919): 1-17; A. Paul, "Sagia Custom in Shendi District," *Sudan Notes and Records* 19, 2 (1936): 346-351; NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/590, "Registration of Minimum Shares in Land in Dongola Province," and NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/591, "Riverain Lands."

31. Jay Spaulding, *Arcangelo Carradori's Dictionary of Seventeenth-Century Kenzi Nubian* (Bergen: 1975), Entry A 1; and Hoskins, *Travels*, p. 207.
32. Photographed by the present author in February 1970. The use of such storage facilities was mentioned by English (*Narrative*, p. 51): "They [the *makks* of the Shaiqiya] obliged the peasants to work hard to raise food and forage to fill the magazines of their castles, which are seen here and there all over this country."
33. Spaulding, "Farmers, Herdsmen," pp. 337, 343-346.
34. al-Shatir Busayli, *ma 'alim*, pp. 291 (photocopy) and 262 (text).
35. O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, p. 70.
36. From an untitled manuscript genealogy of the Awlad Nibayr, in the possession of the family. I am most grateful to Mr. Ahmad al-Mu`tasim al-`Abbas, whose good offices permitted me to copy it (11 July 1979).
37. For an introduction, see J.K. Jackson and M.K. Shawgi, "Shifting Cultivation in the Sudan," *Sudan Notes and Records* 31, 2 (1950): 210-222.
38. J.W. Robertson, NRO Dakhlia 112/8/54, "Hamar;" Spaulding, "Farmers, Herdsmen," pp. 333-335; and `Abd al-Ghaffar, *Shaykhs and Followers*, pp. 42, 47-48.
39. The following discussion is based largely upon `Abd al-Ghaffar, *Shaykhs and Followers*, esp. pp. 94-95.
40. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 357.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 358.
42. See "The Hamaj."
43. The partial dependence of the gold-producing regions upon imported food was noted as early as 1700 and again in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. "Letter of Pasquale da Montella from Sinnar, 15 May 1700;" Montano, *Etiopia Francescana*, 2, pp. 508-509; A Peney, "Mémoires sur l'ethnographie du soudan égyptien, IV – Le Fazouglou," *Revue d'Ethnologie* 3 (1885): 50; Giovanni Beltrame, *Il Sennaar e lo Sciangallah* (Verona: 1879), 2, pp. 116-117; "Notes on the Abyssinian Frontier near the Blue Nile by N.M. Smythe," NRO Intelligence 2/17/146, "Sudan-Abyssinia;" "Statement of `Abd al-Rahman al-Hasan al-Ja`ali," NRO Intelligence 2/17/144; and G.S. Nickerson, "Dar Fung and Burun Country," NRO Dakhlia 112/16/102, "Buruns."
44. The Berta, for example, rationalized their payments of gold on the grounds that before the Funj came they did not know either the value of gold or how to extract it. It was the Funj who taught the Berta "how to extract gold, for the Berta knew no use for gold at first." The gold did not stay in the hands of the local Funj lord but "was carried to the big *mukuk* [plural of *makk*] of Keili, Fazagalu and Sennar;" Alessandro Triulzi, "Prelude to the History of a No Man's Land: Bela Shangul, Wallagga, Ethiopia (ca. 1800 – 1898)," Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1979, p. 139. The rationalization given has constitutional but not historical significance; the Berta had been suppliers of gold since the days of Cosmas, whose account of the gold trade out of western Ethiopia included Berta terms. See G.A. Wainwright, "Cosmas and the Gold Trade of Fazoghli," *Man* 5, 42 (1942): 52-58.
45. For example, when a Berta gold-washer came across an unusually large deposit amounting to about eight ounces, he turned it over to his lord and received in return a house and a pretty slave girl; see Juan Maria Schuver, "Reisen im oberen Nilgebiet," *Petermanns Mittheilungen*, Ergänzungsheft 72 (1883): 45.

46. J.W. Robertson, "Observations on the Berta of Kiri Omodia 27/2/32," NRO Dakhlia 112/16/101, "Berta." Adjoining this reference in the margin of the manuscript, a note in the handwriting of A.J. Arkell states that there once existed an essay on the (presumably numerous?) rights of a southern nobleman to payments by his subjects in the form of gold, written by A.W.M. Disney on the basis of information given him by *makk* Nayil (of Kiri), but that this essay had since been lost. The present author approached Mr. Disney in the hope of recovering some of this information; alas, the message arrived a few weeks after his passing. For another example of the imposition of death dues, derived from Ghule, see Delmet, "Islamisation," p. 39.
47. For an illustrative example, see Smythe, "Notes," NRO Intelligence 2/17/146.
48. For example, the Berta recalled that with the arrival of the Funj, individuals formerly executed for witchcraft were handed over as slaves to the Funj nobles; note by J.D.P. Chataway on A.J. Arkell's history of the Berta, NRO Dakhlia 112/16/101, "Berta."
49. For example, see James, *'Kwanim Pa*, pp. 46-59, especially the episode recounted on p. 50. Since James emphasizes that these stories represent "common knowledge and general feeling on the question" (p. 48), they therefore possess a general constitutional value that exceeds the weight as evidence of the specific events they purport to describe.
50. A certain anthropological tendency has approached these southern peoples with the expectation of finding "tribes" and has often been disappointed with reality. Some of this sentiment appears in Triulzi's comment in regard to the Berta ("Prelude," p. 12): "As waves of conquerors, slave-raiders and colonizers penetrated the region, all imposing their own structure of domination and oppression, the Berta seem to have lost whatever social organization they formerly possessed."
51. Spaulding, "Farmers, Herdsmen," p. 346.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 344 and note 96.
53. Such acts of generosity were the stock-in-trade of court storytellers, who gave form to the ethos of the elite. For some examples, see Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
54. Spaulding, "Farmers, Herdsmen," p. 346.
55. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 317-321.
56. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 18, pp. 119-128.
57. For appeals from the local community to a district *makk*, see Triulzi, "Prelude," p. 127.
58. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 47, pp. 262-266.
59. See "The Bureaucracy," note 17.
60. Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 128-129; and Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 602.
61. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 248.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 602.

7. EXCHANGE

1. For an extended discussion, see Jay Spaulding, "The Management of Exchange in Sinnar," in Leif O. Manger, ed., *Trade and Markets in the Eastern Sudan* (Bergen: 1984), pp. 25-48.

2. The intensity and pervasiveness of this concern with obtaining a good match may be seen in the northern Sudanese oral literature of folk tales, through which the norms of acceptable and preferable marriage choices were inculcated among the young. See F.C. T. Moore, "An Approach to the Analysis of Folk Stories from Central and Northern Sudan," in Sayyid H. Hurreiz and Herman Bell, eds., *Directions in Sudanese Linguistics and Folklore* (Khartoum: 1975); Sayyid H. Hurreiz, *Ja 'aliyyin Folktales* (Bloomington: 1977); and Ahmed al-Shahi and F.C.T. Moore, *Wisdom from the Nile: A Collection of Folk Stories from Northern and Central Sudan* (Oxford: 1978).
3. From the perspective of an historian's preoccupation with genres of sources, the first type of society tends to generate large numbers of wills, while in the second certificates of bridewealth, supplemented by evidence of gifts from the senior to the junior generation tend to predominate. The source literature from the northern Sudan before the Mahdia contains very few wills but numerous bridewealth certificates and gifts from parent to child.
4. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 183.
5. MacMichael, *History*, 2, p. 376.
6. For an extended discussion see Jay Spaulding, "*Kora*: A Theme in Nubian Cultural History," *Africa Today*, 28, 2 (1981): 61-68.
7. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 39, pp. 220-225.
8. Brehm, *Reiseskizzen*, 1, p. 172.
9. The definition of *kora* employed here is that of `Awn al-Sharif Qasim, *Qamus al-lahja al-'amiya fi'l-Sudan* (Khartoum: 1972), p. 695.
10. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 23, pp. 141-145. In the more conservative districts of the northern Sudan, even at the beginning of the twentieth century each market was said to "belong" to a particular nobleman. See NRO Blue Nile Province 1/28/206, "White Nile Handbook." To cite one familiar example, the market which formed the core of the modern town of al-Qadarif was known throughout the nineteenth century by the name of its overlord, as the *suq* of Abu Sinn.
11. For the activities of the *sid al-darb* in various parts of southern Sinnar, see NRO Dakhlia 112/15/100, "Ingessana;" Chataway, "Burun Tribes;" C.S. Seligman, "Note of Darfung" [Ingessana and Sillok]; G.S. Nickerson, "Dar Fung and Burun Country" [Keili], NRO Dakhlia 112/16/102, "Buruns;" and NRO Blue Nile Province 1/27/202, "Fung Province Notes." For the comparable institution in parts of the Nuba Mountains, where non-Arabic titles were used, see S.F. Nadel, "Interim Reports" [on the Moro, Mesakin, Korongo and Koalib], NRO Dakhlia 112/215/98, "Nuba."
12. Schuver, "Reisen," p. 55.
13. *Makhtuta*, p. 42; and Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
14. Lejean, *Voyage*, p. 15; and Mordechai Abir, "Brokerage and Brokers in Ethiopia in the first half of the 19th Century," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 3, 1 (1965): 1-5.
15. Schuver, "Reisen," p. 5.
16. Mengin, *Histoire*, 2, pp. 222-223; and Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 141. Prudhoe ("Extracts," p. 54) was afforded a unique opportunity to examine the specie hoards of a small village in the central Gezira, for during his visit the settlement caught fire and people were forced to expose their valuables while rescuing them.

17. Poncet, *Red Sea*, p. 98.
18. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 285.
19. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 330 (Atbara).
20. Iron, gold, cloth and grain are discussed by Burckhardt (*Travels*, pp. 216-217). For the use of the familiar Ethiopian *amole*, known in Sinnar as the "Qalib" or "Galub," see Schuver, "Reisen," p. 55, and Marno, *Blauen Nil*, pp. 80-86.
21. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 358. The same practice was observed in the north at Berber by Cailliaud (*Voyage*, 2, p. 113), and Brocchi (*Giornale*, 5, p. 309) similarly observed that all traditional taxes could be paid in diverse forms.
22. Papers of A.J. Arkell, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Box 1, File 1: White Nile, "Note on the tribute system of Dar Gimma and Dar Muharrib at the Turkish reign (Kerrar Mohd. Beshir) 1928" (folios 81-84) and "al-jizya bi-dar al-Jima` sabiqan, Arabic 1928" (folios 85-86). A corresponding example of value-fixing from the northern zone, c. 1800-1820, may be found in a (real or bogus) grant by the central government to a holy man of a stipend to consist of 120 *mikyal min ma'ali 'aysh al-dinar*, meaning perhaps "120 royal measures of grain worth one *dinar* each;" photocopy and text of ostensible letter of "Sultan Muhammad Badi `Ajib" to "the Banu Umayya living in the province of Dongola," no date, authenticity doubtful; published in al-Shatir Busayli, *Ma 'alim*, pp. 269-271.
23. The system presupposed that the overall value of commodities exchanged in the market did not grossly exceed that of the same commodities offered as tax payments to the government. The general principle at work has been formulated as follows: "The extent to which the State theory is capable of explaining the value of primitive money, as distinct from its validity, depends upon the relative importance of political and non-political payments in a given community. Where political payments predominate, the value of money is largely derived from its acceptability for such payments. On the other hand, in highly commercialized communities, where payments arising from trade are of overwhelming importance, the supply and demand theory, quality theory and cost of production theory are much more useful in explaining the behavior of money than the State theory;" Einzig, *Primitive Money*, pp. 412-413.
24. "Taxes for use of a market, payable to its sponsor;" NRO Dakhlia 112/5/28, "Arakiin;" "a due taken on the sale of articles," MacMichael, *History*, 2, p. 79; see also Lejean, *Voyage*, p. 132.
25. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 218.
26. For a comparative perspective on the royal trade of Sinnar, see Lidwien Kapteijns and Jay Spaulding, "Precolonial Trade Between States in the Eastern Sudan, *ca.* 1700 – *ca.* 1900," *African Economic History* 11 (1982): 27-62.
27. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 238. The registers from the frontier were audited when the caravan reached the capital; on arrival, the *khabir* "is obliged, immediately upon his arrival there, to give an account of how many persons he is conducting, their status, condition, and the quantity of goods carried by each;" see the correspondence of Francesco Maria da Salemi (1698), in G. Giamberardini, ed., *I viaggiatori francescani attraverso la Nubia dal 1698 al 1710* (Cairo: 1963), p. 389.
28. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 265; 304-305. From Krump's account it is clear that travelers bound for Sinnar were forbidden to enter provincial capitals (p. 304);

their goods were to be regarded as royal property, not to be examined by local lords (pp. 237-238), and if they tarried along the way royal couriers were sent to hurry them along (p. 270). The central government's protection of *khawajas* from both the risks and temptations of the journey through the provinces is also evident in Pasquale da Montella's letter of 19 March 1699; Montano, *Etiopia Francescana*, 2, p. 480.

29. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 285.
30. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 317, 330.
31. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 362 (Sinnar town).
32. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 285.
33. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 317.
34. "The Egyptian Christians and foreigners here have their own burial ground;" Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 323,
35. For an example from about 1720, based upon court records in Cairo, see Terence Walz, "The Trade Between Egypt and Bilad as-Sudan, 1700-1820," Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1975, chapter 1, p. 104, note 1.
36. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 281-282.
37. This role of the patron of *khawajas* in Sinnar is most clearly evident in Schuver's account of the court of Gubba ("Reisen," pp. 77-78), whose lord, by the end of his reign, would claim for himself the title "Sultan of the Funj;" see Major R.E. Cheesman, *Lake Tana and the Blue Nile* (London: 1936), p. 369.
38. Burckhardt (*Travels*, p. 275) noted that the traders of the Sinnar caravan were "chiefly agents of the King of Sennaar and his vizier, who are the principal merchants of that place." By Burckhardt's day, however, the relative status of this sultanic trade in relation to other commerce had greatly declined.
39. The information given to Lapanouse (*Mémoire*, p. 93) is quite explicit that "the exclusive privilege of exploiting these [gold] mines is reserved to the sovereign." Like many others of his day, Lapanouse was misled into thinking that Sudanese gold was derived from a few large "mines" or "workings." Alas, no such concentrated centers of extraction existed, and gold was acquired only by the application of many hands to alluvial washings at numerous sites; therefore, royal control could not have been exercised in as simple a fashion as Lapanouse suggests. He added that "the nuggets of gold which weigh more than half a Spanish piaster belong to the king, and those below this weight to the officers and soldiers who protect these workings." This feature of the customary regulation of gold production in southern Sinnar is confirmed as an overall principle by Smythe's note on "Dul, Beni Shangul, Assosa," in NRO Dakhlia 112/16/101, "Berta," while Schuver ("Reisen," p. 45) recorded an exemplary case in which a subject, upon finding a large piece of gold, promptly delivered it to his lord—who then rewarded him. One may conclude that the sultan probably received his share of the southern gold as tribute from his vassals, who obtained it from the subjects in various ways, including the preemptive claim of nuggets mentioned by Lapanouse.
40. Lapanouse, *Mémoire*, p. 97; and Mengin, *Histoire*, 2, p. 223.
41. Cailliaud, *Voyage*, 3 p. 121.
42. This paragraph is adapted from Kapteijns and Spaulding, "Precolonial Trade."
43. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 177-178; 202; 220; 229; 233-234; 248; 253-254; 263; 270; 371; 379-381.

44. Lapanouse, *Mémoire*, p. 96; *Makhtuta*, pp. 9-10, 47; and Bruce, *Travels*, 7, p. 98.
45. The seventeenth-century sultan Badi II "used to send presents with his caravan-guides to the *`ulama'* of Egypt and elsewhere, and his gracious gifts came to them with his caravan-guide [*khabir*] Ahmad walad `Alwan, ancestor of Ya`qub walad Abu Bakr" (*Makhtuta*, p. 10). Arbab Yusuf walad Abbakr walad Ahmad walad `Alwan, perhaps a brother of Ya`qub, appears as a witness to several sultanic charters of the third quarter of the eighteenth century.
46. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 171-178; 202; and 204.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 309.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 204-205. Poncet (*Red Sea*, pp. 94-95) offered a rather idealized account of the internal discipline of a caravan.
49. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 226; 231; and 264-265.
50. Ledyard, an American traveler in Cairo in 1788, reported: "Not only is he [the sultan of Sinnar] concerned in the Sennaar caravans, but keeps an agent at Cairo to procure and contract for him;" J. Leyden, *Historical Account of Discoveries and Travels in Africa* (Edinburgh: 1817), 1, p. 290.
51. Poncet (*Red Sea*, p. 94) met such an agent, "a relation of the King of Sennar" in Asyut. Frederick Lewis Norden met a royal agent from Sinnar, also in Upper Egypt, at mid-century; *Travels in Egypt and Nubia* (London: 1757), 2, p. 33. C.S. Sonnini had a similar experience in 1777: *Voyage dans la haute et basse Egypte* (Paris: VII/1799), 3, pp. 85-88. Both Norden and Sonnini reported that they were invited to go to Sinnar by the royal agent; Poncet did not record an invitation, but in this case none was necessary as he was generally known to be en route to the Sudan at the time of his encounter.
52. The famous traveler `Umar al-Tunisi, who spent much of the first two decades of the nineteenth century in Dar Fur and Wadai, reported that a "man of Sinnar" in Jidda had invited his grandfather to go to the Funj kingdom; H. Perron, *Voyage au Darfour* (Paris: 1848), p. 12.
53. Poncet, *Red Sea*, p. 113.
54. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 365.

8. KINGS OF SUN AND SHADOW

1. NRO Intelligence 5/1/5, "Arabic MS Genealogy;" the text reads: "*awwiluhum al-sultan `Amara Dunqas wa-kanu yaquluna lahu malik al-shams wa'l-zill.*"
2. I am most grateful to several members of the royal family who shared their knowledge on the condition that their names not be mentioned. The interviews took place in February and March 1977.
3. For example, see Hillelson, "David Reubeni," pp. 55-66. For a discussion of Ethiopian views of the same period, see O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, pp. 33-35.
4. *Makhtuta*, p. 10
5. For a discussion of this legend and the sources from which it is derived, see P.M. Holt, "Sultan Selim I and the Sudan," *Journal of African History* 8, 1 (1967): 19-24.
6. *Makhtuta*, pp. 21-22.
7. Triulzi, "Prelude," pp. 16, 18, 43ff. For the role of annual communal ceremonies of possession by "spirits from Sinnar" in the religious life of the subject community

of Kunama-speakers in al-Taka province, see Mario Cittadini, "Primitivo Stanziamento estra Eritreo dei Cunama," *Proceedings of the Third International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa, 1966* (Addis Ababa: 1970): 329-332.

8. For an extended discussion, see Tor Irstam, *The King of Ganda: Studies in the Institutions of Sacral Kingship in Africa* (Stockholm: 1944).
9. *Makhtuta*, pp. 6-7; see also P.M. Holt, "Funj Origins: A Critique and New Evidence," *Journal of African History* 4, 1 (1963): 39-56.
10. Spaulding, "*Kora*," pp. 61-68.
11. James, '*Kwanim Pa*, p. 81; and Triulzi, "Prelude," pp. 71, 139, 145.
12. O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, p. 18.
13. Elles, "Tagale," p. 21; Triulzi, "Prelude," chapter 2; and M.C. Jedrej, "The Funj Bull: Myth, History and Ritual," in John Hargreaves, *An African Miscellany for John Hargreaves* (Aberdeen: 1983): 54-56.
14. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 381; Lejean, *Voyage*, p. 119; and A.E. Robinson, "The regalia of the Fung Sultans of Sennar," *Journal of the Royal African Society* 30 (1930-1931): 361-376.
15. Triulzi, "Prelude," p. 57.
16. "Preliminary Notes on the Gura Tribe," NRO Dakhlia 112/16/105, "Gura-Maban;" and James, '*Kwanim Pa*, p. 100.
17. O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, p. 18.
18. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, pp. 373-374; and 7, pp. 348-354; and "D.B. Thompson, Inspector Roseires to the Governor of Singa, 12 February 1911" in "Tour of Inspection in Southern Khots, Roseires District," NRO Intelligence 2/19/156, "Gallabat Intelligence News."
19. The most prominent victim of this technique of malefaction was Sultan Badi IV; *Makhtuta*, p. 25.
20. J. von Russegger, *Reisen in Europa, Asien und Afrika* (Stuttgart: 1843), 2, ii, pp. 460-462.
21. Marno, *Blauen Nil*, p. 198; and NRO Blue Nile Province 1/27/202, "Fung Province Notes."
22. For various examples from the provinces, see C.S. Seligman, "Note on Darfung," NRO Dakhlia 112/16/102, "Buruns;" Chataway, "Burun Tribes," NRO Dakhlia 112/16/102, "Buruns;" Robertson, "Sillak, Maghagha and Abu El Dugu," NRO Dakhlia 112/16/102, "Buruns;" and Triulzi, "Prelude," p. 52.
23. Marno, *Blauen Nil*, p. 239; and Russegger, *Reisen*, 2, ii, p. 462.
24. This discussion is adapted from Spaulding, "Demystification," p. 8.
25. Russegger, *Reisen*, 2, ii, p. 603.
26. Triulzi, "Prelude," chapter 3.
27. Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "al-qatl al-taqsi `and al-funj," *Dirasat fi ta'rikh al-Sudan* (Khartoum: 1975), pp. 88-108.
28. Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, *al-Funj wa'l-ard: watha'iq tamlik* (Khartoum: 1967), p. 51.
29. Russegger, *Reisen*, 2, ii, p. 553, note.
30. For the example of the Berta-speaking areas see Triulzi, "Prelude," chapter 3.
31. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 572.
32. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 381.

33. See "The Nobility."
34. NRO Miscellaneous 1/100/1546 (Keili).
35. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 230.
36. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 395; see also Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 539.

9. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ARABS

1. O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, p. 70; and *Tabaqat*, pp. 190-201, 160-173.
2. For a general perspective, see Yusuf Fadl Hasan's register of books cited in the *Tabaqat*, pp. 417-418.
3. See "Exchange."
4. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 288.
5. Lapanouse, *Mémoires*, p. 93.
6. For a discussion, see Carlo M. Cipolla, *Money, Prices and Civilization in the Mediterranean World: Fifth to Seventeenth Century* (New York: 1967); and Frank C. Spooner, *The International Economy and Monetary Movements in France, 1493-1725* (Cambridge: 1972). For a discussion based upon Egyptian perspectives, see Terence Walz, "Gold and Silver Exchanges Between Egypt and Sudan, 16-18th Centuries," in J.F. Richards, ed., *Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds* (Durham, N.C.: 1983), pp. 305-328.
7. Spooner, *International Economy*, pp. 28-29.
8. William Foster, ed., "A Narrative by William Daniel of his Journey from London to Mocha and Back, 1700-1701," in *Red Sea*, pp. 63-64.
9. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 367; and Poncet, *Red Sea*, p. 107, and "[John] Ovington's Notes on the Red Sea Ports," p. 176.
10. Krump (*Palm-Baum*, p. 245) mentioned the approach toward the capital of "soldiers who are bringing money to the king of Sinnar."
11. A.J. Arkell, "Roman Coins at Sinnar," *Sudan Notes and Records* 15 (1932), 271-272, and "A Roman Coin of the Emperor Diocletian at El Obeid," *Sudan Notes and Records* 19 (1936), 187; Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 288-289; Poncet, *Red Sea*, p. 105; and O.G.S. Crawford, *The Fung Kingdomn o Sinnar* (Gloucester: 1951), p. 438.
12. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 288.
13. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 402, 475-476.
14. Krump (*Palm-Baum*, p. 209): "Whoever so desires may make these iron coins, and one may make them large or small, thick or thin, narrow or wide, long or short;" Brocchi (*Giornale*, 5, p, 180): "The singular thing is, that the ability to coin them lies with private citizens on their own account."
15. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 289.
16. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 180.
17. Poncet, *Red Sea*, p. 105; Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 289; and Crawford, *Fung Kingdom*, p. 438.
18. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 288; Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 330; Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 180, 340, 401-402, 473-478, and Plate VII, Figure 3.
19. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 473. According to Ahmad b. `Isa, *muhallaqat* went out of circulation in about 1785.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 180. Brocchi compared the use of the term *muhallaqat* in Sinnar to that of *filus* in Egypt, but the similar modern Sudanese idioms involving the use of the term *qurush* would be equally applicable.
21. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 288 and 262.
22. Coins were apparently used in payment for three pieces of land sold in the enclave of the Awlad Khojali in [modern] Khartoum North: NRO Miscellaneous 1/10/79, Piece 5 (*muhallaqat*, 1758) and Pieces 6 and 7 (*ashrafis*, 1758-1759).
23. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 330.
24. Brocchi's informant from Abu `Ushr estimated that the dollars of Carlos IV, imported from Egypt, became dominant in about 1800 (*Giornale*, 5, p. 318), while the effect of their arrival upon the *muhallaqat*, on the authority of Ahmad wad `Isa, would suggest a somewhat earlier date (*ibid.*, p. 473).
25. Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 216, 257-258; and Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 98, 126-127, 141, 318-319, 573.
26. While Krump was the last to observe the widespread use of the gold ounce system, later travelers reported examples of circulation of gold in some of the southern districts.
27. For example, see Burckhardt's discussion of the coin value of the "*Puma*," or gold ounce, in Berber (*Travels*, pp. 216-217).
28. NRO Miscellaneous 1/5/31.
29. Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 216-217, 277.

10. THE ENCLAVES

1. James, "Funj Mystique," p. 104.
2. El-Sayed El-Bushra, "Towns in the Sudan in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century," *Sudan Notes and Records* 52 (1971), 63-70.
3. Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *The Arabs and the Sudan from the seventh to the early sixteenth century* (Edinburgh: 1967), pp. 177-181.
4. For an example of a grant of the right to offer asylum, see H.C. Jackson, *Notes on the Yacubabi Tribes of Sennar* (Khartoum: 1912), p. 2. As for the attitude of society toward those who sought refuge: "Whoever commits an offence and flees to the tomb of a *wali* [holy man] secures pardon for his offence, but he is called a coward, and his act counted craven and disgraceful" (NRO Dakhlia 112/4/18).
5. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 254.
6. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 45, pp. 247-250. For the violation of a sanctuary, not by a nobleman but the relatives of a murder victim eager to seize the killer, see *Tabaqat*, p. 120.
7. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 11, pp. 76-79.
8. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 326.
9. *Tabaqat*, p. 215.
10. The remains of the castle of the *makks* of Kajabi reveal the existence of an elaborate and elegant palace establishment.
11. *Tabaqat*, pp. 47-48.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 347-348, 183-184.
13. Triulzi, "Prelude," chapter 3.

14. From an untitled manuscript from the Rubatab country in the private collection of the author; it is called the *Kitab al-Nibayr* by `Umar Muhammad `Ali in his "Jawhar al-khabr fi istiqsa' al-athr," likewise in the author's private collection. A second example may be found in Ibrahim l-Hajj Babikr, "al-Rikabiya wa-Bani al-`Abbas: ta'rikh al-Shaykh Ya`qub wa-rihlatuhu," NRO Miscellaneous 1/15/181.
15. *Makhtuta*, p. 44; and Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
16. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 317.
17. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan," and Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p.540. Most written charters explicitly granted the fuqara' who received them exemption from "all the customary *siblas*," or sumptuary laws.
18. These documents were collected by Dr. Janet Ewald and are cited here according to their classification in the Sudan Collection of the Historisk Institutt, Universitetet I Bergen: SK 3.1/3 ("*wa-jami' man muta'allaq bihum*"), SK 4.1/4 ("*wa-jami' man muta'allaq bihum jahan mutammaman min al-makk*"), and SK 5.1/5 ("*wa-jami' man muta'allaq bihum jahan mutammaman*"). A similar phrase is used in Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents,* Document 3, pp. 42-43. I am most grateful to Dr. Ewald for permission to consult and cite these documents.
19. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 3, pp. 42-43.
20. *Ibid*, Document 25, pp. 157-167. The question of whether a ruling confirming an Islamic land title, like a sultanic grant, was subject to judicial reconsideration, was raised in Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 61, pp. 344-349. One authority cited argued that a legal reexamination of existing claims was acceptable, while another emphasized the definitive character of a judge's ruling. All agreed that a sound Islamic ruling could not be overturned.
21. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 23, pp. 141-145 and Document 24, pp. 146-156.
22. *Ibid.*, Document 59, pp. 326-332. It was possible for a lord to retain some rights while giving others away. The terms of a charter grant therefore needed to be drawn with precision, for there existed various degrees of alienation. For example, a lord might reserve the right to collect the hut-tax (*dajaja*) on the dwellings of the inhabitants of otherwise-alienated land; see E.N. Corbyn, "Report on Land Tenure," NRO Civil Secretary 38/C/4, "Land Tenure and Settlement."
23. *Tabaqat*, pp. 347-348 and Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 24, pp. 146-156.
24. *Tabaqat*, p. 182.
25. NRO Miscellaneous 1/86/1392.
26. This principle is evident in Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 2, pp. 37-41, the earliest surviving dated charter, and in most subsequent grants. The exceptions are discussed in the course of this chapter.
27. *Ibid*, Document 2, pp. 37-41 and Document 4, pp. 44-47.
28. NRO Miscellaneous 1/10/79, Piece 5 (20 Shawwal 1171/27 June 1758) and Piece 6 (27 Dhu'l-Qa`da 1171/2 August 1758). The principals in both sale transactions are identical.
29. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 33, pp. 197-202
30. A grant of the sultan Badi IV to Faqih `Abd al-Hadi walad Muhammad `Abd al-Hadi walad Dolib and his heirs decrees: "Let no one trouble them in their grant,

not in little and not in much, not in buying and not in selling" (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents,* Document 10, pp. 71-75).

31. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents,* Document 23, pp. 141-145.
32. *Tabaqat*, pp. 347-348 and Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Pu blic Documents*, Document 3, pp. 42-43.
33. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 6, pp. 52-55 and Document 4, pp. 44-47.
34. *Ibid.*, Document 23, pp. 141-145, Document 26, pp. 168-169, Document 35, pp. 205-211, Document 36, p. 212 Document 38, pp. 214-225, Document 39, pp. 220-225, Document 42, pp. 234-238, Document 44, pp. 242-246, Document 45, pp. 247-250.Document 47, pp. 262-266, Document 49, pp. 271-273, Document 50, pp. 274-280, Document 51, pp.281-286, Document 52, pp. 287-289, Document 53, pp. 290-295, Document 54, pp. 296-305, Document 56, pp. 313-317, Document 58, pp. 321-325, Document 59, pp. 326-332, Document 60, pp. 333-343, Document 62, pp. 350-352, Document 63, pp. 353-356, Document 64, pp. 357-361, Document 65, pp. 362-364, Document 66, pp. 365-368, Document 67, pp. 369-372.
35. For example, NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/778.
36. In the words of one charter: "Thereupon, when his son Sultan Nasir had succeeded [to the throne] the sons of Shaykh Khojali came before him to congratulate him upon [receiving] the kingdom [*al-dar*] and they asked him to confirm for them the gift of alms of his father, Sultan Badi." (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 18, pp. 119-128).
37. For an alternative viewpoint, see R.S. O'Fahey, "Endowment, privilege and estate in the Central and Eastern Sudan," in R.S. O'Fahey, ed., *Some Articles on Dar Fur and Kordofan.* (Bergen: 1980), no pagination. O'Fahey rejects the clash between traditional and Islamic law in regard to private property in land as outlined here; he views the institution of *sadaqa* in Sinnar as "proto-*waqf*," an example of flawed and immature Islamic law found on the barbarous frontiers of Islam.
38. Originating charter issued by [Arbab Him?] b. al-Arbab `Abd Allah to the Faqih al-Madlul, concerning a gift of 40 `*uds* in Umm Zarazir. No date. (From the private collection of the author).
39. The system of religious taxes paid by the Hawazma is derived from C.E. Lyall, "Report on the Rights and Customs Prevailing Among the Arab Tribes [White Nile]," *Sudan Intelligence Reports*, no. 165 (April 1908), Appendix B. A similar but not identical system is described by al-Shatir Busayli (*ma `alim*, pp. 265-266). Neither author attempted to place the system in its broader historical context because both assumed that the *zakat* and the traditional feudal obligations were part of a single and historically uniform system of taxation.
40. Lyall, "Report," (no pagination).
41. Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 236-237.
42. [Abu Salim], *Sadat al-Majadhib*, Document 1.
43. Lorimer, "The Megadhib," pp. 335-341.
44. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 246.
45. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 585-586 and NRO Dakhlia 112/4/18, "Robatab."
46. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 316-322.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 321.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 277.
49. NRO Miscellaneous 1/10/79, Piece 8.
50. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 322.
51. For a biography, see *Tabaqat*, p. 183.
52. [Abu Salim] *Sadat al-Majadhib*, 1. *Sunbul* (spikenard, either *nardus celtica* or *nardostachys jatamansi*) and *mahlab* (*prunus mahaleb*) were important imported luxury goods, prized in Sinnar as medicines, condiments, and ointments. A camel-load of *sunbul* and *mahlab*, consisting ordinarily of about 350 pounds of the former and 120 pounds of the latter, was called a *zamila* (Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 266-267).
53. MacMichael, *History*, 2, p. 376.
54. I am grateful to Dr. al-Hajj Bilal `Umar for insight concerning this practice.
55. NRO Miscellaneous 1/10/79, Piece 4.
56. NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/778, Piece 10.
57. [Abu Salim}, *Sadat al-Majadhib*, 2.
58. *Ibid.*, 1.
59. *Ibid.*
60. NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/590, "Registration of Minimum Shares in Land in Dongola Province," and 1/30/591, "Riverain Lands."
61. [Abu Salim], *Sadat al-Majadhib,* 1.
62. Jay Spaulding, "The Misfortunes of Some—The Advantages of Others: Land-Sales by Women in Sinnar," in Margaret Jean Hay and Marcia Wright, eds., *African Women and the Law: Historical Perspectives* (Boston: 1982), pp. 3-18.
63. NRO Miscellaneous 1/14/125, Piece 20.
64. NRO Intelligence 5/1/3.
65. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 451.
66. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 236.
67. *Ibid.*, In some cases the dissipation of charisma of a later generation of holy men may be traced by the spread of the use of their personal *wasm* (brand or mark) as a pattern for facial scarification—first by their own families, then by their devotees, and finally by whole tribes; see NRO Dakhlia 112/4/18, "Robatab."
68. Lorimer, "The Megadhib," pp. 335-340, and Linant, *Diary*, p. 73.
69. Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 236-237. The dispersal of missionizing disciples from the knee of a great teacher forms one prominent theme of the *Tabaqat*.
70. For an extended discussion, see Kapteijns and Spaulding, "Precolonial Trade."
71. G. Beltrame, *Il Sénnaar e lo Sciangàllah* (Verona: 1879), 2, p. 153.
72. From a chronicle fragment describing the adventures in the south of Hammadna Allah walad Malak (*Tabaqat,* p. 183), a *faqih* of Burri and a pioneer in the slave trade; NRO Miscellaneous 1/86/1392.
73. [Abu Salim] *Sadat al-Majadhib*, 2.
74. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 238.
75. [Abu Salim], *Sadat al-Majadhib*, 1.
76. For a detailed discussion see Abraham Udovitch, *Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam* (Princeton: 1970), pp. 170-248; and Anders Bjørkelo, "Partnerskap i jordbruk og handle i Sudan pa 1800-talet," *Historisk Tidsskrift* 3 (1982), 228-246.

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Maliki usage would have permitted the formation of a partnership in commodities other than gold or silver but would have required the settlement to be conducted in terms of the identical substance in which the contract was established, in this case, cloth.

77. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 238.
78. Na`um Shuqayr, *Ta'rikh al-Sudan al-qadim* (Cairo: 1903), p. 106.
79. Linant, *Diary*, p. 73.
80. Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 239-241.
81. Linant, *Diary*, p. 153, and Cailliaud, *Voyage*, 3, pp. 175-176.
82. Kapteijns and Spaulding, "Precolonial Trade."
83. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 220, 263.
84. *Ibid.*, pp. 256-258, and Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 63, 225-226.
85. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Documents 49, pp. 271-271 and 58, pp. 321-325 (Qarri), Document 61, pp. 344-349 (al-Halfaya), Documents 66, pp. 368-368 and 67, pp. 369-372 (Shandi), and Document 62, pp. 350-352 (al-Timayd).
86. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 2.
87. Jay Spaulding, "The Evolution of the Islamic Judiciary in Sinnar," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 10, 3 (1977), 414-415.
88. Hasan b. Shawir, Wadih al-bayan."
89. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 233. The daughter of Nimr, the last independent *makk* of Shandi, was a famous trader; see Hoskins, *Travels*, p. 125. For the horse trade of the Sharifs of the Yemen, see L. de Grandpré, *Voyage dans l'Inde et au Bengale fait dans les années 1789 et 1790* (Paris: 1801), 1, pp. 135-138.
90. For example, Muhammad Abu Likaylik had a personal "factor"; the man had a Turkish name and may well have been a *khawaja*. See Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 316.
91. For the ethnic composition of Berber, see Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 175; for Shandi, p. 248. For a map of the residential quarters of Sinnar town, see Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, Plate 8.
92. Cailliaud, *Voyage*, 3, p. 121, and Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 282.
93. Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 274-275.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 219.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 248.
96. *Ibid.*, pp. 195, 204.
97. A rare glimpse into the internal political life of the northern Sudanese merchant community—although dating from sixty years after the fall of Sinnar—may be found in Yousef Bedri and George Scott, *The Memoirs of Babikr Bedri* (London: 1969), pp. 97, 177, 184, 202.
98. Linant, *Diary*, p. 73.
99. Richard Hill, *Egypt in the Sudan* (London: 1959), p. 49, note 2; and Yousef Bedri, *Memoirs*, pp. 184, 202.
100. Evliya Çelebi, *Sehayatnamesi*, 10, p. 890.
101. Spaulding, "Islamic Judiciary," pp. 414-415.
102. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 47, pp. 262-266.
103. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 320.

104. Spaulding, "Islamic Judiciary," and Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Documents 54, pp. 296-306, 55, pp. pp. 307-312, 60, pp. 333-343, and 61, pp. 344-349.
105. Spaulding, "Islamic Judiciary," pp. 419-420.
106. *Ibid.*, pp. 424-425.
107. Lejean, *Voyage*, p. 27.
108. Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 246-323.
109. Cailliaud, *Voyage*, 3, pp. 115, 121; and Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 266.
110. Linant, *Diary*, p. 84.
111. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, p. 372 (Sinnar); Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 206-297 (Berber) and p. 249 (Shandi); Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 442-446.
112. O'Fahey and Spauilding, *Kingdoms*, p. 82.
113. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.
114. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 310-312.
115. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 522, 600-601; and Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 310, note.
116. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, pp. 325-326.
117. Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, pp. 258, 306.
118. Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 259-260.
119. In preparing this table, noblemen were identified by the use of the titles sultan, *manjil*, *makk*, *arbab* or shaykh in a conclusively political context. Middle-class names were selected from among the principals to the legal acts documented, the writers of the documents, and their witnesses. Commoners appeared among the ancestors of the principals and as neighbors in defining land boundaries. Slaves were specifically designated as such by the documents. Some names appear in more than one category; most conspicuously, there is some overlap between the nobility and the commoners, while the slaves—although distinguished from the middle class—share with them a preponderance of sound Arabic (although not prestigious) names.
120. NRO Miscellaneous 1/10/79, Piece 9.
121. For some eighteenth-century examples, see the sources cited above, note 52.
122. Marno, *Blauen Nil*, pp. 31-40; Lejean, *Voyage*, p. 34; and Yousef Bedri, *Memoirs*, p. 181.
123. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, pp. 1390140, 224, 269. In the Rubatab country, too poor to support a town or even a class of resident entrepreneurs until the twentieth century, as recently as 1900 a woman was allowed to swim in the river "if she has a good reason for doing so" (J.W. Crowfoot, "Customs of the Rubatab," NRO Dakhlia 112/4/18). By mid-century, the district had its town, and the natatorial abilities of its womenfolk had vanished.
124. Cailliaud, *Voyage*, 2, pp. 116-117.
125. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan." Public prayers were introduced by the *manjil* ``Abd Allah during the last years of the nineteenth century; that this may be considered an innovation of that age is apparent in the fact that people called the new obligation "`Abd Allah's prayers."
126. Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 209, 236-237. "Education," as a leader of the Rubatab explained at the beginning of the twentieth century, "is confined to the reli-

gious families. Other men's children are wanted for cultivation"; NRO Dakhlia 112/4/18, "Robatab."

127. From the private collection of the author.
128. See the register of works cited in *Tabaqat*, pp. 418-419.
129. For the acquisition of a copy of this work, see Brocchi, *Giornale*, 5, p. 465.
130. For a full reference, see "The Funj," note 4.
131. Representative examples may be found in MacMichael, *History*, 2; and al-Fiki al-Fahl al-Tahir, *Ta'rikh wa-usul al-'Arab bi'l-Sudan* (Khartoum: 1979). Relevant here is the observation of J.H. Plumb: "It is interesting, if not surprising, that outbreaks of genealogical fever occur most frequently when new new classes are emerging into status, a new faction pushing its way into an ancient aristocracy, or when the established ruling classes feel threatened by the nouveaux riches." *The Death of the Past* (Boston: 1971), pp. 31-32. See also Jay Spaulding, "The Chronology of Sudanese Arabic Genealogical Tradition," *History in Africa* 27 (2000), pp. 325-337.
132. T.R.H. Owen, "Notes on an Arab Stellar Calendar," *Sudan Notes and Records* 16, 1 (1933): 67-73. Owen's data were collected in the Funj province of Alays.
133. [Abu Salim,] *Sadat a-Majadhib*, 1.
134. To choose one example from the private collection of the author, Arbab Na`im donated a piece of land to Faqih Musa b. Madlul on the eleventh of Qusayyir "in the first [year] of his reign."
135. For a concordance with standard terminology, see Hillelson, *Sudan Arabic*, pp. 337-338.
136. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, pp. 298, 315-316, 346-347.
137. *Makhtuta*, p. 39.
138. NRO Intelligence 2/31/256.
139. NRO Intelligence 1/22/247.
140. *Makhtuta*, pp. 73-74; see also Jay Spaulding, "The Fall of a Wayward Saint," *Northeast African Studies*, 5, 3 (1983-1984), 43-50.

11. THE WARLORDS

1. See PART ONE.
2. From the traditions of grain traders in Dar Masalit recorded by Dr. Lidwien Kapteijns, to whom I am most grateful for this reference.
3. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 254; Cailliaud, *Voyage*, 3, p. 110; and Georges Douin, *Histoire du Soudan égyptien* (Cairo: 1944) 1, p. 51.
4. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 65.
5. Jay Spaulding, "Two Credit Documents from Sinnar," *Sudan Texts Bulletin*, 2 (1980), pp. 59-61.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Farah Hassan Adam and William Andrea Apaya, "Agricultural Credit in the Gezira," *Sudan Notes and Records*, 56 (1973), p. 104.
8. Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 219-220.
9. Compare Burckhardt's evaluation of agriculture around the towns of Shandi (*Travels*, p. 250) and Berber (p. 215) with that of the comparatively bucolic al-Damir (p. 238).

10. For an example of cut-throat competition between two such entrepreneurs, see H.C. Jackson, "Two Gezira Families," *Sudan Notes and Records* 2, 2 (1920), 98.
11. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, pp. 694-695.
12. Bruce, *Travels* 6, p. 348.
13. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 380.
14. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 254.
15. Bruce, *Travels* 6, pp. 342-347, and Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, p. 544.
16. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 50, pp. 274-280.
17. The last *muqaddam al-khayl* at the sultan's court appeared as a witness in a charter roster of 1744. Shortly thereafter the officer died in the Kordofan wars, and it would seem that no successor was appointed. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 10, pp. 71-75.
18. The last sultanic official to hold this title appeared as a witness to a court roster of 1765; Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 16, pp. 109-115.
19. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, p. 547. Unless otherwise noted, the description of the army of Sinnar is drawn from Brocchi's account (pp. 543-547).
20. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 35, pp. 205-211.
21. *Ibid.*, Document 38, pp. 214-225.
22. *Makhtuta*, p. 10.
23. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, pp. 544-547.
24. Bruce, *Travels*, 6, pp. 342-347.
25. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, p. 538. Mengin (*Histoire* 2, pp. 225-226) described how the last sultan distributed the lands of his kingdom (which Mengin understood to constitute the Gezira area) to the "*chefs de sa malice*," who had them cultivated by their slaves.
26. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, p. 544.
27. Prudhoe, "Extracts," p. 38.
28. Rüppell, *Reisen*, p. 29, and Cadalvène, *l'Egypte* 2, p. 161.
29. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 307.
30. O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, pp. 102-103.
31. Burckhardt, (*Travels*, p. 307) estimated that the average bourgeois household in the towns of Berber and Shandi possessed one or two slaves, and the richer ones five or six, some of whom might work the master's fields, among other duties.
32. Hoskins, *Travels*, p. 201.
33. Bruce, *Travels* 6, pp. 370-371.
34. al-Shatir Busayli, *ma 'alim*, pp. 269-271.
35. The acceptance of the Funj as Umayyads was more conspicuous in the southern and less Arabized provinces; see Triulzi, "Prelude," p. 19.
36. O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, pp. 88-89.
37. *Makhtuta*, p. 20.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.
40. Compare the court rosters of Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 10, pp. 71-75 and 12, pp. 109-115.
41. *Ibid.*, Document 2, pp. 37-41

42. *Ibid.*, Document 12, pp. 80-88.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*, Document 14, pp. 90-101.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*, Document 16, pp. 109-115.
47. *Ibid,* Document 25, pp. 157-167.
48. *Ibid.*, Document 14, pp. 90-101.
49. *Ibid.*, Document 23, pp. 141-145.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*, Documents 16, pp. 109-115, 24, pp. 146-156.
52. *Ibid.*, Document 24, pp. 146-156.
53. *Ibid.*, Document 24, pp. 146-156.
54. *Ibid.*, Document 25, pp. 157-167.
55. *Ibid.*, Document 35, pp. 205-211.
56. *Ibid.*, Document 35, pp. 205-211.
57. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-Bayan."
58. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 28, pp. 175-179.
59. Nalder, "Tales," p. 75.
60. H.A. MacMichael, *The Tribes of Northern and Central Kordofan* (Cambridge: 1912), p. 185.
61. For the Meidob, see H.A. MacMichael, "Nubian Elements in Dar Fur," *Sudan Notes and Records* 1, 1 (1918), 30-48; and C.D. Lampen, "A Short Account of Meidob," *Sudan Notes and Records* 11 (1928), 55-62. Delmet ("Islamisation") offers evidence for the previous existence of a system of matrilineal succession at Ghule.
62. NRO Dakhlia 112/9/60, "Kawahla."
63. N.M. Smythe, "Notes on the Abyssinian Frontier near the Blue Nile," NRO Intelligence 2/17/146, "Sudan-Abyssinia."
64. Some families of fuqara' who had been following matrilineal succession practices also seem to have experienced a crisis; for an example, see Jackson, *Yacubabi Tribes*, p. 2. A stimulating treatment of this theme may be found in the M.A. thesis of Dr. al-Hajj Hamid Muhammad Khayr, "Matrilineal Elements in the Political Organization of the Medieval Eastern Sudan," Department of History, University of Khartoum, 1979.
65. O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, pp. 86-87.
66. "And their two [male] forefathers took natives as wives." The author is most grateful to Dr. `Ali `Osman Muhammad Salih for making available the exemplar of this familiar genre cited here, a document entitled "*Nisbat al-Mahas*" deriving from the kingdom of Koka immediately north of the border of Sinnar.
67. Ferdinand Werne, *African Wanderings* (London: 1852), p. 219; see also Arthur E.P. Myers, *Life with the Hamran Arabs* (London: 1876), p. 49.
68. Werne, *Weissen Nil*, p. 38.
69. For example, see NRO Intelligence 5/1/6, "Note of Turkish invasion of Sudan."
70. For an extended discussion, see Jay Spaulding, "The Fate of Alodia," *Transafrican Journal of History* 2 (1977), 39-53.

12. THE HAMAJ

1. Bruce, *Travels* 6, p. 391.
2. Marno, *Blauen Nil*, pp. 109, 224-225.
3. Shaykh `Adlan walad Subahi appears as the governor of al-Bahr in charters of 1762, 1763, 1765, and 1770; he died before the issue of the next extant charter in 1780.
4. R.S. O'Fahey and J.L. Spaulding, "Hashim and the Musabba`at," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 35, 2 (1972), pp. 316-333.
5. O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, p. 98.
6. The *makks* of Taqali seceded from Sinnar during the Hamaj period and subsequently paid tribute to the Fur governor of Kordofan (Elles, "Tagale," p. 16).
7. For a discussion, see Spaulding, "Islamic Judiciary."
8. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, pp. 324-326. A typical example was the establishment of a village near Dabarki by the Abu Jinn manjils of the Rufa`a for Faqih Muhammad b. Daf` Allah "for his clerkly services"; the settlement was appropriately known as Hillat al-Sarraf (NRO Civil Secretary 38/C/4, "Land Tenure and Settlement").
9. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, pp. 572-573, 643.
10. The first Shaykh of Arbaji appeared with the widening of the court of Badi IV in 1752.
11. *Makhtuta*, pp. 31-32.
12. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 195.
13. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 57, pp. 318-320.
14. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 195.
15. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 28, pp. 175-179.
16. *Ibid.*, Document 43, pp. 239-241.
17. Bruce, *Travels* 6, p. 348.
18. *Makhtuta*, pp. 17-18.
19. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, p. 321.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 443.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 320.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 445.
24. Jackson, "Two Gezira Families," p. 95.
25. *Makhtuta*, p. 66.
26. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, p. 326.
27. *Makhtuta*, p. 35.
28. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, p. 629.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 320.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 701.
31. *Ibid.*, 632.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 631.
33. *Makhtuta*, p. 65.
34. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, pp. 486, 632.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 333.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 478.
37. I am grateful to Dr. Terence Walz for permission to cite this transaction, described by a court record in Cairo, a copy of which is in Dr. Walz's collection.

13. THE FAMILY INCORPORATED

1. Of fundamental importance are Richard Hill, *Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-1881* (London: 1959) and Bjørkelo, *Prelude*. Further information may be found in G.N. Sanderson, "The Modern Sudan, 1820-1956: The Present State of Historical Studies," *Journal of African History* 4, 3 (1963). Sanderson correctly notes that most of the existing literature has emphasized "the administrative activities of the ruling institution" (p. 438) and calls for an examination of the type of private documents employed as sources here (pp. 451-452).
2. An enthusiastic supporter of the new Turkish regime justified his views to Linant (*Diary*, p. 152) by explaining how the trade policies of the conquerors favored his own private enterprise.
3. NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/778, Piece 69 contains the sisters' authorization of *wikala*, sealed in Khandaq on 22 Sha`ban 1250, and Bakhayta bint Shawir's sale of her share, sealed in al-Damir on 28 Jumada I 1254. Piece 79 contains Rabiha bint Shawir's sale of her share, witnessed in al-Damir but without date.
4. For a thorough analysis of Turkish taxation in northern Sinnar, see Bjørkelo, *Prelude*.
5. Quoted by A. Brun-Rollet, *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie de Paris* 9 (1855), p. 367.
6. Jay Spaulding, "Slavery, Land Tenure and Social Class in the Northern Turkish Sudan, 1820-1881," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 15, 1 (1982), p. 4.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 10; see also Lejean, *Voyage*, p. 42.
8. NRO Miscellaneous 1/10/79, Piece 30.
9. Prudhoe, "Extracts," p. 38.
10. From the private collection of the author: 16 Shawwal 1241/24 May 1826.
11. NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/591, "Riverain Lands." No successful mortgage redemption is recorded among the surviving documents of the Turkish period; for an example of forfeiture of mortgaged land, see NI 108.11/10.
12. NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/410 (22 Rabi1 II 1301/20 February 1884).
13. NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/591, "Riverain Lands."
14. NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/437.
15. NRO Miscellaneous 1/14/125. A note written on the back of this document describes the partial repayment of the loan: "He received from the body of the document fifty-nine Majidi *riyals*, and fifty-one remain" (no date).
16. NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/453; and NRO Miscellaneous 1/14/125, Piece 4.
17. NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/458.
18. For an extended discussion, see Wakin, *The Function of Documents in Islamic Law.*
19. NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/443.
20. NRO Miscellaneous 1/14/125 (7 Ramadan 1302/20 June 1885).

21. "Bayan min warith al-Fiki Ahmad al-Rih (al-mutawafi `ala sanat 1236 hijriya [1820-1821]) b. Sanhuri b. Mudaththir [b. Sanhuri] b. Hamuda," NRO Miscellaneous 1/81/1292.
22. *Tabaqat*, p. 187.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 225-226.
24. NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/778, Piece 36 (7 Dhu'l-Hijja 1280/15 May 1864).
25. NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/429, Text 4 (1277/1860-1861).
26. NI 1266.14/1.
27. NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/412.
28. NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/778, Piece 58 (2 Rabi` I 1290/30 April 1873).
29. NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/ 778, Piece 51 (25 Muharram 1286/7 May 1869).
30. NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/460, Piece 2.
31. NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/420 (7 Rabi` II 1294/21 April 1877).
32. NRO Miscellaneous 1/14/125 (1270/1853-1854).
33. NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/442 (1279/1862-1863).
34. NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/778. Piece 47 (27 Muharram 1285/20 May 1868).
35. NRO Miscellaneous 1/13/122 (21 Jumada I 1262/17 May 1846).
36. NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/606 (10 Sha`ban 1303/14 May 1886).
37. For example, see NRO Miscellaneous 1/35/821.
38. NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/778, Piece 20 (Rajab 1267/2 May – 1 June 1851).
39. NRO Miscellaneous 1/5/31 (1261/1845).
40. For the text of a claim of 11 Muharram 1306/17 September 1888, see Husayn Sid Ahmad al-Mufti, *Tatawwur nizam al-quda' fi'l-Sudan* (Khartoum: 1959), pp. 172-173.
41. NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/608.
42. NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/44 (1292/1875-1876).
43. NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/590 and 1/30/591.
44. No precolonial document extant specifies separation of a *jarf* from its adjoining *saqiya* land. Examples from the Turkish period include NRO Miscellaneous 1/14/125, Piece 10; NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/608; NRO Miscellaneous 1/35/820; and NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/778, Piece 28.
45. For the significance of *maqsuma* tenure, see NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/590, "Registration of Minimum Shares in Land in Dongola Province," and 1/30/591, "Riverain Lands." *Rawka* tenure is also mentioned in these sources but is defined with greater precision by `Awn al-Sharif Qasim (*Qamus*, p. 308) as "common property" ("*milk li'l-jami`*").
46. No precolonial document extant specifies the *rih* of a *jarf*. For examples from the Turkish period, see NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/607 and NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/433.
47. W. Bond, "Report on the Dongola Sagia," NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/590.
48. For the attempt to establish a new minimum share and the legendary orphan, see NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/590; the large fractions cited are derived from NRO Miscellaneous 1/86/1394. Or again, among the twenty-five heirs of one Maryut Muhammad `Ali of Blue Nile Province, typical fractional shares of land inherited included 2,212,127/107,827,200; 10,920,000/107,827,200 and

5,140,800/107,827,200 of a single rainland tract; see N.G. Davidson to Civil Secretary 38/1/2, "Land Registration . . . 1929."

49. Spaulding, "Slavery," p. 7.
50. NRO Miscellaneous 1/13/122.
51. NRO Miscellaneous 1/35/820.
52. NRO Miscellaneous 1/14/125, Piece 8.
53. Richard Hill, *On the Frontiers of Islam* (London: 1970), p. 29. For confirmation of the scarcity of *saqiyas* along the Blue Nile before the Turkish conquest, see Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, p. 314.
54. [Durham] "Mr. [S.H.] Hall on Geteina Settlement Operations, 1910-1912," p. 9.
55. The records of this long dispute, about twenty-five in number, are to be found in NRO Miscellaneous 1/86/1365-1400. Not all the documents in these files relate to the present case, but as the individual pieces are not numbered, a more precise reference is not possible.
56. NRO Miscellaneous 1/22/244 (6 Sha`ban 1310/24 February 1893).
57. NRO Miscellaneous 1/30/606.

14. VAMPIRES OF THE BORDERLANDS

1. For the affairs of Taqali during this period see Janet Ewald's unpublished doctoral dissertation, "Leadership and Social Change on an Islamic Frontier: The Kingdom of Taqali 1780-1898," Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1982. Dr. Ewald's later publications confuse rather than enrich the material to be found in her dissertation.
2. *Makhtuta*, pp. 106-107; for a discussion of the *manjil* of Ghule, see Spaulding, "Demystification," pp. 2-3.
3. A typical example was the imposition of Nasir as *makk* of Taqali; see Elles, "Tagale," p. 16; Peny, "Mémoires, III" p. 516; and Mansfield Parkyns, "Notes on Tagalla, The Noubes, Dowleeb, etc." University of Khartoum, Sudan Library Case 8KOPB (no pagination).
4. For an example from Ghule, see Marno, *Blauen Nil*, p. 252.
5. For example, on 20 April 1863 the Turkish governor Musa Pasha Hamdi ordered 300 horsemen sent to Rajab b. Idris, the second *manjil* of Ghule, "to get what has been demanded." The Pasha also advanced the opinion that the *manjil* was a liar who deliberately neglected the collection of tribute; NRO Miscellaneous 1/89/1419.
6. For example, see Elles, "Tagale," pp. 16-18; Peney, "Mémoire, III" pp. 515-516; and Parkyns, "Notes."
7. Note by J.D.F. Chataway on A.J. Arkell's history of the Berta, NRO Dakhlia 112/16/101, "Berta." A confirmation of these principles in regard to Fazughli proper may be found in statements recorded by L.F. Nalder, NRO Blue Nile Province 1/27/202, "Fung Province Notes."
8. Peney, "Mémoire, III," pp. 515-516.
9. Spaulding, "Demystification," p. 3.
10. The nineteenth-century Gaam (Ingessena), for example, undertook to kill all strangers who approached their land without the specific permission of their *makks*, which was not easy to obtain. "And no doubt it was due to this attitude to

a great extent," a later observer commented, "that they have remained free from the pest of Watawit rule;" NRO Dakhlia 112/15/100, "Ingessana."

11. Russegger, *Reisen* 2, 2, pp. 776-777.
12. Triulzi, "Prelude," chapter 5.
13. Gustav Nachtigal, *Sahara and Sudan* (Berkeley: 1971) 4, p. 354.
14. Marno, *Blauen Nil,* pp. 432-436; translation by the present author.
15. NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/778, Piece 67.
16. NRO Miscellaneous 1/14/125, Piece 5.
17. NRO Miscellaneous 1/14/125, Piece 1.
18. Spaulding, "Slavery," p. 19.
19. NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/778, Piece 34.
20. Slatin, *Fire and Sword*, pp. 133-134.
21. This discussion draws heavily on the previous studies of Richard Gray, *A History of the Southern Sudan, 1839-1889* (London: 1961), pp. 33-34, 76-78; and Patricia Mercer, "Shilluk Trade and Politics from the Mid-Seventeenth Century to 1861," *Journal of African History* 12, 3 (1971), 407-426. In some cases the evidence marshaled by Gray and Mercer has been reinterpreted.
22. Mercer ("Trade and Politics," p. 417) emphasizes that the international ivory boom of the nineteenth century brought many northern *jallaba* to the Shilluk country.
23. For example, shortly before his death *reth* Nyidok had in his service people such as Muhammad wad `Adlan, who served as the "secretary or confidante of the king;" (Gray, *Southern Sudan*, p. 34, Note 4).
24. Giovanni Beltrame, *Di un Viaggio sul Fiume Bianco nell'Africa Centrale* (Verona: 1861), pp. 74-75.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
26. Muhammad Khayr had been a courtier in the service of *makk* Nasir of Taqali and followed his master into exile on the White Nile after the seizure of power in Taqali by *makk* Adam Umm Dabalu (Muhammad `Abd al-Rahim, *al-Nida'*, p. 128). Following his expulsion from the Shilluk country Muhammad Khayr again established himself as a mediator between the *jallaba* and local folk, this time on the upper White Nile. Recollection of his activities survives in Latuka memory; see Abannik O. Hino, "Latuka Country: An Outline of the Process of Colonial Encroachment and Reaction to it—1840-1900," *Northeast African Studies* 4, 3 (1982-1983), pp. 39-50.
27. A thorough study of the Berta under Turkish and Watawit rule may be found in Triulzi, *Salt, Gold and Legitimacy.*
28. Schuver, "Reisen," p. 5.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
30. Marno, *Blauen Nil,* p. 92.
31. Schuver, "Reisen," p. 42.
32. Guillaume Lejean, "Note sur les Fougn et leur idiome," *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie de Paris,* 5e série, 9 (1865), 243.
33. Schuver, "Reisen," p. 61.
34. A. Skrine's note on the sultanates of Dul, Beni Shangul and Assossa," NRO Intelligence 1/5/25.

35. N.M. Smythe, "Notes on the Abyssinian Frontier near the Blue Nile;" NRO Intelligence 2/17/146, "Sudan-Abyssinia."
36. For example, *makk* Amaka of Jabal Ab Danab fled to Faronje with his subjects, the Fadoka and Goamili. Ilyas Khamis, a descendant of the last Funj *makk* of Belà Shangul, fled with his followers to Fazughli. Makk Bilburka, the last Funj ruler of Dul, fled to Ghule-controlled territory with his folk and settled at Keili. *Makk* Komo, lord of several groups of southern "Burun," withdrew from Watawit territory westward into Ghule, settling south of the Khor Yabus. N.M. Smythe, "Notes," NRO Intelligence 2/17/146, "Sudan-Abyssinia."
37. From a letter to Romolo Gessi, cited by B.M. Allen, *Gordon and the Sudan* (London: 1935), pp. 149-150.
38. A vigorous restatement of the latter viewpoint may be found in Dunstan M. Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan* (New York: 1981).
39. Lejean, who was in the Sudan at the time of the first legal prohibitions against the slave trade reported that the government began immediately to use the new set of regulations as a tool with which to assert its own monopoly over the trade; presumably Lejean was echoing the market gossip of Khartoum and the attitude of its private traders (*Voyage*, pp. 111-112).
40. Abbas Ibrahim Muhammad Ali, *The British, the Slave Trade and Slavery in the Sudan* (Khartoum: 1972), p. 75.
41. NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/778, Piece 43.
42. Babikr Bedri tried to rationalize one such instance, in which the former slave was an officer in the Egyptian army and his bride a free but impoverished refugee; "she's young," he said, "and was forced to it; so she has her excuses" (Youssef Bedri, *Memoirs*, p. 118).
43. This fact seems obvious to everyone except a surprisingly resilient group of historians. For the viewpoint of a contemporary free man, see the source cited in note 42; for the impressions of nineteenth-century travelers, see Rüppell, *Reisen*, p. 107; Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 224; Hoskins, *Travels*, p. 90; for that of a modern Sudanese ethnographer, see Hayder Ibrahim, *The Shaiqiya: the Cultural and Social Change of a Northern Sudanese Riverain People* (Wiesbaden: 1979), p. 71ff.
44. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, 276. When Brocchi expressed his concern about this practice in a village near the Nile confluence, he was assured by the village holy man that it was normal and universal.
45. NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/424 (2 Jumada II 1277/16 December 1860)
46. NRO Miscellaneous 1/10/67. For some additional examples of two- or three-generational sale, see NRO Miscellaneous 1/27/458; NRO Miscellaneous 1/27460; NI 102.11/4; NI 108.11/10; NI 110.11/12; NI 117.11/19; NI 123.11/25; and NI 121.11/23. The list could be greatly multiplied.
47. For example, NRO Miscellaneous 1/17/125, Piece 8.
48. NRO Miscellaneous 1/14/125, Piece 17.
49. NRO Miscellaneous 1/33/778, Piece 31.
50. NRO Miscellaneous 1/35/815.
51. NI 120.11/22.
52. One of the handful of surviving manumission documents specifies the age of the individual freed—sixty. A copy of the document, dated 29 Rajab 1294/9 August 1877, may be found in Husayn Sid Ahmad, *Tatawwur*, p. 88.

15. TO THE FIRE

[no notes]

16. THE DAYS OF MUHAMMAD ABU LIKAYLIK

1. Arthur E. Robinson, "Abu El Kaylik, the King-maker of the Fung of Sennar," *American Anthropologist*, n.s. 31 (1929), pp. 237-238; and Durham 404/4, "Extracts from Section of Soudan History."
2. *Ibid.*, p. 238; a more detailed version is given in Durham 404/4 "Extracts."
3. Bruce, *Travels* 7, p. 96.
4. *Makhtuta*, p. 24.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
6. Bruce, *Travels* 7, pp. 95-96.
7. NRO Intelligence 5/1/6 (two versions); Robinson, "Abu El Kaylik," p. 236.
8. *Makhtuta*, p. 24; Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 14, pp. 90-101; Document 15, pp. 102-108; 16, pp. 109-115; 18, pp. 119-128. Abu Likaylik introduced himself through his seal as follows (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 17, pp. 116-118:

   "He who trusts in the King, the Guide
   Shaykh Muhammad, son of the late
   Shaykh Badi 1160/1747-1748"
9. For the earlier history of Kordofan, see Jay Spaulding, "Early Kardofan," O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, pp. 63-66, 93; O'Fahey and Spaulding, "Hashim," pp. 316-333; and R.S. O'Fahey, "Kordofan in the Eighteenth Century," *Sudan Notes and Records* 54 (1973), pp. 32-42.
10. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 25, pp. 157-167.
11. Durham 404/4, "Extracts."
12. Acording to the Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa, this particular expedition was dispatched in [11]57/1744-1745, presumably in the latter part of the year.
13. For the presence and leadership of `Ali walad Toma, see *Makhtuta*, p. 24, and the Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa. The fact that `Ali walad Toma was the *muqaddam al-khayl* may be inferred from his presence under that title as a witness to sultanic charters of 1743-1744 and 1744 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 9, pp. 66-70 and Document 8, pp. 60-65. The office died with the man; no successor to the position of *muqaddam al-khayl* was appointed.
14. For the presence of "the *amin*, Bishr," see the Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa. The *amin* Bishr b. Yunus appears in witness rosters of sultanic charters of 1743-1744 and 1744 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 8, pp. 60-65 and Document 9, pp. 66-70).
15. For the relationship of Shammam to `Abd Allah, see Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
16. *Makhtuta*, p. 24; and Durham 404/4, "Extracts."
17. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
18. Durham 404/4, "Extracts."
19. *Makhtuta*, p. 24.
20. Durham 404/4, "Extracts."

21. *Makhtuta*, p. 24.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Makhtuta*, p. 23, states that Abu Likaylik was made a shaykh (in this context, an officer) in 1160/1747-1748, apparently following the battle of Shamqata in the same year. The significance of the year 1169/1747-1748 in the life of Abu Likaylik is confirmed by the fact that his seal bore that date (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 17, pp. 116-118).
24. Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa. This date (1164/1750-1751) is to be preferred over all alternatives because it appears in the writings of a known contemporary, who further specified the year by identifying it through its vernacular nickname of "Abu Sham," and because it corresponds well with the first appearance of `Ali Karrar as Shaykh of Kordofan in a sultanic charter of 1752. The retrospective account of the Chronicler (*Makhtuta*, p. 24) conflates the two Kordofan expeditions of this period in which Abu Likaylik took part.
25. Cadalvène, *L'Egypte* 2, pp. 207-208. On the evidence of the Funj charter rosters, `Ali Karrar was Shaykh of Kordofan in 1752, 1762 and 1763 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 12, pp. 80-88, Document 14, pp. 90-101 and Document 15, pp. 102-108). He was succeeded in orderly fashion by his brother (1765), his son (1770), his nephew (1791) and his nephew's son (1798-1799).
26. Cadalvène, *L'Egypte* 2, pp. 208.
27. *Makhtuta*, p. 25.
28. For example, one may observe the condition at the time of Bruce's visit to Sinnar.
29. *Makhtuta*, p. 25; and Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Documents 16, pp. 109-115 and Document 18, pp. 119-128.
30. See above, chapter 10.
31. *Makhtuta*, p. 23.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 25-26.
35. Jay Spaulding and Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmad, "The Sinnar King-List of the Sid al-Qum Ahmad," *Sudan Notes and Records* 56 (1975), pp. 234-242.
36. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 14, pp. 90-101 and Document 15, pp. 102-108.
37. For example, Badi IV's *wazir* Doka never appeared on the court rosters of charters issued during his ascendancy; the *wazir* Isma`il did appear, but in his capacity as maternal uncle of the king rather than as *wazir*.
38. *Makhtuta*, pp. 20-21.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
40. For the marriage of `Adlan b. Muhammad Abu Likaylik, see Lepsius, *Letters*, p. 177.
41. See the discussions of the reigns of Nol and Badi IV above.
42. For the survival of the *muqaddam al-sawakira* throughout the Hamaj period, see the post-coup sultanic charters of 1763, 1765, 1780, 1781, 1791, 1798-1799 and 1815 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 15, pp. 102-108, Document 16, pp. 109-115, Document 24, pp. 146-156, Document 25, pp. 157-

167, Document 28, pp. 175-179, Document 32, pp. 192-196 and Document 40, pp. 226-231).

43. NRO Intelligence 5/1/6, "Note of Turkish Invasion of Sudan," and Robinson, "Abu El Kaylik."
44. MacMichael, *History* 2, pp. 197, 200; see also Bruce, *Travels* 7, p. 94.
45. Bruce, *Travels* 7, pp. 96-97; and Marno, *Blauen Nil*, pp. 109, 224-225.
46. Compare Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 12, pp. 80-88 and Document 14, pp. 90-101. The importance of the coup year in the career of `Adlan walad Subahi may be inferred from the fact that the date of his seal was 1176/1762-1763 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 20, pp. 131-133).
47. The position of *muqaddam al-qawawid* vanished from among the high court officials of Sinnar after 1762; however, charters of 1770 and 1815 contain reference to a *shaykh* or *muqaddam* of the *qawawid* of the *malik* (sultan), albeit in a much lower ranking position.
48. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
49. *Makhtuta*, pp. 23, 25.
50. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 16, pp. 109-115, Document 18, pp. 119-128, Document 24, pp. 146-156 and Document 25, pp. 157-167.
51. Robinson, "Abu El Kaylik," p. 241. Robinson was told that Badi was killed in 1767.
52. Bruce, *Travels* 6, pp. 306-307, 375.
53. On the evidence of the charter rosters, Shaykh `Ali was replaced by al-Fadil b. Mismar b. Hasan after 1765 and before 1770; these dates would be compatible with the date of 1767 for the death of Badi proposed by Robinson.
54. *Makhtuta*, p. 26.
55. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 22, pp. 136-140.
56. *Makhtuta*, p. 26. S
57. Spaulding and Abdel Ghaffar, "King-List." The Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa confirms the year 1183/1769-1770 as the date of Nasir's end.
58. *Makhtuta*, p. 26.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.
60. See above, chapter 10.
61. *Makhtuta*, p. 25.
62. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 18, pp. 119-128, Document 23, pp. 141-145, Document 24, pp. 146-156, Document 25, pp. 157-167, Document 39, pp. 220-225, Document 40, pp. 226-231, Document 42, pp. 234-238.
63. Prudhoe, "Extracts," p. 49; see also Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, pp. 554-555.
64. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 23, pp. 141-145,
65. *Ibid.*, Document 18, pp. 119-128.
66. *Makhtuta*, p. 42.
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.
68. *Tabaqat*, p. 213.

69. Bruce, *Travels* 6, p. 371.
70. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 17, pp. 116-118.
71. Cadalvène, *L'Egypte* 2, pp. 208; and Robinson, "Abu El Kaylik," p. 243.
72. Translated by the present author from the text given in A.E.R.[obinson], "The Fung Drum or Nehas," *Sudan Notes and Records* 4 (1921), pp. 211-212.
73. *Makhtuta*, p. 25.
74. O'Fahey and Spaulding, "Hashim," pp. 323-324.
75. Bruce, *Travels* 7, p. 98.
76. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 18, pp. 119-128.
77. *Makhtuta*, pp. 27, 32; and Bruce, *Travels* 7, p. 98. Makk Sa`d returned from the west in 1199/1784-1785, by which time the situation in Kordofan had altered radically.
78. *Makhtuta*, p. 27, gives the date 1190/1775-1776, but since Badi walad Rajab was already issuing charters as regent in 1188, this date must be amended.
79. Cadalvène, *L'Egypte* 2, pp. 208-209; and Robinson, "Abu El Kaylik," p. 238.
80. W.G. Browne, *Travels in Africa, Egypt and Syria from 1792 to 1798* (London: 1806), p. 352.
81. *Makhtuta*, p. 27.

17. THE DAYS OF KING `ADLAN

1. Cadalvène, *L'Egypte* 2, pp. 207-208.
2. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 22, pp. 136-140.
3. *Makhtuta*, p. 27.
4. Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa.
5. *Makhtuta*, p. 28.
6. The formality of etiquette which obliged a *wazir* to refer to himself as the "slave of the *makk*" was also recorded by Lord Prudhoe; however, the traveler would seem to have incorrectly interpreted the figure of speech literally. He wrote of "a vizier, who . . . soon possessed himself of all power, though he continued to pay every outward mark of respect to the muk [*makk*], whose slave he really was, and always called himself" ("Extracts," p. 49).
7. All the incidents cited derive from the account of the Chronicler in *Makhtuta*, p. 28.
8. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 23, pp. 141-145.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Robinson, "Abu El Kaylik," p. 243.
11. *Makhtuta*, p. 28.
12. *Tabaqat*, p. 201. If Muhammad al-Amin was born toward the end of the life of Shaykh Khojali in about 1742, it would confirm Bruce's estimate of his age as thirty in 1772.
13. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
14. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 12, pp. 80-88, Document 14, pp.90-101, Document 15, pp. 102-108, Document 16, pp. 109-115.
15. Muhammad al-Amin was deposed after the issue of the sultanic charter of 1765 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 16, pp. 109-115) and

before the issue of the first dated charter of ʿAjib in 1768 (*Ibid.*, Document 47, pp. 262-266); since the latter document seems to imply that Nasir was still the king, Muhammad al-Amin could not have been deposed for complicity in Nasir's attempted coup which followed soon thereafter.

16. Spaulding, "Islamic Judiciary," pp. 419-420. Dr. Abu Salim (*al-Funj wa'l-arḍ*, p. 80) has read one of ʿAjib's seal dates as 1172/1758-1759, an interpretation which, if correct, would seem to require yet another deposition of Muhammad al-Amin toward the end of the reign of Badi IV. While this would account for Muhammad al-Amin's initial support for the Hamaj, the present author prefers to read this seal date as 1182/1768-1769, thus consolidating all of ʿAjib's known document dates within the period 1180/1766-1767 to 1184/1770-1771.
17. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 50, pp. 274-280. This single surviving document of Muhammad al-Amin was issued after its seal date of 1184/1770-1771. His effective control of the ʿAbdallab court at the time of its issue is demonstrated by the presence of a complete roster of courtiers, while the fact that the personnel who filled the court offices were in most cases identical to those who appeared in the dated charter of ʿAjib (*Ibid.*, Document 47, pp. 262-266) would indicate that no great period of time or revolutionary convulsion in provincial government had taken place.
18. Bruce, *Travels* 6, p. 416; for background material, see also pp. 414-423.
19. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 22, pp. 136-140.
20. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan;" Robinson ("Abu El Kaylik," p. 243) believed that Nasir was the brother of Muhammad al-Amin and identified him as the ʿAbdallab leader slain by *makk* Khojali of the Jamuʿiya. ʿAbdallab traditions, however, state that Nasir was simply deposed and retired to Sinnar.
21. *Makhtuta*, p. 29.
22. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan;" and *Makhtuta*, p. 29.
23. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document18, pp. 119-128, Document 24, pp. 146-156. Shukriya traditions say that at this time the dominant "tribe" of the region was the Rikabiyin, quite possibly the people of the *manjil* ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAwad, but concerning whom little is known. For more detailed treatment of the material discussed here see NRO Dakhlia 112/6/35, "Shukria," and S. Hillelson, "Historical Poems and Traditions of the Shukria," *Sudan Notes and Records* 3, 2 (1920), pp. 35-75.
24. The story of Shaʿ al-Din walad al-Ṭuwaym's matrilineal connections was told to justify the right to rule of ʿAwad al-Karim "Abu ʿAli," said variously to be his son, his grandson, or a distant descendant depending on whether the audiences of the eighteenth century toward which it was directed were perceived as sympathetic to matrilineal or patrilineal principles. From the time of Shaykh "Abu ʿAli," the first historical Shukriya leader, tribal shaykhs were chosen by election within a constituency determined by patrilineal descent.
25. *Makhtuta*, p. 28
26. J. Longe, "A Note on the Shukria," NRO Dakhlia 112/6/35.
27. *Makhtuta*, p. 28.
28. *Ibid.*; Hillelson, "Historical Poems," p. 45; and A.E. Robinson, "Historical Note on the Batahin & Shukria Feud," NRO Dakhlia 112/6/35. These sources identify the leader of the Musabbaʿat as "Khamis" or "Abu Rayda," but a more likely candidate

is "Sultan Ghuradim b. Khamis" (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 22, pp. 136-140) who does not seem to appear in other documents and may also have died during the eastern campaign.

29. Hillelson, "Historical Poems," pp. 44-49; Longe, "Note;" and Robinson, "Historical Note," NRO Dakhlia 112/6/35.
30. *Makhtuta*, p. 28.
31. Robinson, "Historical Note," NRO Dakhlia 112/6/35.
32. *Makhtuta*, p. 28.
33. Hillelson, "Historical Poems," pp. 49-54; Longe, "Note," and Robinson, "Historical Note," NRO Dakhlia 112/6/35.
34. *Makhtuta*, p. 28.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 29. For traditions concerning the establishment of `Ali "Abu Hunayk," his son Ahmad, and his grandson Muhammad Kamtur as a Rufa`a lineage in perennial candidacy for the governance of al-Bahr, see Nalder, "Tales," pp. 73-75. Ahmad b. `Ali appeared as Shaykh al-Bahr in 1744 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 22, pp. 136-140) and was therefore an appointee of the regent Badi, but the regent subsequently deposed him.
36. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
37. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 368.
38. *Makhtuta*, p. 29.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Tabaqat*, pp. 106-107; 323-324. The role of this faqih in the coup of 1762 has been mentioned above. Hijazi appeared in Sultan Nasir's charter of 1765 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 16, pp. 109-115) but then vanished from the court rosters for several years. The regent Badi's concessions to Shaykh Barakat of al-`Aylafun, which have been discussed above, may also have carried the significance of undermining any aspirations Hijazi may have had to the leadership of his family, the people of Shaykh Idris walad al-Arbab, and their religious community.
41. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
42. *Makhtuta*, p. 29.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
45. The references here are to the ceremony of the confirmation of names and to the rite by which a knight swore fealty tp his lord.
46. *Makhtuta*, p. 30.
47. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan;" and MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 369.
48. Werne, *African Wanderings*, p. 27.
49. *Makhtuta*, p. 30.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
51. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 24, pp. 146-156, Document 25, pp. 157-167.
52. Cadalvène, L'Egypte 2, pp. 209-210; and O'Fahey and Spaulding, "Hashim," p. 327. The date of the battle is given by the Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa.
53. For example, reference to a confirming grant by Rajab to the Awlad Najm of the Shuwayhat may be found in a *sijill* of a later period published in Husayn Sid

Ahmad, *Tatawwur*, pp. 69-70. The author is grateful to R.S. O'Fahey for calling his attention to this document.

54. *Makhtuta*, p. 31.
55. Elles, "Tegale," p. 16.
56. *Makhtuta*, p. 31.
57. *Ibid.*
58. The *makk* Idris was active in 1168/1754-1755; [Abu Salim], *Sadat al-Majadhib* 2.
59. It was said by the pious that Idris had been cursed by Faqih Ibrahim walad Barri for wrongfully seizing a man's land, so that his descendants would never rule in peace after him; *Tabaqat*, pp. 98-99.
60. Jamu`iya traditions recorded by Robinson ("Abu El Kaylik," p. 243) state explicitly that the Hamaj rejected the candidacy of the younger al-Fahl "because he was a nephew of Muhammad al-Amin."
61. Both *makk* Idris and his grandson Idris walad al-Fahl were killed by rebellious subjects of the Kawahla tribe; see Cailliaud, *Voyage* 3, p. 106. Kawahla traditions recall the events with pride but regard them as a tribal feud between themselves and the Ja`aliyyin; see "The Kawahla Tribe," NRO Dakhlia 112/9/60, "Kawahla." Ja`aliyin traditions say that Muhammad walad Nimr killed Idris (possibly with the support of the Kawahla) at a time when Idris was said to be acting as an agent for his uncle, Sa`d. If this assertion is true, it would explain why the royalists no longer supported Idris; however, it is by no means clear whether the royalists shifted their support to Walad Nimr because Idris had already reconciled himself with Sa`d, or whether Idris shifted sides after the royalists had thrown their support to his rival; see NRO Dakhlia 112/3/12, "Ga`aliyin."
62. The dynastic relationships discussed here are published without full comprehension of their significance in A.E. Robinson, "Nimr, the Last King of Shendi," *Sudan Notes and Records* 8 (1925), pp. 105-118
63. MacMichael, *History* 2, pp. 369-370.
64. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 28, pp. 175-179. The office of Shaykh of Arbaji survived the destruction of the town itself, and the subjects of this authority came to regard themselves as a tribe, the "Shanabla." For the condition of the Shanabla at the time of the Turkish conquest, see Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, pp. 694-695, who called them "bush Arabs" of the Arbaji region. Following the destruction of the city, elements of the tribe dispersed, and the NRO records concerning the tribe (112/6/38, "Shenabla") derive from a group who emigrated to Kordofan.
65. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 370.
66. *Makhtuta*, p. 31.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
68. The arrest of Ibrahim was placed in 1199 by the Chronicler (*Makhtuta*, p. 32), which he could specify with precision, he said, because it was the year of his own birth. According to the Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa, an elder contemporary, the executions took place in Muharram, 1200; the present interpretation reconciles these accounts by assuming that the arrests came late in 1199 and that at least a short interval separated them from the executions. Spaulding and Abu Salim,

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Public Documents, Document 26, pp. 168-169 seems to be a fragmentary charter issued by Ibrahim b. Muhammad Abu Likaylik.

69. *Makhtuta*, p. 32; and MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 370.
70. Nalder, "Tales." P. 77.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
72. This is a version preserved by the family of Abu Likaylik and recorded by Nalder ("Tales," p. 71). An alternative version, derived from the generally hostile `Abdallab traditions, may be found in Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
73. Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa; and *Makhtuta*, p. 35. The word *turus* means the low ridge of earth raised by farmers around plots of cultivated rainland and does not designate a presently known geographical location. The account of Nalder ("Tales," pp. 68-73) places the battle, plausibly enough, "on the plains of Sinnar" at the outskirts of the capital; however, this detailed and colorful version is gloriously confused, for it conflates into one incident events and personalities which the more sober chronicle literature distributed over sixty years.
74. *Makhtuta*, p. 35.
75. *Ibid.*; and Macmichael, *History* 2, p. 371.
76. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 371.
77. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 25, pp. 157-167.
78. *Makhtuta*, p. 34.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
80. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 371.
81. *Ibid.*; and Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa.
82. *Makhtuta*, pp. 35-36; and Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa.
83. Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa.
84. *Makhtuta*, p. 36.
85. *Ibid.*
86. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
87. *Makhtuta*, p. 36.
88. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 371.

18. THE REGENCY

1. Such was the perspective of an untitled manuscript circulated in northern Sinnar and attributed to Faqih Muhammad b. al-Faqih al-Nur Hamarabi of the people of the Awlad Jabir of Dongola (NRO Intelligence 5/1/5, "Arabic ms Genealogy).
2. Nalder, "Tales," p. 72. Nalder's informants gave Abu Rayda entirely different partners in this episode—Sultan Badi IV, long since dead, and Muhammad `Adlan, not yet born. The circumstances described apply only to the fall of Sinnar to the regent Nasir.
3. *Makhtuta*, p. 36.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Prudhoe, "Extracts." p. 54.
6. Estimates by travelers ranged from 20,000 to 100,000, and much depended upon their understanding of where the ill-defined limits of the city were; a definition which included all the villages between the Blue Nile and Jabal Moya would natu-

rally produce a larger figure than one narrowly confined to the palace complex, the mosque, and the surrounding business district.

7. *Makhtuta*, p. 36.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa.
10. *Makhtuta*, p. 37; and Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa.
11. *Makhtuta*, p. 37.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 38; and Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa.
13. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 372.
14. *Makhtuta*, p. 38.
15. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan." Additional details may be found in two useful collations of `Abdallab tradition: Muhammad Salih Muhyi al-Din, *Mashaykhat al-`Abdallab wa-atharuha fi hiyat al-Sudan al-siyasiya* (Khartoum: 1392/1972); and Ahmad `Abd al-Rahim Nasr, *Ta'rikh al-`Abdallab min khilal ruwayatihim al-sima`iya* (Khartoum: 1969).
16. Robinson, "Abu El Kaylik," p. 238.
17. NRO Miscellaneous 1/10/79, Pieces 5 and 6. Piece 5 (20 Shawwal 1171/27 June 1758), a document recording the sale of land, speaks of Hamidan and his son Kudnab (compare king "Kundabes" of medieval Makuria), Hamidan being the shaykh over the land sold. Piece 6 (27 Dhu'l-Qa`da 1171/2 August 1758) in a similar context refers to "Hamidan b. Kudnab, Shaykh of Dar al-Jamu`iya." This Hamidan is probably the ancestral tribal forefather cited in the untitled chronicle written down by or for *makk* `Ali of the Jamu`iya in 1923 and preserved in NRO Dakhlia 112/3/10, "Gamuia."
18. NRO Dakhlia 112/3/10.
19. Alexander Murray, *Account of the Life and Writings of James Bruce of Kinnaird* (Edinburgh: 1808), p. 226.
20. Robinson, "Abu El Kaylik," pp. 242-243.
21. NRO Dakhlia 112/3/10.
22. According to Cailliaud (*Voyage* 3, pp. 94-95) the province of Alays had encompassed all the White Nile peoples from the confluence to the southern frontier, including the Hassaniya, Husaynat, Muhammadiya, Majidiya, Jamaliya, Lahawin, and others. No *manjil* of Alays appeared in royal charters between 1781 and 1813; by the latter date the office had been reconstituted.
23. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan;" and Muhammad Salih, *Mashaykhat al-`Abdallab,* pp. 331-333.
24. *Makhtuta*, p. 37; and Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa.
25. *Ibid.;* and Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa.
26. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan;" and *Makhtuta*, p. 37
27. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 28, pp. 175-179 and Document 29, pp. 180-183.
28. According to Hasan b. Shawir ("Wadih al-bayan") the defecting notable was the reigning *makk*, Muhammad walad Nimr; Muhammad Salih, however, was told (*Mashaykhat al-`Abdallab*, p. 332) that the prince involved was an Arbab walad al-Fahl. If there indeed survived an heir of al-Fahl he would have been an easy recruit, for Muhammad al-Amin would have abandoned him to support the Awlad Nimr.

29. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
30. *Makhtuta*, p. 37.
31. Located on the west bank of the Blue Nile about ten miles upstream from al-`Aylafun.
32. *Makhtuta*, p. 37.
33. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 53, pp. 290-295 and Document 54, pp. 296-306.
34. Ahmad `Abd al-Rahim Nasr, *Ta'rikh*, p. 70; and Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
35. The court office of "Sultan Fur al-Musabba`at" had passed from Khamis (1744) to his sons Badr (1752-1765), Bahr (1770), and Ghuradim (1774), then to Badr's son (?) Khamis (1778), to Adam walad Khamis (1781), and finally (1815) to a "Sultan Abakir," whose descent is not known.
36. *Makhtuta*, p. 37.
37. At al-Subabi, between modern Khartoum North and Shambat.
38. Chronicle of Ahmad b. `Isa. The battle took place after 12 Rabi` I 1206/9 November 1791, when Badi b. Dakin issued Document 28 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, pp. 175-179).
39. *Makhtuta*, p. 37. Jamu`iya tradition (NRO Dakhlia 112/3/10) recalled a war with Abu Rayda, "King of the Hamaj," in the time of *makk* Nayil b. Hammad; this probably implies that the Jamu`iya under *makk* Nayil fought for the regent against the royalists during Nasir's northern campaign and before Abu Rayda's withdrawal to the south. Al-Tarfaya adjoins the modern al-Suki, on the east bank of the Blue Nile about 25 miles above Sinnar. The former presence of the Musabba`at in this region is recalled by the modern settlement of `Urayqat al-Musabba`at on the opposite bank.
40. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 51, pp. 281-286.
41. Possibly through Document 9 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, pp. 66-70).
42. *Ibid.*, Document 29, pp. 180-183.
43. *Ibid.*, Document 51, pp. 281-286 .
44. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
45. When Badi issued Document 51 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, pp. 281-286) in 1794, he described his location by the traditional but vague expression, "in the territories of Qarri." However, the fact that he seems to have been in a position to influence the affairs of al-Kadaro suggests that he was probably not far away at the time. `Abdallab traditions do not regard Badi as a legitimate *manjil* and make no reference to his existence; however, since their accounts of this period place the Awlad al-Amin at al-`Aylafun and `Abd Allah in the east, they seem to leave a vacancy at the capital which Badi may well have filled.
46. *Makhtuta*, p. 41
47. *Ibid.*, p. 38
48. English, *Narrative*, pp. 125-127.
49. Brocchi, *Giornale* V, p. 604; and Mengin, *Histoire* 2, pp. 220-221.
50. Cailliaud, *Voyage* 2, p. 259.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 242-245.
52. *Makhtuta*, pp. 38-39.

53. Jackson, *Yacubabi Tribes*, p. 2.
54. *Makhtuta*, p. 39.
55. Possibly the modern al-`Azaza located about thirty miles northwest of Sinnar.
56. *Makhtuta*, p. 38.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 40; and Richard Hill, *A Biographical Dictionary of the Sudan,* 2nd ed. (London: 1967), p. 59.
58. *Tabaqat*, p. 107.
59. Nalder, "Tales," p. 73.
60. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 373.
61. *Makhtuta*, p. 39.
62. This holy man is not recorded in the *Tabaqat* but may appear as the forty-third witness to Document 15 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, pp. 102-108) in the year 1763. He is al-Hajj `Abd [lacuna] walad Abu Zayd walad al-Shaykh Idris walad al-Arbab. This identification, if correct, would make him a close kinsman of Hijazi.
63. *Makhtuta*, p. 40.
64. *Ibid.*
65. "They [Nasir and his friends] helped each other against his brothers;" *Makhtuta*, p. 40.
66. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 373.
67. *Makhtuta*, pp. 40-41.
68. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 373.
69. *Makhtuta*, p. 39.
70. In the Gezira, approximately halfway between Sinnar and `Abud.
71. *Makhtuta*, p. 41.
72. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 31, pp. 190-191.
73. *Makhtuta*, p. 41.
74. *Ibid.*
75. *Ibid.*
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42; and MacMichael, *History* 2, pp. 374-375.
77. *Makhtuta*, p. 42.
78. The Chronicler (*Makhtuta*, p. 42) lists three of Idris's *wazirs*: the Arbab Qurashi walad Fadl Allah al-Ansari, the Arbab Zayn al-`Abdin b. Sayyid Dolib, and the Faqih al-Amin walad al-`Asha. The version of MacMichael (*History* 2, p. 375) adds the name of the Faqih `Abd al-Jalil walad `Amir and notes that this was not a complete roster of the panel of *wazirs*. None appear in the *Tabaqat*, nor in the charter rosters of Sinnar.
79. *Makhtuta*, p. 42. The "peace of the market," as exemplified by the ability of a merchant to leave his wares unattended—for example, to pray—and to find them unmolested on his return, is a common political idiom by which Sudanese merchants have evaluated the favorable or unfavorable attitude of the government toward their way of life in general; the anecdote need not be taken literally.
80. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 375.
81. The present writer has not been able to locate with certainty the modern descendants of the pre-Hamaj *manjils* of al-Bahr: Badi (1729), Sha` al-Din (1732-1734),

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al-Fatir (1743-1744), and al-Daw walad Arbab (1752). Possible candidates might include the Kawahla, whose shaykh `Abd Allah b. Sha` al-Din b. Hamid (born 1885) preserved an official chiefly drum from Funj times and among whose forebears men named al-Daw figured prominently (NRO Dakhlia 112/9/60, "Kawahla"). The Chronicler (*Makhtuta*, p. 82) described the pre-Hamaj *manjils* of al-Bahr in enigmatic terms as "the people of Launi and others."

82. Nalder, "Tales," p. 74.
83. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 22, pp. 136-140.
84. *Ibid.*, Document 28, pp. 175-179.
85. L.F. Nalder, "Tribal-Northern District," NRO Dakhlia 112/4/23, "Hamada-Rufa`a."
86. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, pp. 554-555.
87. *Makhtuta*, p. 43; and Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 32, pp. 192-196. Dr. Abu Salim (*al-Funj wa'l-ard*, p. 82) reads Ranfa's seal date as 1219 but observes in a footnote that 1212 or 1213 would be equally plausible readings. On the basis of circumstantial evidence and a photocopy most graciously provided by Dr. Abu Salim, the present writer would prefer to read 1213.
88. *Makhtuta*, p. 43; Brocchi's account (*Giornale* 5, pp. 304-305) emphasizes the desire of the regent to stop quarrels among the northern rulers and to ensure the regular payment of tribute.
89. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
90. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 375.
91. For a discussion, see al-Hajj Hamid Muhammad Khayr and Jay Spaulding, "The Deposition of a *Makk* of Berber," *Sudan Texts Bulletin* 2 (1980), p. 55, note 10.
92. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 52, pp. 287-289; and NRO Dakhlia 112/3/10, "Gamuia."
93. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 53, pp. 290-295 and Document 54, pp. 296-306.
94. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
95. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 53, pp. 290-295, Document 54, pp. 296-306, and Document 55, pp. 307-312. For a discussion see Spaulding, "Islamic Judiciary," pp. 422-423.
96. *Makhtuta*, pp. 37-38, 43.
97. Cailliaud, *Voyage* 2, p. 193.
98. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
99. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 39, pp. 220-225.
100. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 387; Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, p. 298; and Cailliaud, *Voyage* 2, pp. 307-308.
101. NRO Dakhlia 112/3/10.
102. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 58, pp. 321-325, Document 59, pp. 326-332, and Document 60, pp. 333-343. The tradition recorded by Robinson ("Nimr," p. 106), which claimed that the Jamu`iya makk Babikr killed `Abd Allah may be rejected on the grounds that he does not appear in charters of this period.
103. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 34, pp. 203-204.
104. Al-Hajj Hamid and Spaulding, "Deposition," pp. 47-58.

105. *Makhtuta*, p. 44.
106. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document63, pp. 353-356.
107. *Ibid.*, Document 64, pp. 357-361.
108. *Makhtuta*, p. 43; *makk* Sa`d died in 1215/1800-1801 but before the encounter between `Adlan and the Awlad Nimr later that year.
109. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 376
110.. *Makhtuta*, p. 44; and Robinson, "Nimr," p. 107.
111. *Makhtuta*, p. 44; and Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 65, pp. 362-364.
112. Cailliaud, *Voyage* 3, pp. 104-105.
113. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 57, pp. 318-320.
114. The Wadi al-Hawad debouches into the Nile at Kabushiya, and its course runs east and then south. If the battle were fought due east of Shandi, it would have been about thirty miles distant from the town.
115. Robinson, "Nimr," p. 108; H.C. Jackson, "The Batahin Tribe," NRO Dakhlia 112/3/17, "Batahin," and NRO Dakhlia 112/3/12, "Ga`aliyin."
116. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents,* Document 66, pp. 365-368 and Document 67, pp. 369-372
117. *Makhtuta*, pp. 47-48.

19. THE SUNDERING OF THE TRIBES

1. O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, pp. 28-29.
2. *Makhtuta*, p. 39.
3. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 28, pp. 175-179.
4. Mrs. Speedy, *My Wanderings in the Soudan* (London: 1884) 2, p. 174.
5. The major sources consulted for the following discussion are: Hillelson, "Historical Poems;" H.C. Jackson, "The Batahin Tribe," NRO Dakhlia 112/3/17, "Batahin;" "Resume of the Feuds between the Battahin and Shukriya Tribes;" A Tribal Record of the Shukria Tribe in the Butana;" J. Longe, "A Note on the Shukria;" and A.E. Robinson, "Historical Note on the Batahin and Shukria Feuds," all in NRO Dakhlia 112/6/35, "Shukria." A number of absolute dates appear in these tales, but most are far too early for the events they purport to describe; for example, if al-Hajj `Ali had actually become chief of the Batahin in 1397 (Jackson, "The Batahin Tribe"), he would have been almost 400 years old at the time of his death. The relative chronology given by each set of traditions inspires greater confidence; the present author has compressed the series of events described by the traditions into a chronological framework based upon dates which may be corroborated from the documents and chronicle literature. Thus, if the feud between the Batahin and the Shukriya began in the time of the regent Nasir ("Resume"), it began after 1788.
6. *Makhtuta*, p. 42.
7. Longe, "Note."
8. Robinson, "Historical Note."
9. Longe, "Note."
10. *Ibid.*
11. "Resume."

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12. Robinson, "Historical Note."
13. *Makhtuta*, p. 45.
14. Robinson, "Historical Note."
15. *Makhtuta*, p. 48.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
17. Hillelson, "Historical Poems," p. 57. The present author has changed Hillelson's translation slightly to make it more easily accessible to the general reader.
18. NRO Dakhlia 112/9/60, "Kawahla;" and NRO Civil Secretary 57/33/122, "Blue Nile Handbook."
19. NRO Intelligence 5/1/6, "Note on Turkish Invasion of the Sudan;" and NRO Civil Secretary 57/33/124, "Correspondence re the Blue Nile Handbook." Robinson ("Abu El Kaylik," p. 250) proposed the date 1803 for this event.
20. NRO Dakhlia 112/5/32, "Khawalda."
21. "The Halowin: A Note on their history by Abdallah Abu Hassan Zarroug and others," NRO Dakhlia 112/5/31, "Halowin."
22. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 26, pp. 168-169.
23. NRO Dakhlia 112/5/28, "Arakiin."
24. See also Bruce, *Travels* 7, p. 88.
25. NRO Dakhlia 112/4/23, "Hamada-Rufa`a."
26. Cailliaud, *Voyage* 2, pp. 220-221.
27. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 47, pp. 262-266 and Document 49, pp. 271-273.
28. *Ibid.*, Document 53, pp. 290-295 and Document 54, pp. 296-306.
29. NRO Dakhlia 112/4/23, "Hamada-Rufa`a."
30. This holy man may be the "Muhammad al-`Araki" who served as one of Muhammad al-Nur's informants; see *Tabaqat*, p. 158.
31. There survives, in English translation, a later confirmation of this grant by the restored Sultan Badi VI; see "The Arakiin by `Abd Allah Effendi El Shafie, 8 August 1928," NRO Dakhlia 112/5/28, "Arakiin."
32. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents,* Document 32, pp. 192-196 and Document 39, pp. 220-225.
33. NRO Civil Secretary 57/34/128, "Reports of Province Handbooks—Fung Province." See also Peter P. Garretson, "Manjil Hamdan Abu Shok (1898-1938) and the administration of Gubba," in Joseph Tubiana, ed., *Modern Ethiopia* (Rotterdam: 1980), pp. 197-210.
34. "Resume;" and Robinson, "Historical Note."
35. Robinson, "Historical Note;" Jackson, "The Batahin Tribe;" and NRO Civil Secretary 57/33/124, "Correspondence re the Blue Nile Handbook."
36. NRO Dakhlia 112/9/60, "Kawahla."
37. "The Shenabla Tribe by Izzel Din Effenfi Mukhtar," NRO Dakhlia 112/6/8, "Shenabla."
38. Longe, "Note."
39. MacMichael, *Tribes*, p. 92.
40. O'Fahey, *State and Society*, p. 11; for the chronology of the Keira sultans, see p. 16.

41. For the Kordofan Musabba`at, see O'Fahey and Spaulding, "Hashim," pp. 316-333.
42. O'Fahey, "Kordofan," pp. 32-42.
43. For an interpretation of evidence concerning this heritage, see `Ali `Osman, "The Economy and Trade of Medieval Nubia."
44. For a useful survey of the evidence, see Herman Bell, "An Extinct Nubian Language from Kordofan," *Sudan Notes and Records* 54 (1973), pp. 73-80.
45. Ernst Marno, *Reise in der Egyptischen Aequatorial-Provinz und in Kordofan in den Jahren 1874-1876* (Wien: 1878), p. 225. Marno's informants at Jabals Umm Daraga, Abu Hadid and Doalib, spoke "Nuba," by which they probably meant "Nubian."
46. Durham 404/4, "Extracts."
47. H.A. MacMichael, "Objects found at Faragab in Middens," *Tribes*, pp. 242-244.
48. From a manuscript of 4 Ramadan 1330/17 August 1912 beginning with the words, "This is the Book of Derr" (NRO Miscellaneous 1/15/182), p. 398.
49. Marno, *Aequatorial-Provinz*, p. 235. Lejean (*Deux Nils*, p. 41) described the situation as of 1860: "At Omzerzour, I entered the metallurgical district of which the large village of Tendar is the center; this district contains numerous forges in the infancy of the art."
50. Cailliaud, *Voyage* 2, pp. 10-11.
51. O'Fahey, *State and Society*, pp. 42-45, 131-135.
52. For specific examples, see Terence Walz, "Trading into the Sudan in the Sixteenth Century," *Annales Islamologiques* 15 (1979), p. 213 and note 4.
53. MacMichael, *Tribes*, p. 183.
54. Bruce, *Travels* 6, p. 515.
55. MacMichael, *Tribes*, pp. 172-198, 201-211.
56. Talal Asad, "A Note on the History of the Kababish Tribe," *Sudan Notes and Records* 47 (1966), pp. 47-68.
57. Longe, "Note;" NRO Dakhlia 112/9/60, "Kawahla;" NRO Dakhlia 112/6/38, "Shenabla;" and MacMichael, *Tribes*, pp. 92, 177, 200, 206.
58. O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, pp. 38, 66-68, 74-77.
59. Bruce, *Travels* 6, p. 418.
60. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 50, pp. 274-280.
61. For the identification of the `Adlanab as the heirs of Hammad al-Simayh, see NRO Dakhlia 112/3/13, "Shaigia."
62. O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, pp. 100-104.
63. Hasan b. Shawir, "Wadih al-bayan."
64. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 53, pp. 290-295.
65. O'Fahey and Spaulding, "Hashim," p. 326.
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 328-329.
67. Cadalvène, *L'Egypte* 2, p. 210.
68. O'Fahey and Spaulding, "Hashim," pp. 329-331.
69. NRO Dakhlia 112/3/10, "Gamuia."
70. O'Fahey and Spaulding, "Hashim," p. 331.
71. NRO Dakhlia 112/3/10, "Gamuia."
72. *Ibid.*; and *Makhtuta*, pp. 39-40.

73. NRO Dakhlia 112/3/10, "Gamuia."
74. MacMichael, *Tribes*, p. 63, note 3.
75. MacMichael, *Tribes*, p. 63, note 3 (a victory for Hashim); and NRO Dakhlia 112/3/10, "Gamuia" (a victory for Babikr).
76. *Makhtuta*, pp. 27, 32.
77. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 28, pp. 175-179 and Document 32, pp. 192-196.
78. Nachtigal, *Sahara and Sudan* 4, pp. 294-295.
79. *Makhtuta*, pp. 39-40.
80. For a discussion see Jay Spaulding, "Dar Fur on the Nile: a Charter of the *Maqdum* Musallim," *Sudan Texts Bulletin* 4 (1982), pp. 14-19.
81. M. Brun-Rollet, *Le Nil Blanc et le Soudan* (Paris: 1855), pp. 44-45. For confirming traditions from Taqali, see Ewald, "Leadership and Social Change" 1, p. 52.
82. O'Fahey and Spaulding, "Hashim," pp. 332-333.
83. *Makhtuta*, p. 45.
84. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 34, pp. 203-204.
85. Spaulding, "Dar Fur on the Nile."
86. For Musallim's grant to a group of Kanana southeast of modern al-`Abbasiya, see SK 5.1/5.
87. See the contributions of J.F.P. Maclaren to NRO Blue Nile Province 1/28/206, "White Nile Handbook;" of E.M.H. to "Magdia and Kurtan Tribes," NRO Dakhlia 112/4/22, "Magadia & Kurtan;" and Lyall, "Rights, dues and customs," pp. 200-201.
88. For example, see NRO Dakhlia 112/3/14, "Gima`a," and 112/3/16, "Dar Muharrib."
89. Alays was reconstituted after 1799 and before 1813; circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that this step was taken under the strong leadership of Idris rather than during the chaotic civil wars to follow. The Jamu`iya leadership during the next two decades was divided against itself, and former subjects rebelled; the revolt of the Khawalda at the southeastern quarter of the enlarged Jamu`iya *dar* was notable for the exceptionally scurrilous invective it engendered (NRO Dakhlia 122/5/32, "Khawalda").
90. This inference is based upon the fact that the governors of the restored province of Alays after 1800 appear in none of the traditional lists of tribal leaders in the area; therefore, they were probably outsiders imposed by the central government.
91. NRO Dakhlia 112/4/22, "Magadia & Kurtan;" NRO Blue Nile Province 1/28/206, "White Nile Handbook;" and NRO Dakhlia 112/3/16, "Dar Muharib." Werne (*Weissen Nil*, p. 79) mentioned Alays as "a principal settlement of the Hassaniya."
92. R.S. O'Fahey and J.L. Spaulding, "A Sultanic Present," *Sudan Texts Bulletin* 3 (1981), pp. 38-43.
93. O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, pp. 100-104.
94. Cailliaud, *Voyage* 2, pp. 38, 67-68, 182.
95. *Ibid.*, pp. 186, 195.
96. Shawish seems to have exacted these lands from the Turkish invaders as one of the conditions by which he agreed to surrender; Werne (*Weissden Nil*, p. 51) mentioned the district of al-Thamaniyat, on the east bank between the modern Geili

and Khojalab, as an estate of the Shaiqiya in his day. The estate was confiscated by the governor Ahmad Pasha.

97. O'Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms*, pp. 100-104.
98. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 257.
99. O'Fahey and Spaulding, "Hashim," pp. 323, 332-333.
100. MacMichael (*History* 2, pp. 337 and 416) was told that the *makk* `Isawi defeated by `Adlan "was a Jamu`i, the eponymous ancestor of the `Isawiya section, and nephew of Babikr Sulayman." While it is more probable that `Isawi should be viewed primarily as a kinsman of Hashim, one may also accept the tradition that he enjoyed ties to the royal house of the Jamu`iya, more specifically to the branch of the late *makk* Babikr.
101. *Makhtuta*, p. 61.
102. NRO Dakhlia 112/4/21, "Bedayriyeh;" and Marno, *Aequatorial-Provinz*, pp. 221-222, 225, 240.
103. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 257.
104. *Makhtuta*, p. 71.
105. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 383.
106. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 257.
107. Hoskins, *Travels*, p. 182.

20. THE DAYS OF LORD TAYFARA

1. Bruce, *Travels* 6, p. 344.
2. Krump, *Palm-Baum*, p. 301.
3. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 206.
4. Bruce, *Travels* 6, p. 372.
5. These observations are based upon material dictated by Dgalo Dgondan Aré to Karl Tutscheck and published by the latter's brother Lorenz as "Ethnologische Skizzen aus Tumale in Central-afrika," *Das Ausland* (1847), pp. 1049-1050, 1054-1055, 1057-1059, 1062-1063, 1065-1067, 1070-1071, 1093-1094, 1098-1099, 1102-1103, 1105-1107, 1110-1111; (1848), pp. 313-315, 318-319, 321-323, 326-327, 330-331, 334-335; and (1853), pp. 13-17, 27-34.
6. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, p. 545.
7. Bruce, *Travels* 6, pp. 351-353.
8. Werne, *Wanderings*, pp. 44-46.
9. *Makhtuta*, p. 45.
10. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 376.
11. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 35, pp. 205-211.
12. *Makhtuta*, p. 41.
13. Unless otherwise noted, the account of the civil war to follow is derived from the account of the *Makhtuta*, pp. 48-64.
14. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 35, pp. 205-211.
15. *Makhtuta*, p. 48.
16. Robinson, "Abu El Kaylik," p. 252.
17. *Makhtuta*, p. 50.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

19. Identified by al-Shatir Busayli (*Makhtuta*, p. 48, note 4) as the modern "Kubur," about five miles west of al-Masallamiya. The present writer prefers the alternative site of "El Kabur," about three miles west of the modern Wad al-Haddad Station and considerably closer to Sinnar.
20. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 377.
21. *Makhtuta*, p. 48.
22. Al-Shatir Busayli (*Makhtuta*, p. 53) was told that the battle site lay near Wad Madani, but the logic of Wad Nasir's advance would rather suggest a location between al-Tayyiba and Sinnar. Traditions of the Kamatir (Nalder, "Tales," p. 77) placed it, more plausibly, in the "plains of Sinnar," near the capital.
23. *Makhtuta*, p. 53.
24. Nalder, "Tales," p. 77.
25. Some versions of the Funj Chronicle (*Makhtuta*, p. 55ff; MacMichael, *History* 2, pp. 378ff) read "Kassala," but this is wildly improbable. The present study follows the versions cited by Jackson (*Tooth of Fire*, p. 73) and Robinson ("Abu El Kaylik," pp. 252-253).
26. Both sites are on the west bank of the Blue Nile about halfway between the modern al-`Aylafun and al-Masid.
27. Ranfa was still alive on 20 Sha`ban 1220/13 November 1805, when he issued a land charter to the Faqih Idris wad Muhammad wad Makki al-`Abbasi. See [Durham], J.C. Matthew, "Report on Land Customs and Tenure in Singa District . . . 23 March 1909," p. 23. By the end of 1220 (on 20 March 1806), Ranfa was dead (*Makhtuta*, pp. 55-56). Cailliaud (*Voyage* 2, p. 257) was told that Ranfa was killed by Wad Rajab.
28. Adjacent to Wad Nasir's putative former headquarters of al-Kabur and similarly located a few miles west of the modern Wad al-Haddad Station.
29. Unidentified, but said by the Chronicler to lie near Kassab.
30. Possibly the modern `Azazat Nasir, about five miles above Karkoj.
31. *Makhtuta*, p. 60.
32. Such, for example, was the attitude of the Chronicler; see the *Makhtuta*, p. 61.
33. If Tayfara's rule lasted for eight months beginning in Ramadan 1222 (MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 380), it must have ended in about August 1807.
34. *Makhtuta*, p. 61.
35. MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 380.
36. *Makhtuta*, p. 62.
37. See above, note 28.
38. *Makhtuta*, p. 61.
39. MacMichael, *History* 2, pp. 381-382.
40. Jumada II 1223/25 July – 23 August 1808.
41. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 35, pp. 205-211, Document 38, pp. 214-225, Document 36, p. 212 Brocchi (*Giornale* 5, p. 545) mentioned Wad Faraj Allah and Wad Kab as officers.
42. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 35, pp. 205-211, Document 38, pp. 214-225. Significantly, Tayfara's title was never recognized by the regent Husayn.

21. THE MAN ON HORSEBACK

1. *Makhtuta*, p. 49.
2. Lapanouse, *Mémoires,* p. 89.
3. *Makhtuta*, p. 78. For a different assessment, at least in regard to one woman, see MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 384.
4. Brocchi, *Giornale* 5, p. 433; for the title of *manjil al-kabir*, see pp. 546-547.
5. For a peccadillo of Badi in this regard, see the account to follow.
6. In the traditions preserved by the family of Kamtur, for example, Muhammad `Adlan figures as a consummate monster; see Nalder, "Tales," pp. 68-80.
7. *Makhtuta*, p. 68.
8. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 35, pp. 205-211.
9. *Makhtuta*, pp. 69-70; and MacMichael, *History* 2, p, 382.
10. One set of traditions (MacMichael, *History* 2, p. 382) asserts that as early as 1225/1810-1811 Muhammad `Adlan occupied al-Halfaya without resistance and chased Shaykh Nasir to Shandi: however, this story is not corroborated by the account of the *Makhtuta* concerning that year, and it seems difficult to reconcile with the tactical position of Muhammad `Adlan at that time. Finally, Nasir was still officially recognized as Shaykh of Qarri as late as 1813 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 39, pp. 220-225).
11. After 12 Muharram 1228/15 January 1813 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 39, pp. 220-225) and before 13 Dhu'l-Qa`da 1230/17 October 1815 (*Ibid.*, Document 40, pp. 226-231).
12. The encounter took place opposite Siru, near Karkoj.
13. *Makhtuta*, p. 72.
14. After 13 Dhu'l-Qa`da 1230/17 October 1815 (Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 40, pp. 226-231) and before 1820. The traditions are preserved by MacMichael (*History* 2, p. 383).
15. Spaulding and Abu Salim, *Public Documents*, Document 42, pp. 234-238.
16. The death of Kamtur took place after 27 Rabi` II/12 February and before the end of 1235, on 8 October 1820.
17. *Makhtuta*, p. 76.
18. About halfway between Sinnar and Sinja, five miles south of the Blue Nile at Marafa.
19. Nalder, "Tales," pp. 75-80.
20. Sulayman survived his captor by many years and played a prominent role in the early years of the colonial administration,. For an appreciation, see Werne *Wanderings,* p. 80.
21. *Makhtuta*, p. 79.
22. *Ibid.*, b. 79
23. Cailliaud, *Voyage* 2, pp. 233-235.
24. *Makhtuta*, p. 79.
25. Cailliaud, *Voyage* 2, pp. 233-235.

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This book analyzes the decline and fall of the Funj kingdom of Sinnar, the last in a long sequence of ancient, medieval and early modern kingdoms centered in the Nile valley Sudan. Over the course of the century from 1750 to 1850 the old social order disintegrated, and the new partisans who came to dominate affairs could neither restore peace nor prevent the annexation of the kingdom to Egypt in 1821.

Part One, "The King of the Nubian Muslims," offers a static tableau of state and society in Sinnar at the dawn of her troubled "Heroic Age" in about 1750. One encounters the king, his court, the hereditary nobility who governed the widespread districts and provinces, and the central bureaucracy, staffed by slaves and Islamic holy men. Consideration is given to the subjects, the systems of taxation and exchange, and to the ideology that explained and justified the social order of the old kingdom.

Part Two, "The Principles of the Arabs," introduces the forces, institutions and ideology that precipitated social change. A new middle class gradually took root in eighteenth-century northern Sudanese society, basing itself first in privileged sanctuary enclaves of Islamic holy men, but soon expanding into towns linked by merchant diasporas. The upstart elements adopted Arab identity as a symbol of their rejection of older society. A new and unhealthy relationship developed between the southern districts—now seen as a source of enslaveable pagans—and the rest of the land. A dynasty of hereditary warlords called the "Hamaj" came to dominate the last Funj kings, but despite the personal virtues of many Hamaj leaders, they were unable to create a viable new central government.

Part Three, "To the Fire," offers a detailed history of events for the Hamaj period; it is arranged according to the dominant personalities of each generation. One meets Muhammad Abu Likaylik, the founder of the Hamaj regency, then King `Adlan IV who plotted to restore power to the Funj royal house. After a comparatively peaceful interval under two of Abu Likaylik's sons, the regents Idris and `Adlan, a prolonged civil war broke out among the numerous younger Hamaj heirs, in the midst of which a gifted slave officer named Tayfara reimposed enough order to install `Adlan's son Muhammad as the last *de facto* strongman of Sinnar. Meanwhile, as the authority of the central government collapsed, each subject community of the realm staked its claim to independence by redefining itself as an immigrant Arab tribe. The Heroic Age in Sinnar was over, and the modern Arab Sudan was born.

Jay Spaulding studies the older history of Northeast Africa. He has written widely concerning the kingdoms of Sinnar, Dar Fur and Wadai during Islamic times, and more briefly on medieval Nubia and the period of Turco-Egyptian rule in the Sudan. He lived in the Sudan for extended periods during the 1960s and 1970s, and has visited other parts of Northeast Africa briefly. He is Professor of History at Kean University in New Jersey, USA.

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